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Abstract
Nations, because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures can
have dramatically different beliefs about the nature of effective military doctrine, strategy,
and capabilities. This dissertation argues that when such doctrines-or "theories of
victory"-differ across states, misperceptions and false optimism are likely to occur. In
turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making communication
and common assessments of the balance of power more difficult. When states are en-
gaged in strategic coercion--either deterrence or compellence--these problems can lead
to escalation and war. To develop this unique explanation for the pernicious problem of
false optimism, this dissertation draws on scholarship on the sources of doctrine, strategic
culture, misperception, strategic coercion, and deterrence theory. It assesses the argu-
ment through case studies of attempts at strategic coercion in early Cold War Sino-
American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait. The dissertation also tests the pro-
posed theory against the conventional approach of deterrence theory that focuses on the
"objective" quality of the signaling. The cases rely on process tracing using both pri-
mary and secondary sources from each side, and they support the dissertation's proposed
theory in broad terms as well as in their details. The two attempts of deterrence sur-
rounding the Korean War failed. There, the signaling between the two great powers de-
pended heavily on each side's own doctrinal theory of victory. These different doctrinal
lenses further impeded the conduct of diplomacy between the two by blurring the inter-
pretation of those signals as well as the overall assessment of the balance of power. In
the third case (deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait), the two sides had much more
similar theories of victory, and misperception and conflict were avoided. By providing
a unique analytic perspective on military capability, this dissertation suggests
policymakers need to carefully consider the perceptual framework regarding military
doctrine of those they are trying to influence.
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A Note on Romanization
Following its common usage in the People's Republic of China, and increasingly
internationally, the pinyin system of Romanization is used in referring to Chinese names,
places, and other words. A very few phrases that are commonly transcribed in other
Romanization systems are left in the more familiar format: thus, Chiang Kai-shek is not
changed to pinyin (Jiang Jieshi), nor is the Kuomintang changed (to Guomindang).
However, another large category of exceptions comes from quoted material and
bibliographic references. For these cases, this dissertation makes use of the
Romanization style chosen by the book or article in question. A few of the most
common occurrences of names are listed here to reduce any confusion.
Mao Zedong = Mao Tse-tung
Zhou Enlai = Chou En-Lai
Lin Biao = Lin Piao
Nie Rongzhen = Nieh Jung-chen
Peng Dehuai = P'eng Te-huai
Ye Jianying = Yeh Chien-ying
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
As to war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison will not
show you the inferiority of Athens ... For our naval skill is of more use
to us for service on land, than their military skillfor service at sea.
Familiarity with the sea they will notfind an easy acquisition. If you
who have been practicing at it ever since the Persian invasion have not yet
brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything considerable
being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population, who will
besides be prevented from practicing by the constant presence of strong
squadrons of observation from Athens?
-Pericles, exhorting his fellow Athenians to war
After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the
spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and
war and pestilence at once pressed heavy on them. They began tofind
fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all their
misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Sparta...
-Thucydides, describing the Athenians' mood two years later'
This dissertation explains an understudied source of misperception and false
optimism in international relations. Nations have different doctrines and hold different
beliefs about the nature of effective military doctrines, strategies, and capabilities. That
is, they have different beliefs about how to win wars, different "theories of victory."
This dissertation suggests that when these differences are large, diplomacy and signaling
will be more difficult and this will lead to coercive failure and escalation or conflict. In
addition to documenting this causal chain, this dissertation explains how to avoid it by
I Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide
to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press,
1996), 81-2 and 123.
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tailoring signals to the perceptual framework of one's adversary with regard to military
doctrine and effectiveness, to their theory of victory.
At its core, the logic of the argument is based on the difficulty of accurately
measuring power. Assessing an adversary's relative power is a critical task for nations.
At a broad level, it helps to determine the level of threat faced by one's nation, and thus
the costs and benefits of various courses of action in the foreign sphere. Understand the
cost-benefit calculations an adversary is making is also important since such calculations
play a role is shaping the adversary's behavior. Additionally, in specific crises,
understanding an adversary's intent requires interpretation of his signals. Since these
signals often rely on threats to use force, the actual deployment of military assets, or the
limited use of force, understanding these signals also requires understanding the degree
of power that they represent from the adversary's perspective. When
miscommunication occurs, attempts at strategic coercion-be they compellent and
deterrent in nature-are more likely to fail. In all these ways, then, different theories of
victory serve as lenses impeding the conduct of diplomacy between potential adversaries,
shaping the signaling and blurring the interpretation of those signals as well as the overall
assessment of the balance of power. Alternatively, to use a different analogy, doctrines
and theories of victory provide the language of diplomacy in cases of strategic coercion.
When the two sides speak different languages, important signals are likely to get lost in
translation.
This chapter outlines several aspects of this argument, laying the groundwork for
the rest of the dissertation. It begins with a discussion of the topic at a broad level,
highlighting the questions and puzzles that this dissertation addresses and the answers it
18
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proposes. Then it outlines the remainder of the dissertation, summarizing the theory and
the evidence that supports it. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief discussion of
some of the literature that this dissertation builds on and expands from: deterrence and
compellence, credibility, the measurement of power, strategic culture, and the dangers of
false optimism.
Question and Topic
Is war rational? If states want to minimize costs while maximizing benefits, why
would they ever resort to war? Why would adversaries be unable to strike an agreement
in accordance with their relative power and avoid costly military conflict? Perhaps war
is best thought of as a bargaining failure; if so, how central is the role of information
asymmetries in such bargaining failures? How important are misperception,
miscalculation, and miscommunication in the outbreak of conflict? These questions lie
at the center of important debates in political science.2 Attempts at strategic coercion,
responses to such attempts by others, decisions to cross the use of force threshold, to
escalate in a limited conflict, these all depend on a state expecting some positive return
from its action.3 That assessment, in general, depends on some evaluation of the
relevant military balance, perhaps conducted formally through a military net assessment
2 For a good summary of the issues involved here, see the debate between Fearon and Kirshner. James
D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995); Jonathan
D. Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?," Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000). See also Geoffrey
Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); Robert Powell, In the Shadow of
Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1999), see especially Chapter 3: "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power" and Chapter 4: "Bargaining in
the Shadow of Shifting Power"; Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3 At least, positive relative to the expected alternate outcome.
19
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or campaign analysis process or through methods that are more informal. However, as
this dissertation will make clear, different actors will often analyze the same military
situation differently. Further, the conduct of international diplomacy depends on the
ability to send signals, and nations often use military force-explicitly or implicitly-to
do this. However, again, evaluating an adversary's military signals can be more
difficult in some cases than in others. Thus, this dissertation examines misperceptions
and false optimism that stem from different theories of victory that can lead to coercive
failure and costly uses of force.
Assessing an adversary's relative power is a critical task for nations for two main
reasons. First, such assessments help to determine the level of threat facing a nation.
Assessment of their adversaries' relative power also shapes nations' expectations about
the outcomes of possible wars and, thus, the desirability, or lack thereof, of specific wars.
Further, assessments of adversary's intent often include some assessment of their cost-
benefit analysis about the future. Second, under the best of circumstances,
communication between potential adversaries is difficult. When sending signals,
nations need to understand how others measure power and send signals appropriate to
their adversaries' perspectives. However, in circumstances where the two sides face off
with different perceptions about the nature of military capability (a relatively common
occurrence, as will be discussed), this can be very challenging. In international relations,
this sort of miscommunication can lead to false optimism and, in turn, war.4
4 On the importance of false optimism as a cause of war, see Blainey, The Causes of War; John G.
Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 8th ed. (New York: Wadsworth, 2001); Stephen Van Evera,
Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the
prevalence of misperception in international affairs, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception
in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
20
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Thus, the central argument advanced in this dissertation is: when nations have
different doctrines and hold different beliefs about the nature of effective military
strategies and capabilities, diplomacy and signaling will be more difficult, potentially
leading to escalation or conflict. There are two stages to this causal statement; each is
expressed as a hypothesis in the following chapter. The first portion links the different
beliefs to misperception; the second extends that to miscommunication and crisis
outcomes (escalation or conflict). In the first part of this causal chain, this dissertation
hypothesizes that different theories of victory should be likely to lead to an
underestimation of one's adversary (rather than other misperceptions) due to
organizational, perceptual, and cultural dynamics that lead to an exaggerated degree of
confidence in the strategies and doctrines that one uses oneself. The second part of the
causal chain explains how this sort of false optimism can lead to mistaken views about
the overall balance of power and about the degree of intent and capability in an
adversary's signals within a crisis.
Sino-American relations provide an excellent window into the phenomena of
misperception, miscommunication, and false optimism caused by differences in theories
of victory. Consider the period of the 1950s. Beijing ignored American threats,
implicit or explicit, of nuclear attack and strategic air attacks. Mao's widely reported
public views of nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" were mirrored by private comments of
similar substance. Similarly, Chinese threats of intervention based on a strategy of
"People's War" did not create any trepidation in Washington (at MacArthur's command
in Tokyo the reaction was closer to derision). Both sides viewed the other's key
military doctrine with disdain. Not only did this lead to difficulties in assessing the
21
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overall balance of power between the two, but it also made sending coercive signals
between them very difficult. As two of the empirical chapters will show, this
contributed to outbreak and escalation of the Korean War in significant ways. However,
in another theater with a different strategic context-the Taiwan Strait-the nations'
theories of victory were more similar. Consequently, in the third case examining
deterrence in that strategic geography, there were no misperceptions nor
miscommunications, and most importantly, no war.
In short, this dissertation argues that when nations hold different beliefs about the
nature of effective military strategies and capabilities, diplomacy and signaling will be
more difficult leading to escalation or conflict. The process of cajoling, convincing, or
bribing an adversary to do one's bidding often requires sending nuanced signals
regarding one's own intent and capabilities. When these signals are sent via threats to
use, or the actual use of, military forces that the other side does not fully comprehend,
diplomacy is impeded.
Organization of the Dissertation
This chapter has introduced the question posed and the answer proposed. It has
pointed to the importance of identifying the sources of misperception that might lead to
diplomatic failures in cases of strategic coercion. It has suggested different theories of
victory as a possible cause. After summarizing the rest of the dissertation, this chapter
will conclude by identifying a number of literatures relevant to these hypothesized
answers.
22
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The next chapter continues to develop this causal chain more rigorously. It
begins by defining the universe of inquiry of the study (attempts at strategic coercion
including both deterrence and compellence) and the concept used as the independent
variable (theories of victory). It proceeds to ground that concept in its doctrinal and
strategic context. Then, it makes use of the existing political science literatures in a
number of areas to identify specific hypotheses that will flesh out the proposed causal
chain based on two separate hypotheses. These hypotheses move from the sources of
beliefs of theories of victory to those theories themselves, then to the difference in
perceptions that they can cause, and finally to the negative international outcomes that
can arise from those. These hypotheses draw on psychological and organizational
dynamics that have been used before (in different ways) in the field of political science.
Along the way, a number of brief examples are detailed. Chapter 2 also draws out
specific empirical predictions that come from the theoretical hypotheses that can be used
to evaluate them. Finally, the chapter explains the methodologies used in the
dissertation (qualitative cases studies, process tracing, alternate theories, etc.) and
explains the criteria used for case selection.
The rest of the dissertation focuses on three specific attempts at strategic coercion.
The first two are failed attempts at deterrence that resulted in the American decision to
cross the 38 th parallel and the Chinese decision to support North Korea's invasion in the
first place. The one successful attempt of strategic coercion by the Americans deterred
China, and led it to postpone its invasion of Taiwan. Chapter 3 begins the discussion of
this empirical material. Since Sino-American thinking about the two Korean War cases
both depended on the same two theories of victory held by Washington and Beijing, these
23
Twomey, The Military Lens
are discussed in a single chapter. This chapter argues that the two sides' theories of
victory were very different. At the time, American doctrine focused on using airpower
and nuclear weapons to win general wars and considered mobile, integrated formations of
armor, infantry, and artillery to be dominant on land. On the other hand, China
expressed disdain toward atomic weapons and strategic bombing and relied instead on a
"People's War" doctrine to defeat what it considered its main threat: invasion of China
proper. Beijing emphasized infantry, quantity over quality, and guerrilla tactics. The
two sides understood the language of military affairs quite differently, or, put another
way, viewed the world through very different military lenses.
Chapter 4 makes use of this characterization of the independent variable and asks,
"Did it have the hypothesized relationship with the dependent variable?" The case finds
that it did. Specifically, when the United States crossed the 38th parallel, it did so after
ignoring and explaining away a series of Chinese signals. Many of the signals that
Beijing sent were clearly based on its own views regarding military effectiveness. The
United States, with dramatically different views, did not view those signals as particularly
threatening nor, therefore, credible. This case presents strong evidence that both the
sending and interpretation of signals were impeded by the two sides' theories of victory.
The Chinese threats to the United States simply got lost in translation and deterrence
failed.
Chapter 5 looks at a different, earlier decision, with the positions of the two sides
reversed. It asks, what role did the two sides' views on military affairs have on the
statecraft leading up to China's decision to approve the North Korean invasion of the
South in June of 1950? The chapter shows that American signals were heavily infused
24
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with its own doctrine. While other factors were certainly important in explaining the
outcome of this case, the limited data on the Chinese interpretation of the American
signals does support the contention that Beijing underestimated American intent and
capability in ways consistent with China's theory of victory. Particularly notable is
China's surprise once the battle was joined when the PLA's substantial losses in battle
forced a reappraisal of its strategy on its leaders. Beijing's theory of victory had led it to
expect otherwise.
The final empirical chapter moves away from the Korean peninsula and the
theories of victory discussed in the third chapter. Chapter 6 examines the U.S.
deployment of the 7 th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and the Chinese decision to
postpone their planned invasion of the island indefinitely. Since the primarily military
theater here is naval, with successful amphibious operations being the critical goal, it is
important to understand how the two sides viewed warfare in this environment. This
chapter argues that, in the wake of Chinese learning at the end of its civil war, the two
sides had a broadly similar view of amphibious warfare. This shared understanding of
military effectiveness meant that even though the signal that the United States sent in this
case was militarily weak (very little of the 7 th Fleet deployed in the short term), the
Chinese understood American intent and capabilities quite clearly and adjusted their
behavior accordingly.
Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes these results. The cases provide
initial support for the hypotheses and suggest that additional work on them is merited.
The chapter also suggests important ways that policymakers can use the insights from
this dissertation to reduce the prospects for misperceptions across nations and better
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advance national interests without recourse to avoidable war. Finally, it discusses the
contributions that this dissertation makes to the field.
Situating the Project in the Existing Literature
This project fits within the existing literature in several ways. First, it builds on
the existing understandings of when deterrence works and when it fail. Second, its
independent variable is grounded in the concept of strategic culture. Third, the key
causal mechanism that it relies on (in part) is an important, recognized danger in
international relations: false optimism. Fourth, it has some (limited) implications for
spiral and security dilemma research. In short, the dissertation integrates insights from
several literatures and speaks to a number of important debates in the field. Each of
these areas is discussed in turn.
What We Know about Achieving Deterrence Success
Clearly, this proposed theory does not have a monopoly on possible explanations
for the failure of deterrence and compellence.5 Before moving on, these alternative (or,
perhaps, supplemental) explanations should also be discussed.
There is a large literature attempting to explain the success or failure of deterrence
policies.6 There are three key elements to the study and conduct of strategic coercion in
international relations: credibility, capability, and communication (often referred to as the
5 The next chapter will discuss the term "strategic coercion," a blanket term that includes both of these
and defines the universe of applicability of the proposed theory. In general, see Lawrence Freedman,
Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
6 For good reviews, see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979);
Jack S. Levy, "Review Article: When Do Deterrent Threats Work?," British Journal of Political
Science 18 (1989).
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three Cs).7 Political science has long emphasized the importance of and difficulties in
assessing an adversary's credibility.8 Less studied but equally important for the conduct
of international diplomacy is assessing an adversary's capabilities.9 Least studied is the
way credibility and capability are communicated. The work on each of these is
discussed in turn here.
Credibility and Intent
It is clear that motivations by both actors play a central role in the likelihood of
success in strategic coercion through their effects on credibility and willingness to fight.'0
The perceived intent of both sides plays a role. The credibility of the country making
7 The term is often credited to Kissinger. See Alastair lain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking':
The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security 20, no. 3 (1995/96).
8 On the literatures on credibility and reputation, for some recent work, see Christopher Gelpi, The
Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2003); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Threats During
Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming, 2005). For the classics, see Thomas C.
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C.
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Albert Wohlstetter,
"The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs 37 (1959). Between them is a substantial set of
productive research. For an excellent summary of that, see Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats
Work?."
9 For the best works on the topic, however, see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis & Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); William Curti
Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics 39, no. 3
(1987); William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Related also are the debates between Fearon and Kirshner:
Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."; Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?." On the
importance of measuring capability in general, see Blainey, The Causes of War, Chapter 3; Van Evera,
Causes of War, Chapter 2. For thorough, rigorous, and detailed attempts to assess power balances at
a given time, see Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without
Lanchester Theory (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985); Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and
the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security 12, no. 4 (1988); Barry R. Posen,
"Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment,"
International Security 9, no. 3 (1984/85); Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War
and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
10 For the classic statement on this see, Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chapter 2: The Art of
Commitment. On the different between motivation and intent (or willingness to fight), see Charles L.
Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and
Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (1992).
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the deterrent or compellent threat will be enhanced if it is believed to care a lot about the
issue and if it is expected to follow through with its threat if the opponent does not
comply." On the other side, highly motivated aggressors are harder to deter (or coerce)
than are status quo powers. '2
It is because of the importance of motivations that compellence is thought to be
much harder than deterrence." In cases of compellence, one side is being asked to
surrender something it already has. Since people tend to care more about things they
have than things they do not yet possess,' 4 they are more likely to defend them forcefully.
Qualitative work also tends to emphasize the importance of credibility. George
and Smoke stress their finding that the challenger's perception of the credibility of the
commitment is critical." George and Simons highlight eight key factors that lead to
success of deterrent policies: clarity of objective, strong motivation, asymmetry of
motivation, sense of urgency, strong leadership, domestic support, international support,
fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity of terms. 16 Many of these are directly related
to the clarity of the signal.
I 11 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 79ff.
12 On the role of aggressors in complicating deterrence, see James W. Davis, Jr., "The Forgotten
Variable: The Role of Promises in Deterrence" (Columbia University, 1995); James W. Davis, Jr.,
Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2000); Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997);
Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 58; Jonathan Mercer, "Reputation and Rational Deterrence
Theory," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997); Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What
Security Dilemma?," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996).
13 See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69-91.
14 See the discussion of prospect theory at footnote 9 in the following chapter
15 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974), Chapter 17.
16 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994), 279-91. Note that strictly speaking, George and Simons are looking at certain
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Capability
Relative capability plays a role in international politics in many ways.'7 States
choose policies toward other states based, in part, on the relative balance between them.'8
Measuring that balance accurately is critical, as Morgenthau notes:
As for the assessment of the power of other nations, either to overrate or to underrate it
may be equally fatal to the cause of peace. By overrating the power of B, A may prefer
to yield to B's demands until, finally, A is forced to fight for its very existence under the
most unfavorable conditions. But underrating the power of B, A may become
overconfident in its assumed superiority. A may advance demands and impose
conditions upon B which the latter is supposedly too weak to resist. Not suspecting B's
actual power of resistance, A may be faced with the alternative of either retreating and
conceding defeat or of advancing and risking war.' 9
Further, states often use military forces to signal their interests and capabilities.
There is a significant amount of work making use of large-N methods to assess whether
deterrence works (or not) in general, and it has identified capability-particularly locally
deployed capability-as a primary factor of importance.2 That is, many scholars have
attempts at coercive diplomacy rather than deterrence per se. However, it is clear from George and
Simons' work (see pp. 13-15 esp.) that their assumptions are compatible with the study of the practice
of deterrence. Clearly, compellence is a very demanding form of coercion and may require even
more of the signaling party than does deterrence itself.
17 This statement is one of few that realists, liberals, Marxists, and constructivists would all agree with, at
least in part. For recent realist treatments that explicitly focus on power, see Dale C. Copeland, The
Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). For exemplary liberal
treatments, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for
Europe: Social Purpose and State Powerfrom Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1998). Constructivists generally accept the role of power, but suggest that-beyond a limited
degree of 'rump materialism'-the more important questions center on what precisely constitutes
power in different cases and periods (e.g., economic wealth, the military capability to defend, the
military capability to punish, soft power, religious leadership, etc.). See Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 96ff.
18 Of course, other factors matter as well. For a discussion of both the role of power in shaping the
choice between balancing and bandwagoning, and a discussion of other factors that play a causal role,
see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
19 Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, Sixth ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1985), 564.
20 On the one hand, Huth and Russett argue that it works, and on the other, Lebow and Stein argue that it
does not. See Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and
Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989); Paul K. Huth, "Reputations and
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concluded that greater capability enhances deterrence. Similar conclusions apply to
instances of compellence or other influence strategies.2 ' Generally, this capability is
measured as the overall relative power between the two countries, although some variants
of the quantitative models consider only the local power that could brought to bear (that
is, forces in the area, relevant to carrying out a threat).
However, measuring power is recognized to be very difficult.' Policymakers
have no simple index to which they can turn.z3 General opacity in the international
system certainly plays some role here,24 as do incentives to misrepresent.25 The
ambiguity and capriciousness of feedback, the lack of conclusive tests, and the dynamic
Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," Security Studies 7, no. I (1997); Paul K. Huth
and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?: Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36
(1984); Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,"
World Politics 42 (1990); Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence between Enduring
Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993);
Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," in Perspectives on
Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
21 Issues of relatively capability permeate Schelling, Arms and Influence. Also see George and Smoke,
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
22 John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System, Dubious battles ed.
(Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1992); Prados, The Soviet Estimate; Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance.
This is also implicitly supported in Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?," 147-150. For a
timeless indictment of intelligence failures generally, see Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and
Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978). Noting the
even more challenging problem of linking any assessment of the military balance to predictions about
coercive success is Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy
Confidence," World Politics 37, no. 2 (1985).
23 For an alternate view, see the COW dataset. Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer,
"Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,"
Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 (1996). For the ongoing work on this, see
"http://cow2.polisci.psu.edu/datasets.htm".
24 Blainey, The Causes of War.
25 Van Evera, Causes of War, 47, 83, 137. See also Les Aspin, "Games the Pentagon Plays: Views
from the House (2)," Foreign Policy, no. I (1973); Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera,
"Overarming and Underwhelming," Foreign Policy, no. 40 (1980).
30
Chapter 1: Introduction
nature of the balance itself all deepen these problems.2 6 Further, shifts in the power
balance make assessments of relative power even more difficult, and Wohlforth
emphasizes the dangers that such situations have historically posed: "IThe] four crisis
phases in the Cold War ... werel shaped by a change in the power relationship
differently interpreted by the two sides."2 7 Andrew Marshall, the long-time head of the
Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, noted these problems
trenchantly decades ago:
The fact that estimating procedures Ifor the military balancel are so vague and
impressionistic at one level, and so mechanical at another level, is not altogether
surprising. As discussed above, the conceptual problems in constructing an adequate or
useful measure of military power have not yet been faced. Defining an adequate
measure looks hard, and making estimates in real situations looks even harder.'
Adding the effects of strategy into the mix makes analysis even more complex, leading
military establishments to rely on oversimplified "dominant indicators."2 9 Thus, the
assessment of military capability should not be viewed simply as a data collection
exercise, but rather as a complex process of interpretation that can be shaped by many
factors. This is the approach taken by this study.30
Communication
Communication is the least studied of the "three Cs," as Jervis noted in 1970,
Military and economic resources, the main instrumentalities of power, have been widely
studied. Less has been written about the role of diplomatic skill, and the authors of this
26 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, 296-300.
27 Ibid., 301.
28 Andrew M. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power, P-3417 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
August 1966), 9.
29 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1997).
30 Compounding these well-studied impediments, this dissertation argues, actors also bring to their
assessments of power their own biases and predilections based on their own theories of victory, history,
and military heterogeneity in doctrine and force structure
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literature have rarely focused on the full range of techniques by which a state can
influence the inferences others are making about it and have not explored in any detail
the ways desired images, which may be accurate or inaccurate, not only supplement the
more usual forms of power, but are indispensable for reaching certain goals.3'
Studying communication per se can be complicated by the frequent use of tacit signaling
by states to communicate over matters of great importance.3 2 "Tacit bargaining takes
place whenever a state attempts to influence the policy choices of another state through
behavior, rather than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges."33 Neither
George and Simons nor Schelling (the two classics in the field of coercive diplomacy)
focus on impediments to communication. Rather, they both generate a set of
prescriptions at the abstract level for deterrence and compellence to succeed that focus on
credibility, capability, and some assurances that the threats are contingent. Beyond
commendable admonitions for "clarity" in the threat, the difficulties associated with
communication are not examined in depth.34 Yet the issues involved are complex.
Jervis notes the links between perception and difficulties in communication:
The signaling actor may try to compensate for the fact that ambiguous signals sent in an
environment of noise are especially susceptible to distortion. This would be relatively
easy if all actors had the same perceptual predispositions. Introspection would then
permit the actor to understand the influences present when the signals were received and
allow him to correct for them. But these predispositions vary and are determined by
complex factors, some of which are beyond the knowledge of even the most careful and
intelligent observer.3
31 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1970), 3.
32 See discussion in George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms
Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Jervis, The Logic of Images, 18-26;
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. A large body of game theoretic work on tacit signaling grew out
from Axelrod's pioneering work. Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, NY:
Basic Books, 1984); Robert M. Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of
Competition and Collaboration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
33 Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, 3.
34 See George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict;
Schelling, Arms and Influence.
35 Jervis, The Logic of Images, 134.
32
Chapter : Introduction
The impediments to communication caused by this sort of perceptual difference are
precisely the focus of this dissertation.
Thus, deterrence and compellence can be thwarted many ways. One side may
lack the capability to adequately threaten the other side. The threat might be
communicated unclearly. Each side's assessment of the other's motivations might lead
them to doubt its credibility. The theory proposed in this dissertation by no means
contradicts any of these. It merely suggests that, in addition, differences in theories of
military doctrine across the two sides will make it more difficult for them to interpret
signals and assess the overall balance. Differing perceptions about the nature of
military capability across states can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by
making communication-the third and least studied element of strategic coercion listed
above-more difficult. The substance of the communication in question can be related
to either capability or credibility. If one does not know how one's adversary
understands military power, then one also does not know how he will interpret any
military signals one sends. This can lead to mistakes in communicating one's credibility.
In international politics, miscommunication can lead to war, so this topic merits further
research.
Culture, Strategic Culture, and Communication
The depth of the ability of culture to shape people's understanding of the world
can be substantial. Some psychologists and linguists argue different ways that
languages-one component of culture-treat numbers can shape basic cognitive
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processes like counting.3 6 The argument that culture shapes perceptions and political
outcomes has a long and well-respected lineage in political science. The contributions
of political culture to the field have been particularly large.37 Much of this early work
aimed to explain differences in political development, and the differences in Asian
nations were often emphasized.3 8
Beyond political culture, several other facets of culture can play a role in shaping
perception about international security issues: strategic culture, civil-military culture, and
organizational culture.39 The first of these is of particular interest for this project,
although the others contribute as well. A number of scholars have productively
examined the role of culture in the study of national security affairs.' In this vein,
36 See Daniel L. Everett, "On the Absence of Number and Numerals in Piraha, Paper in Progress, 2004,"
Department of Linguistics, The University of Manchester; Peter Gordon, "Numerical Cognition
without Words: Evidence from Amazonia," Science (2004); "Linguistics: Language Barrier," The
Economist, August 19 2004.
37 For a review of recent work on the role of political culture, see Richard W. Wilson, "The Many Voices
of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches," World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000). For some
earlier classics, see Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes
and Democracy in Five Nations, an Analytic Study (Boston: Little Brown, 1965); Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968);
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One
Countries, Democracies ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney
Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press,
1965); Myron Weiner, Samuel P. Huntington, and Gabriel Abraham Almond, Understanding Political
Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little Brown, 1987). The original formulation of the term
comes from Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18 (1956).
38 Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic
Conflict in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); Weiner, Huntington, and Almond,
Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study.
39 Scobell suggests this list (and also includes political culture): Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military
Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 4-8.
40 R. A. D. Applegate and J. R. Moore, "The Nature of Military Culture," Defense Analysis 6, no. 3
(1990); Arthur Hoffmann and Kerry Longhurst, "German Strategic Culture in Action," Contemporary
Security Policy 20, no. 2 (2000); Alastair lain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture,"
International Security 19, no. 4 (1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security:
Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J.
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several scholars have found this concept to be useful in the study of Chinese security
policy.4 ' Constructivist scholarship has been a source of analytic rigor in the renewed
attention to the role of culture in foreign policy.42
This dissertation continues in the footsteps of these earlier works. It attempts to
make use of the self-conscious attention to positivist rigor that characterizes more recent
scholarship on strategic culture.4 3 However, it focuses on a narrower form of strategic
culture than many other works. Johnston centers his definition of the term on beliefs
regarding "the role of and efficacy of military forces in interstate political affairs.""" As
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National
Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University East Asia Program, 1993); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military
Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jeffrey S. Lantis,
"Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002); Jeffrey
Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War Ii (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995); Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited
Nuclear Operations, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977); Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1984). For a useful review of some of this literature from a constructivist perspective, see
Theo Farrell, "Culture and Military Power," Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998).
41 See, for instance, Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in
Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Scobell, China's Use of Military
Force; Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations,
1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
42 Generally in international relations, see Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy; Judith Goldstein and Robert
O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993); Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations
Theory," International Security 23, no. 1 (1998); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International
Politics : Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2002); Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics; John
Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New
York: Routledge, 1998); Wendt, Social Theory of international Politics.
43 For the most forceful advancing of that issue, see Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture." For
a response that emphasizes the difficulties of such analytic rigor in the context of mutually constitutive
beliefs and behavior, see Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory
Strikes Back," Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (1999).
44 This definition is paraphrased from Clifford Geertz, see Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture,"
46. This is essentially the definition Johnston uses in his own empirical study of the role of strategic
culture: Johnston, Cultural Realism.
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will be clear below, the term "theory of victory" is used here to describe beliefs at a
different level, one closer to doctrine and the operational art of military strategies and
tactics. The usage in this dissertation more closely accords with that referred to by
Scobell as the "organizational culture" of different national militaries.45
Another difference between the approach taken here and that in most recent work
on strategic cultures is one of perspective: Much of the existing work focuses on
explaining the sources of strategic culture or their persistence in the face of changing
geopolitical circumstances. In both cases, strategic culture primarily serves as a
dependent variable. Instead, this project uses strategic culture as an independent
variable that might explain miscommunication and conflict. Thus, the conceptual work
on strategic culture is useful as a building block here.
The argument made in this dissertation has many parallels with existing
scholarship on role of culture in the social sciences. Authors who work in this area have
often stressed the difficulties in communicating across different cultures in general.
Indeed, there is a sizable industry of business consultants offering help in "cross-cultural
communication." Linguists and anthropologists are familiar with such difficulties.
Similarly, the role of culture and norms in shaping perceptions is well documented in the
constructivist literature.46 At a somewhat different level of analysis, Mark Haas argues
that different national governmental ideologies can also impede communication and
45 Scobell, China's Use of Military Force, 7-8.
46 See Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 186-88, in particular;
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, espec. Chapter 5: The Self-Defense Forces and
External Security; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case
of NATO," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J.
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 359-71; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is
What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no.
2 (1992).
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complicate threat assessments.4 7 This dissertation applies those insights to a different
substantive area.
Finally, constructivist approaches help to explain the causal mechanism advanced
here. Geertz defines culture as "webs of significance" created by individuals in social
settings (taken from Weber).48 To adapt the term to the focus of this study, when
national leaders face off across different military doctrinal cultures, they will be using
different "webs of significance" to evaluate power and signals. A particular signal that
is significant in one strategic culture may not be understood as significant in a different
strategic culture. This is a recipe for endemic miscommunications and
misunderstandings.
Thus, this dissertation draws on work on strategic culture and constructivism in
explaining international security outcomes.
False Optimism
Overestimation of an adversary or underestimation of him can cause problems in
international politics. Many scholars have studied the various sources and dangers of
overestimation of one's opponent, as discussed below. 9 This dissertation focuses on a
47 Mark Haas, "Ideology, Threat Perception, and Great Power Politics through Two Centuries" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2001).
48 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973),
5.
49 This is a central tenet of the spiral theory and of the security dilemma. See the discussion in the
following section. In terms of the sources of overestimation in general, several arguments are
possible. For instance, Lowi argues that there is a domestic political incentive for overselling in the
United States. See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,
Second ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979). Huntington argues that military
leaders assess threats conservatively, that is, to maximize protection of their own forces. Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 66. A more instrumental view is
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separate problem-a perceptual problem caused by different theories of victory-and this
problem generally leads to underestimation of an adversary and its own set of negative
consequences. That is not to suggest, however, that either underestimation or
overestimation of an adversary is in some abstract sense a larger problem in international
politics. Both misperceptions have dangers. Both are common.5
That said, the dangers of false optimism in general are well-understood to be
substantial :51
This historical record suggests that false optimism is a potent and pervasive cause of war.
False expectations of victory widely coincide with the outbreak of war. This suggests
that false optimism is a strong and common cause of war.5
There is similar agreement on the problems that can arise in deterrent situations when an
aggressor sees its adversary as being relatively weak.53 The implications of false
optimism for the entire deterrence success literature discussed above are clear: false
optimism will make states less likely to be successful in deterrence and compellence.
Thus it certainly merits attention.
presented in Jane Kellett-Cramer, "National Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National
Security" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002).
50 On the frequency of overestimation of threats in the cold war, and reasons behind it, see Kellett-
Cramer, "National Security Panics"; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold
War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a contrary view, see Robert Jervis, "Was
the Cold War a Security Dilemma?," Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (2001). For a recent
discussion of the prevalence of this problem in current American foreign policy, see Fareed Zakaria,
"Exaggerating the Threats," Newsweek, June 16 2003. On the problem of perception in general, see
Jervis, Perception and Misperception.
51 Blainey, The Causes of War, Chapter 3: Dreams and Delusions of a Coming War; Stoessinger, Why
Nations Go to War; Van Evera, Causes of War, Chapter 2: False Optimism: Illusions of the Coming
War. See also Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System.
52 Van Evera, Causes of War, 34.
53 This is the primarily conclusion of the large-N work on deterrence theory. See for instance, Huth and
Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?." For a good review of this literature, see Levy, "When Do
Deterrent Threats Work?." For other views on this issue, see Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence
Theory and Comparative Case Studies."; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory."; Huth and
Russett, "Deterrence between Enduring Rivals."; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein,
"Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics (1989).
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Escalation, Spirals, and Security Dilemmas
Other important sources of escalation in international security theory are security
dilemmas and spirals.s 4 At its heart, escalation that stems from these sources comes
from false pessimism. For the most part, this project focuses on the dangers of the
failures of deterrence and compellence; however, the first implication of this project's
theory is opacity, it is worth discussing the dangers of misperceptions that lead to the
opposite problem. 55
The spiral model suggests that wars are caused by states over-responding to
misperceived threats and creating security dilemmas:
54 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978). A great
many works use this approach theoretically or to survey a range of cases. See Alexander L. George
and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991).
For an application of these concepts to WWI, see Laurence Davis Lafore, The Long Fuse; an
Interpretation of the Origins of World War I, 2d ed. (Philadelphia, Penn.: Lippincott, 1971); Barbara
Wertheim Tuchman, The Guns ofAugust, Anniversary ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1988); Stephen
Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Military Strategy
and the Origins of the First World War, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van
Evera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
55 On treating spirals and deterrence failure as opposing models, there is a long-standing literature
treating spirals and deterrence failure as opposing models of avertable conflict. Among the earliest
are Evan Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar
and Postwar Periods," World Politics 19, no. 2 (1967); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration:
Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), see in particular
Chapter 9. The citations that have shaped the modern debate are Glaser, "Political Consequences of
Military Strategy."; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, Chapter 3.. See also his Glaser, "The
Security Dilemma Revisited." A recent, rigorous empirical examination of the two theories
applicability can be found in Davis, Threats and Promises, 20. Other notable cites are Richard H.
Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, the Deterrence Model, and
Miscalculations in U.S.-Third World Relations" (Princeton University, 1987); Martin Patchen,
Resolving Disputes between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation? (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1988); Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision
Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1977); Paul C. Stern and others, "Deterrence in the Nuclear Age: The Search for Evidence," in
Perspectives on Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Philip
E. Tetlock, "Policymakers' Images of International Conflict," Journal of Social Issues 39, no. 1 (1983).
For a discussions on the differences between nuclear and conventional weapons and their bearing on
these two theories, see Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," Daedalus
120, no. 1 (1991). See also, his Barry R. Posen, "Competing Images of the Soviet Union," World
Politics 39, no. 4 (1987).
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When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little-too
much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being
menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security.5 6
Given the assumption (or empirical fact) of anarchy,57 states must assume the worst and
maintain security forces to protect themselves. In situations other than perfect defense
dominance,' these forces will threaten others who will respond with their own build up,
thus forcing the first nation to respond in kind. This concept is very closely related to
the security dilemma-"an increase in one state's security decreases the security of
others."5 9 The security dilemma is at the heart of the spiral model; and the prisoner's
dilemma is the game theoretic representation of it. 60 As Jervis notes in this model
"symmetrical beliefs produce incompatible policies"6 ' and will combine with inherent
cognitive failings and misperceptions and that these will together lead to war.6 2 Self-
fulfilling prophesies are likely as each nation views the other's reactive buildups as a sign
56 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 64.
57 As for which of these it is, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International
Security 20, no. 3 (1996); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the
International State," American Political Science Review (1994); Alexander Wendt, "Constructing
International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995).
58 This term is used here in the terms of the offense-defense literature. For the classic statement of the
impact of this variable see Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For an application of
this to WWI, see Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive." For an extensive study using this variable
to explain large variations in the frequency of war across time, see Van Evera, Causes of War.
59 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 186. See also Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited."
The concept of the security dilemma has a long history in political science. See, for instance, John
Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950); Jervis,
"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma."
60 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 67. For early discussions of the prisoner's dilemma, and
applications of it to political science, see Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213ff; Snyder and Diesing,
Conflict among Nations, 37ff.
61 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 65.
62 Ibid., 75.
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of its inherent aggressive intent. Jervis has described a number of different explanations
for this addressing the role of cognitive failings and shortcoming in worsening spirals
(e.g., "the world is ganging up on me", "I didn't mean it that way", etc.).3
A simple policy prescription arises from this model: it is "often not to the state's
advantage to seek a wide margin of superiority over its adversary." The historically
grounded literatures on crisis diplomacy and crisis management making this point are
quite extensive.64 For instance, Lebow and Stein argue that the faith of scholars and
policymakers alike in deterrence as the key to winning particular Cold War crises--and
indeed the entire Cold War-is soundly misplaced.65 Instead careful attention to
accommodative steps accounts for the avoidance of war in these periods.
The spiral literature included a number of related themes. There is a large
literature on arms races that is formal in nature. The pioneering work in this area is
referred to as a Richardsonian model. 66 These models have been applied to stocks of
particular weapons (most often nuclear missiles) and military budgets, as well as factors
such as fatigue in each country. Beginning with Huntington, there is also a substantial
literature on the historical association of arms races with wars.67 Crisis stability in
63 Ibid., Chapters 4-10.
64 E.g., George and Bar-Siman-Tov, Avoiding War.
65 Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War.
66 Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert Brito, "Richardsonian Arms Race Models," in Handbook of War
Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 221.
67 To name a few: Paul Diehi and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message?: Military Buildups and the
Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics 49, no. 3 (1987); Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races:
Prerequisites and Results," Policy Studies? (1958); James D. Morrow, "A Twist of Truth: A
Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 33, no. 3 (1989); Michael Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 1 (1979); Michael Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two
Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1982).
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nuclear situations can be productively analyzed from this perspective.6 8 In a seminal
book, Robert Axelrod examined used game theory to examine the prisoner's dilemma-a
game theoretic construct that captures the central elements of the spiral model. In this
study, he found that the optimal solution for competing in a iterated prisoner's dilemma is
a strategy of "tit for tat."69 Refinements on this early work have taken the form of
adding uncertainty and noise into the simulation, making the real world application of
such models more robust.70
While much of this work is instructive, it speaks primarily to the dangers of
overestimation of an enemy and to the dangers of false pessimism (and ways to resolve
it). Both theoretically and empirically, this project has found that an underestimation of
the enemy has been the more likely consequence of differences in military doctrine.
However, as will be discussed below, opacity is also an important consequence. In
some circumstances, such opacity may tend toward an overestimation of the enemy and
an undue pessimism. In these cases, the large literature on spirals and security
dilemmas warns us of profound dangers as well.
68 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation.
69 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. For an alternate approach to creating cooperation that does not
require iteration, see Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49, no. 3
(1997): 379. For a critical view of the game theoretic application here, see George W. Downs, David
M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Cooperation under Anarchy,
ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1986). For arguments questioning
the model's external validity see Matthew Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament:
Negotiations in the 1 950s," World Politics 42, no. 4 (1990). Broader critiques are raised in Curtis S.
Signorino, "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict," American
Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999).
70 See Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation, 38.
42
I _
Chapter 1: Introduction
Parallel Arguments
A number of scholars working in some of the above areas have come to parallel
conclusions to that of the dissertation's overall argument. However, none make it their
focus theoretically, nor subject it to thorough empirical evaluation. Nevertheless, this
scholarship does provide an important starting point for the work presented here.
A few simply raise similar points in passing, and thus do not evaluate it
empirically in detail. For instance, Betts provides a tantalizing critique of rationality in
international security, noting the tension of "Culture versus Coercion":
Coercive strategies aimed at an adversary's will depend on communication. Cultural
blinders prevent the common frames of reference necessary to ensure that the receiver
hears the message that the signaler intends to send.7'
At a more general level, Jervis writes:
Perception is laden with interpretation and theory. Almost no inferences-perhaps none
at all-are self-evident in the sense that all people under all circumstances looking at the
information would draw the same conclusion. Thus knowing how theorists read a signal
does not tell us how the perceiver does.72
What Jervis calls for to overcome this problem for the understanding of signaling and
deterrence is the following:
Scholars can then look at the image an actor is trying to project, the behaviors that it
adopts to do so, and then, shifting attention to the perceiver, examine what influences the
perceiver and what inferences it draws. At the next stage we can see what the perceiver
thinks it must do in order to send the desired message in response, what it does to reach
this goal, and how the actor in turn judges both the other's behavior and determines how
the other perceived its behavior. I suspect it is rare for actors, especially adversaries, to
understand the situation the same way, to be able to discern how the other sees them and
their behavior, or even to know what signals are taken to be most important.73
71 Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 28-29.
72 Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," in Political
Psychology, ed. Kristen R. Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2002), 298.
73 Ibid., 310.
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This dissertation implements that research strategy.7 4
There are a few pieces of research that focus on similar lines of reasoning to this
dissertation in slightly different empirical contexts. There is other excellent scholarship
emphasizing the role of ideational factors in coercive bargaining situations that focuses
on the role "dispute settlements as normative referents."7 5 Scott Sigmund Gartner
emphasizes the power of organization lenses in various national security bureaucracies in
shaping perceptions of success and failure in war.76
Lastly, in a few cases, scholars pursuing different theoretical goals have found
empirical support for phenomena that are very similar to that studied in this dissertation.
Mearsheimer emphasizes the role of one specific doctrine-blitzkrieg-in causing
optimism and deterrence failure in his Conventional Deterrence.7 7 Cohen argues that
different concepts of operation and strategies led American analysts to underestimate the
dangers posed by the Soviet Red Army.78 Arquilla notes that continental powers
engaging in land-sea wars often misperceive significant aspects of the conflict.79 Finally,
Shimshoni points out that states relying on qualitative advantages and surprise have a
particularly difficult time deterring their adversaries. Such states cannot enhance the
credibility of their threats by pointing out their own military advantages, because doing
74 Jervis goes on to note the empirical difficulties in doing this, however, and the relatively few empirical
examples of work that have pursued this time-consuming research strategy.
75 Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy, 38.
76 Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War.
77 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
78 Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward a Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,"
International Security 13, no. 1 (I 1988). See also the vigorous rebuttal by two scholars so accused in
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, and Eliot A. Cohen, "Reassessing Net Assessment,"
International Security 13, no. 4 (1989).
79 Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System.
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so will erode the prospects for surprise. This point closely parallels the argument made
here.'
This dissertation builds on many of these theorists to draw out their core, shared
issues, place them in a common, general framework, and evaluate their plausibility
through detailed empirical testing.
Summary
Thus, this project draws on theoretic work on strategic culture, the sources of
military doctrine, the causes and dangers of misperception, and the measurement of
power. Empirically, it incorporates approaches used productively in an existing body of
work on crisis diplomacy.81 It contributes to the understanding of the role of
information asymmetries in leading to war as a bargaining failure,8 but it does so by
outlining a source of asymmetry that has not been studied (and one that requires unique
policies to correct). If this argument is correct, it has important implications for
international theorists in the areas of rationalist views of war, the roles of military
doctrine in shaping international outcomes, the importance of sub-state variables in
shaping international systemic outcomes, the understanding of the sources of deterrence
80 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988). See Chapter 2, note 103, below, on the differences between this
dissertation (particularly the proposed H,) and Shimshoni's theory.
81 This is a wide-ranging literature. Most notable is: George and Smoke, Deterrence in American
Foreign Policy.
82 Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."; David A. Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and
International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Powell, In the Shadow of
Power.
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failure, and the importance of crisis diplomacy and statecraft.' (A few other literatures
that are relevant to this project are discussed in the next chapter in detail.' 4)
The dissertation's argument also has important policy prescriptions for national
leaders.8s Scholars have long known of the dangers stemming from "the inability of
foreign-policymakers to view events from the perspective of their adversaries."86 This
dissertation closely examines one important facet of miscommunication that comes from
specific perceptual differences, and suggests that the existing concern with an adversary's
views of his national interests is incomplete.7 In addition, national leaders must focus
on their adversary's theory of victory, recognizing that will shape its assessment of the
balance of power and its interpretation of signaling in the conduct of statecraft. While
some steps can be taken to tailor signals to an adversary's theory of victory, in general,
this dissertation emphases the inherent difficulties of deterrence and compellence.
83 Each of these is discussed in turn in Chapter 7: Conclusion and Implications.
84 First, the universe of cases explained by the theory is bounded by the concept of strategic coercion and
limited war. Second, many other scholars have studied this dissertation's independent
variable-theories of victory-as a dependent variable. Systemic and geographic imperatives,
technologic advancement, past historic practice, and organization structures and practices are all
argued to play a role in shaping nation's perceptions regarding optimal doctrines. Finally, the causal
logics of the two hypotheses that the dissertation focuses on depend on organizational and
psychological logics that are well established in political science. Again, each of these is discussed in
detail in the next chapter.
85 Again, the final chapter discusses these.
86 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of
Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 66ff. See also Keith B. Payne, The
Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, Kent.: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2001). In the Chinese context, a similar point is made in Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo
Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1980), 4-5. McNamara makes a similar point in explaining the U.S. misperceptions
regarding Vietnamese motivations. Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The
Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, I st ed. (New York: Times Books, 1995), 322.
87 See for instance, Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics among Nations, 587.
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Chapter 2. THEORY AND
METHOD
The core of this chapter is a detailed statement of the causal argument advanced in
the dissertation. When nations have different doctrines and hold different beliefs about
the nature of effective military strategies and capabilities, diplomacy and signaling will
be more difficult, potentially leading to escalation or conflict. There are two stages to
this causal statement, each expressed as a hypothesis below: the first portion links the
different beliefs to misperception; the second extends that to miscommunication and
crisis outcomes (escalation or conflict). The logic of each will be sketched out in turn,
and then predictions are derived to allow for testing in the dissertation's empirical work.
The chapter also includes an explanation of the methodology of inquiry pursued in the
remainder of the dissertation. First, however, the terms used in the theory used must be
defined explicitly.
Definitions
This section defines two terms important to the project. The dissertation uses
strategic coercion to describe the universe of cases studied here and differences in
doctrine or theories of victory serve as the main component of the independent variable.
Each term, and its links to existing literatures, is discussed in turn.
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The Project's Universe: Attempts at Strategic Coercion
This project focuses on one important way that attempts at strategic coercion can
fail. This is a large universe of cases since, "the use of intimidation of one kind or
another in order to get others to comply with one's wishes is an everyday occurrence in
human affairs."' Therefore, it is important to be precise about what constitutes strategic
coercion. This section discusses definitional points regarding both the goals served by
such a policy and the tools and means used to advance those goals.
The Goals of Strategic Coercion
Lawrence Freedman has introduced the term "strategic coercion" which he
defines as "the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's
strategic choices."2 He adopts the term in his study as a way to subsume deterrence and
compellence/coercive diplomacy, which share many similar elements, under the same
umbrella concept.3 Both can be thought of as part of a "threat based bargaining
process."4 As he notes each of these term's historical origins have somewhat artificially
enhanced the difference between them.
[Though] deterrence and coercive diplomacy ... are two sides of the same coercive coin,
the difference between them came to be exaggerated through the research that they
stimulated. The study of deterrence was largely concerned with the United States'
1 Alexander L. George, "Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," in The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 2.
Indeed the limitation of "human affairs" may be too narrow. For discussion of similar phenomenon
in other advanced primate societies, see Christopher Boehm, "Egalitarian Behavior and the Evolution
of Political Intelligence," in Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, ed. Andrew
Whiten and Richard W. Byrne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 342.
2 Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence
Freedman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15.
3 Ibid.
4 Lawrence Freedman, "Introduction," in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence
Freedman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.
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essentially symmetrical relationship with the Soviet Union, while coercive diplomacy
was bound up with its asymmetrical relationship with smaller powers.5
Different scholars use these various terms in slightly different ways, as discussed below.
In terms of the goal of the threats under strategic coercion, there is widely
understood to be a distinction between stopping someone from doing something in the
future (deterrence) and inducing them to do something that they would not have
otherwise done (compellence).6 Schelling separates the two, emphasizing that
compellence is more difficult than deterrence.7 Others also follow this distinction.8
The central difference between deterrence and compellence centers on what
psychologists refer to as the "perceptual reference point." This highlights the question
of whether the issue at stake is perceived to be something that one does not already have
or something that one already possesses. Prospect theory speaks to precisely this issue
and finds it to be a useful distinction.9
5 Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 32.
6 Somewhat more ambiguous is categorizing an attempt to stop someone from something they are
currently engaged in doing. Focusing on the future aspect of this behavior suggests that it is
deterrence; emphasizing that it has already been started leads to a categorization as compellence.
This raises precisely the point of perceptual reference points, discussed in the following paragraph. It
also emphasizes the difficulty in drawing clear, bright lines between the concepts, a difficulty resolved
by considering them jointly.
7 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 69-
91.
8 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for
Theory and Practice (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 1 Iff. Robert J. Art, "The Four
Functions of Force," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed.
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York, NY: Longman Publishers, 2003).
9 For a helpful survey of this work on this in the field of international relations, see Barbara Rearden
Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). Particularly useful in summarizing prospect theory itself is
Jack S. Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory," in Ibid. For a measured assessment of the
potential pitfalls in using prospect theory, see later in the same volume Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory
and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," in Ibid.
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Going a step further in categorizing the use of threats, George subdivides
compellence, separating two concepts: "coercive diplomacy" and, in what he refers to as
the offensive side of policy, 'blackmail strategies".' ° For George, coercive diplomacy
aims to undo something whereas the more offensive "blackmail" tries to force the
opponent to do something completely new that it had not planned to do. Jakobsen
provides an excellent chart to help think about these various concepts and how they relate
to each other.
Figure 2-1: Categorizing the Use of Threats in International Relations
Source: Adapted from Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A
Challenge for Theory and Practice. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1998, p. 12, Figure 2.1: "Overview
of existing terms concerning the use of threats."
This builds on Schelling's dichotomy and Freedman's umbrella term, discussed above,
but adds some further detail by clarifying the two potential goals of compellence.
10 Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," in The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 7.
However, note that George's term 'coercive diplomacy' would seem to include many cases of
deterrence since it includes "efforts to persuade an opponent to stop ... an action." However, he
explicitly rules out deterrence cases from his definition. (For both these points, see again George,
"Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," 7.) Freedman refers to this usage as "neither
tenable in practice nor useful analytically". Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 18. To avoid precisely
this sort of confusion, the broader term coined by Freedman-strategic coercion-will be used here.
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However, in practice, the boundary lines within the various forms of compellence,
deterrence, and coercion are not so clear. Nearly all scholars working in the field make
this point somewhere in their work. George notes the distinctions between his offensive
and defensive forms of compellence are not always obvious." Byman and Waxman
present their views succinctly in the title of a figure: "Deterrence and Compellence Blur
in Practice." 2 Another scholar points out the various subjective factors that play a role
in answering the critical question of is a threat aimed at deterrence or compellence: "The
answer depends on two points: the level of analysis and who defines the status quo and
how. ... In any event, the deterrence-compellence ordering is problematic, if useful at
all, in explaining the bargaining outcome...." Others agree that the line between
deterrence and compellence is not as clear as it would appear.'4
Clearly, there is a range of tasks to which coercive tools might be applied. In
order of increasing difficulty, one can try to persuade an adversary to: not do something it
was planning to do, stop something it is currently doing, undo something it has recently
done, or do something new that it did not want to do. Nevertheless, these seem likely to
be differences of degree rather than of nature. More fundamentally, the process of
weighing capabilities, creating credibility, and communicating any of those demands is
11 George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," 8. Jakobsen make this point rather
forcefully: Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy, 13.
12 Daniel Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric V. Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, MR-
1061 -AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 12.
13 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988), 174. He expresses a similar, broader reaching concern on p. 25.
Davis makes a similar point, and his model explicitly draws on prospect theory, so his finding that this
central distinction is difficult to apply in the real world is instructive. James W. Davis, Jr., Threats
and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000), 421 (see also his discussion of related difficulties on p. 415).
14 Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 19; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy, 13.
53
Twomey, The Military Lens
similar regardless of the goal of the coercive attempt. Therefore, this dissertation will
not restrict its universe to any one of these concepts, but will focus on strategic coercion,
thus including both deterrence and compellence attempts. Several in the field also make
this broader view of coercion the subject of their research.' 5
Finally, when discussing the goals of deterrence, scholars and analysts often draw
a distinction between general and immediate deterrence. 6 General deterrence is a state
of affairs that exists between potential adversaries before a crisis. While neither side
has made an explicit threat, both sides are aware that they must consider the other's
interests as they ponder any future action. If general deterrence appears to be
insufficient to ensure a nation's interests, that nation may choose to make a specific
threat: "if our opponent attacks our country (or our ally), we will retaliate by doing the
following...." At this point, general deterrence has broken down and the policy being
pursued is immediate deterrence. A similar distinction could be made on the
compellence side: some compellent attempts are made more overtly than others are.
Of course, there are potential grey areas. Oblique threats, expressions of interest
in a region, statements that one country is monitoring the moves of another, all these fall
15 This seems, in fact, closest to Schelling's usage of the term. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3-5,
71. For a sympathetic view see also Karl Mueller, "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and
the Future of Air Power," Security Studies 7, no. 3 (1998): note 4.
16 This distinction was originally drawn in Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977). It continues to have important effects on the study of
deterrence. See, for instance, the debate over whether deterrence works, where this difference is
critical to accusations of selection bias. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989); David Collier and
James Mahoney, "Research Note: Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," World
Politics 49, no. 1 (1996); James Fearon, "Selection Effects and Deterrence," International Interactions
28, no. 1 (2002); Jack S. Levy, "Review Article: When Do Deterrent Threats Work?," British Journal
of Political Science 18 (1989): 508. For a broader discussion of selection bias in this literature, see V.
Danilovic, "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.
1 (2001); Daryl G. Press, "Weak and Varying Selection Effects: Obstacles to Inference on Military
Deterrence and Economic Sanctions, 1995," Cambridge, Mass (MIT).
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short of an explicit deterrent threat that would clearly move a situation out of the realm of
general deterrence and into that of immediate deterrence. Thus, these two concepts as
well are better thought of as part of a continuum. Thus, when studying strategic
coercion, it is important not to neglect cases that are not full blown cases of immediate
deterrence but lie somewhere along the continuum toward the general deterrence ideal
type. General deterrence can fail for the same reasons that immediate deterrence does:
questions about capability and intent. Analysts should not ignore the potential to learn
more about it. (This is particularly the case given that one prominent theorist has
recently argued that general deterrence will be increasingly important in the post-Cold
War world.'7)
The Tools of Strategic Coercion
If strategic coercion is the use of threats or actual force to achieve any of a broad
range of goals, what more can one say about the tools used to ensure its success? Two
areas are worth discussing: the use of force itself, rather than mere threats of its use, and
the use of incentives versus carrots.
All students of strategic coercion in all its various forms would agree that it
should be distinguished from simply forcing an adversary to do something by using
overwhelming force. Rather, strategic coercion depends at least in part on threats
(implicit or explicit) to achieve its goals.'" The distinction between using military
power as a means of brute force to achieve a goal and the use of threats involving
military power can trace its origins (at least) to Clausewitz, who writes, on the one hand
17 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
18 Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy, .
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war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each
side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which
must lead, in theory, to extremes.' 9
On the other, he writes that "modifications in practice" in many areas impede this
tendency toward all out war. Thus, he concludes, "war is never an isolated act"; "war
does not consist of a single short blow"; and "in war, the result is never final."20 These
factors lead to wars responding to the needs of politics:
If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the
prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it...
Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature
will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.'
This interjection of policy into the use of force characterizes the realm of strategic
coercion.
Another way of raising this same issue is to discuss the phenomenon of limited
war. Since most wars fall short of all-out conflict, they retain an element of
bargaining. This is particularly the case for so called limited wars that made up the
bulk of American military policy during and after the Cold War.23 Similarly, most arms
races could escalate even further or more rapidly, and thus are also examples of limited
19 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 76.
20 Ibid., 78-80.
21 Ibid., 87.
22 On the ubiquity of limited wars, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 126ff. Bernard Brodie, War and
Politics (New York,: Macmillan, 1973), 39. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
23 The classic study is Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York, NY: John Wiley
& Sons, 1963). For further discussion of limited war in Cold War foreign policy, see Christopher M.
Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994). The limited wars in the post-Cold War are treated in Daniel P.
Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995); Ivo H.
Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound : The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003).
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international conflict. 4 On another dimension, scholars often write about militarized
and non-militarized crises. Rather than sharply distinct modes of interaction, diplomatic
crises, militarized crises, limited wars, and total wars are better thought of as lying along
a continuum of conflict. Any study of bargaining along this continuum need not shy
away from considering several different sorts of interaction for examination. However,
excluding the bargaining that occurs within total war does seem appropriate, as it lacks
both the ability to threaten more and the fear that the other side might do more-by
definition, the combatants are already doing their utmost. Thus, both non-militarized
crises and limited wars are to be considered in the universe of cases that this dissertation
evaluates.
Most scholars explicitly take a broad view regarding whether strategic coercion
can include some uses of force, while still distinguishing that from the pure brute force
method of military compellence. Thomas Schelling, in a chapter entitled "The
Diplomacy of Violence," emphasizes the difference between nations getting what they
want through brute force rather than threats, intimidation, and blackmail, "between the
unilateral, 'undiplomatic' recourse to strength, and coercive diplomacy based on the
power to hurt."25 Pape also points out that "coercion ... isi logically distinct from the
imposition of demands after complete military victory."26 He nevertheless focuses on a
class of events that are characterized by the heavy use of force, because even there, the
communicative nature of the use of force is central. Jakobsen and Freedman both make
24 George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
25 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2-3.
26 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996), 13.
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parallel points.27 Alexander George appears to take a somewhat more restrictive view of
coercive diplomacy, stressing the importance of threats rather than the actual use of force.
The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand on an adversary with a
threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to
persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.... It should be kept in
mind that coercive diplomacy is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the
threat of force rather than the use of force to achieve the objective. If force must be
used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in an exemplary
manner, in the form of a quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and
willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary." 28
However, as is clear from a careful reading of that passage, even here some recourse to
use of force still falls under the rubric of coercive diplomacy for George, so long as it is
aimed primarily at communication of threats of even greater violence. Violence can
play such a communicative role in all conflicts except those that have escalated to
Clausewitz's theoretical extremes.
The approach adopted in this dissertation will follow this broad definition, widely
shared in the field that allows strategic coercion to include the uses of force so long as
they have some communicative element and are not part of a total war strategy.
Another question regarding the nature of tools to implement strategic coercion is
what exactly is threatened. Again, there are some core, shared elements in the field.
While most work on deterrence or compellence has focused on threats to punish, other
threats are also possible. Glenn Snyder has pointed out that military force can be used
either to deny victory to an adversary or to directly hurt him and that both of these may
useful to threaten in coercive diplomacy.29 Freedman argues strongly that denial
27 Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 20ff; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy, 14-15.
28 George, "Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," 2.
29 Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, N. J.: Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959);
Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.:
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strategies can be used both to deter and to compel. 30 Schelling and Pape raise similar
points, and Shimshoni goes further to point out that, in conventional deterrence, the
distinction can be easily blurred.3' The usage adopted here will include both of these
tools of influence-punishment and denial.
Further, threats and signals can be made explicitly or tacitly.32 While much
attention focuses on the former, it is important not to neglect the latter for several reasons.
First, they are ubiquitous. Arquilla finds that "tacit signals" using military forces were
used in 60 percent of the cases he studied.33 The entire tit-for-tat literature sparked by
Axelrod's work centers on tacit signaling.34 Beyond that, to some scholars, tacit signals
convey an exceptional clarity:
Despite their lack of nuance and heavier costs, relative to verbal communication, tacit
measures have, in theory, three great strengths. First, if they are unsubtle, they are also
unambiguous. Language is rich, and its very complexity can be used to obfuscate as
easily as to clarify. A warship in the harbor may provoke many things but certainly not
confusion.35
Thus, this study will address strategic coercion with either explicit or tacit signals.
Princeton University Press, 1961). For a recent analysis of nuclear deterrence that considers both
deterrence by defense and deterrence by punishment, see Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in
the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 29ff.
30 Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 26ff. For a less supportive view on this point, see Art, "The Four
Functions of Force," 155.
31 Pape, Bombing to Win, 13; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional
Deterrence, 15. Pape provides an example of denial being used for coercion in the later stages of the
Korean War during the early part of the Panmunjom negotiations. Pape, Bombing to Win, 140.
32 Note that here the term "signals" incorporates both Jervis' usage of "signals" and "indices." See
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1970).
33 John Arquilla, "Louder Than Words: Tacit Communication in International Crises," Political
Communication 9 (1992): 163. Also see Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining.
34 See the discussion in the previous chapter at note 69 on Axelrod's work.
35 Arquilla, "Louder Than Words," 157. As discussed in the rest of this dissertation, unfortunately
military signals are not always so clear-cut.
59
Twomey, The Military Lens
Finally, many scholars of strategic coercion focus on both incentives and threats,
or carrots and sticks, as tools of policy.36 This is theoretically attractive because both
incentives and threats can manipulate the cost-benefit analysis by a potential adversary.
However, this dissertation will not address incentives, while it acknowledges that they
can certainly be useful in achieving a nation's goals.37 This is done because the causal
dynamic highlighted (misperceptions caused by different theories of victory) here focuses
on impediments to communication of threats, primarily.38
Thus, for the purposes of this project, strategic coercion is defined as the process
of one nation trying to convince another nation to do something it would not have done
through threats (implicit or explicit) and limited uses of violence, either by opposing an
36 David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24, no. 1 (1971); David A.
Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); David Cortright,
The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 1997); David Cortright and Andrea Gabbitas, "Incentives for Nuclear Restraint:
The Role of Inducement Strategies in Controlling Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons," in Tactical
Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, ed. Brian Alexander and
Alistair Millar (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc, 2003); David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and
International Peace Academy., The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 990s (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy; Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1976), 590ff; Michael Laird, "Wars Averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 1945-47, Berlin 1948," Journal of
Strategic Studies 19, no. 3 (1996): 356; Evan Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of
Political Strategies in the Interwvar and Postwar Periods," World Politics 19, no. 2 (1967): 186; Martin
Patchen, Resolving Disputes between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation? (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1988), Chapter 10; Gaines Post, Jr., "Mad Dogs and Englishmen: British
Rearmament, Deterrence and Appeasement," Armed Forces and Society 14, no. 3 (1988); Arnold
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), see particularly Chapter 9. Howard takes a rather different view of the role of
incentives, suggesting that it is allies that need be reassured. Michael Eliot Howard, "Reassurance
and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs 61, no. 2 (1982/83).
37 For similar treatment, see Cortright and Gabbitas, "Incentives for Nuclear Restraint," 6.
38 That said, different theories of victory might lead to an under-appreciation of the carrot offered by an
adversary. Suppose the United States withdrew tactical aircraft from a region, but left its ground
troops in place. Nations who focused more on ground forces as sources of power would not
appreciated the full incentive that the United States was trying to signal. This too would have
negative effects on international diplomacy and peace. However, this study excludes this sort of
phenomenon for simplicity's sake.
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adversary's actions or punishing him. With the caveats discussed above, this is similar
to the usage of the term by others in the field.39
The theory below should apply when strategic coercion is attempted. That is,
attempts at strategic coercion are the universe of cases for the theory. As noted above,
this is a very large set of cases as threats, implicit or otherwise, are frequent in
international politics. It is in these cases that communication regarding intent and
assessments of the balance of power are critical issues between nations.
Doctrines and Theories of Victory
The difference between two nations' theories of victory is the independent
variable in this study. Thus, some explicit and detailed discussions of what "theory of
victory" means and where one comes from are warranted. Posen defines a military's
theory of victory in the following passage
Every military organization, explicitly or implicitly, has a theory of victory, a notion of
the combination of human and material resources and tactics that it believes is most likely
to produce success on the battlefield. The theory of victory is the organization's military
doctrine.'
Others use the term in similar ways, with some variations.4 '
39 In addition to the citations discussed above, see, Byman, Waxman, and Larson, Air Power as a
Coercive Instrument, 10; Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chapter 1: The Diplomacy of Violence.
Note that Schultz, while lacking a precise definition of coercive diplomacy, clearly makes use of the
broader meaning that used here. Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Jakobsen uses the term "coercive diplomacy" to mean the
same thing that "strategic coercion" is used for here. Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy.
40 Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat
Assessment," International Security 9, no. 3 (1984/85): 51.
41 The earliest citation this author is aware of is Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a
Theory of Victory," International Security 4, no. 1 (1979). However, Gray is never explicit about
what he means by the term, although clearly there is some broader element of integration of political
goals in his version of the concept. (Thus, Gray's version has some similarities with Posen's "grand
strategy". Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.) Rosen is more explicit in
Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 20. There he defines a theory of victory as "an explanation of what the next
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Military strategies link force structures to political or military goals.42 Below
that level, military doctrine sketches out a generic understanding of how elements of
military power can be used to achieve victory. Doctrine refers to a concept below
nations' grand strategies, but above their operational or tactical military strategy.43
Doctrines can be based on organizational frameworks, specific technologies, or more
conceptual elements.44
Examples from current American security policy might illuminate this discussion.
Military doctrine does not refer to the new U.S. strategies of maintaining and ensuring
global predominance and the pre-emption of threats.45 Those more appropriately fit at
the level of a grand strategy.46 Nor does it refer to the specific U.S. strategy of the left
hook in the first Gulf War; this is more of an operational or tactical strategy.4 7 Rather,
in the context of policy today, American military doctrine is the theory of victory for
war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be won." For other uses of the term in similar
ways, see Neta C. Crawford, Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War," Perspectives on
Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 10 and 17; Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and
Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 5 and 75.
42 Again see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13.
43 For a similar definition of military doctrine, see Ibid., 13, 245, n.3. Mearsheimer refers to this
conceptual level as military strategy. See John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983), 28. This dissertation's usage of the term is also consistent with that
in several other studies: Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessonsfrom
Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 3 n. 7; Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War:
French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997); Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War I1 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1995).
44 For discussion of the first two of these, see Rosen, Winning the Next War, passim, but espec. 185.
45 See President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington DC: White House, September 2002). Available at
http://www.whi tehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
46 Concurring that they do not belong in the category of military doctrine is Michael Ignatieff, "Why Are
We in Iraq? (and Liberia? And Afghanistan?)," New York Times Magazine, September 7 2003, 42.
47 For descriptions of the left hook, see, for instance, Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in
the Gulf War (Washington: Brassey's, 1994).
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conventional wars based on heavy use of airpower and precision guided munitions aimed
to decapitate an adversary, followed up by heavy mechanized forces and very highly
mobile infantry forces, as needed.' This is a conception of how the United States plans
to win wars in general, of the fundamental basis of military power.
Choosing optimal doctrines and strategies is not straightforward and is better
thought of as an art than a science. There is no single, optimal strategy to achieve a
given goal with a given force structure. ® Indeed, doctrines can range widely as can
understandings of the fundamental basis of military power. For example, a nation might
emphasize any one of the following: blitzkrieg, submarine blockade, conventional
strategic bombing, intense tactical air without an associated ground force, sea control
based on a battleship navy, highly trained light infantry, etc. (And indeed nations might
emphasize one of these in one strategic geography and another elsewhere.) Empirically,
Weigley traces more than a dozen different "ways of war" for the United States alone
over its first 200 years.50
Building on the usage of Posen and others described above, this dissertation
defines a "theory of victory" as a belief about what constitutes effective military power at
a fundamental level and how it should be used operationally and tactically. It
48 For a representative statement see FM 3-0: Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army, June 14, 2001); General Henry H. Shelton, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP
3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2001). For an earlier example, see the
1982 edition of FM 100-5 that introduced AirLand Battle.
49 Making an even broader point is Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," International Security 25,
no. 2 (2000).
50 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). Note Weigley's use of the term strategy is
similar to the use of "theory of victory" in this dissertation (see his definitional comments on pp. xvii-
xix). However, strategy is a broad term, one used differently by many people. Therefore, it is not
selected here.
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includes-indeed, is centered on-doctrine, but also consists of the make up of military
forces as well as some elements of grand strategy. It is a blanket term to describe a
generic understanding of how to win wars. It is a mental construct, albeit one that is
often informed by past empirical experience and one that clearly has tangible effects on
policy. It guides the procurement of forces, shapes the doctrine with which those forces
are used, and prioritizes grand strategic goals for the nation.
Other terms express similar meaning, although none has gained wide currency,
and each has some limitations. Applegate refers to "military cultures" which would
seem to exclude sources of such beliefs from more material factors." Weigley's term
"the way of war" comes very close to the meaning used here, but might be a bit broader,
since it centers on grand strategic questions (which are included primarily as
supplementary to doctrinal issues in the usage here).52 Further, the term "theory of
victory" also reminds us that such a perspective need not have been actually tested, that it
might remain theoretical only (whereas Weigley's research is focused on the actual
conduct of war). The term used here term is also similar to Builder's description of the
different "concepts of war" that the various services have within the U.S. military.'
The term "concept of operations" (or CONOPS) is also similar, although less precise as it
can refer to a wide range of scales (e.g., the concept of operations for the B-2 bomber as
well one for use of military force by the United States in the periphery for the purposes of
51 Or at least it would suggest that such sources are less important than sociologic sources. This is not a
fight this dissertation engages, as for its purposes, the sources of such beliefs are less relevant than
their effects. See R. A. D. Applegate and J. R. Moore, "The Nature of Military Culture," Defense
Analysis 6, no. 3 (1990).
52 Weigley, The American Way of War.
53 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), Chapter 12: The Service Concepts of War.
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regime change). As noted in the previous chapter, this concept overlaps with Scobell's
"organizational culture" of the PLA in his discussion of the possible cultural influences
on China's propensity to use military force.54 One study of recent American uses "force
structure and doctrine" to define the scope of a similar topic:
For the armed forces, force structure and doctrine represent two critical characteristics
that define the military capabilities upon which leaders can draw. Force structure
incorporates doctrinal decisions and assumptions about mission execution. It
incorporates specific mixes of personnel, equipment, organizational structure and
assumptions about operational effectiveness. It constrains options for employing the
military (e.g., inability of active forces to sustain themselves for long deployments
required call up and deployment of National Guard and Reserves in Desert Storm).
Doctrine provides the conceptual framework that relates military means to desired ends.
lAccording to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staffl "Military doctrine presents fundamental
principles that guide the employment of forces ... doctrine deals with the fundamental
issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends."
Doctrine operationalizes a theory of military action. It is the driving force behind
training and preparation for military operations by units and the tactical and operational
levels.55
Thus, the dissertation will focus on nations' broad theories of victory as well as their
narrower doctrines in its evaluation of the independent variable.
Theory
With those definitions on the table, this chapter now turns to the specific causal
chain proposed by the theory. It begins with a summary of the existing work that
explains the sources of doctrinal beliefs before moving on to the next two stages of the
causal chain proposed by the dissertation. First, differences in theories of victory should
lead to an overestimation of one's own power relative to that of one's adversary.
54 Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-8.
55 Richard Ariynn Lacquement, Jr., "Preaching after the Devil's Death: Shaping American Military
Capabilities in the Post-Cold War Era" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2000), 14-15. And
as that author goes on to note, "these capabilities cannot be changed easily or quickly," thus suggesting
their importance. Ibid., 8.
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Second, such an overestimation should lead to increased prospects for failure of strategic
coercive policies and unnecessary conflict.
The Origins of Strategic and Doctrinal Beliefs
This dissertation does not explain the sources of different theories of victory but
rather their effects.56 It is nevertheless important to understand the range of influences
on leaders' perceptions of optimal strategies and to be aware of indicators of their
perceptions. The large literature on these topics has shown that many factors shape
nations' perceptions regarding optimal strategies. This section briefly discusses four
categories of these.
First, systemic and geographic imperatives can have a powerful effect forcing
doctrinal innovation. 7 Military defeat punishes laggards, and the international system
presents powerful incentives to find effective military solutions to strategic dilemmas.
Some argue that others in the international system emulate effective military strategies
under the right conditions. 8 (Different scholars note that, at least in peacetime, the
56 This dissertation will focus on an effect of doctrine, one that has received little systematic attention.
Doctrine has long been recognized to have other important effects at the geopolitical level. See, for
instance, Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984); Posen, Inadvertent Escalation; Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign
Affairs 37 (1959). For work on the effects of conventional doctrine, see Mearsheimer, Conventional
Deterrence; Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,"
in Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones,
and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
57 The most famous argument about when this occurs is: Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
Also see Colin Elman, "The Logic of Emulation: The Diffusion of Military Practices in the
International System" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999); Mearsheimer, Conventional
Deterrence; Sten Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers between
International Power and Domestic Interests," Security Studies 1 I, no. 2 (2001/2).
58 Elman, "The Logic of Emulation"; Jodo Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military
Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1930," Security Studies 5, no.
3 (1996).
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imprecision of intelligence makes such emulation very challenging.5 9) Financial
shortfalls and other resource constraints can also play a similar role in shaping a nation's
choice of strategy. (That is, there may be situations when states are forced to choose a
strategy because is the only one they can afford.)
Second, closely related to this third image argument is the role that technologic
advancement has in leading to innovation. When such advances occur, new options are
available to states in terms of weapons and tactics. Sometimes, states will indeed avail
themselves to these new opportunities, shaping their views of strategy.' For instance,
one historian argues that the proliferation of a variety of technologies-the railroad,
artillery, and improved personal arms-drove the adoption of general staffs, an
organizational change.6 ' The rise of general staffs, in turn, then led to new opportunities
at the strategic and operational levels. Thus, some scholars argue, the link between
technologic innovation and change in doctrine is not necessarily linear, but rather is often
59 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 61. Rosen notes that in the first decade of the interwar period, the
United States based its intelligence regarding Japan primarily on open sources. This was clearly
insufficient for guiding doctrinal innovation, as he notes. Nevertheless, both sides pursued parallel
innovations (independently, and at great cost) in the area of carrier-based airpower.
60 For a forceful statement on the role of technology in fomenting innovation, see Martin L. Van Creveld,
Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. To the Present, Revised and Expanded ed. (New York, NY:
The Free Press, 1991). For a broader look at the impact of technology, see William H. McNeill, The
Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000 (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1982). For a contrary view, arguing against any deterministic role for technology in
military affairs, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance
and International Security," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000). For broader critiques against
technologic determinism, see Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J. Pinch, The Social
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, Does Technology Drive
History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
61 Dallas D. Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," The Journal of Modern History 10, no. 2 (1938).
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quite complex and depends on many other factors (organizational politics, budgetary
factors, etc.).6 2
A third important source of such perceptions is past historic practice. One
manifestation of this is the well-known adage that 'states often prepare to fight the last
war'.63 When states have found viable strategies, they are reluctant to change them.
The process of learning from history, however, is not straightforward and debates over
what lesson history conveys are endemic.6 4
Fourth, organizational structures and practices can also shape doctrine by reifying
the lessons of history, setting standard operating practices, and defining actors' interests.
A variety of hypotheses have been introduced regarding organizational sources of
innovation: the intervention of civilian leaders,6 5 the nature of the institutions of civilian
oversight,66 inter-service and inter-branch rivalry,67 continuity in the officer corps,68 and
62 For an outstanding set of examples of these difficulties, see 1. B. Holley, Jr., "Technology and
Doctrine," in Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment, ed. Jacob Neufeld, George
M. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth (Washington, DC: Airforce History and Museums Program,
United States Air Force, 1997).
63 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York, NY:
The Free Press, 1990).
64 For a historical perspective on the role of such debates in the U.S. Army's process of learning from
history, see Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History,
1865-1920 (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
65 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.; Elman, "The Logic of Emulation".
66 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change; Deborah D. Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen
Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War," International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000).
67 Owen Reid Cote, Jr., "The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The United States Navy and Fleet
Ballistic Missiles" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996); Eugene Gholz,
"Systems Integration in the U.S. Defense Industry: Who Does It and Why Is It Important?," in The
Business of Systems Integration, ed. Andrea Prencipe, Andrew Davies, and Mike Hobday (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003); Rosen, Winning the Next War; Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris
System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1972); Harvey M. Sapolsky, "On the Theory of Military Innovation,"
Breakthroughs 9, no. 1 (2000).
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the historically-derived organizational culture.6 9 Much work also emphasizes the
impediments that organizations throw up to innovation. 70 Organizations can also shape
doctrine more directly: A professionalized force has options available to it that a
conscript military does not due to the skill levels of its officers and non-commissioned
officers. 7 '
Thus, the sources of theories of victory are numerous. All of these four
categories of factors might affect a nation's theory of victory, that is, their own
understanding of how their military forces should be used to maximize their effectiveness
in the pursuit of some goal. Again, this vast body of work is an important precursor to
this dissertation's argument, but this project does not attempt to assess the accuracy of
specific sides of the debate on the sources of military doctrine.
Since states have different factor endowments, recent histories in security affairs,
and their own national and organizational cultures, analysts should expect to find
significant variation in theories of victory across space and time. While different factor
68 Elman, "The Logic of Emulation".
69 Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies."; Kier, Imagining War; Legro, Cooperation under Fire.
Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," in The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1996). This also seems to be at the core of the argument advanced in
Scobell, China's Use of Military Force.
70 That organizations retard innovation, in general, is implicit in many of the works cited above. See
also Scott Douglas Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
71 See for instance the discussions on French strategy in Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive:
Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
Also, the role of the professionalism was critical at all levels of the German Wehrmacht, R. Ernest
Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945
(New York, NY: Nova Publications, 1995). In current affairs, the Chinese clearly recognize this
today, see David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For discussions of China and other East Asian
states in this regard, see Eric Heginbotham, "The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military
Organizations, Domestic Politics, and Grand Strategy," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002).
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endowments are important to understanding the sources of the Sino-American
differences,72 in many other cases other issues are at the foundations of the differences in
theories of victory. (Further, even in the context of material disparity, nations can have
similar understandings of theories of victory if other factors are important.73)
Nevertheless, this dissertation will not systematically survey the variation of this, the
independent variable. At least one study concludes that there are significant differences
in military cultures, even among European and North Atlantic nations:
The results are rather unambiguous. First, it evolved that fairly large differences exist
between military cultures, as discerned among the samples of student officers. For
example, the cultural differences between the Canadian academy and the Italian academy
are quite considerable and systematic. ... Furthermore, the dispersion among the
various military academies on all cultural dimensions proved to be even larger than in the
original Hofstede study of civilian employees.7 4
While the variable in question in those studies is not precisely the same as the military
cultural aspects that are the focus of this dissertation, that study is suggestive of
substantial and fundamental cross-national differences. Furthermore, anecdotal
evidence suggests that significant differences in theories of victory across two nations are
common. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, examples from the Napoleonic
wars, several dyads in World War II (U.S.-Germany and France-Germany), and the Arab-
Israeli war of 1973 are found to exhibit wide differences in theories of victory (and
something similar seems to have existed in the Peloponnesian wars). Mearsheimer
72 That said, clearly the cases below do not simply reduce to capability differences. In the chapters that
follow, the United States is just as prone to overestimating its own capabilities as is China.
73 The cases below provide examples of this. See Chapter 6: China Postpones the Invasion of Taiwan.
74 Joseph L. Soeters, "Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study," Armed
Forces and Society 24, no. 1 (1997): 24. The Hofstede study had focused on cross-national
comparisons of workers at various IBM subsidiaries. It, too found a wide range of national
differences.
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notes the large doctrinal differences between the French and Germans before WWII.75
Arquilla argues something similar occurred in World War I and the wars of Louis XIV.76
Shimshoni finds evidence for a related phenomenon in the Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1954
and 1967.7 7 It likely occurs between the United States and China today.78 Thus, there
is some evidence that the phenomenon exists widely.
The chart below shows the link between these various factors and nations' beliefs
about theories of victory and effective strategies and capabilities as the arrow labeled
under Hexisting literature (really, this is best thought of as a set of- sometimes
competing--hypotheses, but for simplicity's sake, that is reduced here).
Figure 2-2: The Theory's Precursors
Hexistin
Rather than join the debate on the sources of doctrine or explain the origins of
nations' theories of victory, this dissertation will look to their effects. Once a nation has
arrived at a set of beliefs that constitute its theory of victory, the implications are
75 Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence.
76 John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System, Dubious battles ed.
(Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1992), 103-29.
77 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence.
78 Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S.
Security Policy," International Security 25, no. 4 (2001).
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substantial. Scholars have long recognized the inflexibility of doctrinal thinking in
other spheres. William Graham Sumner, a prominent sociologist and political scientist
at Yale writing at the dawn of the 2 0 ' century, wrote forebodingly of doctrines in foreign
policy:
Now when any doctrine arrives at that degree of authority, the name of it is a club which
any demagogue may swing over you at any time and apropos of anything. In order to
describe a doctrine, we much have recourse to theological language. A doctrine is an
article of faith. ... A doctrine is an abstract principle; it is necessarily absolute in its
scope and abstruse in its terms; it is metaphysical assertion. It is never true, because it is
absolute, and the affairs of men are all conditioned and relative
As is the case for doctrines of foreign policy, so too it is with those of military affairs.
The effects of a particular doctrine are wide-ranging. Future force procurement
decisions will be made based on that decision. Training is geared to implement it (even
at senior levels of the military). Political leaders will also be educated in it by the
military leadership. Further, once incorporated into a nation's doctrine, these beliefs are
often applied to unexpected situations through the creation of standard operating
procedures that are relatively inflexible yet widely applied.' As Lt. Colonel Richard
Lacquement, a professor at the Naval War College, notes,
In the short-response time, come-as-you-are nature of most international crisis situations,
the employment of the armed forces places critical importance on existing forces and
their existing organizational routines (SOPs, doctrine, etc.). The structure and doctrine
of armed forces establishes how they operate.8 '
79 Quoted in Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, Sixth ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1985), 585.
80 The classic statements on the role of standard operating procedures in foreign policy are: Graham T.
Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review 63, no.
3 (1969); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston,:
Little Brown, 1971).
81 Lacquement, "Preaching after the Devil's Death", 13.
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Indeed, while military doctrine is necessary in order to rehearse and plan, once accepted
it reinforces a belief system about its own efficacy.' Even sharp external shocks may
not be enough to lead to change:
The enemy's sudden attack [at Pearl Harborl produced no quick reorientation of
American ideas about the use of air power. The first impulse was to resurrect schemes
concocted under different circumstances. As in many other matters, so too in the use of
air power. Pearl Harbor was not the watershed it came to seem.8
This inflexibility of doctrine, coupled with its application to a wide range of policies and
issues, emphasizes its importance as a variable in and of itself.
Thus, the choice of doctrine, and more broadly a theory of victory, has important
impacts in terms of shaping the very way national leaders think about international
security.84 The hypotheses below outline the specific causal argument of these impacts.
Hypotheses
The literature discussed above analyzing the sources of doctrine treats doctrine as
a dependent variable. This dissertation uses doctrine and related thinking regarding
theories of victory instead as an independent variable. Essentially, the dissertation has a
two-part argument: differences in theories of victory lead to misperceptions; these in turn
lead to miscommunications, escalation, and conflict through deterrence failure and
coercive failure more generally. Each is expressed as a separate hypothesis. The first
is stated as H, below.
82 In addition to the discussion below on the difficulties of innovation, Smith also discusses the rigidity
and persistence of doctrine. Perry M. Smith, "The Role of Doctrine," in American Defense Policy, ed.
John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr. (Baltimore, Mary.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
83 Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987), 117.
84 For other effects of doctrine, see the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the overestimation of
dangers.
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Hypothesis #1
H,: When two nations have different theories of victory, they will be more likely
to misperceive each other's capabilities relative to their own, and these
misperceptions, ceteris paribus, will lead to underestimation of the adversary.
This hypothesis has two components. The first predicts opacity as a result of
differing theories of victory. The second focuses on the primary way that opacity
manifests itself: underestimation. (This component also has a "ceteris paribus"
assumption built in, which will be discussed at the end of this section).
The hypothesis relies on seven underlying logics. Each of these explains why H.
is likely to hold. In cases where two nations have different theories of victory, these
different logics explain why it is that nations will be prone to underestimating their
adversaries. They are based on various organizational, cultural, and perceptual
arguments. Each is explained in turn.
Causal Logics.
The first three logics depend primarily on the logics of organizational politics and
the effects of culture on perception. The next four logics trace their roots to perceptual
arguments, primarily from the psychology literature.
First, the military innovation literature suggests that organizations, and militaries
in particular, are reluctant to innovate.' In general, organizations are reluctant to
85 For a quick summary of these problems, plus some insightful discussion of factors that may mitigate
this, see Rosen, Winning the Next War, espec. pp. 1-6ff. Other works that use organizational theory
in international relations are: Allison, Essence of Decision; Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and
Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1974); John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). A few that focus directly on military affairs are
Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes; Edward L. Jr. Katzenbach, "The Horse Cavalry in the
Twentieth Century," in The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, ed. Robert Art
and Kenneth Waltz (Lanham, MD: The University Press, 1993), 180; Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine, 224; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic
Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); T. H. E. Travers,
"Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean De Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-
1914," Journal of Modern History 51, no. June (1979). More generally on organizational theory see
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change, have trouble thinking outside of established ideas, and resist changing 'standard
operating procedures. Militaries are particularly sensitive to this since not only does
change threaten the organization, but also it involves putting soldiers' very lives at risk.
Because they denigrate innovation in their own organization, they should also discount its
value to others. This can be the case even when other countries have successfully
innovated and all that the country in question must do is to emulate others.86
The well-known example of the horse cavalry between the world wars in the U.S.
Army exemplifies well. Even after the carnage on the front lines of the European
battlefields at the Somme and Verdun and the success of tanks at the end of the war, a
dominant group of horse cavalry officers in the interwar period continued to insist that
the horse was a superior weapons platform to the tank because it was more maneuverable
and flexible.87 As a result, at the outbreak of WWII in Europe, the United States had a
mere 28 tanks in service that were not obsolete.88 Even as late as 1944, desires by
military leaders to continue emphasize high mobility precluded the deployment of heavy
armor and anti-tank weapons. 9 The merits of such a doctrine when facing German
Tiger tanks seems quite irrational in hindsight, but would have appeared justified in the
context of the prevailing understanding of cavalry doctrine at the time.
Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Max
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, NY: Free Press, 1947).
86 On impediments to emulation, see Elman, "The Logic of Emulation", passim, 101ff.
87 See Ibid., 169; Katzenbach, "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century."
88 Elman, "The Logic of Emulation", 177. Note that even these were all light and medium tanks.
Note the Germans were not entirely immune from the hold of horse cavalry. Guderian writes of one
of his division's "curious fear of hostile cavalry." General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader
(Cambridge, Mass.: DeCapo Press, 1996), 99.
89 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 188. See also David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers:
Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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Second, strategies are costly, risky endeavors. Getting them implemented is
difficult and often requires military (and political) leaders to oversell their merits and
denigrate alternatives.9' For instance, "The U.S. lacked a competitive tank engine in the
period before World War II, but in the absence of hard data to the contrary, the chief of
the AmericanI Ordnance Department was able to assert in 1938 that U.S. tank engines
were among the best in the world."9' Other cases of best-case assumptions in the
context of poor information regarding an adversary abound. v2 One U.S. Army general
(and military historian) writes sweepingly:
On every occasion, modern nations involved in recent small wars have overestimated the
destructive power of their own forces. Inevitably, this overestimate has led to optimism
and expectations greater than either men or machines could deliver. Munitions intended
to destroy a conventional force may have little or no effect against an elusive, dispersed,
entrenched enemy not encumbered by vulnerable heavy equipment or lines of
communication. A concentrated bombardment that would shock the life out of a
Western unit might have only a temporary effect on the fighting strength of a tough Third
World unit inured to hardship and prepared to die for a cause. 3
The downplaying of alternatives is similarly common in other historic periods. For
instance,
Air Corps leaders had reached a doctrinal decision by 1935 as to the efficacy of
unescorted long-range strategic bombardment and were unwilling either to question that
decision or even to observe technological advances that might case them to modify this
doctrine.. .4
90 For examples of denigration of alternative doctrines, see Smith, "The Role of Doctrine." On
overselling at the political and to some extent grand strategic, level, see Jane Kellett-Cramer, "National
Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National Security" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2002); Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the
United States, Second ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), 130ff.
91 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 188.
92 Ibid., 194. Also see Smith, "The Role of Doctrine."
93 Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1990), 289.
94 Smith, "The Role of Doctrine," 40.
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All of these trends would lead to an overestimation of one's own capabilities relative to
the adversary.
Third, strategic culture, as with any culture, can shape perceptions in critical
ways.95 By creating norms and expected patterns of behavior, culture profoundly shapes
one's understanding of reality. At a very fundamental level, "culture refers both to a set
of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules
or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and
interrelate."9 Military cultures are known to have important effects on grand strategic
preferences.' On a related note, one scholar writes, "each organization employs a
different informational lens to interpret these data from their own conflicts. 98 He goes
on to argue that these assessment criteria are quite constant over time, even outlasting
specific policy preferences or goals in a conflict.9
Theories of victory are a sort of military strategic and doctrinal culture, and thus
have this type of effect on perceptions of power and signals. Differences in such
95 See the discussion on strategic culture in the previous chapter entitled "Culture, Strategic Culture, and
Communication." Also see Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations
Theory," International Security 23, no. I (1998): 186-88, in particular; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural
Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1996), espec. Chapter 5: The Self-Defense Forces and External Security; Thomas Risse-Kappen,
"Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), 359-71; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992).
96 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identities, and Culture in
National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed.
Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 56.
97 Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the
Use of Force (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
98 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1997), 3.
99 Ibid., passim.
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cultures will lead to differences in perceptions about power and signals across countries,
precisely what this hypothesis predicts. This will increase the chance for
misperceptions in such situations.
Fourth, leaders understand what they have had experience with. If they lack
experience with a military weapon or strategy, then it is hard for them to understand it.
Further, if they lack advisors with experience with the weapon or strategy, this problem is
exacerbated. One example of this comes out of John Arquilla's work on "why 'losers'
start wars."' °° One of the answers to this question that he finds is the "imperfect
understanding of sea power and its role in land-sea war" by leaders from continental
powers.'"' The same phenomenon can occur more generally whenever leaders lack an
understanding of their adversary's theory of victory.
Fifth, differences in military forces of a qualitative nature are harder to assess than
those of a quantitative nature. Andrew Marshall makes a similar point:
By far the most interesting implicit estimate of military power emerges, I would
conjecture, from what one would call the symmetry syndrome of more standard or,
perhaps, classical military planning. This is the typical reaction pattern: If an opponent
buys bombers, we tend more to increase our bomber forces, rather than to increase our air
defense; when an opponent deploys an ABM system, we deploy an ABM system. ...
Classical military force posture planning, I believe involved an attempt to achieve a
posture of rough postural symmetry with the potential enemy, subject always to the often
inadequate peacetime budgets and a variety of bureaucratic, institutional constraints to be
discussed below. Symmetry is defined in terms that if the enemy has so many divisions,
the planners say we ought to have so many divisions; if he has so many naval ships of
various classes, we should have the same proportional number; the balance of our forces
would reflect the balance of the enemy's forces.'"
100 Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System. The passage quoted is
the title of chapter 5 in the book, although that question underlies the entire project as well.
101 Ibid., 121. Note that the findings of this dissertation are almost the opposite: when a land power
faced off against a sea power (over Taiwan), there were few mistakes, and deterrence and peace
prevailed. However, when a sea power faced a land power on land (in Korea) mistakes and escalation
were pervasive. This suggests that something deeper is at play, at least in these cases.
102 Andrew M. Marshall, Problems ofEstimating Military Power, P-3417 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
August 1966), 10.
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This is also related to an inductive conclusion that comes from a study of Arab-Israeli
conflict from 1953 to 1970.°03 That study was structured to address the traditional
elements of deterrence theory, noting their particular difficulties in cases of conventional
conflict: relative interests, relative power, reputation, the conduct of diplomacy itself, the
potential for domestic politics to intervene, etc. A key part of the story that the author
tells, however, was the ability of forces to adapt to threats posed by an adversary and thus
the ephemeral advantage presented by some qualitative differences. That is,
Because conventional forces are adaptable, divulging information in the hope of
enhancing deterrence gives an opponent an opportunity to design around the revealed
capabilities, so that eventually deterrence is undermined by knowledge. Yet if the
opponent knows too little, he will also remain undeterred." 4
Expanding on this insight, this argument supporting H, emphasizes that not only
is diplomacy impeded because nations have incentives to be coy about the sources of
their power when they depend on qualitative differences, but the evaluation of qualitative
differences is simply more challenging than those based on quantitative differences.'0 5
It is more difficult to think about different sorts of forces facing off than different
numbers of forces. It is relatively easy to think about how an extra division or warship
will affect a particular military balance, especially if they are similar to a state's own
forces of that type. However, considering the effects of a new type of tank or submarine
103 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 226-28. Shimshoni's excellent work closely
parallels the argument offered here, and this dissertation attempts to build on his useful contribution.
The approach taken here broadens the conclusions of Shimshoni's work by focusing not just on
qualitative differences in forces, but also by emphasizing that doctrinal and grand strategic differences
exhibit similar dynamics. Shimshoni's primary conclusions focus on the role of surprise and an
emphasis on quality (over quantity) in procurement and deployment. Qualitative differences more
generally are discussed only in passing in the conclusion. The hope here is to build on his insights
there by explicitly designing a research program to evaluate this point.
104 Ibid., 227.
105 This point is consistent with, although not made explicitly in, Ibid.
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is much more challenging. Conducting net assessments or campaign analysis with
fundamentally different sorts of forces is particularly challenging.'
Sixth, leaders believe their views are correct because they chose them. That is, a
psychological defense mechanism of self-justification occurs. The fundamental
attribution error-a concept thoroughly grounded in psychological experimental
research-is closely related to this point.'07 The fundamental attribution error
emphasizes that contextual justifications for choices get less emphasis than they merit.
For instance, when subjects are told that a lecturer has been ordered to defend a particular
position, they nevertheless believe that the subject does indeed believe the content of his
speech.'" Similarly, a particular theory of victory might be chosen for any number of
reasons (as discussed above) other than functional optimality. However, once it is
chosen, the context or situation that led to its selection will drift to the background, and
people will tend to ignore the reasons why a militarily sub-optimal strategy might have
been chosen.
One scholar of doctrine notes precisely this phenomenon in his field of study.
Social psychologists have shown that stating an idea often leads to changes in personal
convictions.... Getting people to commit themselves publicly to a particular belief can
lead them to internalize that belief. ... if 'saying is believing,' many aspects of the
military's culture [and thus doctrine, in the author's mind] may have originated as
politically expedient strategies.109
106 Note that this component of H. does not predict either over or under-estimation, but only that some
error in estimation will occur. The other five components of this hypothesis do support
underestimation per se.
107 On the use of attribution theory in international relations, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
108 Erica Goode, "How Culture Molds Habits of Thought," New York Times, August 8 2000. For an
example of political science research that utilizes this concept, see Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics.
109 Kier, Imagining War, 156.
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Beyond ignoring the shortcomings of one's own theory of victory, the phenomenon of
self-justification easily leads to a denigration of different views by an adversary. In turn,
the adversary has the same beliefs about both his own and his adversary's beliefs. Both
cannot be correct at the same time.
Seventh, psychologically, humans are predisposed to have an exaggerated sense of
themselves."° Psychologists refer to this as a 'positive illusion'. The key research
underpinning this phenomenon suggests:
most people exhibit positive illusions in three important domains: (a) They view
themselves in unrealistically positive terms; (b) they believe they have greater control
over environmental events than is actually the case; and (c) they hold views of the future
that are more rosy than base-rate data can justify."'
This finding is widely held in the field of social psychology: "there are at least 121
articles on perceived invulnerability and optimistic biases about risk and future life events
alone, a listing that does not include a number of relevant references on optimism as a
trait concept.'"12 Beyond that, there is increasing evidence that this phenomenon, in
some manifestation, exists across cultures,'3 including, of particular interest to this study,
110 For the path breaking article on this topic, see S. E. Taylor and J. D. Brown, "Illusion and Well-Being:
A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health," Psychological Bulletin 103 (1988). For the
book length refinement, see: Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the
Healthy Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1989). For a recent discussion of it in light of the increasing
evidence for it, and a response to some of the critiques of that have accumulated, see Shelley E. Taylor
and Jonathon D. Brown, "Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction,"
Psychological Bulletin 116, no. (1994).
1I 11 Taylor and Brown, "Positive Illusions," 22.
112 Ibid.: 25.
113 See Chihiro Kobayashi, "Relationships among Self- and Other- Positive Illusions and Social
Adaptation," Japanese Journal of Interpersonal and Social Psychology, no. 2 (2002). Also, see the
interesting work on exaggerated positive views of one's close personal relationships in Japanese
cultures (rather than an enhanced view of one's person) in Yumi Endo, Steven J. Heine, and Darrin R.
Lehman, "Culture and Positive Illusions in Close Relationships: How My Relationships Are Better
Than Yours," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26, no. 12 (2000).
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Chinese culture. 14 This psychological phenomenon has already been productively
applied to the study of international conflict." 5 From the perspective of this dissertation,
it should lead to underestimation of the adversary.
However, this effect will occur whether or not the theories of victory are similar
or different. Thus, on first glance, it would not seem to speak to the hypothesis
introduced above. Thus, regarding this last psychologically derived argument (and to
some extent the fourth point as well), some additional discussion is necessary. There
are reasons to expect them to be particularly pronounced in cases of different theories of
victory. That is because in many circumstances, cognitive errors will be overcome:
[G]roups of at least seven or eight decisionmakers (and probably as few as two, three or
four), especially across time, would correct cognitive biases made by one individual, or
the group would at least override an individual's error even if the individual persevered in
his or her cognitive misperception-the group would refuse to make the same simple
error as a particular individual. Further, most individuals would correct their errors if
they were made aware of them." 6
However, there are situations when it will be easier to correct such biases and some
situations that will make it harder to do so.
When a state compares its own capabilities to an adversary's, if they are similar in
nature, such exaggerations would seem harder to sustain. However, differences in the
nature of capabilities (or strategies) should allow for a wider range of dissonance.
114 V. S. Y. Kwan, M. H. Bond, and T. M. Singelis, "Pancultural Explanations for Life Satisfaction:
Adding Relationship Harmony to Self-Esteem," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73
(1997). Also see the discussion in Michael Harris Bond, Virginia S. Y. Kwan, and Chun Li,
"Decomposing a Sense of Superiority: The Differential Social Impact of Self-Regard and Regard for
Others," Journal of Research in Personality 34 (2000).
115 Dominic D.P. Johnson, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Dominic D.P. Johnson, Richard W. Wrangham,
and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Is Military Incompetence Adaptive? An Empirical Test with Risk-Taking
Behaviour in Modem Warfare," Evolution and Human Behavior 23 (2002); Richard W. Wrangham,
"Is Military Incompetence Adaptive?," Evolution and Human Behaviour 20 (1999).
116 Jane Kellett-Cramer, "9/I 1, Exaggerating Threats and the Poverty of Psychological Theories for
Explaining National Misperceptions," in ISA Annual Meeting (Portland, Ore.: 2003), 12.
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Scholarship in the psychology literature has noted, "it is often hard to distinguish reality
from illusion. This is especially difficult when one is dealing with people's
interpretations or subjective perceptions of stimuli and events that do not have a sure,
physical basis.""'7 When both sides are operating under similar theories of victory,
assessments of one's opponents forces and plans will be less subject to "interpretations or
subjective perceptions" than if the two sides have very different theories of victory. As
noted above, there is no objectively rational strategy or doctrine; they are more art than
science."8 Thus, correcting one's own bias or that of others will be more challenging in
such cases where the differences between how the two sides view effective war making
reduce the clear basis upon which assessments might be made.
Summary.
The graphical representation above in Figure 2-2 can be expanded to include this
hypothesis as shown in the flow chart below.
117 Taylor and Brown, "Positive Illusions," 22.
118 Again, see Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?."
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Figure 2-3: The Causal Chain of H,
Hexistine Hi
This figure moves first from the sources of doctrines and theories of victory to them.
Then, when those theories differ substantially, they can interact across nations leading to
differences in perception between them.
Complications and Extensions.
For the theory to be correct, it is not necessary for all of these seven factors to
hold in a particular instance. Any one of them will lead a state to perceive an
adversary's capabilities as being relatively weaker than the adversary itself views them to
be. Their relative absence will decrease the likelihood of the miscommunications and
differences in perception that this hypothesis predicts. Thus, when nations have
relatively similar theories of victory, both sides are more likely to understand coercive
threats similarly."9 (Of course, strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy can fail for
119 Shimshoni makes a similar observation within one of his cases, but does not develop it. He describes
the better prospects for clear communication between Jordan and Israel in the mid-1950s than in 1948
because both sides had a lengthening and relatively intense history of small-scale border raids. This
made it easier for each side to understand the implications of other's moves in this regard. However,
it is unclear to what extent Shimshoni views that as caused by learning about the other side's intent or
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many reasons other than miscommunication, for instance, if the two sides both care
deeply about a particular issue. 20)
Note also that the latter five rationales will all apply to cases where innovation has
not occurred, but where one adversary has nevertheless chosen a strategy different from
that of its opponent. Budgetary reasons or factors particular to a local strategic
geography might cause this. (Indeed, there is already recognition that power
assessments in the former circumstances is particularly difficult: "The elusiveness of the
balance of power is intensified by the differences in states' resources." 2 1)
This hypothesis predicts a difference in perception between the two sides
regarding each other's capabilities. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this
hypothesis is not predicting misperception by one of parties per se. Clearly, if there is a
difference of perception and an objective reality,' 22 then one of two sides is misperceiving
the situation (and thus this dissertation will generally use the language of
"misperception"'z3). However, this hypothesis is agnostic as to which of the two sides is
correct and which is wrong. Indeed, it is quite possible that both sides are
misperceiving the actual situation. Measuring power and capabilities is inherently
whether the shared understanding of doctrine and tactics made signaling easier. See Shimshoni,
Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 65.
120 Again, see the discussion in the previous chapter on deterrence failure in general.
121 William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 305.
122 Contrary to some critical theorists, this dissertation takes the approach that there is a reality that is
generally knowable or observable. For the alternate view, see, for instance, Hayward R. Alker,
Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
123 Jervis does the same thing, avoiding the question of who is right and focusing on the differences in
perception. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 29.
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difficult.'24 Judging which side perceives correctly and which is not (in cases where the
two sides' perceptions differ) is a complex task, and it is not the goal of this
dissertation.'25 Rather, the goal here is to focus on the effects of different perceptions,
regardless of which side is correct.
The theory also does not make predictions regarding the perceptions of offense or
defense dominance. Again, this is clearly a very important variable in the study of
international security.'26 However, the theory proposed here does not make any
predictions about proneness to offensive ideologies. Rather, it suggests that under
circumstances of doctrinal differences, states will be overconfident regarding their own
forces compared to those of the adversary regardless of whether they expect offense or
defense to be more important in future conflicts.
Opacity, Inflation, and Underestimation.
Each of those seven factors supports the overall hypothesis, suggesting that
differences in theories of victory can lead to misperceptions regarding an adversary's
military power. Thus, all support the opacity component of the hypothesis. Most go
further to also explain why, ceteris paribus, one should expect that opacity to lead to an
underestimation.
124 Again, that is the conclusion of a large body of work. See footnote 22, in the previous chapter. That
would suggest that such dual misperceptions are relatively common. Measuring that-the frequency
of dual misperceptions-is not the goal of this dissertation, which has not been designed to do that
effectively.
125 That said, given that in many cases these misperceptions result in violent conflict, the objective reality
of the power balance and the efficacy of specific theories of victory can be measured.
126 See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive."; Stephen Van
Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 (1998); Stephen
Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
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This is not to say that in all circumstances the opacity that comes from the
difference in theories of victory will lead to underestimation. In some cases, threat
inflation, or overestimation, may be more likely.
For instance, motivated biases will often trump other factors. Thus, in the 1970s
and 1980s, elements of the U.S. military were able to make use of the opacity that came
from the differences in theories of victory between the United States and the Soviet
Union to inflate the Soviet threat, leading to increased budgets.'2 7 While opacity might
make such threat inflation easier, when organizations are strongly motivated to
exaggerate a threat they will often find a way to do so, regardless of the clarity with
which analysts might see the world.'28 The role of such motivated biases is well
studied.'29 In cases where such motivated biases are high, they will dominate the more
subtle effects being examined here and will play a major role in shaping the eventual
perception regarding the adversary.
127 Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance."
128 A recent example is the second Bush Administrations concerns with Iraq's connections to Al Qaeda in
2003 that were widely viewed as fallacious by civilian analysts (and indeed many governmental
bureaucrats as well). No opacity was at work here, just motivated bias by the neoconservative
elements in the political leadership. See Chaim Kaufman, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the
Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security 29, no. 1 (2004).
129 For recent work, see Kellett-Cramer, "National Security Panics"; Kellett-Cramer, "9/11, Exaggerating
Threats and the Poverty of Psychological Theories for Explaining National Misperceptions."; Van
Evera, Causes of War, Chapter 6. For earlier works, see Model III in Allison, Essence of Decision.
For the classic statement of the way in which bureaucracies can pursue their motivated biases, see
Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, espec. Chapter Nine:
Maneuvers to Affect Information. For more specific work on the role of military biases for offensive
operations, in part due to their effects on budgets, see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Snyder,
The Ideology of the Offensive.
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Similarly, some argue that there is a general pressure in international relations at
the systemic level toward conservatism.'30 Such conservatism will be prudent in an
uncertain and anarchic world. To the extent this is true, this would thus lead to pressure
toward overestimation of the adversary. This too can be thought of as a form of
"motivated bias".
This study has not been designed to assess the relative impacts of these two sorts
of misperceptions in international affairs (that is, motivated bias toward threat inflation
and the organizational and cognitive based hypothesis above leading to underestimation).
Rather, it aims to sketch out a plausibility probe of the less studied of these, that is, the
way in which differences in theories of victory can lead to chronic underestimations of
the adversary, ceteris paribus. Thus, it makes predictions about very specific
circumstances when pressure for overestimation (coming from neo-realism's anarchy,
budgetary competition, or elsewhere) will face a countervailing dynamic working in the
opposite direction due to the organizational, cultural, and psychological factors listed
above.
Examples.
An excellent example of the phenomenon described by the above hypothesis
occurred in the early part of World War II as the United States considered how to face
Germany on the plains of Europe. There, American beliefs about the nature of armored
warfare led to a set of policy decisions that hurt it when battle was joined. Elman's
description of the issues involved summarizes the point well:
130 Such a logic sits at the heart of Mearsheimer's argument that great powers strive for power
maximization rather than power balancing. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
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With respect to U.S. tanks, the belief that tank vs. tank combat could be avoided,
combined with a continuing stress on mobility, led to an almost complete reliance on
medium tanks. It was quickly recognized that light tanks were of little use on the
modern battlefield. In addition, official American doctrine had no place for slow, heavy
tanks that could take on German Panthers and Tigers. Although it was recognized that
Sherman medium tanks would be unequal to German heavy tanks in a fight, official
policy held that such combat was a matter of choice not necessity. This policy rested on
two errors. The first was relying on tank destroyers, which with the exception of a few
later and more powerful models, were unequal to the task. The second was the mistaken
belief that tank vs. tank combat was an option that the U.S. ground forces could choose to
decline at their convenience. The fact was that tanks did fight tanks, and the U.S. tanks
were not very good at it.
In short, between 1941 and 1946, U.S. reactions were heavily influenced by pre-existing
organizational sub-cultures, and by the results of decades of bureaucratic infighting.'31
It was only after the defeats at the Battle of the Bulge in 1945 that the United States
began experimenting with heavier tanks on the battlefield, even though they had engaged
Tigers (Panzer Mark VI) as early as 1943 in Tunisia.'32
Beyond the lack of hardware, the United States had doctrinal problems as well.
The U.S. Army had been slow to come to accept the role for an independent armor force.
As late as 1939, official doctrine stated, "As a rule, tanks are employed to assist the
advance of infantry foot troops, either preceding or accompanying the infantry assault
echelon." 3 3 Before the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, armor was an integral part of either
131 Elman, "The Logic of Emulation", 102-3.
132 Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, Kan.: University
Press of Kansas, 200 1), Chapter 5: The Complexity of Total War, 1942-45.
133 Quoted in George S. Patton and Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1885-1940 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1972), 1048.
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Cavalry or Infantry units.'m Even officers later identified with armor breakthrough
battles still firmly supported horse cavalry in 1940.'35
The result of these limitations of hardware and doctrine was straightforward: As
Elman writes, "The Germans destroyed a lot of American tanks."'3 6 In this case, the
American theory of victory, as manifested through weapons purchases and doctrinal
thinking, led to an underestimation of the enemy that resulted in substantial losses and
casualties.
Guderian similarly shows the link between a difference in doctrine across nations
and an assessment of the balance of power between them:
Despite possessing the strongest forces for mobile warfare the French had also built the
strongest line of fortifications in the world, the Maginot Line. Why was the money
spent on the construction of those fortifications not used for the modernization and
strengthening of Frances mobile forces? The proposals of de Gaulle, Daladier and
others along these lines had been ignored. From this it must be concluded that the
highest French leadership either would not or could not grasp the significance of the tank
in mobile warfare.' 3 7
For Guderian here, the differences in doctrine between France and Germany lead him to
deprecate the quality of leadership on the other side. 38
134 For discussion of this period, see Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of
20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1985); Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers.Johnson notes that there had
been a brief period when independence of the Armor arm was possible, through the "Mechanized
Force," but that "interbranch frictions, most notably the opposition of the chief of infantry" led
MacArthur to quash that organizational creativity. Ibid., p. 1 16.
135 Patton is an excellent example. See Patton and Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1885-1940, 1034,
inter alia.
136 Elman, "The Logic of Emulation", 103.
137 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 94-6.
138 It is certainly arguable that this judgment was correct. However, the maligning of the Maginot Line
in military history seems excessive. It achieved its operational goal of deterring a German attack
directly across the French-German border. The attack of May 1940 went around the Maginot Line
and was successful in no small part due to luck. (Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest
of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).) Furthermore, the key point here is that the perception
of the adversary was heavily influenced by the difference between the two sides' doctrines.
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As Napoleon weighed his strategy against the British at the dawn of the 19th
century, he too made a number of underestimations attributable to the vastly different
approaches to warfare that the British and French held at the time. Sea power had many
advantages at the time:
In brief, six times as many guns of much heavier caliber, could be transported daily by
Nelson's fleet as by Napoleon's army, at one-fifth of the logistic cost and at five times
the speed.' 139
Yet, Napoleon's inability to understand British prowess at naval warfare caused him to
repeatedly overestimate his own capabilities relative to the British. In 1805 his
"grandiose plan" '4 to invade England had many problems that stemmed from his limited
understanding of naval affairs:
Although Napoleon could impose a ruthlessly enforced timetable for the grand army's
marches from Boulogne to Austerlitz, he could not so order the movements of wind
driven ships. The ocean was not the "drill-ground" he assumed it to be and his plan
took little account of the difficulties of evading the blockading British' 4'
Similarly, he was convinced that flat bottom boats would be sufficient for the crossing:
"the channel, he declared, 'is a ditch one can jump whenever one is bold enough to try
it." '4 2 His overconfidence was directly related to his ignorance about warfare at sea:
INapoleon] not only sustained a larger strategic vision than any of his subordinates could
frame; he was also driven by a far more powerful resolution, all the stronger because his
ignorance of the sea dissolved the difficulties that they-and Villeneuve in
particular-knew to lie between the vision and its realization.
His resulting defeat was legendary: "Trafalgar was, in short, a massacre."'4 3
139 John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York, N.Y.: Viking,
1989), 48.
140 David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 (New York, NY: Arnold Publishing, 1997), 103.
141 Richard Woodman, The Sea Warriors: Fighting Captains and Frigate Warfare in the Age of Nelson
(New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2001), 173-74. Similarly, Keegan writes: "Napoleon
the general might have found ways of defying winter on land...Napoleon the admiral could not
command the waters." Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, 20.
142 Tom Pocock, The Terror before Trafalgar: Nelson, Napoleon, and the Secret War (New York, NY:
W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 90, see also 95.
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These examples highlight the importance of doctrinal and strategic thinking on
power assessments; that is, they underscore the first hypothesis, linking doctrinal
differences to perception. The next hypothesis (and the examples that follow it)
suggests the importance of this type of effect on international security.
Hypothesis #2
The second component of the dissertation's logic is expressed as H2.
H2: An underestimation of an adversary's capabilities- that comes from H, -can
lead to deterrence and coercive failure, escalation, and conflict because it
complicates (H2A) assessments of the balance of power and (H2B)
interpretation of the adversary's signals.
This hypothesis explains the ways in which false optimism leads to war by highlighting
two distinct, but interacting, causal chains: one pertains to capability, the other to intent.
First, underestimation of an adversary's capabilities leads to a misunderstanding
of the overall military balance (H2A). As Jervis notes, "Since the interpretation of
indices depends on theories, perceivers are likely to go astray when these are
incorrect."'"4 4 This can lead the underestimating nation to think that it is stronger than it
really is. As a result, that nation may pursue more assertive policies than it would have
if it correctly estimated its adversary's capabilities. This can lead to failures of strategic
coercion and unnecessary conflict. A large body of work on the causes of war has
suggested this causal chain. 45 This is the first possible outcome highlighted by H2.
143 Keegan, The Price ofAdmiralty, 100.
144 Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," in Political
Psychology, ed. Kristen R. Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2002), 304.
145 Again, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), Chapter 3:
Dreams and Delusions of a Coming War; John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 8th ed. (New
York: Wadsworth, 200 1); Van Evera, Causes of War, Chapter 2: False Optimism: Illusions of the
Coming War.
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Second, when a nation underestimates an adversary's capabilities, then signals
that the adversary sends using its own capabilities will look relatively weak to the first
nation (H2B). Nations often use such signals to communicate the degree of their
interests.'46 Indeed such signals appear attractive because they promise exceptional
clarity.'47 However, the universal clarity of military signals should not be overstated.
When nations have different views about the efficacy of the adversary's forces and
strategies, such signals about depth of interests will be hard to interpret. A warship in
the harbor is clear to states that know what that represents. However, for states with no
background in naval warfare, the meaning is less clear, as the related examples below
suggest. At a broad level, Van Evera makes a similar point:
States rarely exaggerate their own will, but they often underestimate the enemy's. As a
result, they misjudge the endurance or the materiel that each will commit to the war,
seeing an illusory balance in their own favor. This fosters false expectations of
victory.'4
The logic of this causal chain of H2 specifies a specific source of the misperception that
Van Evera writes of, that is, difficulties in signaling by the two sides during attempts at
strategic coercion.
Both causal chains-misperceptions of the overall military balance or
miscommunications of the depth of one side's interest-can result in the failure of
coercive diplomacy. Worse, they have the potential to interact. States expect their
adversaries to make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses, and this will affect one
state's understanding of the other side's intent. That is, if state A thinks its adversary,
146 Arquilla, "Louder Than Words," 163. See also Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining.
147 Arquilla, "Louder Than Words," 157. See the discussion above regarding implicit coercive threats on
page 59.
148 Van Evera, Causes of War, 25.
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state B, believes a particular conflict will lead to B's own destruction (an assessment
made on capability grounds), then first state, A, is likely to expect restraint by B (a
judgment about the adversary's intent). State A is likely to make this judgment about
how A thinks B sees the outcome of the future conflict on the basis of A's own theory of
victory. However, in B's actual assessment, B is likely to use its own theory of victory
to make that determination, and the two side's theory of victory might be quite distinct.
Intentions always must be informed by the costs and benefits of pursuing specific goals.
The problem is, however, each side makes such cost-benefit calculations using its own
theory of victory to enlighten their analysis.
When strategic coercion fails, violence is often the result as states follow through
on their deterrent or compellent threats for both reputational and intrinsic reasons.'9
Thus, this hypothesis predicts the potential the militarization of a crisis or an escalation of
an existing conflict.'50
Examples.
Several examples of this second hypothesis leap from the annals of military
history. In 1973, Israeli assessments of the balance of power between themselves and
the Arab states suggested a wide margin of comfort. Less than two months before the
devastating attacks that began the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Defense Minister
149 On the role of reputation in international politics, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke,
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1974), 523-26; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics; Daryl G. Press, Calculating
Credibility: How Leaders Assess Threats During Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
forthcoming, 2005).
150 For scores of examples of the link between failures of coercive diplomacy and war see the large
deterrence and deterrence failure literature. E.g., George and Smoke, Deterrence in American
Foreign Policy. George H. Quester, "Some Thoughts on 'Deterrence Failures'," in Perspectives on
Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Alexander L. George
and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994);
Paul W. Schroeder, "Failed Bargain Crises, Deterrence, and the International System," in Perspectives
on Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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concluded, "The balance of forces is so much in our favor that it neutralizes the Arab
considerations and motives for the immediate renewal of hostilities."'5 ' That same
summer, then Deputy Prime Minister and heroic general from the War of 1948, Yigal
Allon suggested, "Egypt had no military option at all."'5 2
However, the Israeli estimates were substantially incorrect, as the initial Egyptian
advances in the Sinai showed. Two key differences between the Egyptians and the
Israelis were central to this overconfidence. Egypt had made good use of mobile
surface to air missiles (particularly the SA-6 system) and had integrated man-portable
anti-armor weapons (Sagger and RPG-7s) in their infantry formations. These weapons
and the associated doctrinal changes allowed the Egyptians to make substantial gains.'53
"At least half of the first attacking Israeli planes were shot down by the unexpectedly
accurate and devastating Egyptian antiaircraft fire."'54 One of the front-line IDF
armored brigades lost nearly all of its 100 tanks to infantry forces.'55 These two
innovations reduced key Israeli military advantages.
This example highlights the way in which different theories of victory can lead to
underestimation of the adversary's capabilities by complicating assessment of the balance
of power (as predicted by H 2 A). The Israelis did not understand the changed Egyptian
151 Quoted in Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974, 3rd ed. (Dubuque,
Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1992), 406.
152 Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1999),
191.
153 In this case, the weapons themselves were critical. Thus, it is important to keep the focus on a
"theory of victory" rather than the more limited doctrine.
154 Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 419.
155 Ibid.
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capabilities and how they would fit in their overall theory of victory. That, in turn, led
to mischaracterizations of the overall balance of power in Jerusalem.
World War II again provides several examples of this phenomenon. One
historian describes its occurrence in the outbreak of war in the west: French and British
leaders made no effort to understand how or why German thinking might differ from
theirs.'" Guderian also provides an excellent example of the other phenomenon
highlighted in this hypothesis, that of inferring intent of the adversary through the lens of
one's own doctrine (H2B, above). He writes,
But so far as the French leaders were concerned, we were amazed that they had not taken
advantage of their favorable situation during the autumn of 1939 to attack, while the bulk
of the German forces, including the entire armored force, was engaged in Poland. Their
reasons for such restraint were at the time hard to see. We could only guess. Be that
as it may, the caution shown by the French leaders led us to believe that our adversaries
hoped somehow to avoid a serious clash of arms.' 7
Here, Guderian is inferring French intent or motivation from French action. Of course,
that is commonplace. What is of interest from this dissertation's perspective is that the
action in question-French inaction-seems clearly based on the theory of victory that
held sway in the Hotel de Brienne (that is, one that had neglected the offensive potential
for blitzkrieg warfare). This link between a perception regarding the adversary's theory
of military to his intent is precisely the point of the hypothesis.'58 A policy taken
156 May, Strange Victory, 480.
157 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 97.
158 And, as noted above, while one of the two sides must be misperceiving the situation, the theory
advanced in this dissertation is making no predictions about which side that is. Rather, it makes use
of the difference in perception between the two sides. In terms of this specific case, while the usual
historiography of the Battle of France would suggest that Guderian was right, and that the Maginot line
should not have been emphasized as much, some scholars would point out that it played a key role in
deterring Hitler's attack prior to May 1940. Again see May, Strange Victory; Mearsheimer,
Conventional Deterrence.
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primarily because of a particular doctrine communicates a mistaken view of French intent
to Germany.
Summary of the Entire Theory
For international communication to be effective, both sides must understand the
language of diplomacy. When that language depends on military threats, different
theories of victory can lead to problems in translation and thus, unnecessary conflict. In
order to send an effective signal to an adversary, nations have to understand how that
adversary will interpret the signal. Military measures often are taken to express will or
intent. This demands that nations understand their adversary's perceptual framework.
When a nation sends a deterrent or coercive signal by using military force, or the threat of
it, the perceptual framework through which an adversary will interpret the signal depends
on its views of what constitutes effective military strategies and capabilities. When
these views are substantially different across nations, the signals will be difficult to
interpret. Because of the tendency to overstate one's own power, in general (as outlined
in H1), the signals will be too weak to appropriately shape the adversary's views, leading
to deterrence or coercive failure and thus escalation or conflict.'5 9
Before concluding this discussion of the theory, it is useful to return to expand on
Figure 2-2 and 1-3 to show how these three elements fit together. Figure 2-4, below,
works from the sources of beliefs of theories of victory to those theories themselves, then
to the difference in perceptions that they can cause, and finally to the negative
international outcomes that can arise from those. Again, this project focuses on the
159 Of course, strategic coercion can fail for many reasons other than miscommunication, for instance, if
the two sides both care deeply about a particular issue. Again, see the discussion in the previous
chapter.
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middle link primarily, and to a lesser extent the final link. H2 and especially Hexisting
literature have already been the subject of much research, thus the primary value added from
this dissertation will come from testing H.
Figure 2-4: The Complete Causal Chain
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To make this causal discussion complete, it should be noted that if there is a
difference in theories of victory, then both sides will likely have their perceptions of the
other's military power affected. This should lead to both sides underestimating their
adversary in an overall power sense and to underestimate the signals that the other sends
using its capabilities.'" Thus, a complete version of the causal flow chart above would
include the effects on both states, as shown below.
160 Again, these underestimations are relative to the perceptions of the other side in terms of both the
overall balance and the strength of the signals it intends to send.
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Figure 2-5: The Interaction of Both States' Perspectives
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To reduce the complexity, it will be easier to use the earlier figure (Figure 2-4) when
considering the logic of the theory.
Research Methodology
These two hypotheses will be evaluated through the study of several cases. This
section describes the grounds for choosing the specific cases after outlining several
aspects of the research methodology, including a discussion of specific empirical
predictions of the general theoretical hypotheses, consideration of alternate explanations,
the manner in which each case is approached, and coding criterion.
Predictions
These two hypotheses lead to eleven specific predictions that should be apparent
in the empirical record. These are essentially indicators of the validity of the theory and
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can be used to test it.'6 ' They are grouped here into several different categories. First,
perceptions about war and the balance of power should exhibit underestimation of the
enemy and overconfidence regarding a state's own capability. Second, signaling and
judgments about intent should be conducted through the lens of one's own theory of
victory. Third, actors should be surprised once reality contradicts their perceptions.
Finally, extreme values on the independent variable (at either an individual or national
level) should lead to extreme outcomes. Specific predictions in each of these categories
are listed below.
Perceiving the Balance of Power and the Nature of War
I) Differences in theories of victory should correlate with states underestimating an
adversary's capabilities, ceteris paribus. Conversely, similarities in beliefs should
correlate with states having more accurate assessments of each other's military capabilities,
ceteris paribus.
2) Before conflict, leaders of states with different theories of victory should denigrate the
other side's theory of victory relative to their own.
3) Leaders of states with different theories of victory should not have nuanced discussions of
the merits of their adversaries' strategies, nor recognize that their adversaries' financial
and strategic situations mandate their choice of strategy.
4) Each side should believe that battles will be dominated by factors emphasized by its own
theory of victory.
Signaling and Intent Issues
5) When signaling to the other side, each side should send signals that make use of forces in
accordance with its own theory of victory.
6) A state's assessment of its adversary's intent should depend, in part, on the first state's
understanding of the adversary's cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, that understanding
will likely be incorrect because the first state will assess costs and benefits differently than
its adversary when the two sides have different theories of victory.
7) Leaders of states with different theories of victory should downplay the likelihood of the
other side getting involved in a conflict or in further raising the stakes in it.
Perceptions Meet Reality: Surprise!
8) Actual battle outcomes, when they occur, should deviate further from leaders'
expectations when nations have more different theories of victory guiding their forces.
161 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997).
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(a) In cases where one side forced the battle on the other, the side taking the initiative
should be surprised at its difficulties on the battlefield.
(b) In cases where both sides pursued battle, both sides should be surprised at their
difficulties.
(c) More generally, any leader who believes s/he has a viable strategy in the context
of the current conflict should be surprised at its (relative) shortcomings when
battle is actually joined.
(d) Leaders often have incentives to conceal their surprise, so it may manifest itself
as hastily reinforcing or last minute changes in strategy.
9) Leaders should be surprised about the degree of adversary interest in an issue when the
signaling over the issue made use of military forces (or threats about them) that are
different than their own. (Indeed, they may ascribe aggressive motives to the other side
because of this.)
Extreme Values on IV Lead to Extreme Indicators
10) Larger differences between the two states' theories of victory should correlate with a
larger or more frequent underestimation of the adversary's capability.
II) Leaders (both political and military) deeply versed in their own theory of victory should be
more likely to misperceive and miscalculate than leaders less imbued with that particular
view.
Investigation of the empirical record in the cases is centered on these predictions
as well as the hypotheses more generally. These predictions focus on relatively
operationalized factors stemming from the hypotheses, and thus ease the task of assessing
the theory's validity. To the extent the cases do align with these predictions, the
dissertation's hypotheses are supported.
Again, per the discussion preceding Figure 2-5, since these logics should apply to
both sides, the predictions should as well. Thus, both sides ought be surprised at how
difficult military operations are, at their adversary's intent, etc.
(These predictions, along with the hypotheses they support, are reprinted on a
single page at the end of this chapter for easy reference.)
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Additional explanations
Clearly, this proposed theory does not have a monopoly on possible explanations
for failures of strategic coercive attempts. The previous chapter, in the section entitled
"What We Know about Achieving Deterrence Success," discussed a number of alternate
insights. It will be useful to draw on these to create a baseline for comparison with the
proposed theory. If the proposed theory provides no "value-added" in terms of
increased accuracy of prediction over the existing theories, then they ought be
sufficient.'62 The roles of several of these various alternate factors are suggested in the
chart below, using the graphical framework introduced above.
Figure 2-6: The Complexity of the Real World
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The argument that the "'objective' quality of the signal" is key to coercion
success or failure represents the most important elements conventional wisdom about
162 For other factors that contribute to a theory's utility to the field see Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane,
and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Van Evera, Guide to Methods.
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assessing the prospects for success in strategic coercion.' 3 Therefore, this will be used
as an Alternate Hypothesis (and is labeled as such on the figure). Stated precisely, the
hypothesis that will be tested is:
HAte,,e: Weak signals are more likely to lead to coercive failure and escalation
,~ .while strong signals are more likely to lead to coercive success.
This simple version of. the basic deterrence logic will be used to incorporate arguments
about strength or weakness of the coercer's capabilities (both local and global) as well as
the clarity of the signal.
This Alternate Hypothesis will be used to evaluate the proposed theory; it will
serve as a foil for the approach that focuses on the difference in the theory of victory.
Thus, this dissertation conducts a Lakatosian three-cornered test.'64 Does consideration
of the doctrinal differences allow us to predict coercive failure better than focusing on the
"objective" size and quality of the signal alone? While labeled an Alternate Hypothesis,
the proposed theory of doctrinal differences should be thought of as additive rather than
strictly alternative. That is, it seems quite clear that the Alternate Hypothesis has some
validity. The question is, will accuracy of explanation and prediction be significantly
increased by consideration of the hypotheses suggested here in addition to the Alternate
Hypothesis? The increase in accuracy must be significant since by adding additional
factors to consider the complexity of the entire undertaking increases. Thus, the
163 Again, see the discussion in the introduction chapter on the three Cs.
164 Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, England: University
Press, 1970). For a discussion on Lakatos and three-cornered tests that suggests an alternate way to
understand his contributions, see Elman, "The Logic of Emulation", Appendix Two. The usage used
here remains consistent with the standard usage in the field.
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dissertation's theory sacrifices parsimony in the hopes of gaining accuracy.'6 5 This
research design evaluates that aspiration.
Beyond that, complexity of the real world, as shown by the above discussion of
the myriad of influences on the success of strategic coercion, should lead to modesty in
claims. There are many sources of misperceptions and this dissertation focuses only on
a single one. Nevertheless, it is an important one, for reasons outlined in both the
introduction and conclusion chapters.
Case Procedure
For each of the cases, the dissertation uses congruence tests, process tracing
within the cases, and the method of differences across the cases to evaluate the
hypotheses and associated predictions.66 Predictions derived from the hypotheses allow
for detailed process tracing to assess the causal force of the theory in the case material.
Assessing these various ancillary predictions of the theory generally requires examination
of leaders' statements, policies implemented, and reactions to the adversary's behavior.
Process tracing within cases can provide relatively robust grounds to assess the validity
of a theory as it characterizes not only macro-level outcomes but micro-level processes
165 On the value of the latter, see Van Evera, Guide to Methods; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979).
166 On the former, see the discussion on case studies in Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the
Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 691-93. On its utility for
theory building, see Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of
Political Science, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1975); Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," Comparative
Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975). Also see the discussion of the comparative method in Lijphart,
"Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 685-91. For a contemporary discussion of the
merits of qualitative approaches, see King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 209-12.
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by which the outcomes occur and judges whether these correspond with the theory's
predictions.'67 The data requirements for this methodology are, thus, substantial.
After a brief summary of the relevant history, each case begins with an evaluation
of the two nations' beliefs regarding doctrine and effective military strategies. Drawing
on existing work on strategic beliefs and doctrine,' the cases use contemporaneous
writings on strategy, tactics and doctrine, as well as the make up of military forces to
code this, the independent variable. Within the cases, the strategic contexts of
importance at different periods vary. Thus, the relevant beliefs are not always the same
across cases and must be coded accordingly.
Next, each case assesses the signaling involved in a particular period. That is,
what was the nature of the signaling? Did it depend on implicit or explicit threats of the
use of force? Was the force in question easily comprehensible to the other side?
The last of these questions obviously begins to bring the responding side, and the
following section in each case formally takes that up by assessing the interpretation of
the signals explicitly. How well were the signals interpreted? Did the responder's
theory of victory impede this process?
Finally, any evidence relevant to either side's post-event evaluation (that is, from
after the attempt at strategic coercion fails or succeeds) is assessed. Was either side
surprised by the difficulties their forces faced? About the degree of opposition from
their opponent? These questions are suggested by the predictions section above, and
will help to ascertain the accuracy of the theory in these cases.
167 On the merits of process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, forthcoming, 2004).
168 See the citations at and following note 14 in this chapter.
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Coding Theories of Victory (the IV)
Theories of victory are likely to vary across nations and across time. The
various sources of doctrine, as discussed above, are one set of influences; additionally,
nations might have different goals or different national interests. In order to describe
the differences between any two theories of victory (that is, the independent variable for
HI), it is useful to be familiar with the range of possible beliefs at a general level.
For this purpose, many factors can be used to compare nations' theories of victory.
One dimension is clearly the make up of the forces: are the actual components of forces
between two nations similar? Do both have an air force, for instance? If so, does a
similar mix of fighter and bombers characterize them both? Several dimensions are
useful in coding this dimension: manpower based versus technology and machine-based
(i.e., labor versus capital); maneuver versus firepower and fortifications; preferences for
quantity over quality; emphasis on one service over another; reliance on particular
platforms within services; etc.
A second dimension looks directly at the military doctrine tactics planned for with
a given set of forces. That is, a force made up of approximately 80 divisions with some
2500-3000 tanks might concentrate their tanks or spread them out across the army.69 A
doctrine might emphasize flanking maneuvers or head-on attacks (or similarly, mobility
versus positional warfare). Offensive strategies might be preferred to defensive ones.'70
One force might be optimized to attrit an adversary across the entire front, while another
169 This was the case for the two sides in the opening days of WWII in Western Europe. On May 10,
1940 on the Western Front, the British and the French together deployed 3074 tanks to the German
deployment of 2439, and the allies deployed 93 first line divisions to the Germans' 76. May, Strange
Victory, 477-78.
170 Again, for arguments on this point, see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Snyder, The Ideology
of the Offensive; Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive."; Van Evera, Causes of War.
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might aim to secure an initial breakthrough and exploit it.'7 ' Yet another dimension
would look to the political goals that military force is aimed to advance. 172 Will
victory be secured by reducing the relative power of the adversary's military or will the
adversary's society and economy itself be punished?
Evaluating questions such as these allows the difference in theories of victory to
be coded in each case. The examples above serve as a starting point for that evaluation,
although in specific cases, other elements also play a role. Clearly, the potential
variation is very large. At different periods and in different theaters, some of the
questions will be more important than others. Each case goes to substantial lengths to
characterize accurately the appropriate theory of victory for the conflict in question.
The two sides' writing on strategy, tactics and doctrine, as well as their make up
of military forces, are used to evaluate these and to code the differences between two
nations' theories. Even in authoritarian countries, there is a significant amount of
material available on such doctrinal and strategic debates in the public sphere.73 Those
sources, as well as selected declassified (or leaked) documents will be used.
171 See Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 67-133.
172 This tends to get close to the concept of a grand strategy. See Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine, 13.
173 This was the case even for the Soviet Union during the peak of the Cold War. "Careful sifting of a
very rich open Soviet military literature can contribute great to [the study of Soviet concepts of
operationsl. Senior Soviet officers, in far larger numbers than their Western counterparts, write
reams of history and contemporary military analysis. Despite the stultifying and false character of
their ideological framework, which makes these works tiresome to read and frequently hard to accept,
they merit study" (Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward a Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European
Conventional Balance," International Security 13, no. 1 (1988): 212.)
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Case Selection
Three Sino-American cases from the early cold war test these hypotheses in this
dissertation. The cases focus on particular stages within crises in which critical
decisions were being made regarding the future. In particular, they focus on the
outcome of attempts at strategic coercion. This focus on crisis periods is warranted
since the hypotheses center on the difficulties in signaling and interpretation, and crises
are often periods of intense communication between the two sides. Thus, these cases
are data rich.
The three cases evaluated in this dissertation are:
a) The United States decision to cross the 3 8th parallel,
b) China's earlier approval of North Korea's invasion of the South, and
c) The Chinese decision to postpone the invasion of Taiwan in the face of the
American deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait.
All three occur in 1950, which permits the extensive data collection and detailed analysis
that the research procedure outlined above requires. The first two attempts at strategic
coercion were not successful and resulted in avoidable escalations of conflict. In the
third attempt, strategic coercion was successful, and the great powers avoided expansion
of their conflict to another theater.
These three cases focus on several of the most important strategic coercive
attempts that could have succeeded in this period. That is, there were other coercive
attempts (discussed below), but they failed because the basic national interests of one (or
really both) of the two parties involved were fundamentally in conflict, rather than some
misperception. Miscommunication did not cause the other escalations, and a better
understanding of the two sides' interests and plans would not have avoided them. There
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is widespread agreement that such cases are not usefully studied in a deterrence or
strategic coercion framework.'74
Undoubtedly, there are other theories that contribute to the understanding of the
Korean War in general, and these decisions in particular. Bipolarity in general meant
that conflict between the east and west was very likely in this period.'75 Security
dilemmas certainly contribute to the understanding of China's behavior,'7 as does
window theory (i.e., the Korean War presented either a window of vulnerability or
opportunity for China).77 This dissertation is not designed to determine which of these
different approaches (or others) best explains the Korean War. Rather, it tests two
different theories against each other to probe their validity more generally.
(Indeed, some of these alternate theoretical approaches complement that taken
here in terms of providing a rich explanation for the Korean War. International relations
scholarship emphasizes the particularly acute dangers posed by states motivated by both
174 This is the point of Oye's admonition: "When you observe conflict, think Deadlock-the absence of
mutual interest-before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized." Kenneth A. Oye,
"Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Cooperation under Anarchy,
ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 7. See also Matthew
Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament: Negotiations in the 1950s," World Politics 42, no.
4(1990).
175 This is a theme in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Waltz, Theory of
International Politics.
176 Allen Suess Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, NY:
Macmillan, 1960).
177 Christensen highlights several elements consistent with this logic in Thomas J. Christensen, Useful
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 153-76. See also his forthcoming book
manuscript: Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliances in U.S.-PRC Security
Relations (forthcoming).
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insecurity and greed.'" Arguments using the logics of the security dilemma and closing
windows explain sources of Chinese insecurity. The theory presented in this
dissertation contributes to the explanation of greed: Chinese leaders expected victory to
be cheap.)
The Merits of the Chosen Cases
There are several reasons why these three cases are particularly attractive for
study. These different crises within an individual conflict can be considered a 'set of
crises.' By selecting such closely related cases, the analyst can immerse himself in the
history and culture of the countries involved.' 70 Doing so allows him to "reduce the
'property space"' and create "comparable cases" in Lijphart's terms.'" This is
particularly important given the substantial requirements with regard to data collection
that assessing this theory requires (as noted above).
Sino-American interaction presents excellent cases for study as plausibility probes
for this theory since, in two of the cases, the two sides had such vastly dissimilar
perspectives on military power: faith in People's War was at its height in this period in
China, whereas the United States was heavily dependent on airpower, capital intensive
ground forces, and nuclear weapons. Thus, two of the cases have extreme values in the
independent variable, and examining instances of strategic coercion that occur under
those conditions should be useful.' 8' Nevertheless, these cases also provide a relatively
178 Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral
and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (1992).
179 On the importance of such immersion, see King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 37ff.
180 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 687.
181 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 43.
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easy test (or a hoop test). If the theory does not provide explanatory value here, it
should not be expected to elsewhere.
Additionally, across the entire set of cases, there is variation in the value of the
independent variable as in the third case there is a low value on the difference of theory
of victory. As King, Keohane and Verba write, "Selecting observations for inclusion in
a study according to the categories of the key causal explanatory variable causes no
inference problems."" Thus, choosing cases because they vary in the independent
variable is a useful research strategy.
Thus, these cases jointly allow a degree of both empirical thoroughness and
methodologic rigor that other cases, more widely separated in time or space, would not.
Another reason why these Sino-American cases are important to study is that they
will provide particular relevance for modern American foreign policy for two reasons.
First, both then and now, the United States faces an adversary that is substantially behind
in technologic terms. It will be clear from subsequent chapters that this is a central
element of the cases. Today, the United States is vastly ahead of any potential
adversary.'83 It seems likely that some lessons drawn from an earlier period with a
similar difference might have particular relevance for current American foreign policy.
Second, Sino-American relations continue to be fraught with tension and
occasional recourse to attempts at strategic coercion.'84 Further, many scholars argue
182 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 137.
183 For a convincing discussion of just how far ahead the United States is, see Stephen G. Brooks and
William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002).
184 On the general tension in the relationship, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams:
Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); James
Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). On the most recent occurrence of coercive diplomacy between
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that culture and ideology play important roles in shaping Chinese foreign policy in
general.'" Learning more about the ways in which miscommunications and
misperceptions occurred to the two in the past can help us to avoid them in the future.
This is critical for the avoidance of nuclear and large-scale conventional war in an era
where some prognosticate a long-term competition between these two countries.'
Even if the phenomenon examined here lacks general applicability, the United States has
overestimated its own capabilities in the past, and seems likely to do so in the future.
This merits examination.
Cases Not Chosen
Two important events in this period are coercive attempts that had no chance of
success. Thus, they are not treated as cases. First, the U.S. decision to intervene in the
war in late June could not have been deterred by the Chinese: nothing the Chinese could
have threatened would have changed the American calculus. Washington, at that point,
already expected the Chinese (and possibly the Soviets) to get involved in the war.'87
the two, see Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the
Use of Force," International Security 25, no. 2 (2000).
185 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1992); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and
Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo
Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998);
Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1995); Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural
Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1985); Ross Terrill, The New Chinese
Empire: And What It Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
186 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Avery
Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," The
China Quarterly, no. 168 (2001); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Fareed Zakaria,
"China: Appease ... Or Contain? Speak Softly, Carry a Veiled Threat," The New York Times,
February 18 1996.
187 On American expectations that China and the Soviets would get involved in the early days of the war,
see several different primary sources: "Memorandum of National Security Council Consultants'
Meeting, Thursday, June 29, 1950," in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
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Given that, there is nothing more the Chinese could have threatened, and indeed there is
no evidence that the Chinese even attempted deterrence at that point.
Second, the U.S. attempt to deter Chinese intervention after Washington had
crossed the 38'h parallel was unlikely to succeed for several reasons. First, the Chinese
viewed any American presence in that part of Korean an inimical to their interests'" and
when they entered the war, they seem to have expected large-scale war with the United
States to ensue.' Thus, deterrence failure is not the primary explanation for the
United States, 1950, vol. I: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977), 327-8. "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick E.
Nolting, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Mathews)," June 30, 1950, in
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VII: Korea
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 258. Chace has a direct quote from
Acheson and Paige has a direct quote from Truman, both supporting this point. James Chace,
Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1998), 287; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York, NY: Free Press,
1968), 248. Note that the Wake Island meeting of October 15, 1950, where American concerns
(expressed by Truman, among others) regarding Chinese entry are much more pronounced, occurs
much later than this early point in time. At that point, the question was whether to push northward,
not whether or not to intervene in the first place. See the discussion on this issue in the cases that
follow.
188 The key piece of evidence here comes from a telegram Mao drafted to send to Stalin. _ig- "~
T~: [~J'~Jk.~/kifJtRz~[~l!~;/k2; l" , 1950F1--}~-[, <<[ _ l"~1[:~c->> , I
-f:9/1949-12/1950( :0(i:± ~ itt±, 1987) 539 ,o. Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Stalin
regarding the decision to send troops to Korea for combat", October 2, 1950, Mao Zedong's
Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State (Beijing, Central Party Documents Publishers, 1987) p.
539. For the most thorough advocation of this argument, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats,
Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams,"
International Security 17, no. 1 (1992). For a broadly concurring view, that emphasizes the key
decisions were all taken in October as the United States approached the 38th parallel and not later as
they approached the Yalu, see Scobell, China's Use of Military Force.
189 For the argument that China expected its entry to lead to a wider war, see Christensen, Useful
Adversaries, 163-74. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao,
and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 159, 181, and 194; Hunt,
Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 188. Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U.S. Aggression, Aiding Korea and
Defending Peace," October 24, 1950, reprinted in Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, I st ed.
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press: Distributed by Guoji Shudian, 1981), 62. Chen Jian is the best-
known proponent of the argument that any American involvement on the peninsula would lead to
Chinese intervention. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 128, 139, 143, 148, 173.
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eventual entry of Chinese forces; rather, the logic of the security dilemma is.'9
However, the Chinese optimism about the conflict that the second case (Chapter 5)
outlines did likely play some supporting role here. However, it would have reduced the
prospects for deterrence success and done so in ways that are similar to the failings
discussed in the second case. Thus, it need not be expounded upon at length separately.
Thus, in these two other cases, difficulties in communication and assessing the
balance of power are unlikely to have had a large effect. In the other three cases Sino-
American cases from this period, there is at least the potential for such an effect; thus,
they merit examination here.
Other cases from outside the early Cold War Sino-American conflict, however,
would likely speak to the issues raised by the hypotheses but are suboptimal for testing
for other reasons. The German views of Blitzkrieg might be contrasted with the French
views of static defense leading up to May of 1940. However, these differences,
important as they are, are not as large in scale as are those in the Sino-American case.91
The first U.S.-Iraq war also has some important differences in terms of modern precision
guided munitions, airpower, etc., but it is too recent to get good information out of even
the U.S. government, let alone the Iraqi archives. The Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967 and
190 See the discussion in the previous chapter entitled "Escalation, Spirals, and Security Dilemmas." For
discussion of the Chinese entry into the Korean War as explained by the security dilemma, see Chapter
5. Allen Whiting was the original proponent of this view. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu.
191 For traditional views on this issue, which emphasize the relatively advanced nature of the German
tactical innovations see Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat; a Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New
York,: Octagon Books, 1968), 36-68; Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of
Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 30-45;
Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), Chapter 2; Williamson Murray
and Allan Reed Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). In contrast, May emphasizes the similarities between the militaries. May,
Strange Victory.
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1973 in particular, but perhaps also in 1948, also exhibit a large degree of this difference
in doctrines and beliefs. These have been examined productively from a similar
perspective to that of this dissertation,' 92 and it is worthwhile to see if a broader
theoretical approach will travel geographically to Asia.
The following chapter begins that task.
192 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence.
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Theory Summary Sheet
Hypotheses
H1: When two nations have different theories of victory, they will be more likely to misperceive each other's capabilities
relative to their own, and these misperceptions, ceteris paribus, will lead to underestimation of the adversary.
H2: An underestimation of an adversary's capabilities-that comes from H, -can lead to deterrence and coercive
failure, escalation, and conflict because it complicates (H2,A) assessments of the balance of power and (H2B)
interpretation of the adversary's signals.
HA,,:mac: Weak signals are more likely to lead to coercive failure and escalation while strong signals are more likely to lead to
coercive success.
Predictions
Perceiving the Balance of Power and the Nature of War
I ) Differences in theories of victory should correlate with states underestimating an adversary's capabilities, ceteris paribus.
Conversely, imilarities in beliefs should correlate with states having more accurate assessments of each other's military
capabilities, ceteris paribus.
2) Before conflict, leaders of states with different theories of victory should denigrate the other side's theory of victory relative to
their own.
3) Leaders of states with different theories of victory should not have nuanced discussions of the merits of their adversaries'
strategies, nor recognize that their adversaries' financial and strategic situations mandate their choice of strategy.
4) Each side should believe that battles will be dominated by factors emphasized by its theory of victory.
Signaling and Intent Issues
5) When signaling to the other side, each side should send signals that make use of forces in accordance with its own theory of
victory.
6) A state's assessment of its adversary's intent should depend, in part, on the first state's understanding of the adversary's cost-
benefit analysis. Furthermore, that understanding will likely be incorrect because the first state will assess costs and benefits
differently than its adversary when the two sides have different theories of victory.
7) Leaders of states with different theories of victory should downplay the likelihood of the other side getting involved in a conflict
or in further raising the stakes in it.
Perceptions Meet Reality: Surprise!
8) Actual battle outcomes, when they occur, should deviate further from leaders' expectations when nations have more different
theories of victory guiding their forces.
a. In cases where one side forced the battle on the other, the side taking the initiative should be surprised at its difficulties
on the battlefield.
b. In cases where both sides pursued battle, both sides should be surprised at their difficulties.
c. More generally, any leader who believes s/he has a viable strategy in the context of the current conflict should be
surprised at its (relative) shortcomings when battle is actually joined.
d. Leaders often have incentives to conceal their surprise, so it may manifest itself as hastily reinforcing or last minute
changes in strategy.
9) Leaders should be surprised about the degree of adversary interest in an issue when the signaling over the issue made use of
military forces (or threats about them) that are different than their own. (Indeed, they may ascribe aggressive motives to the
other side because of this.)
Extreme Values on IV Lead to Extreme Indicators
10) Larger differences between the two states' theories of victory should correlate with a larger or more frequent underestimation of
the adversary's capability.
11) Leaders (both political and military) deeply versed in their own theory of victory should be more likely to misperceive and
miscalculate than leaders less imbued with that particular view.
Chapter 2: Theory and Method
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Chapter 3. FACING OFF OVER
KOREA: COMPARING THEORIES
OF VICTORY
The next two chapters examine cases of the U.S. decision the cross the 38 'h
parallel into North Korea and Mao's decision to support North Korea's invasion. These
two cases depend on a similar assessment of the two sides' military capabilities.'
Therefore, it will be simpler to assess the independent variable, that is the differences
between the two sides' theories of victory, jointly for those cases. This chapter does
that.
It begins with an examination of American thinking about military effectiveness,
before turning to China's views and contrasting the two. The conclusion summarizes
the very large differences between the two countries' theories, thus making explicit the
coding for this period.
The U.S. Theory of Victory on Land
The generic American theory of victory in 1950 centered primarily on the use of
strategic bombing and atomic weapons in a general war context. Beyond this, American
strategic thought emphasized the utility of tactical airpower, mechanized forces, and
combined arms in the event of conventional war. Each of these emphases is discussed
below.
I The third case, Mao's decision not to attack Taiwan in that same year, involves a rather different
military calculation, and so the independent variable is treated entirely separately in its chapter.
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Strategic Bombing in General ...
One of the key beliefs for American policymakers was the perceived effectiveness
of strategic bombing in general. This view traced its roots to the pre-WWII era and had
changed little over time.
An understanding of American air power and of the problem of aerial warfare can be
achieved only in the context of cultural and intellectual history. The ways people have
thought about air power proved so remarkably consistent, despite rapidly changing
technology over a half-century, that a mere recital of a particular invention or an
individual bombing raid sheds little light on the appeals and uses of air power. The
bomber in imagination is the most compelling and revealing story.2
Beliefs about the lessons of WWII reified this belief: "Immediately after the war, it
appeared relatively certain that strategic bombing would be an integral part of any proper
military effort."3 This perception came out of the "formative common experience" held
by senior military leaders from the previous world war.4 The Strategic Bombing Survey,
conducted at the behest of President Roosevelt, came to simple, sweeping conclusions:
"Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe."5 Indeed, even aside from
atomic weapons, discussed below, the Air Force continued to foresee a important role for
conventional strategic bombing: "Many targets were not appropriate for scarce and
2 The consistency and causal importance of these beliefs is the story told in Michael S. Sherry, The Rise
of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), x.
See also Pape's discussion of the awe with which strategic bombing was held. Robert Pape, Bombing
to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), Chapter 4 and
8.
3 Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 31.
4 Michael Howard, as cited in Ibid., 30-31.
5 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, September 30, 1945), 16. The report on the Pacific War
was similarly positive. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War),
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, July 1, 1946).
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expensive atomic weapons anyway, and a requirement would continue for conventional
bombing forces."6
... And Atomic Weapons Specifically
Integral to and intertwined with the beliefs regarding the efficacy of strategic
bombing was a confidence in the utility of atomic weapons. This thoroughly permeated
national security thinking at the time. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had
important effects on American thinking about the usefulness of nuclear weapons: "the
advent of atomic weapons and the image of the mushroom cloud surely strengthened the
vague perception that strategic bombing would remain a deadly aspect of war."7
While Dulles's New Look strategy, which publicly emphasized nuclear weapons
over every other sort of armament through its reliance on "massive retaliation," was not
to become policy until a few years later, even at this point, nuclear weapons were at the
core of American thinking about international conflict in general.8
Strategic bombing with atomic weapons had been at the core of U.S. war plans ever since
the military began thinking seriously about the prospects of armed conflict with the
Soviet Union.... Comparatively, atomic weapons were cheap, and Truman accepted
plans and approved budgets that made the United States dependent on their use should
war erupt.9
6 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), 16-17.
7 Gacek, The Logic of Force, 31.
8 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York:
Random House, 1988), 230.
9 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 323.
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The Joint Outline Emergency War Plan of October 1949 called for attacks on over a
hundred Soviet cities with multiple weapons on most and a reserve of over 70 weapons.'0
Similarly, long term planning in 1949 was also assuming that nuclear weapons would be
at the center of warfare:
At the close of 1949 the Joint Staff drew up Dropshot, a long-term procurement plan for a
hypothetical war in 1957. ... Dropshot proposed ending the war as soon as possible,
and that meant a massive atomic campaign. It proposed up to 435 atomic bombs for use
in the first month against industrial and military targets in the Soviet Union and its
satellites.'
The Navy was trying to secure a role for itself in delivering nuclear weapons as a way to
ensure its relevance for the defense of the country,' 2 and even Army generals were
emphasizing the centrality of retaliatory strategic bombing to American grand strategy at
this time.'3 Kennan had unsuccessfully tried to wean U.S. policy away from nuclear
weapons and toward a conventional defense of Europe, but had been rebuffed by
Acheson.'4 This emphasis on nuclear exchanges prevented consideration of other forms
of warfare.
Some kind of air-atomic war dominated strategic thinking, and all the more so with the
continued slashing of nonatomic forces. The Joint Chiefs gave no attention to any
strategic alternatives. For instance, they never took up a State Department view in 1948
and 1949 that the United States should have highly mobile divisions to fight limited wars
of containment, not atomic wars of annihilation or conquest. 5
10 David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-
1960," International Security 7, no. 4 (1983): 16.
II George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1994), 313. While the war game focused on 1957, not 1950, as it was
conducted in 1949, it does illustrate the thinking about what constituted important weapons on the eve
of the Korean War from the perspective of the American military leadership.
12 Ibid., 296-97. There were however contrary arguments also being made within the navy at the time.
See Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 304.
13 William Whitney Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea,
1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 155-56.
14 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 329.
15 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 302-3.
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A survey of American doctrine of the Korean War period concluded, "Americans,
including the government, succeedledi in convincing themselves that the atomic bomb
was a sovereign remedy for all military ailments."' 6
It is important to emphasize that the reliance in doctrine on strategic bombing and
atomic weapons was pervasive. As the last two quotes in the paragraph above make
clear, the atomic arsenal was not thought of as solely relevant to World War III. Rather,
analysts felt it would be useful in general, in any conflict. As discussed below, there
was little nuanced consideration of "limited war," making this oversimplification easier
to sustain.
The American arsenal was impressive.' 7 At its core were 369 atomic warheads,
ready to be loaded on long-range bombers.' 8 The higher efficiency of the atomic bombs
after completion of the "Sandstone" research program had allowed the United States to
produce 63 percent more warheads with the same stockpile of fissile material, which had
16 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 382. More generally on this point, see
Chapter 15: "The Atomic Revolution".
17 On the tendency of American military and strategic leaders to regard any size arsenal as too small, see
Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill." An arsenal of several hundred weapons has been regarded as
more than adequate for a number of nuclear powers over the past several decades. See Avery
Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring
Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).
18 See the Natural Resources Defense Council's web page at www.nrdc.org which has historical data on
both American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. While the precise month of this figure (369 warheads) is
not apparent from the NRDC database, the previous year's figure (of 235 warheads) suggests that a
significant arsenal existed throughout the year of 1950. Similarly, Leffler suggests an arsenal of "a
little under 300 in June 1950." Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 324.
Finally, DOE provides similar, although slightly smaller, numbers. It lists 170 weapons available
in 1949 and 299 in 1950, and also notes that there were 264 warheads built in 1950, and some 135
warheads retired (which includes weapons taken out of service to be modified into more efficient
designs in subsequent years). The total megatonage available in 1950 is just under 10 megatons.
See "DOE Facts: Summary of Declassified Nuclear Stockpile Information", Department of Energy,
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC (1994) available online as of July 15, 2004 at
http://llwww.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/press/pc26.html.
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meant a recent surge in the quantity of bombs.' 9 Further, according to several analysts,
"by January 1949 actual and foreseen shortages of bombers and bombs had begun to be
alleviated." Overall, SAC was beginning to improve substantially on its late 1940s
position across the board in integration of capabilities.
By 1950, the command operated 225 atomic bomb carrying aircraft (including B-29s, B-
50s, and 34 B-36s), flew 263 combat ready crews, and was training forty-nine more.
Eighteen bomb assembly teams were fully qualified, and four would be added by June.2'
Even pessimists were forced to conclude that by August of 1949, "Strategic Air
Command began to achieve a measure of deterrent capability."22 Nevertheless, on
January 31, 1950, the President Truman had decided to move forward even further in this
area by publicly beginning research on the thermonuclear bomb.23 The Soviets' ability
to respond against the American homeland at this time was extremely limited. 4
Atomic strategy at this point focused on strategic bombing rather than tactical
battlefield attacks. While development of large artillery guns for use with atomic
weapons had begun in late 1949, tactical weapons were not available in significant
numbers until mid-1952.2 5 Nevertheless, the tactical use of nuclear weapons had also
19 Gacek, The Logic of Force, 33; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 320.
20 Gacek, The Logic of Force, 33. See also Rosenberg's discussion which contrasts the period from
1945-48, when weapons and delivery systems were scarce, to the period after 1949 when those
limitations relaxed significantly. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill."
21 Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 191.
22 Ibid., 187.
23 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 197.
24 Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis
Management, ed. Stephen Van Evera (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 116.
25 Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the
Korean War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 141, 138.
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been considered and studied. Atomic weapons were expected to in many cases
substitute for shortfalls in conventional armament.26 For instance, one study "led the
JCS to task the Strategic Air Command in the fall of 1949 with the 'retardation of Soviet
advances in Western Europe."' 27 Further, once the Korean War broke out atomic use
was repeatedly discussed.28 When MacArthur, the battlefield commander, proposed
using nuclear weapons in December of 1950, he sent to Washington "a list of retardation
targets which he considered would require 26 bombs ... including] 4 bombs to be used
on invasion forces and 4 bombs to be used on critical concentrations of enemy air power,
both targets of opportunity. " 29 (Interestingly, some of the other "retardation targets"
apparently included locations within China.30)
Thus, in the United States the utility of atomic weapons was thought to ubiquitous.
26 Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, 3 vols., vol. I (Washington, D.C: Historical
Office Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), 445.
27 Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 16. Note that the arsenal the United States had at the time was
far from ideal for this sort of targeting. Nevertheless, the weapons could have been used in a tactical
setting, had the President so ordered.
28 See Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," 119, 124 n. 48, and 130-31.
29 Quoted from an Army archival source (a G-3 report) in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American
Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985),
114-5. See also Gacek, The Logic of Force, 58. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons,
38. The Air Force also felt atomic weapons would have been valuable in an interdiction role during
the retreat of the Eighth Army. John W. Dower, War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books,
1986), 701.
30 Again see Foot, The Wrong War, 115.
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General War
Closely related to this emphasis on nuclear weapons at the time was a near
exclusive focus on general war rather than limited war.31 "A school of detailed writings
about limited war did not appear until the 1950s."32 This led American strategists to
avoid worrying about how to win a local, limited war of containment (which would have
very likely involved a heavy focus on enhancing conventional capabilities) and to rather
focus on ensuring the apocalyptic, general war would be devastating to the Soviets.
Having prepared in the late 1940s for general war, the government and the services were
caught off guard by the North Korean attack in June, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson
admitted in ht he first top-level conference on the crisis that his department had no war
plan for Korea and thus no recommendation. The Joint Chiefs as well did not attempt
formal estimate of the military situation in Korean, and they were not sure what would be
required to mount United States military operations in the area.33
NSC-68 began to address this by alluding to the prospect of limited wars, but it had not
developed sophisticated analysis to consider such prospects.3 4 One military historian
characterized the thinking at the outset of the Korean War as follows
So ingrained was the American habit of thinking of war in terms of annihilative victories,
that occasional warnings of limited war went more than unheeded, and people,
government, and much of the military could scarcely conceive of a Communist military
thrust of lesser dimensions than World War III.35
Thus, American strategic thought remained centered on general war.
31 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, vol. 2
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 161; Gacek, The Logic of Force, Chapter 2:
Patterns in America's Use of Force Before the Korean War.
32 Gacek, The Logic of Force, 37.
33 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, Morningside ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), 154, see also 17.
34 See NSC-68, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol.
I: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977). See also Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,"
International Security 4, no. 2 (1979).
35 Weigley, The American Way of War, 382-83.
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Heavily Armed, Mechanized Ground Forces
In terms of ground force doctrine in general, mechanized and combined arms
were viewed as optimal for conventional forces in general by the United States. Again,
the point of this section is to describe the general doctrinal perspective towards armor
and combined arms held by the U.S. military. In some cases, specific geographic areas
would not have the equipment to fully implement that doctrine. Nevertheless, the
leadership nationwide would be still be indoctrinated by the theory of victory, so it is
important to understand its characteristics.
The standard "table of organization and equipment" (TOE, the list of equipment
allotments for generic military units and how they are organized) in 1950 had 143 tanks
in each of America's eight infantry divisions.36 This was only slightly lower than the
number of tanks deployed in Soviet armored units of the same size at the end of World
War II. 37 The U.S. Army also had a dedicated armor division, a cavalry division, at least
four armored cavalry regiments, and six independent regimental combat teams that would
have also been heavy in terms of allotment of armor.38
In terms of stockpiles army-wide, there were even more tanks available than the
TOE would suggest: there were enough tanks for each division to be equipped with 300,
36 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea (New York: Times Books, 1988), 48, note. The
divisions in the Far East Command were substantially less well endowed in this regard, having only 22
tanks assigned to each infantry division and a small detachment of armor available to corps and army
level commands.
37 Typically, Soviet armored corps were regarded as the equivalent of Western (or German) divisions
during WWII. These were generally armed with 165-195 tanks; thus, the American infantry units
were a quarter lighter than Soviet armored units. See Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett, A
War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2000), 286; R. J. Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 21 1.
38 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, vol. 3 Policy and direction: the first year
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army/GPO, 1972), 43-4.
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with a similar number available for replacement use and parts.3 9 Additionally, "machine
guns and towed artillery were in plentiful supply," although more modern heavy
equipment was less abundant." At the time of the Korean War "the average American
infantry division had a third more artillery than its World War II predecessor."4' Note
however, that even these comparatively large endowments were viewed as insufficient at
the time from the U.S. Army's perspective, thus underlining the depth of their beliefs in
the utility of mechanization and armor in general.
Combined Arms and Close Air Support
Beyond quantity of equipment, the doctrine of combined arms emphasized the
value of integrating multiple types of capabilities in military operations to take advantage
of their synergies. The U.S. Army of WWII had increasingly integrated heavy weapons
to every level of its force structure, swapping infantry units for heavy weapons units at
the company and platoon levels.4 Training emphasized flexibility, combined arms, and
39 Author's calculations based on data from Ibid., 43-46. Schnabel list the following holdings for what
was a 10 division army at the time:
Serviceable Unserviceable
M-24 Chaffee (light tank) <900 2557
M-4A3 Sherman (medium tank) 1826 1376
M-46 Patton (newest medium tank) 319 N/A
Total <3045 3933
(Note this excludes holdings of the M-26 Pershings, for unknown reasons.) While these were mostly
WWII vintage tanks, so was the T-34 used by the North Koreans. The forces available to MacArthur
lacked the relatively large armor component that would imply, as discussed in Chapter 5; however, the
point here speaks to the culture of the military in general.
40 Ibid., 46.
41 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York, NY:
The Free Press, 1990), 182.
42 On the eve of the American entry into WWII, the U.S. Army undertook a major organization change,
moving from a square divisional structure (with four regiments) to a triangular divisional structure
(with three regiments). This change was first tested at a large scale at the famous Louisiana
Maneuevers. Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century
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jointness. The primary organizational structure for the army at the outbreak of the
Korean War, the regimental combat team or RCT, was a direct descendant from the late
WWII innovation of the combined arms task forces that integrated armor, artillery, and
infantry at the battalion and regimental levels.43 These continued to be emphasized at
the time in the Asian theater: "Divisions were directed to complete RCT field exercises
and develop effective air ground combat procedures."44 This focus on combined arms
permeated the American ground forces at all levels. In general, it gave even infantry
units an armored punch and significant mobility.45
The utility of close air support (CAS) to augment ground forces was another
lesson from the WWII experience. Indeed, the doctrinal manuals still in use in 1950
derived directly from the history of that period:
Close air support as practiced in Korea was rooted in Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Air-
Ground Operations. First published in August 1946, this manual distilled the lessons
and procedures learned by the Army's 12 h Army Group and the Army Air Force's Ninth
Air Force primarily in Europe during World War 1I.46
While the Air Force had focused its efforts on strategic bombing, the other services
emphasized CAS, and indeed, during the Korean War "tactical support from Navy and
Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, 1985). As part of this organizational shift the units got heavier: "a heavy wapons company
replaced a rifle company in each battalion, and a weapons platoon replaced a rifle platoon in each
company." John H. Bradley, The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific, ed. Thomas E. Griess, 3
vols., vol. 2 (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1989), 24.
43 Eric Heginbotham, "Military Learning," Military Review 80, no. 3 (2000).
44 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 55.
45 Again, it is true that the units deployed in the Far East Command were understrength and did lack
some of their organic transport assets and much of their organic armor. However, the point here is
that the culture of the American doctrinal thinking about war, the theory of victory in general, focused
on these elements.
46 William T. Y'Blood, Down in the Weeds: Close Air Support in Korea (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 2002), 1.
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Marine Corps aircraft was excellent."47 That said, the Air Force did not completely
abandon the CAS mission.48 In early discussions regarding the appropriate American
response to the North Korean attack, this belief was clear. U.S. Navy officers
wanted an immediate 'fly-over' of American airplanes for psychological effect while the
aggressors pondered the terms of the Security Council resolution... The [U.S.] Air Force
was considering the possibility of sending tactical air unit to South Korean airfields, a
move which would involve the commitment of ground forces to protect the bases, but the
Navy believed that the situation was 'made to order' for carrier based air power."49
American ground forces not only expected their air forces to defend them from
the enemy's planes, but CAS was integral to their views on joint operations. Indeed,
General Ned Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff and latter commander of X Corps, was
a strong proponent of CAS over the use of airpower in its more strategic roles.50 Even
the Air Force was not exempt: the B-29, an Air Force owned airframe typically used for
strategic attacks, was used in the CAS role during the war.5
Other Doctrinal Influences
In Korea, the additional strategic concept of isolating the battlefield influenced
American thinking. American strategy in Italy as well as island hopping in the Pacific
47 Weigley, The American Way of War, 384. On the Air Force's abandonment of the tactical air role in
this period, see Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 21-22. Also commending
the role of the Navy in providing CAS, see John R. Bruning, Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea
(Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1999), 83.
48 While the Air Force chaffed at requirements to serve at the behest of ground commanders throughout
WWII and in the Korean War, there was constant pressure for it to do so. Indeed, in the opening days
of the Korean War nearly all air strikes were made in direct support of ground forces (to the clear
chagrin of senior Air Force leaders): "FEAF was directed to employ its aerial predominance in close
support of ground units to the exclusion of all else. This absolutely precluded a proper interdiction
program." (Quoted from a USAF Historical Study by William W. Momyer, A. J. C. Lavalle, and
James C. Gaston, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1983), 190, see also 188.)
49 Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968), 136, note
137.
50 Y'Blood, Down in the Weeds, 6-7.
51 Ibid., I 1.
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carried key lessons for peninsular Korea.52 In the Italy campaigns during WWII, the
United States relied on a sequence of amphibious landings in Sicily, Solarno, Anzio,
etc. 3 This allowed the United States to take full advantage of the strategic mobility that
its dominant Navy provided. Both in Italy and in the Pacific, the United States focused
also on isolating the battlefield through the use of airpower and naval forces, thus
limiting the adversary's ability to resupply and reinforce. Tactical and operational
interdiction were key strategies here. The American leaders were confident these tactics
would apply easily and decisively in Korea.
Thus, the American theory of victory had several elements. Across all of these,
however, was one essential element: a substitution of capital for manpower.54 This is
something scholars have identified in American military policy across a wide span of
time.
Observers [of the American civil warl noted that the Americans would rarely close with
the enemy but chose instead to fight at ranges of a quarter mile or more and throw
enormous quantities of lead at each other, often for hours without end. What these
observers witnessed first hand has become immutably associated with the American way
52 Weigley, The American Way of War, 385.
53 Thomas B. Buell et al., The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean, ed. Thomas E. Griess,
3 vols., vol. I (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1989), 227ff.
54 While it is common to bemoan the state of the American military budget in 1950 (thus suggesting that
even capital was not being provided to the U.S. military), that concern needs to be put into context.
The following chart shows budgets for several great powers in 1949 and 1950. The United States and
the Soviet Union are on a rough par. Beyond that, U.S. spending dwarfed the rest of the world.
China France U.K. U.S. Russia
1949 $2.0 b $1.2 b $3.1 b $13.5 b $14.0b
1950 $2.6 b $1.5 b $2.4b $14.6b $15.5b
Data Source: "National Material Capabilities" (version 2. 1), Correlates of War Project, The University
of Michigan, Principal Investigators: J. David Singer and Melvin Small, originally created July 1990,
updated April 1999.
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of war-the willingness of Americans to expend firepower freely to conserve human
life.5 5
With these various beliefs-strategic bombing, nuclear weapons, combined arms-the
United States was to face off against China in northeast Asia. The contrast between the
two could hardly be greater.
China's Theory of Victory on Land
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shifted their focus from their own violent
rise to power to the emerging international Cold War, they faced an adversary in the
United States that maintained a military radically different from its own. The People's
Liberation Army (PLA) had just emerged victorious from two decades of civil war and a
seven-year fight against Japan. In both conflicts its adversary was better equipped and
often more numerous. These experiences left it with a robust set of strategic beliefs that
it incorporated into its theory of victory.
Much of the evidence in this section comes from doctrinal discussions within the
PLA. As such, it is heavily laced with Maoist propaganda, and it is tempting to write it
off as such: Actual military leaders would not follow such guidance, would they? To do
so would simply ignore the critical power that Maoist ideology held over China, even at
this early date. 6 During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Maoist thought was
elevated further, nearly to the status of a religion. In the pre-Korean War period, the
worship of Mao did not rise to that level; nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the
55 On the more general American tendency to substitute firepower for manpower, see Robert H. Scales,
Firepower in Limited War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 3-4, inter alia.
56 While there was some variation of beliefs between Mao and a few leaders who were less supportive of
his views, on balance, there was widespread acceptance of Mao's views within the senior leadership.
The role of dissenting views is discussed later in this chapter and also in Chapter 6.
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contrast between the periods.57 Indeed, some argue this earlier period is the true high
point of belief in Maoist People's War.- As Zhang Shuguang argues in his persuasive
Mao's Military Romanticism these ideas profoundly shaped policy.59 Indeed, China's
evolving military culture continues to shape Beijing's foreign and security policy today.'
Other scholars agree on the importance of Maoism to security policy and doctrine:
Western scholars tend to mock the notion of "man over weapons." ... It is easy in
retrospect to dismiss what was in actuality the enormously stifling effect of Maoist
doctrine on innovated thinking in the Chinese officer corps. When Liu IShaoqi] gave
his lectures in the early 1950s, Mao's military thought had not yet ascended to the
biblical proportions it would assume in the 1960s. Nonetheless, Liu had to struggle
against an incipient Maoist orthodoxy in attempting to turn the attention of younger
officers to problems about which Maoist thought offered little but dismissive (albeit
morale boosting) aphorisms.6 '
Similarly, Ellis Joffe, while conceding that Maoist "doctrine is merely a rationalization,"
goes on to emphasize the substantial effects that such ideas-particularly when they are
grounded in a long history that supports them-can have on shaping people's
perceptions.6 2 In a slightly different issue-area, but one that had many parallels to that
discussed here, Lucian Pye writes that "political culture continues for many reasons to be
singularly important in shaping Chinese politics" and speaks of "the special importance
57 On this historiography, see Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949 (London; New York:
Longman, 1995).
58 See Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 (Lawrence,
Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
59 Ibid.
60 Li Nan, From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military's
Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era, Peaceworks No. 39 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2001).
61 Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the
Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 22.
62 Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964 (Cambridge,: East Asian Research Center Harvard University Distributed by Harvard University
Press, 1965), 50-52.
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of political culture for understanding China."3 Finally, the PLA put Maoist doctrine
into practice in a number of tangible ways, as this section will show.
The Chinese beliefs regarding the nature of warfare began with an assessment of
the likely threat they would face (general invasion) and a view on the appropriate way to
deal with that (lure them in deep). Mao downplayed the importance of nuclear weapons
and emphasized the role of People's War and infantry forces more generally. These are
the doctrinal beliefs that the Chinese People's Volunteers' took with them into battle in
Korea. The following sections will describe each of these points.
Fear of Invasion, But Confidence in Strategic Value of Hinterland
Across a long span of history, Chinese leaders had frequently faced adversaries
aiming to conquer all of China.6 5 In the wars against the Guomingdang (GMD) and the
Japanese, the communists had faced an existential threat, one that aimed to occupy the
entire area of the Chinese empire. Chinese writing throughout this period emphasized
this threat, as Segal notes:
A military operation designed to control all China was of great concern to CCP strategists,
in large measure because the Communists' campaigns against Chiang Kai-shek as well as
the Japanese dealt with just such a problem. Thus, it is not surprising that more than
any other threat to China, the problem of general invasion is the one most
comprehensively analyzed.66
63 Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, New ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1992), ix.
64 The People's Volunteers was the name given to the PLA units that deployed to Korea to provide a
veneer of separation between them and Beijing. Beijing exerted complete and direct control over
these forces.
65 William W. Whitson and Zhenxia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist
Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York, NY: Praeger, 1973), 459. As Whitson and Huang note, this
threat predates the communist era by epochs.
66 Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 48-49.
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Mao maintained this threat perception during the Korean War, with one Chinese scholar
writing that Mao had expressed fears that Japanese might deploy troops to the Korean
peninsula.67 Indeed, these views regarding the nature of the threat to China (a land
invasion and occupation) likely remained in place at least until 1961.68 While at one
level this appears to parallel American concerns regarding general (rather than limited
war), the focus of the two was fundamentally different: China was worried about an
invasion of its own territory, whereas the United States was concerned about the conquest
of Europe and the potential for a nuclear exchange.
Because of this concern, and because of the relative weakness of China, Chinese
general strategic thinking emphasized the policy of "trading space for time"6 9 by "luring
the enemy in deep."70 Chinese doctrine recognized that China had a vast hinterland into
which its military could withdraw. The CCP had pursued this strategy with eventual
success against the Japanese in WWII,7' and Mao repeatedly wrote of the value of this
strategy in the war in that conflict.7 2 The main point of Mao's famous "On Protracted
67 i~j.,<<[i«g lE@->>(E z:;L i :±,2002)o Song Liansheng, Recollections on the
Korean War (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 2002), 170-71.
68 Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy," The China
Quarterly, no. 18 (1964): 84. Indeed, arguably, Chinese threat perceptions today continue to be
shaped by the legacy of this period. See Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Epilogue: The Legacies of China' Cold War Experience.
69 See Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War [December 19361," in Selected
Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 133; Mao Tsetung,
"Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation ISeptember 1, 1947]," in Selected Military
Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 329.
70 Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War IDecember 1936]," 113.
71 Dick Wilson, China's Revolutionary War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), Chapter 5: Invasion
and Chapter 6: Battle Lines Drawn.
72 Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War May 19381," in Selected Military Writings of
Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 155,167.
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War" (written in May of 1938) is to describe this strategy.7 3 Indeed, he continued to
advocate avoiding positional war in the civil war through late 1947, favoring instead
mobile, guerilla warfare that avoided preoccupation with controlling territory.74
That history shaped views about the future. "Mao made it plain that in defeating
an invader, geography was China's first ally... The essential principle that China's
vastness aids the defender and allows space to be traded for time, is an accurate one. 7 5
One specialist on Chinese security concurs:
To sum up, China's physical geography suggests that defending China, while not easy, is
by no means impossible. Land invasion-the only fundamental threat to China's
national security-is made difficult by aspects of topography. While China is
vulnerable to certain border challenges or seaborne threats, its geography makes it easier
to defend rather than attack "core China."7 6
This concept was not just theoretical for the communist leadership; in late 1949,
the Chinese took steps to implement the strategies called for by this aspect of their theory
of victory.
In order to respond to this, instead of maintaining a positional defense along the coast, the
Chinese Communists also decided to build an in-depth defense-a defensive zone of
several layers with forces deployed in such a way to maneuver and reinforce on another.
... This was an essential element of traditional Chinese strategy: houfazhiren, to gain
mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.77
As a result, China did not need to preemptively attack any would be aggressor but rather
could await the onset of war with some security that this patience would not jeopardize
73 Mao Tsetung, "On Protracted War IMay 19381," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), espec. at 215ff.
74 Mao Tsetung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks [December 25, 19471," in Selected Military
Writings ofMao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 349. Note that this is quite late
in the war as the KMT was to begin to rapidly crumble early in 1948.
75 Segal, Defending China, 48-49.
76 Ibid., 14.
77 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 47. For a similar view on early Chinese strategy, see
Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-
1981 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 259-60.
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China's overall security.78 Even in the case of nuclear war, China's strategy would
center upon "drawing American ground forces into China's interior."' 9 At a tactical
level, the CCP had utilized this approach many times during the civil war, and once the
Korea War broke out, they turned to it again:
Peng suggested to Mao that UN forces be lured into preset 'traps' as far north as possible
so that individual UN units would be extended with longer supply lines and thus be more
easily isolated and destroyed. Mao quickly approved the plan. Peng instructed that
each CPVF [Chinese People's Volunteer Forcel army would withdraw its main force
farther north but leave one division 'to conduct mobile and guerilla warfare...to wipe out
small enemy units while engaging and luring larger enemy units to the trap.'
Thus, Mao and the other Chinese leaders felt that they had a solid approach to the
main type of threat they perceived from the outside.
Views on Atomic Weapons
The atom bomb is a paper tiger that the U.S. reactionaries use to scare
people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb
is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the
people, not by one or two new types of weapon.
-Mao Zedong, 19478'
Mao's well-known statements that nuclear weapons were mere "paper tigers" may
have been more bravado than representative of his true beliefs. Nevertheless, when
compared to American perceptions, throughout the early part of the Cold War he did
view them as relatively weak weapons.8 2 In their well-regarded history of China's
78 Segal, Defending China, 14.
79 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 189. As discussed below, this commentary occured in the
late 1950s, but on this point there is a large degree of consistancy across time in Mao's thinking.
80 Yu Bin, "What China Learned from Its 'Forgotten War' in Korea," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea,
ed. Li Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001),
15.
81 Quoted in Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the
Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 23.
82 Ibid.
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nuclear program, Lewis and Xue conclude: "For Mao in the late 1940s, the strategic
calculus was clear. The struggle against imperialism could be intensified and need not
be intimidated by the American nuclear threat."'
Mao and his colleagues held their pejorative views of atomic and nuclear weapons
over a sustained period, as a number of strong pieces of evidence show.84 For instance,
in an internal debate in July 1948, Mao and Zhou argued for the weakness and
irrelevance of nuclear weapons for important global security affairs. 5 Even as late as
1961, some members of the Chinese leadership were still downplaying the importance of
nuclear weapons. One of the most senior military leaders, and a member of the standing
committee of the Military Affairs Committee (the most powerful body in the PLA and the
PRC),m stated "Although atomic bombs are very powerful they can only be used to
destroy the centers and the economic reserves of the opponent during the strategic
bombing phase...."7
Other pieces of evidence come from conversations that Chinese leaders had with
the Soviets. In one such exchange, not only did Zhou Enlai suggest that the Communist
nations should not fear a nuclear war, he went so far as to discourage Soviet retaliation in
83 John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press,
1988), 7.
84 The consistent nature of these beliefs is important as it suggests that confidence in the Soviet alliance
and the extended deterrence it might have provided is not critical in shaping this view. Both before
1949 and after the late 1950s that support would have looked rather weak.
85 Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, 20.
86 Note that in both the transitions from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin and from Jiang to Hu Jintao,
chairmanship of this committee was the last title that the outgoing leader retired from, attesting to its
importance.
87 Quoted in Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers," 90.
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the event of tactical nuclear weapons usage against China by the United States.88 He
went on with bravado:
Inflicting blows on the offshore islands, the PRC has taken into consideration the
possibility of the outbreak in this region of a local war between the United States and the
PRC, and it is now ready to take all the hard blows, including atomic bombs and the
destruction of cities.9
In another case, Khrushchev's memoirs recall Mao's pejorative views of the aftermath of
nuclear war expressed in 1955-56: "[Wlar is war. The years will pass, and we'll get to
work producing more babies than ever before."9 In yet another instance in September
1958, Mao had also advised the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on how to respond to a
war between the United States and China. Chen Jian summarizes:
The Chinese chairman, according to Gromyko, stated that if the Americans were to
invade the Chinese mainland or to use nuclear weapons the Chinese forces would retreat,
drawing American ground forces into China's interior. The chairman proposed that
during the initial stage of the war, the Soviets should do nothing but watch. Only after
the American forces had entered China's interior should Moscow use "all means at its
disposal" (which Gromyko understood as Soviet nuclear weapons to destroy them).9'
It is also very clear that nuclear weapons did not receive serious analytical study
in China until well after the period under study in the rest of this dissertation. Chinese
consideration of the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Korean War was extremely
simplistic.92 Even beyond that, before 1955 there had been no formal study of what
atomic weapons could do against China. Only in July of that year did the top 200
leaders in the CCP finally receive a briefing on the subject. Even this was only a scant
88 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 71 and 189. Note these discussions occurred in the late
1950s, at which point the Chinese had significantly hardened their views of nuclear weapons. That
Zhou would nevertheless discourage Soviet retaliation at that late point only emphasizes how little he
feared nuclear weapons in general.
89 Ibid., 189.
90 Quoted in Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 66.
91 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, 189.
92 See the discussion in the following chapter.
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25 pages long, covering different aspects of nuclear war, such as what the weapons could
do to cities, to forces in the field, etc.'. Before 1957, the PLA had not engaged in
training that would allow it to survive a nuclear attack. 4 As late as 1961, the Chinese
discussions of U.S. nuclear doctrine appear exceedingly simplistic.95
Finally, Mao's recent military experiences in general likely colored his views on
nuclear weapons in particular and the threats they posed to Chinese cities. He wrote of
the irrelevance of cities to the communist strategy in 1947:
When we abandoned many cities on our own initiative in order to evade fatal blows from
superior enemy forces and shifted our forces to destroy the enemy when he is on the
move, our enemies were jubilant. They took this to be a victory for them and a defeat
for us. They became dizzy with this momentary 'victory'. ... But now with the lapse of
time, Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters began to change their tune. Now all our
enemies, domestic and foreign are gripped by pessimism. They heave great sighs, wail
about a crisis, and no longer show any sign of joy. ... They had overestimated their own
strength, underestimated the strength of the revolution and rashly unleashed the war, and
so were caught in their own trap. Our enemy's strategic calculations failed
completely."9
His thinking on the dangers of atomic weapons descended from precisely that sort of
thinking. Cities were not important to CCP strategists. The words of the acting Chief
of Staff during the Korean War exemplified this in September 1950: "After all, China
lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there?"9
Before moving on, it is important to discuss an important alternate view regarding
Mao's thoughts on nuclear weapons. Mark A. Ryan, in his 1984 book, Chinese
93 Interview with Shen Zhihua, Beijing, September 2002. Shen is one of only a few historians of
Chinese foreign policy outside the government and government-controlled research centers who has
access to the Chinese archives.
94 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 217.
95 See Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers," 84.
96 Mao Tsetung, "Our Present Situation and Our Tasks IReport to the Central Committee of the CCP,
12/25/19471," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung (Beijing, PRC: Foreign Language Press,
1972).
97 Quoted in Segal, Defending China, 100. The original source is Panikkar's autobiography.
140
Chapter 3: Facing Off over Korea
Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, presents a somewhat dissenting view from the picture
painted above.9 The overall tenor of the book is to argue that the Chinese, contrary to
their public statements, recognized the importance of nuclear weapons. Ryan
summarizes the Chinese views before the Korean War as follows:
An overview of the CCP reaction to nuclear weapons during 1945-49 finds that the CCP,
even before gaining power, became extremely interested in nuclear weapons and perhaps
realized earlier than most groups or nations some of the profound implications of the new
technology.99
Ryan's evidence on the post-Korean War period is strong. However, he himself notes
that evidence on Mao's private position in this early period is quite slim. In particular,
Ryan notes the limitations of his key source on the question: "Halperin goes on to
summarize the impact of these Yan'an debates without, however, offering any
documentation for how he came to know of the debates, or, for that matter, how he knew
what was going on 'in the back of his [Mao's] mind."" °° Indeed, continuing his
thinking regarding the pre-Korean war period, Ryan notes,
The public, surface tone of reaction, that of disparagement, was quickly set by Mao.
This disparagement was in part a defensive, propagandistic reaction to a hard new reality
and in part, a natural corollary of deeply held ideological and historical tenets regarding
the ultimate superiority of men over weapons. These tenets were reinforced through
survival and victories against the much better armed Japanese and KMT armies, and in
the decades to come the nuclear-armed United States would assume a role analogous to
that of those earlier foes. 101
98 Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons.
99 Ibid., 21.
100 Ibid., 18. The Yan'an debates are said to have taken place during the civil war (in approximately
1946), long before the CCP gained power, while it was holed up in the Red Army's redoubt deep in the
interior of Northwest China.
101 Ibid., 21.
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Ryan is right to be cautious about assuming that true beliefs differ from those expressed
in public.'02 He is also right to emphasize the constraining role of ideology. While
Ryan presents clear evidence that by the early 1950s Mao's China was well on its way to
recognizing the importance of nuclear weapons, his position on the period of interest to
this study-May and October 1950-is more nuanced.
Ryan's view recognizes the legacy of Maoist ideology. When his discussion is
coupled with the evidence presented above which included private statements by Mao,
reports from senior military leaders, and discussions of the state of knowledge regarding
weapons, a fairly strong case can be made: On balance, there is significant evidence
that at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao and the senior Chinese
leadership substantially denigrated the utility of nuclear weapons in comparison to their
western counterparts.
People's War
In the wake of the Communist victory in the civil war, the focus of Chinese
tactical and operational doctrine was on a form of "People's War" that encapsulated "a
vision of a highly politicized guerrilla army."'0 3 As one security studies expert puts it:
"The Chinese were different not simply by virtue of the inferior equipment ... but more
generally, by virtue of a different approach to warfare."' 4 Blending both tactics and
102 Indeed, Lucian Pye argues that in Confucian cultures, and China's in particular, public statements are a
better representation of an actors true beliefs than private statements that can be easily disavowed.
Pye contrasts this with Western views that see private statements as less influenced by incentives to
appease various audiences. See Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, 248.
103 Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, 69.
104 Eliot A. Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle': American Intelligence and the Chinese Intervention in Korea,
1950," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. I (1990): 143.
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strategic level thought,'°5 Mao's military philosophy emphasized guerilla warfare and the
strategic depth that China' geography provided.' 6 It had many specific components.
Individual Tactics
Perhaps the main emphasis of People's War was on morale and manpower over
material. As Mao succinctly pronounced, "Weapons are an important factor in war, but
not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive." 7 Similarly, he wrote,
"the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people."'" Zhang, a
Chinese scholar who has carefully studied Maoist doctrine, expands on this statement,
summarizing Mao's thinking:
Mao firmly believed that a weak army could win in a war against a strong enemy because
he was convinced that "man" could beat "weapon." Given Mao's confidence in a
human being's subjective capability to determine defeat or victory in war, the CCP
chairman romanticized military affairs. Yet as he calculated the probability of victory
for a weak army, he found his theory logical, realistic, and plausible.'9
Whitson, a leading scholar of the PLA, refers to this disparagingly as an "infantry small-
arms syndrome.""
For Mao, it was not just sheer numbers (although these were clearly important),
but the motivation of his soldiers that would guarantee victory. He had written that the
105 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command.
106 People's War also had a strategic component that fit into Marxist revolutionary thought, but this is not
relevant to the study at hand. On the tactical and strategic elements of People's War, see Chen-Ya
Tien, Chinese Military History: Ancient and Modern (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1992), 223ff.
On the role of the strategic elements of Chinese ideology and how they too impeded communication
between China and other countries who had different visions, see Mark Haas, "Ideology, Threat
Perception, and Great Power Politics through Two Centuries" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Virginia, 2001).
107 Mao Tsetung, "On Protracted War May 19381," 219.
108 Ibid., 261.
109 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 29. Italics in the original.
110 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command.
143
Twomey, The Military Lens
Chinese people would have the advantage in the war against Japan since China's
"advantages lie in the progressive and just character of her war.""' Mao thought the
Japanese soldier to be inferior, not for racist reasons, but because their "weapons are not
in the hands of politically conscious soldiers.""' Similarly, he wrote,
We must make full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of him.
This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons
and other things is only secondary." 3
In addition to bolstering the morale of one's own troops, another benefit of fighting for a
just cause was that it would make the PLA attractive for potential defectors, who played
an important role throughout China's civil war."4
In addition to these factors, a few other emphases should be mentioned. Mao
stressed the centrality of surprise in People's War. While he recognized that it certainly
also played a role in conventional warfare as well, "there are fewer opportunities to apply
it [in conventional battles] than there are in guerrilla hostilities. In the latter speed is
essential.""' 5 Another important element for Mao was concentration of forces while on
the offensive, but dispersal while on the defensive." 6 Finally, Maoist People's War
emphasized the importance of troops reducing their logistical requirements substantially
by providing for their own sustenance while in the field and by relying on simple means
for shelter. These factors meant that threats to logistical lines (posed by airpower or fast
111 MaoTsetung, "On Protracted War [May 19381," 197.
112 Ibid., 259.
113 Ibid., 228.
114 E.g., Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 201.
115 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 97.
116 Tien, Chinese Military History, 238ff.
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moving ground forces) would be likely to be downplayed since logistics in general were
perceived to be less important.
Integration of the Various Tactics
Weaving together these various strands of People's War theories, Mao's emphasis
on guerilla tactics counseled: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we
harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."" 7 In practice, this
meant that Chinese operations were characterized by the
... use of relatively untrained and under-armed soldiers against a more sophisticated
enemy. By using impressive deception and stealth the Chinese overcame technological
inferiority. By using remarkable mobility, mostly by foot over rough terrain, the
Chinese overcame logistical inferiority." 8
Mao's large, high morale forces would be used to concentrate large numbers of
forces to overwhelm or annihilate entire enemy units. He wrote,
In every battle concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and sometimes
even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive
to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net." 9
Whitson and Huang's The Chinese High Command, a definitive survey of the PLA,
suggests that this particular pronouncement represented not only Mao's strategic thought,
but a consensus of the senior military leadership at the time.'20
This strategy had been used many times with great success during the civil war."'
The west referred to it as a "human wave" or "human sea" tactic.' 2 Chinese communist
117 Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War [December 19361," 1 i1.
118 Segal, Defending China, 101.
119 Mao Tsetung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks IDecember 25, 19471," 349. On the importance
of this document to Maoist thought, see Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 492.
120 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 492.
121 For examples, see Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949; Wilson, China's Revolutionary War.
122 Joffe, Party and Army, I 1.
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forces would gather four or five times as many troops as their opponent, or even more.
They would surround the opponent (often by luring them to the end of a long supply line)
and utterly destroy his forces. This was ambush on a very large scale. These tactics
substituted for more complex "fire and maneuver" infantry practices that have dominated
infantry warfare in the west since WWI. The Chinese communist forces lacked the non-
commissioned officers necessary to lead such challenging tactics.'" Cohen describes
the Chinese tactics as follows:
[The Chinese] attacked mainly by night, using large quantities of hand grenades, light
machine gun and mortar fire ... from very close ranges. They usually approached from
the rear, after drawing enemy fire by sniping and bugle or pipe music. Operationally,
the Chinese had a more supple approach...: feinting, probing, or withdrawing ... in
order to test enemy reactions or to confuse and intimidate them 24
Similarly, a military historian describes the PLA's tactics during the Korean War:
Since the CCF had no close air support, no tanks, and very little artillery, it specialized in
fighting under cover of darkness. The whistles, bugles, and horns were not only
signaling devices (in place of radios) but also psychological tools, designed to frighten
the enemy in the dark and cause him to shoot, thereby revealing the position of men and
weapons. The fighting tactics were relatively simple: frontal assaults on revealed
positions, infiltration and ambush to cut the enemy's rear, and massed manpower attacks
on the open flanks of his main elements. War correspondents were to describe the
attacking waves of the CCF as a "human sea" or "swarm of locusts. "'25
This theory of victory was substantially different from the heavy, combined arms focus of
the American forces.
Implementation in Practice
These doctrines were not just theoretical for the Chinese but were put into
practice throughout the military. In terms of capabilities, the PLA was an exceptionally
123 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 13. While the material shortcomings discussed
elsewhere also limited Chinese strategic choice in other areas, with regard to fire and maneuver tactics,
simple technology had allowed for German infantry infiltrations at the end of WWI. The Chinese
could have pursued something similar, if only they had had sufficient small unit leadership.
124 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 177.
125 Blair, The Forgotten War, 382.
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large, under-equipped force. Late in the civil war it had grown quite rapidly: "from
475,000 regulars in mid-1945 to 1,278,000 in mid-1946 and 1,9500,000 a year later.
Despite the windfall in Manchuria lof captured Japanese weaponry I, these troops were
not well armed."'2 6 Indeed, for equipment throughout the late part of the civil war, the
communist forces relied on captured weapons whether from the KMT or the Japanese.' 27
By the outbreak of the Korean War, it remained a large infantry force, of over 5 million
men in some 250 divisions, still very poorly outfitted.'8 One military analyst writes
In terms of equipment, the Chinese Communist Army of 1950 was primitive by any
standards. It has been compared to an army of 1914, without the trucks and the artillery,
primarily an army of infantrymen. There were few trucks, little artillery, very limited
communication (particularly via radio), no air support, and no antiaircraft defense.
Logistical support in the civil war had been provided by the local population. 9
Another scholar emphasizes its backwardness in these, and other, areas,
On the eve of the Korean War, the PLA remained an infantry army with acute
deficiencies in heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and ammunition. Military officers still
lacked technological know-how as well as familiarity with operational tactics such as
coordination of joint operations, armor-infantry-artillery team work, and close air support.
There was, at that time, no sign of plans to modernize and regularize the PLA.'30
Indeed, as they entered the Korean War, many Chinese noted that their armament did not
even reach North Korean standards, let alone western ones. "Colonel Wong la Chinese
liaison office to the North Korean military] noted that, by Chinese standards, the North
Koreans themselves had been magnificently equipped by the Soviets.""'3 In the
126 Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, 317.
127 Ibid., 318.
128 Patrick C. Roe, The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950 (Novato, CA:
Presidio, 2000), 415.
129 Ibid., 417.
130 Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 33.
131 See Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. In Korea, 1950-51
(New York: Newmarket Press, 1988), 16. See later discussion on the awe with which the Chinese
officer views the North Korean communications equipment and weaponry. Ibid., 16ff.
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standard TOE for divisions from China and North Korea, the latter had nearly twice as
many light machine guns, three times as many heavy machine guns, and six times as
many trucks.'3 2 On the other hand, China held the advantage in horses and mules.'33
The PLA was well configured to implement a People's War strategy.
By the later stages of the Korean war, the PLA was able to arm this poorly
equipped force with substantial amounts of advanced material from the Soviets.
However, at the time that the decisions were being made regarding the outbreak and
participation in the war, no such capabilities existed. More importantly, the doctrinal
lenses that the associated doctrine would have brought were absent as well
The PLA Air Force
While it is not necessary to evaluate each service individually, it is worth
describing the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) briefly, given the
importance that that service plays in American strategic thought of the time. Simply put,
there was little history of any airpower in the Chinese Communist military history. The
CCP had faced a substantial air force in its GMD opponents in the civil war: "the
inventory of the Nationalist air force expanded to over a thousand aircraft by the end of
the war."'34 Nevertheless, the communists, themselves, never had an air force of any
consequence, and the senior leaders consistently demeaned the value of it.
132 Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1995), 93, table 5.2.
133 Ibid., 95.
134 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, 1 st ed.
(College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 17.
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Before 1937, the communist forces had only possessed two planes, and by the
beginning of the long march (October 1936), neither was flying.'35 This fledgling air
force was disbanded a number of times before 1945: by attrition in the early 1930s, by
the arrest of all the members of the Xinjiang Aviation unit in a political purge in 1942, by
financial pressure in 1943 (which forced the student pilots to "terminate their studies and
cultivate the land or work in shops"), and by bureaucratic fiat in 1945.136 Throughout
this period, material factors clearly restrained the communists from considering a modern
air force, but Mao's attitude helped ameliorate the perceived costs of this.
In June 1950, while discussing the air force issue with other Chinese leaders, an
emotional Mao remarked that the Communist way to deal with enemy airpower was to
'not fear death, but be brave, and dare to sacrifice lives.' The hardships Mao
experienced during his revolutionary career unquestionably contributed to his
determination to build a strong air force when the time came. However, his experiences
also influenced him to maintain the view that the human factor could overcome the
machine. 137
Thus, in addition to financial reasons for the slow growth of the Chinese air force, Mao's
attitude also played a role.
Once the Chinese began to create their own air force, several factors continued to
ensure a very different approach to airpower from the Americans. The Chinese
exported a People's War philosophy from the ground-based, guerilla context that it had
originated. This manifested itself in several ways. First, the early Chinese doctrine
regarding air power viewed it as primarily a defensive asset, as a component of People's
135 Of one of those planes, Zhang writes "The Red Army had no choice but to dismantle the airplane and
hide it in a remote mountain area. Local people unearthed the plane in 1951 and turned it over to the
government." Ibid., 19.
136 Ibid., 19, 21, and 23, respectively.
137 Ibid., 28. See the discussion in ,4±JiR, '<<,,>>>(:
'H J4,2001). Liao Guoliang, Li Shishun, and Xu Yan, The Development of Mao Zedong's Military
Thought, Revised ed. (Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 2001).
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War in the sky. 138 This was in sharp contrast to the usage of airpower by nearly every
great power in the second world war.
Second, morale of pilots was emphasized far beyond any justifiable degree:
In the military tradition of the Chinese Communists, CCP military leaders regarded the
human factor as one of the most important elements of victory or defeat. Even though
the U.S./UN forces had higher-quality equipment and technology, they believed that a
weak force like the CPV [Chinese People's Volunteers] could discharge its duties in
Korea and overwhelm superior enemy forces if its soldiers maintained high morale in
combat. Following this military tradition, PLAAF leaders were convinced high morale
could make the young inexperienced Chinese pilots brave, an important factor that would
help them improve combat efficiency and cope with other war-related difficulties.
Throughout the Korean War, the Chinese air force placed much emphasis on morale and
political mobilization to improve combat efficiency.'3 9
In short, "the PLAAF still believed in the efficacy of its man-over-weapons doctrine.
Young Chinese pilots would be able to defeat the enemy, they argued, because they had
come from ground forces accustomed to difficult situations and were willing to sacrifice
themselves for China."'" One of the official histories of the Chinese air force extolled
the virtues of the bravery and valiance of the Chinese pilots and concluded: "The
experience of the People's Volunteer Air Force in the war to resist America and support
Korea revealed a single truth for all to see: Under the conditions of modern warfare,
human factors are the determining factor for victory or defeat."'4 ' Unfortunately,
however, such emphasis on morale, bravery, and elan was to be found ill-suited to
modern air combat:
Inflated combat morale, while welcomed, also caused anxiety among Chinese pilots, who
were eager to redeem themselves with personal glory and individual success. The basic
principles of air operations-teamwork, protecting each other, and tactics-were often
138 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 48 and 103.
139 Ibid., 178.
140 Ibid., 205.
141 t:F,.i,<< At4' , t i[:>>( ,' ± : :;[ ~,1989). Wang Dinglie, Contemporary
China's Air Force (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing/Chinese Social Science Press, 1989),
207.
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ignored. According to PLAAF records, five of eight regimental commanders were
killed in action over Korea because of their brashness.'
Third, the Chinese continued to deemphasize training and education. While this
might be appropriate for a guerilla or light infantry army, it posed significant problems
for the development of an air force. The poor education level of the Chinese soldiers
impeded the communists' ability to create a viable air force throughout the revolutionary
period.'43 The education problems that had made pilot training difficult before 1949
continued after liberation, even when they relied on the Soviets for training their pilots.'44
Indeed, the Chinese often viewed the Soviet training standards for pilots as too rigorous,
suggesting a rather low emphasis on the quality of training coming from their own
leadership. 45
In sum, the Chinese air force exhibits sharp contrasts with that of the United
States. It played a minor role in PLA thinking about warfare, and even that small role
was characterized by a different understanding of airpower than the United States had.
Dissent among the Chinese Leadership and other Caveats
There were dissenters to this Chinese theory of victory, and there were contrary
trends in Chinese military history. While the characterization above is accurate in
describing the dominant element in CCP military thought, it is worthwhile to consider
some of the exceptions to this overall trend.
142 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 179.
143 See Ibid., 17-27 passim, which emphasizes the student pilots' "limited reading and writing skills" (p.
26).
144 Ibid., 41, 119-120, and 181.
145 Ibid., 44. In a later period, as the Chinese began to develop their air force more significantly in the
latter stages of the Korean War, they chose to rely on Soviet doctrine, thus again presenting a contrast
from the American approach. Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 27.
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A number of PLA leaders who had been trained for extensive periods at the
Yunnan Military Academy or at the Whampoa Military Academy did not buy into the
People's War thinking. In both locations they would have been was exposed to
Japanese and German military science.'4 Yunnan Military Academy was notable for its
high quality in the waning days of the Qing Dynasty. Whampoa was the military
institute created by Sun Yat-sen and led by Chiang Kai-shek that created the first
professional army in post-dynastic China. These academies stressed much more the role
of firepower, professionalized divisional-level leaders, the utility of the technical
branches, and many other concepts at odds with Maoist People's War. The role of
leaders with such backgrounds are discussed in the cases.
In the latter stages of the civil war, People's War no longer had a monopoly on
Chinese strategic thought. Whitson writes that in 1947 Chinese doctrine represented a
compromise between the Maoist "peasant ethic" and Soviet and (Westernized) warlord
strategies. 7 Additionally, by the end of the civil war, battles had become much more
conventional.' 8 However, this is generally the case after 1948, when the tide of the
civil war swung dramatically in the favor of the CCP. The lessons from this period
would seem primarily relevant to future "mopping up" campaigns, not to wars against the
most dangerous adversaries. Further, even at this period, the PLA remained a very
poorly mechanized force with regard to artillery and tanks, especially in comparison to
146 Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, 124. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, 39.
147 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 89 and Chapter 11: Strategy and Tactics.
148 Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, 353. Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 82ff. For
discussions by Mao of strategies that appear relatively conventional, see Mao Tsetung, "On Protracted
War [May 19381," 245-47; Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War
IDecember 19361," 105.
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the KMT.'4 9 For instance, in the pivotal HuaiHai Campaign in late 1948, the CCP faced
a force of similar size to that of its own, but one in which "most of whom were better
trained and better equipped than the CCP forces."'" The disparity in aircraft was even
wider, as discussed above. Thus, it is important not to overstate the importance of these
late battles in terms of their lasting legacy on CCP thinking.
Sources of Chinese Doctrine
As suggested above, the PLA's doctrinal and strategic beliefs have many sources.
Many of these elements can be traced to Sun Tsu and other sources of classical military
thought in Chinese history."' Clearly, some strategies were not chosen freely but
were-in part-forced on them by external pressure.'52 Similarly, the backwardness of
the Chinese economy has played a role:
The persistence of the "People's War" concept, of the commissar system, and, indeed, of
the whole "Maoist" approach to military affairs, has been largely a result of China's
relatively low level of industrial development. 53
However, some elements trace their roots to centuries of factor endowments in the
Chinese civilization. The views regarding the importance of manpower had a long
history in Chinese military thought.'54 The reliance on defections for victory, and
149 See Mao's own concerns regarding tanks and aircraft in Mao Tsetung, "Carry the Revolution through
to the End [December 30, 19481," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1966), 384.
150 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 206.
151 Although, as with many classic strategic texts, there are many different lessons that could be drawn
from Sun Tsu. Georges Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," in Chinese Defence Policy, ed. Gerald
Segal and William T. Tow (London: Macmillan, 1984), 5; Tien, Chinese Military History, 212ff.
152 Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, 321. Echoing this is Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers."
153 Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, 26.
154 Tien, Chinese Military History, 214-15.
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therefore the importance of the justness of one's own cause, also can trace its roots
through millennia of Chinese history. Whitson refers to many elements of People's War
as stemming from a "peasant ethic" of warfare, as distinct from the other major
influences on Chinese strategic thought: warlordism and Soviet advisors and training.'5 5
Further, recent history reified these ancient themes. Many of these strategies had
stood them in good stead against the better-armed and better-equipped KMT in the civil
war.'- 6 Mao had consistently argued on behalf of these strategies throughout that
conflict. s7 Immediately before the collapse of the KMT forces, he wrote, "but none of
these efforts can save the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang from defeat. The reason is that
our strategy and tactics are based on a People's War; no army opposed to the people can
use our strategy and tactics."'" Immediately after the collapse of his civil war
adversaries, Mao explained the victory by virtue of the People's War strategy.' 9 These
views remained dominant in the PLA for years to come. In 1961, one of the most senior
military leaders of the PLA wrote confidently "if there is a war within three to five years,
we will have to rely on hand weapons ... In the even event of war within the next few
155 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, passim, espec. 22-23.
156 For Mao's view on the better equipped KMT army, and ways to overcome it, see Mao Tsetung,
"Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War [December 19361," 95ff.
157 Ibid., 112-13, 141.
158 Mao Tsetung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks [December 25, 19471."
159 Mao Tsetung, "On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Ideological Education
Movement in the Liberation Army [March 7, 19481," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 358-59.
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years we can defeat the enemy by using close combat although we have no special
weapons.'6
Finally, the organizational culture of the Chinese military certainly played some
role:
For many reasons, the Soviet and Chinese armies have not responded to the technological
imperative the same way. Perhaps the most important single factor has been the
makeup of the respective officer corps. By the outbreak of the Chinese civil war, PLA
officers were tested, experienced, and thoroughly reliable both politically and military.
... During their civil wars, both the Soviet and Chinese communists engaged in a type
of warfare which was more concerned with winning over populations than with
destroying enemy forces. The "dual-command" system of a military commander and a
coequal political commissar can work very well in such a situation."'
This organizational structure could be expected to oppose any attempt at fundamental
reform.
Thus, the Chinese theory of victory traces its roots to a number of factors:
material and strategic constraints, historical legacies, and organizational politics.
Summary
Based on all this recounting, the evidence strongly supports a characterization of
the two countries facing each other with very large differences in their theories of victory.
China and the United States faced each other with vastly different military capabilities
and beliefs about how best to use them. The two sides' views on nuclear weapons can
only be described as opposites. The beliefs regarding tactical air and combined arms on
the U.S. side and People's War on the Chinese side are also far, far apart. The
160 Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, quoted in Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers," 85. See also pp. 84 and
90.
161 Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, 25.
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independent variable here is one of two very different views about the nature of warfare.
The two nations' theories of victory could hardly be more distinct.
Beyond the discussion above, one can argue that the two sides faced each other
not only with different theories of victory but that they faced off across different
technologic ages or eras. In Van Creveld's classic description of the links between
Technology and War, he presents a typology of four different ages that summarize the
development of militarily relevant technology since 2000 BC. From these descriptions,
it seems clear that China and the United States not only had different theories of victory,
but were facing each other across different historical stages (the Chinese being in the
Ages of Machines whereas the United States would be better placed late in the
subsequent Age of Systems).'6 2 At a very fundamental level, the two sides faced off
with different militaries.
Looking forward to the two Korean War chapters, while each case has the same
IV broadly speaking, there are differences of emphasis. The most relevant portion of
the independent variable in the chapter immediately following this one (Chapter 4)
focuses on relatively narrow elements that are specific to combat in the Korean Peninsula.
That is appropriate for the decision being studied in that chapter: the United States'
crossing of the 38 'h parallel. Chapter 5 relies on the general, very broad level thinking
by both sides regarding the nature of conflict to assess the Chinese decision to support the
North Korean invasion. This broad level thinking is centrally relevant for the decision
to go to war in a general deterrence situation. Nevertheless, a full characterization of
either side's theory of victory includes elements of both levels of thinking (that is, the
162 Martin L. Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. To the Present, Revised and
Expanded ed. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991).
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general war and the specific regarding ground combat in Korea). Regardless of whether
one is talking about general thinking about the nature of warfare of the specifics of
ground force doctrine, the final coding is the same, of widely distinct theories of victory
between the two countries.
The dissertation now turns to examining the tragic effects of this difference.
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Chapter 4. THE UNITED
STATES CROSSES 38TH
PARALLEL (CASE STUDY #1)
The previous chapter summarized the vast differences in the American and
Chinese theories of victory. In early 1950, the United States emphasized the utility of
airpower and nuclear weapons in general wars and relied on mobile, integrated
formations of armor, infantry, and artillery for ground combat. The contrast with the
Chinese was acute. Beijing expressed disdain toward atomic weapons and strategic
bombing and relied instead on "People's War" to defeat what it considered its main
threat: invasion of China proper. Lightly armed, poorly trained soldiers confident in
Maoist ideology were central to Chinese thinking. The two sides viewed the world
through different military lenses. This chapter examines the effect of the large value of
the theory's independent variable on the outcome of a Chinese attempt at strategic
coercion.
After the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, the United States rapidly rushed
to aid the collapsing South Korean forces. Initial hopes that a mere commitment of
American forces would be enough to lead to a change of heart in Pyongyang, Moscow,
and Beijing were dashed as the North Korean offensive continued apace.' Throughout
the summer of 1950, the ground war went poorly for the United States and consisted of a
long retreat back to the Pusan Perimeter. After that line solidified in early August, the
I James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1962), 42.
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subsequent Inchon landings of September 15 were a resounding success, forcing the
United States to consider more directly its plans regarding crossing the 38 'h parallel and
its goals for North Korea. The Chinese sent a large number of signals-both explicit
and implicit-to the United States, warning it against continuing its offensive.
Washington, however, downplayed the significance of these signals believing that the
Chinese would not get involved, and the Americans drove north. The eventual attack by
the PLA in November fundamentally altered the course of this conflict as well as
hardening the Cold War writ large.2 This section outlines the role that the two sides'
theories of victory played in this colossal miscalculation.
2 Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no.
4 (1980).
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Figure 4-1: The American Offensive in Korea, Fall 19503
Historical Background
While this is not the place for extensive historical background,4 it is important to
emphasize that the U.S. decision to cross the 38th Parallel was contingent on a belief that
3 Source: Department of History, Atlas Collection, U.S. Military Academy.
http://www .dean.usma.edu/history/webO3/atlases/atlas%20home.htm.
Available online at
4 See the excellent summaries found in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and
the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, vol. I (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press,
1981); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, vol.
2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War:
The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994);
William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1995); William Whitney Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and
Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). A thorough literature
review through the early 1990s can be found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War:
Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic history 15, no. 3 (1991).
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the Chinese and Soviets would not get significantly involved if it did so.5 This was clear
from the orders that MacArthur received, among many other sources. However, once
the United States crossed the 38th Parallel, the opportunities to avoid a Sino-American
war were severely constrained. As the Chinese finalized their decisions about
intervention in early October, the U.S. crossing of the 38th parallel loomed large in their
deliberations. Thus, the signaling and interpretation regarding this issue was very
consequential. If this dissertation's theory deepens the understanding of this
catastrophic error, it teaches something valuable.
The U.S. advance against North Korea moved very rapidly beginning in early
September. Planning for crossing the 38'h parallel began only days before the actual
Inchon landings took place. "The decision Ito cross the 38thl was embodied in NSC-81,
written mostly by Rusk, which authorized MacArthur to move into North Korea if there
were no Soviet or Chinese threats to intervene."6 NSC-81/1 was dated September 9,
1950 and was approved and ordered implemented by the President on September 11,
1950.7 It permitted crossing the 38th for the purposes of destroying the retreating North
Korean forces, although not for the general occupation of North Korea. s Nevertheless,
Updating that is Allan R. Millett, "The Korean War: A 50-Year Critical Historiography," The Journal
of Strategic Studies 24, no. 1 (2001).
5 Note this is clearly not the case for the U.S. decision to intervene in Korea in the first case when much
thinking focused on Korea as but the first foray in a global communist offensive.
6 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 711.
7 National Security Council, "Report by the National Security Council to the President (September 9,
1950)," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, ed. United States Department of State
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 716. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, A
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 377.
8 The key language is: "The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of
the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat
these forces." National Security Council, "F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7," 716. The document makes no
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NSC-81 did pave the way for the general invasion of North Korea, while putting that
decision off at the time:
It would be expected that the U.N. Commander would receive authorization to conduct
military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in
pursuance of a roll-back in Korea north of the 3 8'" parallel, for the purpose of destroying
the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no
entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement
of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.9
On October 1, MacArthur called on the North Koreans to surrender in sweeping terms,
directing the following message to them "I ... call upon you and the forces under your
command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease
hostilities under such military supervisions as I may direct."' ° Obtaining no such
response, MacArthur received final authority to cross the border on October 2. " By
October 3, "the ROK I Corps was well inside North Korea on the east coast."' 2 Four
days later, the UN passed its "go anywhere" resolution, and the first U.S. troops crossed
on that same day. Throughout these moves toward the North, it is very clear U.S.
policymakers were making contingent decisions based on the expectation that China and
the Soviet Union would not get involved in a significant way.'3
distinction between ground forces and air or naval forces so long as the Chinese and Soviets have not
entered.
9 Ibid.
10 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Albert Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Mary.: Naval
Institute Press, 1957), 117; Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for
Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 131-32;
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, vol. 3 Policy and direction: the first year
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army/GPO, 1972), 193.
11 While NSC-8 1/I was approved on September 11, MacArthur's orders implementing it were not sent
until September 27, and he did not receive final authority to cross the border until October 2. In part,
this delay was due to the change in leadership at the Pentagon, with Marshall taking over for Johnson
who had resigned. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 181.
12 Ibid., 202.
13 Ibid., 178.
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At about the same time, the Chinese side was making its final decisions. There
had long been a belief in the United States historiography regarding the Korean War that
the Chinese decision to intervene came as a result of American troops directly threatening
Chinese territory as they neared the Yalu.'4 It is now clear that this was not the case and
indeed that there was little chance for peace between the two once the United States
crossed the 38 th parallel (as discussed below).'5 Indeed, the Chinese had had serious
concerns once the United States stabilized its lines in South Korea, much earlier.
The Politburo discussion lof August 41 and Mao's telegram demonstrate unmistakably
that the CCP leadership had seriously considered sending troops to assist North Korea in
fighting the UN forces in early August, more than one month before the Inchon landing.' 6
Once Mao heard of the Inchon landings and of the United States regaining the initiative,
he seems quite firm in his own mind regarding the necessity of intervention."7 Other
Chinese leaders agreed that mere defense of the Yalu was not enough:
Nie's talks [of early August with senior military leaders of the NEBDA] demonstrated
clearly that the purpose of China's military preparations had gone beyond the simple
defense of the Chinese-Korea border.'
14 For the classic statement in this vein, see Allen Suess Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision
to Enter the Korean War (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1960).
15 For the argument that any U.S. presence north of the 38th parallel was inimical to Chinese national
interests, see Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," 136-37.
16 Chen Jian, China's Road, 143. At the end of August, a group of senior PLA officials held a meeting
in which they anticipated the Inchon landings. (See discussion in Chapter 6.) While there is no
evidence that the Chinese had expected this in early August, the Chinese were anticipating the prospect
of an American victory as necessitating their involvement. From the evidence available, it is unclear
what would have constituted such a victory: merely the successful defense of the South or rollback in
the North. Christensen suggests that the Chinese were already anticipating the crossing of the 38th at
this point. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization,
and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 157.
17 Chen Jian, China's Road, 161.
18 Ibid., 139. Nie Rongzhen was the acting head of the PLA.
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By early October, the situation worsened appreciably from the Chinese perspective. As
the UN called for the North Koreans to capitulate on October 1, Chinese intelligence
reports from the front painted increasingly bleak pictures:
On October , an intelligence report reached Beijing indicating that U.S./UN vanguard
units had begun crossing the 38th parallel. Twenty-four hours later, another report
confirmed that American troops were moving into North Korea in large numbers.' 9
In a secret report given to the Chinese Peoples Consultative Conference, Zhou Enlai
echoed this point "New dispatches of October 1 and 2 indicated that U.S. troops had
already crossed the 38 'h Parallel and that the South Korean army had penetrated far north
of it."20 (Note that according to American records, as discussed above, these two reports
were false, but what matters here is China's perception of reality.)
Finally, the Chinese leaders undertook their fateful decision. On October 2, an
enlarged session of the Politburo Standing Committee met to discuss Chinese policy.
Mao summarized the decisions taken there in a telegram he drafted to send to Stalin2 ':
Under the present situation, we have decided that on October 15 we will begin
dispatching the twelve divisions that have been transferred in advance to south
Manchuria. They will locate themselves in appropriate districts of North Korea (not
necessarily all the way to the 38'h parallel). While they do combat with the enemy who
dares to advance and attack north of the 38'h parallel, in the first period fighting a
defensive war to destroy small enemy detachments and gaining a clear understanding of
the situation, they will await the arrival of Soviet weapons the equipping of our Army;
19 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 (Lawrence,
Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 77-78.
20 Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U.S. Aggression, Aiding Korea and Defending Peace," October 24, 1950,
reprinted in Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, I st ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press:
Distributed by Guoji Shudian, 1981), 61.
21 Note, however, that as best one can tell, the telegram was not sent. For the actual telegram sent, see
"Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filipov IStalinl 3 October 1950
conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin" in Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao,
Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korea War, September 16-October 15, 1950," Bulletin of the
Cold War International History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96): 114. On the utility of this drafted
telegram for scholarship in general, see Chen Jian, "Commentaries: Comparing Russian and Chinese
Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History," Bulletin of the Cold War International
History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96); Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 159ff.
165
Twomey, The Military Lens
and then [they will] coordinate with the Korean comrades a counterattack, destroying the
invading American army.'
On October 4, the full Politburo met to ratify Mao's decision. After contentious and
inconclusive debate,z3 it reconvened the next day. At Mao's instructions, Peng Dehuai
spoke forcefully in support of intervention: "Peng's speech transformed the mood of the
meeting, and the discussion now centered on the advantages of sending troops to
Korea." 24
The key element in this hardening in Chinese policy was the U.S. crossing of the
38 th parallel.2 For instance, a report written by the senior commanders of the regional
command of the PLA nearest the North Korean border, the Northeast Border Defense
Agency (NEBDA), in late August had counseled patience. It had "suggested that the
best timing for entering the war might be when the UN forces had counterattacked back
across the 3 8th parallel, because this would put China in a politically and militarily more
favorable position to defeat the enemy."26
While Mao's leadership was paramount in October (Lin Biao, and others, were
opposed to intervening27), the aggressive U.S. policy eased his burden in securing wide
support for his preferred policy:
Mao might not need to yield to the different opinions held by his colleagues, but it would
have been foolish for him not to take them into consideration. In fact, unless China's
22 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 272. See also Chen Jian, China's Road, 176.
23 Odd Ame Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 322. See the discussion of the following chapter on some of this dissent.
24 Chen Jian, China's Road, 184.
25 For one of the earliest arguments that this was the case, see Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the
Last Chance for Peace."
26 Chen Jian, China's Road, 152.
27 Ibid., 153. Again, see more on the dissenters in China in the following chapter.
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territorial safety were directly threatened by the Americans, Mao would have had
difficulty in convincing the party and the Chinese people of the necessity to intervene in
Korea.8
Not only was Mao constrained by the views of his fellow leaders in Beijing, he had to
consider the attitudes of those allied leaders in North Korea and the Soviet Union. 29 It
was not until the UN troops crossed the 38'h parallel that the North Korean's formally
requested assistance from China.3 0
In the early Cold War, the evidence available strongly supported the argument
that war might still have been avoided once the United States crossed the 38th parallel had
MacArthur kept his forces from approaching the Yalu River.3" Based on evidence made
available only more recently, it is increasingly clear this was not the case. Indeed, some
argue that mere American entry into South Korea in June and July of 1950 was enough to
make war with the United States hard to escape.32 While this remains contentious, there
is increased agreement that once the United States crossed the former border between
North and South Korea, there was little opportunity to avoid war.33 Even the lull in
fighting in November is now understood to be a tactical military trap rather than a
28 Ibid., 155.
29 Ibid., 160.
30 Ibid., 171.
31 Most famously, this is the argument of Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu.
32 This is the argument of Chen Jian, China's Road.
33 The earliest advocate of this point in English is Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance
for Peace." See also Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 163-74. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and
Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1993), 159, 181, and 194; Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 188; Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military
Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2003). Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U.S. Aggression, Aiding Korea and Defending Peace," October 24,
1950, reprinted in Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, 62.
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diplomatic signal.3 4 There was no lost chance at the "narrow neck" of the Wonsan-
Pyongyang corridor. American forces anywhere in North Korea, not just on the Yalu,
sparked the Chinese insecurity. The security dilemma was extremely severe at this
point, and it would have been hard to imagine the Chinese escaping its grasp.3 5
By mid-October, both sides had made their key decisions. Chinese troops began
crossing the Yalu River on October 18, 1950.36 The armies of the United States and
China were destined to meet in North Korea.
Signaling by China
There were a large number of Chinese signals aimed directly at the United States
in this case. Thus, this is clearly a case of immediate deterrence (rather than general
deterrence). 3 7 This section will begin by surveying the public and private diplomatic
signals sent, and then examine the parallel military signals that the Chinese undertook.
34 See FIIl], <<rpij&(1949-1 972)>>(t: 1999). TaoWenzhao,
History ofSino-American Relations, 1949-1972 (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1999), 32; Yu
Bin, "What China Learned from Its 'Forgotten War' in Korea," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea, ed.
Li Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 15.
35 Precisely using the security dilemma language is Barry R. Posen, "The Chinese Intervention in Korea:
A Case of Inadvertent Escalation" (Draft Manuscript, MIT, 1989). One can array scholars moving
northward up the peninsula as to where the line was that the United States could not cross without
provoking the Chinese to entering the war. At the water's edge (that is, outside of Korea) is Chen
Jian. Moving northward, Christensen and Scobell argue the line was at the 38th. Posen suggests it
is at the narrow neck, and Whiting argued it was at the Yalu. This author's sense is that the evidence
available at this point favors the 38th parallel.
36 Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. In Korea, 1950-51 (New
York: Newmarket Press, 1988), 117.
37 See the discussion in the introductory chapter at note 13 for this distinction.
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Diplomatic and Public Signals
Propaganda served (and serves) many purposes for the Chinese regime,
addressing both domestic and international audiences.3 8 The propaganda department
recognized the importance of the Korean War for domestic politics of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP):
This is an important event at the present time. The United States has thus exposed its
imperialist face, which is not fearsome at all but is favorable for the further awakening of
the Chinese people and the people of the whole world. All over China, we have to use
this opportunity to echo Foreign Minister Zhou's statement and to start a widespread
campaign of propaganda, so that we will be able to educate our people at home and to
strike firmly the arrogance of the U.S. imperialist aggression.3 9
However, following the withdrawal of Stuart in 1949, the United States had no formal
lines of communication with the Chinese, so propaganda was also important as a means
of international communication.40 Public statements were the primary residual means of
direct communication between China and the West. This certainly exacerbated the
problems in communication the two sides faced.
Initially, immediately after American intervention in the Korean War, Chinese
signals were rather mild. At the level of public diplomacy, the restraint was notable:
"China's initial public reaction demonstrated its caution, watchfulness, and explicitly
38 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, I st ed. (New York: Norton, 1990), 514-519.
39 "Instruction, General Information Agency, 'On the Propaganda about U.S. Imperialists' Open
Intervention in the Internal Affairs of China, Korea, and Vietnam,' 29 June 1950" in Zhang Shuguang
and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary
Evidence, 1944-50 (Chicago, Ill.: Imprint Publications, 1996), 153. Note this instrumental use of the
crisis parallels Mao's use of other crises in Sino-American relations. See Christensen, Useful
Adversaries, Chapter 6: Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958
Quemoy Crisis.
40 Yuan Ming, "The Failure of Perception: America's China Policy, 1949-50," in Sino-American
Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Ming Yuan
(Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1989), 145.
169
Twomey, The Military Lens
defensive posture."'4 In late July, the weekly World Culture wrote: "China also had
adopted the principles of non-intervention in Korea's domestic affairs ... the Soviet
Union, each new democratic state, and all peace loving peoples in the world sympathize
with Korean people's liberation movement but that does not imply that they should
intervene with arms."42 However, by the week of July 17-24, 1950 a "Hate the U.S."
campaign began in China43 and "August marked the start of IChina's] more aggressive
stance" in terms of propaganda.44
Indeed, by the end of the summer, the Chinese diplomacy as well had shifted,
from a policy of searching for negotiated solutions (i.e., supporting the Soviet peace
initiative in early August) to explicitly threatening the United States that it would
intervene. These warnings began in late September.45 Initially, China made two rather
oblique warnings. First,
On 20 August Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai sent a message to the United Nations
that deviated from past statements emanating from Beijing in its emphasis on Korea
rather than Taiwan. Because "Korea is China's neighbor," Zhou declared, "the Chinese
people cannot but be concerned about the solution of the Korean question. "s
Within a week of that warning (on August 26th), a Chinese magazine stated more
explicitly that China viewed the Korean question as a potential security threat.47 Later,
41 Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 90.
42 Quoted in Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Longman, 1997),
211.
43 Stueck, The Korean War, 52.
44 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-
1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 79.
45 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 26.
46 Stueck, The Korean War, 64.
47 Ibid.
170
Chapter 4: The United States Crosses the 3 8'h Parallel
On September 25, Nieh Jung-chen, acting chief of staff of the PLA, told [Indian
Ambassador to Beijing] Panikkar that the Chinese would not "sit back with folded hands
and let the Americans come up to the border. '"
Zhou Enlai chimed in on 30 September, stating, "The Chinese people absolutely will not
tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being
savagely invaded by the imperialists."49 On October 3, the Chinese stepped up their
diplomacy one more time:
Even more dramatic was Chou En-lai's late-night meeting with Panikkar on October 3 in
which the Chinese premier made it unmistakably clear that if U.S. troops crossed into
North Korea, Chinese contingents would enter the war. 'The South Koreans did not
matter,' Chou explained, 'but American intervention into North Korea would encounter
Chinese resistance.'50
On October 10,5' the government mouthpiece newspaper, the Renmin Ribao, published a
statement relaying Zhou's Foreign Ministry warning issued that day:
The American war of invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of
China from its very start ... The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such
a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its
accomplice countries and to the dangerous trend toward extending the war...The Chinese
people firmly advocate a peaceful solution to the Korean problem and are firmly opposed
to the extension of the Korean war by America and its accomplice countries. And they
are even more firm in folding that aggressors must be answerable for all consequences
resulting from their frantic acts in extending aggression.5 2
Blair interprets this as "very close to a declaration of war."5 3
Beyond these diplomatic warnings, throughout this period Beijing tried to project
a view of itself as a strong nation that should not be trifled with. Beijing tried to ensure
48 Foot, The Wrong War, 79.
49 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 197.
50 Foot, The Wrong War, 79.
51 Although by this time, both South Korean and American troops had already crossed the border. They
would have had to retreat to abide by the warning at this point, although this would seem quite possible
given the scale of the conflict that was to follow.
52 Emphasis added. Quoted in editorial comments in United States Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VII: Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976), 914.
53 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea (New York: Times Books, 1988), 340.
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that its own domestic situation was in order so that it would not convey an image of
weakness to the Americans. 4 It also played up the role of the Sino-Soviet Alliance as
another way to emphasize the dangers of threatening it.55
Thus, throughout this period, diplomatic warnings were numerous and-over
time-increasingly robust and clear.
Military Signals and Policy
In addition to this signaling using various diplomatic and public sources, "the
Chinese reinforced that policy with active preparations for military intervention in
Korea." 6 Chinese military moves had begun quite early. As Mao explained several
years later to a Soviet delegation, "After the war broke out, we first shifted three armies
and later added another two, putting a total of five armies on the edge of the Yalu
River."' The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the institution that both exerts
control over the military for the CCP as well as integrates military and political decision-
making. 8 As discussed at length in chapter 6, the CMC meeting of July 7 had ordered
forces redeployed from Fujian to Manchuria.9 At CMC meetings from August 7
54 Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 93.
55 Ibid., 95.
56 Stueck, The Korean War, 64.
57 WFl!t,ViW1_, ~ fi<<-~, ~,~.P.>>tf(t,9,:3'[~i±,2001). Liao
Guoliang, Li Shishun, and Xu Yan, The Development of Mao Zedong's Military Thought, Revised ed.
(Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 2001), 372.
58 It is something akin to the American NSC with more military input. See Tai Ming Cheung, "The
Influence of the Gun: China's Central Military Commission and Its Relationship with the Military,
Party, and State Decision-Making Systems," in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in
the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2001).
59 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 59. Chen Jian, China's Road, 132.
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through the 10, Chinese leaders continued to lay the groundwork for defensive
deployments to the Korean-Chinese border, including significant troop deployments.60
The forces gathered there were to number 225,000 by the end of the summer. 6' These
were reinforced further as the United States solidified the Pusan perimeter in early
August when Mao,
... informed his generals in the northeast that they must be prepared to fight within a
month. Later in August he extended the period of preparation to the end of September,
but he also called for twelve armies to be stationed along the Yalu, and an increase of
eight over his order of early July.62
These decisions percolated through the Chinese chain of command, with the PLA Chief
of Staff writing,
North Korea would very likely experience a setback and some complications in the war.
Thus, according to the CMC's decision, I telegraphed an order to the strategic reserve
forces on August 5: "Complete all the necessary preparations within this month. Be
ready for the order of new movement and engagement." 63
These strategic reserve forces consisted of three multi-division armies.
As the Inchon landings approached, Chinese preparations intensified even further.
On August 23, Mao and Zhou Enlai "decided to reiterate to the NEBDA that no matter
what the difficulties, all preparations for operations should completed by the end of
September."64 In early September, the Chinese moved the headquarters of the crack 4 th
Field Army to Shenyang so that it would be closer the North Korean border.6 5 Logistics
60 Chen Jian, China's Road, 136.
61 Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 91.
62 Stueck, The Korean War, 65. See also Edwin Palmer Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea,
1950: The Story of the Failure of America's China Policy, Paragon House pbk. ed. (New York, N.Y.:
Paragon House, 1993), 72; Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 91-2.
63 Nie Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea, ed. Li Xiaobing,
Allan R. Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 40.
64 Chen Jian, China's Road, 148.
65 Spurr, Enter the Dragon, 70-71.
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preparations were made at the same time.6 China sent military observers to North
Korea to assess the tactical situation in late September.6 7
Clearly, many of these steps were taken to create the material conditions that
would allow the Chinese to intervene. However, such military moves also had
communicative goals and served to bolster the diplomatic warnings that were being
issued, as summarized above. Most historians of the period treat these military moves
as having such communicative goals. (E.g., both Allen Whiting and Zhang Shuguang
clearly view the movement of forces as intentional, deterrent signals by Beijing.68) Mao
had a practice of doing precisely this, that is, using military deployments to send deterrent
signals to the Americans. As discussed in the following chapter, Mao believed that his
large deployment of troops to coastal regions in Northern China in 1949 had deterred the
United States from getting involved in the civil war in its waning days.
In his [Mao's] view the deployment of a large number of the PLA forces had compelled
the Americans to evacuate their positions in China and had thus forestalled direct U.S.
armed intervention in 1949.69
(Mao's fears in the civil war were reasonable, given the role the U.S. had played on the
mainland in support of the KMT.70) In that case, there is direct evidence that the
66 Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1995), 170.
67 Chen Jian, China's Road, 163.
68 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 64-67; Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 90-94.
69 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 54, see also 13-33.
70 American troops had finally withdrawn from Mainland China in June of 1949. (U.S. forces declined
from over 100,000 in 1945 to 4,000 in 1948 before finally being completely withdrawn in June of
1949.) While there had been some skirmishing between the Red Army and U.S. Marines (leading to
a total of over forty American casualties) in the late periods of the Chinese Civil War, the last
significant action occurred in April of 1947. (See Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in
North China, 1945 - 1949 (Washington, D. C. 20380: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, 1968).) For a recent treatment of the U.S. role in supporting and running guerilla
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Chinese leadership viewed its military moves as both communicative as well as
enhancing capability. For instance, the Central Military Committee emphasized the
deterrent nature of the deployment "with [these preparations we can dissuade the United
States from realizing its ambition of armed intervention [in China]"71
According to the conventional wisdom in the deterrence literature, tested here as
the Alternate Hypothesis, these strong signals should have had a high probability of
leading to deterrence success. However, these signals - large-scale infantry
deployments-were heavily imbued with the Chinese theory of victory. This is
precisely the outcome predicted by the dissertation (Prediction #5: "When signaling to
the other side, each side should send signals that make use of forces in accordance with
their own theory of victory.") Despite both sets of signals (at the diplomatic and
military levels), the United States crossed the 38th parallel, leading to the Chinese
involvement. The following section outlines the U.S. perception of the strong Chinese
signals and explains why they were not understood.
Interpretation by the United States
How did American decisionmakers interpret these threats? Were they even
aware of them? What role did their beliefs about the nature of war play? This section
answers these questions.
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The primary conclusion in Washington and at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo
was that China would not intervene (supporting Prediction #7 which suggests leaders will
downplay the likelihood of the adversary getting involved). At the Wake Island meeting
on October 15, only a few weeks before the first battle with PLA, Truman and
MacArthur discussed this issue explicitly.
When Truman asked him [MacArthur] to comment on the likelihood of Communist
China's entering the war, MacArthur said that his answer was 'speculative,' but he
guessed 'very little.' Of the 300,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria, he continued, 'Only
60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River, and if they tried to get down to Pyongyang,
there would be the greatest slaughter.' 72
(In that exchange, as in many instances discussed in this dissertation, the assessments of
capability and intent by the Chinese were intertwined, each mutually supporting the
other.) The two leaders later claimed to agree entirely on the situation in the region.
This section examines a range of reasons for this confidence. It begins by
addressing the conventional argument that the messenger of several of the signals
(Ambassador Panikkar) was not trusted. This argument generally is used to bolster the
Alternate Hypothesis, which centers on the objective quality of the signal as explanations
for deterrence success or failure. If the signals were not clearly sent, then the Alternate
Hypothesis would indeed predict the resulting deterrence failure. However, as will be
shown, this is not the case; Panikkar is not to blame for the deterrence failure.
The section goes on to show that the military threats were heard in Washington,
but that they simply were not viewed as threatening. The subsequent section evaluates
the acute and pervasive surprise that the U.S. leadership felt when the Chinese did in fact
intervene and did so at great cost to American soldiers and marines.
72 Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1999), 67-68.
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Role of Panikkar
In the conventional wisdom, Beijing's message did not get through to Washington
because of the latter's mistrust of the chosen messenger, the Indian Ambassador stationed
in Beijing, Kavalam M. Panikkar. The argument goes that he was viewed as a self-
promoter and a communist sympathizer in Washington.73 Britain was also said to view
him as unreliable.'4
However, Panikkar's reliability was not as suspect as the later historiography
would have it. Although the United States was looking to find alternate lines of
communication to use with Beijing,75 it had long used India as a way to send signals to
Beijing.76 It had also looked to India as a way to receive messages from Beijing.77
Indeed, Panikkar, himself, had long been used as a conduit for information from Beijing.
Only a few days before his first warning, he had been suggesting, based on conversations
with Zhou Enlai and other forms of information, that China would not intervene, and this
message was treated seriously in the United States.78 After the outbreak of war between
the United States and China, Washington continued to use Indian emissaries as
intermediaries to Beijing.79 Beyond this history of using Panikkar and India as conduits,
73 Foot, The Wrong War, 79.
74 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, 215.
75 See the concerns expressed in "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)," October 26, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950,
Vol. 7, 1000-02.
76 Foot, The Wrong War, 83.
77 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, NY: Norton,
1969), 452.
78 This occured on September 21, 1950. Stueck, The Korean War, 90.
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it is indisputable that the warnings were conveyed to Washington: "The State Department
got word of this threat early the following day."8
Further, it was not only isolated warnings from Panikkar that got through, but
rather a wide range of sources of information. One report in early September gives
essentially the same warning that was repeated frequently later. In it, the Consul
General in Hong Kong received a letter purporting to reproduce discussions of a "Peking
conference," including the following from Zhou Enlai: "When asked [about the] position
of China should North Korean troops be pushed back to Manchurian border, Chou IZhou
Enlail replied China would fight [thel enemy outside China's border and not wait until
enemy came in."8' Other sources abounded: "From Hong Kong and Taibei, word did
filter into the State Department that Beijing would commit troops to Korea if U.S.
soldiers advanced north of the 38'h parallel."' Similarly,
Indications of Chinese intentions grew increasingly disturbing. On [September 291, the
State Department received word, indirectly through the embassy in Moscow, that the
Dutch charg6 in Beijing believed Chinese officials were considering military intervention
in Korea if U.S. troops entered the North. On 2 October Wilkinson in Hong Kong sent a
partial text of a Zhou Enlai speech of 30 September, which included the assertion that
"the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression nor will the supinely
tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by foreigners..."m
79 Nehru was used as late as the Panmunjom negotiations. Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power
and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 166. During the early part of the
war, the Indians were used several times. See "Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Rusk)," November 16, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1164.
80 Stueck, The Korean War, 94, see also 91.
81 "The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State (September 5, 1950)" in
F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 698.
82 Stueck, The Korean War, 90.
83 Ibid., 93-94. That warning, somewhat sanitized for classification purposes, can be seen at Central
Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical Situations in the
Far East," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J. Kuhns
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997).
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The report from the Moscow embassy was also passed through the CIA, suggesting that it
too, got wide distribution in the U.S. government.84 Beijing's final and most ominous
warning noted above, from the Foreign Ministry on October 10, clearly found its way to
senior leaders in Washington.' All these messages corroborated Panikkar's warnings,
and yet they too were ignored.
When Panikkar conveyed messaged Washington wanted to hear, it listened.
When he passed on messages that Washington did not want to hear, it labeled him as
unreliable. Panikkar's warnings were not the only ones being ignored. His role in the
miscalculations is not causal.
Ignorance of the Military Signals Was Not an Excuse
Throughout this period, not only was the United States aware that the Chinese
were engaged in diplomatic signaling through Panikkar and many other sources, but it
was also aware that Beijing was conducting heavy military movements in the region.
American ignorance of these moves cannot account for the failure of Chinese signals.
A few examples will serve to make the case on the military side: "U.S.
intelligence picked up the steady movement of Chinese forces northward toward
Korea..." General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2 or intelligence officer,
estimated on July 3 that "the Chinese had stationed two cavalry divisions and four armies
84 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical
Situations in the Far East."
85 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) (October 12, 1950)," in F.R. U.S.,
1950, Vol. 7, 931. In that document, Jessup's transmits a message from the British foreign service
dated October 11 referring to the Chinese statement of the day before.
86 Stueck, The Korean War, 65.
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in Manchuria.""7 This would have been a force totaling approximately 140,000 men.
By the end of August, he announced "... sources have reported troop movement from
Central China to Manchuria for sometime which suggest movements preliminary to
entering the Korean theater."88 At that point, he estimated that some 246,000 soldiers
were in Manchuria, and 80,000 were in the village of An-tung, just across the Yalu.89
Following Inchon, Willoughby raised his estimate of Chinese forces in Manchuria to
450,000.90 His staff reported that there were some 38 divisions in Manchuria on
October 4.91
While many of these Chinese moves might have been explained away as
defensive deployments, some specifics are less easily dismissed. On October 5,
Willoughby prepared a Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS). This was the key intelligence
document put out by Willoughby's office and,
contained the raw data for MacArthur's intelligence assessment. The DISs, which could
be 30 pages long and frequently longer, contained detailed accounts of the day's fighting
in Korea, a good deal of political material on all countries in the FEC region (including
Japan and China), as well as special appreciations and order of battle annexes.9
87 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 198. See also Foot, The Wrong War, 79.
88 This is a summary of the contents in "Daily Intelligence Summary #2913 (August 31, 1950)," as
described in General Charles Willoughby, "The Chinese Communist Potential for Intervention in the
Korean War (Undated)", p. 2, The Charles A. Willoughby Papers, Box 10, Military History Institute
Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.
89 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 179.
90 Ibid., 199.
91 See "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 99 (October 4, 1950)," in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection, (Carlisle, Penn.:
Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, 1950). This collection consists of the
daily situation reports for the entire Far Eastern Command.
92 Eliot A. Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle': American Intelligence and the Chinese Intervention in Korea,
1950," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 ( 1990): 132. Cohen notes "Three copies of the DIS
were sent every day to Washington by courier from Tokyo taking three to five days, apparently, to
arrive there. Another 54 copies went by registered mail" (p. 146, note 7). Beyond that, the State
Department staff on the ground in South Korea had access to Eighth Army and X Corps intelligence
reports as they were produced. They often cabled summaries of these to Acheson in Washington.
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This particular DIS was immediately telexed to Washington; in it, Willoughby noted that
many of these troops were massing at border crossings:
... A build-up of Chinese forces along the Korean-Manchurian border has been reported
in many channels, and while exaggerations and canards are always evident, the potential
of massing at the Antung and other Manchurian crossing appears conclusive. This mass
involves a possible 9-18 divisions organized into 3-6 armies of the total strength of 38
divisions and 9 armies now carried in all Manchuria ... the potential exists for Chinese
Communist forces to openly intervene in the Korea War if UN forces cross the 3 8'h
Parallel. 9 3
There were also some reports in the American bureaucracy in Washington of Chinese
forces crossing the Yalu on October 5.'4 By mid-October, Willoughby was reporting
that scores of divisions were being forward-deployed, not just moved to Manchuria in
general: "Intervention is a decision for war, on the highest level, i.e., the Kremlin and
Peiping. However, the numerical and troop potential in Manchuria is afait accompli.
A total of 24 divisions are disposed along the Yalu River."95 Two weeks later, his staff
estimated the number of forward-deployed divisions along the river to be twenty-nine.'
Throughout this period, the United States remained confident in its ability to
monitor the movements of the Chinese through Air Force reconnaissance and intelligence
assets."7 When convoys were sighted coming south from the border (a very common
See, for instance "The Charge in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State (November 1, 1950),"
reprinted in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1022.
93 "Daily Intelligence Summary #2948 (October 5, 1950)," quoted in Willoughby, "The Chinese
Communist Potential for Intervention in the Korean War (Undated)", p. 3. The Daily Intelligence
Summary of 4 days later reinforced that conclusion. See also Schnabel, United States Army in the
Korean War, 200.
94 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 200.
95 "Daily Intelligence Summary #2957 (October 14, 1950)," quoted in Willoughby, "The Chinese
Communist Potential for Intervention in the Korean War (Undated)", p. 3.
96 "Daily Intelligence Summary #2971 (October 28, 1950)," summarized in Ibid., p. 4.
97 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 88.
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occurrence98), the standard operating procedure was to continue to monitor the road with
aircraft, thus guaranteeing information. For instance:
The most significant enemy activity was the unconfirmed sighting of extensive vehicular
convoy movements south, toward and through, Pyongyang. Constant air surveillance of
the routes between Sariwon and Sunchon is now being maintained.99
While these reports were never confirmed, prisoner of war IPOWI reports by the end of
October were presenting a picture of at least small-scale infiltration.' °° General Almond,
commander of X Corps, even personally interrogated some of the Chinese prisoners.''
Nevertheless, these reports never led to a fundamental rethinking of strategy at the
military level, let alone the geo-political level.
Other intelligence sources, outside of the military chain of command, also echoed
these reports through State reports that originated in Moscow, Hong Kong, and Taibei, as
well as through the reporting of other allied nations' foreign ministries and military
attaches. For instance, "Earlier intelligence reports had indicated that, since July,
sizable Chinese ground forces had been moving into Manchuria from distant regions of
the country."' 2 The CIA, in a major survey regarding the prospect of Chinese entry in
early September 1950 also noted the enormous force in Manchuria:
98 Such reports litter the SITREPs beginning in September and continuing through the Chinese offensives.
See, for instance "Joint Daily SITREP No. 69 (September 4, 1950)," "Joint Daily SITREP No. 98
(October 3, 1950)," "Joint Daily SITREP No. 102 (October 7, 1950)," etc., all in Joint Daily Sitrep
Collection.
99 "Joint Daily SITREP No. 99 (October 4, 1950)," in Ibid.
100 See "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 124 (October 30, 1950)," in Ibid. In this SITREP, summaries of recent
POW interrogations are reported, including discussion of a 5,000 person convoy crossing one of the
Yalu Bridges and the presence of several units at regimental strength (including artillery).
101 Lt. General Edward M. Almond, "Personal Notes of Lt. Gen. E. M. Almond Covering Military
Operations in Korea, Sept 1950-July 195 1, p. see entry for October 30, 1950, The Edward M Almond
Papers, Box: "Korean War," Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.
102 Stueck, The Korean War, 90.
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Following the fall of Manchuria there were approximately 565,000 Military District
IMD1 troops in Manchuria (including 165,100 ex-Nationalists), and possibly 100,000 to
125,000 of these MD troops have now been integrated into the regular army and
organized as combat forces. These units, as well as the remaining MD troops, probably
are Soviet-equipped. In addition, reports during the past three months have indicated a
considerably increase in regular troop strength in Manchuria. It is estimated that the
major elements of Lin Piao's 4"h Field Army-totalling sicl perhaps 100,000 combat
veterans-are now in Manchuria and are probably located along or adjacent to the
Korean border, in position for rapid commitment in Korea.
Approximately 210,000 Communist regulars under Nieh Jung-chen's commander are
presently deployed in the North China area. Some of these troops have been reported
enroute to Manchuria.'3
Even more ominously, "Washington also received a report, based on air reconnaissance,
of a large mechanized convoy moving into North Korea from Manchuria.""' 4 There
were also signs of Communist air forces massing north of the Yalu on October 18:
The Commanding General, FEAF, has reported the observation ... of 75-100 aircraft at
Antung Airfield, Manchuria. The observation of this unusually heavy concentration of
aircraft was made by six crew members of an aircraft from the 3 1' Strategic
Reconnaissance Squadron. ... The aircraft on Antung were spaced in six rows of 14
aircraft each, and there were additional aircraft scattered around the airfield."' 5
When follow up reconnaissance flights sortied, they found the airfield empty.
Indeed, in some cases the intelligence was falsely suggesting the Chinese had
already entered North Korea in the days immediately before the United States crossed the
38th Parallel. Two separate Daily Intelligence Summaries (DISs) for the UN Command
made this point. The first on October 3 "reported some evidence that twenty Chinese
communist divisions were in North Korea and had been there since September 10." °6
The second on October 5 "noted the purported entry into North Korea of nine Chinese
103 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 190. Intelligence Memorandum 324, 8 September 1950,
Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The
Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J. Kuhns (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997),
434-35.
104 Stueck, The Korean War, 93-94. It appears this was conveyed on October 4, 1950.
105 See "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 114 (October 19, 1950)," in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection. See also
Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1983), 217-19.
106 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 199.
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divisions. " °7 Based on evidence from the Chinese side, it is clear these reports are false,
and indeed, it appears the DIS did not find the reports to be entirely convincing (and the
reports convey that). Nevertheless, they were included in the final reports and would
have shaped American leader's understandings at the time.
Again, while some of this evidence might have been explained away as primarily
defensive deployments, not all of it could. The massing of troops at border crossings is
a clear sign of offensive capability. Reports of troops (even when false) in North Korea
is another sign of the same. Moving large numbers of troops to forward positions does
not make sense for a military force geared toward defense. Finally, the numbers were
simply of a scale that should have raised eyebrows. At the time that Chinese troop
numbers in Manchuria were thought to be nearly half a million, the total U.S. force on the
Korean Peninsula was less than 150,000.'
All the while, MacArthur continued to insist that there was no sign of "present
entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces."' 9 Even at a
much a later point, once the Chinese forces engaged the U.S. forces in North Korea, the
United States continued to ignore important evidence such as prisoners-of-war who spoke
107 Ibid., 200.
108 Blair suggest that at the end of October X Corps had some 50,000 U.S. soldiers with something just
over 100,000 in Eighth Army (the latter includes both the Commonwealth Brigade and 1-2 Korean
divisions. Blair, The Forgotten War, 366-67. Using a different methodology: at the time of the
Inchon landing, including the landing force, there were 6 divisions plus approximately 3 unattached
task forces of brigade strength, in Korea, which suggests approximately 140,000 troops.
109 MacArthur made this statement on September 28, 1950. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean
War, 188.
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Chinese and claimed to be from large Chinese units that were not known to be in
Northeast China, let alone North Korea. "0
The point here is, while the numbers were often somewhat lower than actual
Chinese deployments, American decisionmakers had access to estimates from a variety of
sources that were approximately correct regarding the scale and pace of Chinese
deployments."' They simply did not find them threatening. The CIA's summary
statement of October 12, 1950 illustrates these blinders well:
Despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda
charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an
actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea." 2
One wonders what evidence would have been convincing to the CIA if statements by
senior leaders, troop deployments of enormous scale, and preparing the populace through
propaganda were not. A similar reaction existed within the theater. General Ridgway
wrote later,
As for the intervention of the Chinese, MacArthur simply closed his ears to their threats
and apparently ignored or belittled the first strong evidence that they had crossed the
Yalu in force."'3
110 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 79. Indeed, even more interestingly, the later
prisoners of war reports in mid-November-those suggesting that the Chinese were withdrawing after
their First Campaign-were given credence. Thus, when the reports fit the bias of underestimating
the enemy, they were heard. Otherwise, they were ignored.
I11 Cohen makes precisely the same point: "Although FEC [the Far Eastern Command] consistently
underestimated the number to troops actually in Korea ... it tracked the buildup in Manchuria more
accurately. FEC estimated that regular forces (i.e., excluding district troops and militia) totaling
1 16,000 men in July had grown to 217,000 men in early August and grown to at least 415,000 and
possibly 463,000 by early November. Ironically, then, FEC intelligence had a better grasp of the size
and disposition of Chinese forces not in contact with UN troops in Korea, than of those who actually
were." Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 133.
112 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical
Situations in the Far East," 450.
1 13 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge: How All-out Asian War Was
Averted: Why Macarthur Was Dismissed: Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited, 1st ed.
(Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday, 1967), 67. There is no question that Mao and the Chinese
leadership did their best to minimize the signs of their presence in Korea, particularly in November of
1950. Nevertheless, as shown above, the United States did have information of substantial forces in
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It is important to point out that this wide range of evidence was reaching a wide
range of people in the American leadership. Certainly, MacArthur was highly
motivated to move northward. However, Ridgway suggests the biases were not just
confined to MacArthur, but were endemic throughout the U.S. military:
But it was not just the High Command [MacArthur's HQ] who refused to read the clear
meaning of the mounting evidence. Typical of the reluctance of all our troops, even the
lower ranks to take the Chinese threat seriously was the reaction of the forces positioned
in and around the village of Unsan, just north of the Chongchon River, and about sixty
miles south of the Yalu, at the end of October. Reports came in from several different
quarters concerning the presence of large concentrations of Chinese troops. ... [Ridgway
then chronicles seven different such reports at the tactical level] ... Still the United States
command was reluctant to accept this accumulating evidence."'
Ridgeway continues, describing the cavalier attitude at various army, corps, divisional,
and even regimental levels. It seems a stretch to argue that MacArthur's attitude would
have overrode potential concerns throughout his command structure. Beyond that, the
CIA reports went to a wide audience in Washington and Tokyo. Clearly, the reports
that were trickling up through the foreign embassies would reach the Secretary of State.
This multitude of intelligence streams cannot be explained away by invoking
MacArthur's incentives to ignore them. The blinders were worn much more widely.
The next section explains why that was the case.
People's War Was Not Threatening
So, if Panikkar's credibility cannot account for the failure of communication, and
if the United States knew of the Chinese military signals, what does account for the
catastrophic deterrence failure? American leaders heard the Chinese warnings, but they
just did not find them-underpinned as they were with a People's War strategy-to be
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and early November were systematically ignored.
114 Ibid., 52-53.
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particularly threatening. Evidence from a variety of sources bears this out and strongly
supports the link between different theories of victory and underestimation (Hi) as well as
several of the theory's component predictions. In this case, differences in theory of
victory did correlate with underestimation (Prediction #1). Leaders did denigrate their
adversary's theory of victory (Prediction #2), did not have nuanced discussions of their
adversary's strategy (Prediction #3), and believed that Washington's view of warfare
would be dominant on the battlefield (Prediction #4). Further, the very large difference
in the theories of victory led to large and frequent underestimations (Prediction #10).
This section will summarize the strong, process tracing evidence on these points.
At a narrow level, American views of Chinese doctrine as ineffective clearly
shaped the assessments of Chinese capabilities:
The JIC [Joint Intelligence Committeel also considered that the past combat experience
of the PLA soldiers was inappropriate to the operations in Korea. Their previous
fighting had involved "hit and run" guerilla tactics; they had never met "a well-trained
force with high morale equipped with modem weapons and possessing the will and the
skill to use those weapons." In addition, China had "practically no capability" of
reinforcing or supporting the North Korean navy and not much in the way of an air force
either. 15
Similarly, on October 12 the CIA noted, '"The Chinese Communist ground forces,
currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively,
but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict."" 6 That report goes on to develop
115 Foot, The Wrong War, 81. The JIC report was dated July 6.
116 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical
Situations in the Far East," 450. Other instances of CIA denigration of Chinese capabilities in general
can be found at Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 186. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 28 July 1950,
Soviet/Satellite Intentions," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J.
Kuhns (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997).
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this point, "Open intervention would be extremely costly unless protected by powerful
Soviet air cover and naval support.""' 7
Figure 4-2: B-29s attacking Chinese position in North Korea"'
Cohen makes the point that the successes of the USAF earlier in the conflict,
against the North Korean forces, biased the view of airpower's utility later. He
describes studies coming out of the Far East Command on the Air Force campaigns
against the North Koreans in the first phase of the war, as they attacked down the length
of the peninsula.
A rather different line of reasoning led to qualified confidence in FEC. Beginning in
early October FEC analysts published in the Daily Intelligence Summary post-mortems
117 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical
Situations in the Far East."
118 Source: ARC Identifier: 542229 (ca. 01/1951); Still Picture Records LICON, Special Media Archives
Services Division (NWCS-S), National Archives at College Park.
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on the campaigns against the NKPA. These retrospective analyses suggested that a
massive air interdiction campaign, coupled with close air support of American troops
during the previous summer had played a critical role in the destruction of the NKPA...
T hese findings-based largely on interrogation of NKPA prisoners-paved the way for
MacArthur's blithe remark to President Truman at Wake Island, "if the Chinese tried to
get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter."
This growing -and, one must say, solidly based-faith in the efficacy of close air support
and air interdiction of enemy lines of communication colored not only MacArthur's
command decisions, but the nature of supporting intelligence assessment. ... This
overconfidence in the efficacy of air power would color FEC's estimates of Chinese
military effectiveness and the Chinese strategic calculus until after the launching of the
second Chinese attack in November." 9
Cohen's suggestion that the U.S. confidence in airpower affected the American
assessment of Beijing's strategic calculus is precisely the argument of this dissertation.
The Daily Intelligence Summary for 12 October, read by the president, explained
why it did not expect Chinese entry:
The Chinese Communists undoubtedly feared the consequences of war with the United
States... In the unlikely event that the Chinese entered the war without the benefit of
Soviet naval and air support, they were bound to suffer costly losses ... This report
agreed with many others that from a military standpoint, the most favorable time for the
intervention had passed. 20
Again, this assessment of intent that comes from estimations of capabilities is predicted
by H2B and Prediction #5.
As mentioned above, an RB-29 from the 31 st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
had sighted a large deployment of MiGs near the Yalu on October 18 that disappeared the
next morning. However, this datum, too, was explained away:
Stratemeyer the air force commander in theaterl certainly did not believe that the
Chinese meant to use these fighters to attack his planes since they had not done so when
the observation aircraft, an easy target, had come close. "I believe it especially
significant," he told Vandenberg, " that, if deployment for possible action in Korea were
under way, it would be highly unlikely that aircraft would have been positioned to attract
attention from south of the border."' 2'
119 Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 138-39. See also Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes:
The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990), 178, passim.
120 Summarized in Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 201.
121 Ibid., 231. See also Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 217-19. Interestingly,
it appears that the planes were lined up on the airfield in Antung without the benefit of revetments for
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Here Stratemeyer is projecting his own understanding of military doctrine on to the
Communist forces. He concludes the Communists were bluffing because he would have
ensured the secrecy of his own deployment had he been on the other side.
Similarly, the U.S. discussions of its own capability vis-A-vis the Chinese exuded
confidence. Even well into the main Chinese intervention in late November, the Chief
of Naval Operations was suggesting, "the Chinese were probably afraid of attacks on
their cities and might hold off for that reason. " '2 As noted in the previous chapter, Mao
and the other senior Chinese leaders had long been cavalier about the vulnerability of the
Chinese cities.
Not only was People's War not viewed as threatening, but also the prospect of
limited war was downplayed, if considered at all. As one contemporary intelligence
officer argues, an important reason for the massive intelligence failures leading up to the
war was that the United States conflated war with the Chinese in Korea with general war
against the Soviets. 1
protection, another incomprehensible aspect from an American perspective.
It is unclear precisely the nature of these planes, although data from the Chinese and Soviet side
suggest it was a deployment of Soviet Air Force MIG-15s (or, possibly, MIG-9s). The first large
scale transfer of planes from the Soviet Union to China occurred on October 14, and it seems unlikely
that they would have been deployed a mere 4 days later. See Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the
Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, I st ed. (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M
University Press, 2002), 61 and 84ff. The Soviets had been deployed in the area and were used
along the Yalu throughout November and December. Only in late March 1951 did the Soviets
become heavily involved in the air war (from bases in both North Korea and China). See Zhang
Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, Chapter 6: Soviet Air Operations in Korea.
122 Philip Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) (December 1,
1950)," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, ed. United States Department of State
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1280.
123 See P.K. Rose, "Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950," Studies in Intelligence, no. II
(2001). Note that Rose seems to downplay the degree of cooperation that did exist among the various
communist countries. More recently available evidence from those countries has deepened the
understanding of that cooperation. Still, Rose's treatment of the U.S. analysis process is excellent.
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The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and military
leaderships circles in Washington, the perception existed that only the Soviets could
order an invasion by a "client state" and that such an act would be a prelude to a world
war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and,
therefore, that no invasion would occur.' 24
This, too, is consistent with the perceptions stemming from the American theory of
victory. As noted in the previous chapter, there was a near exclusive focus on general
war, and-until after the Korean War-little consideration of the particular nature of
limited wars.
All of these assessments were precisely what this dissertation's theory would
predict. Washington viewed Chinese military signals through the lens of American
strategic beliefs and doctrine, leading it to underestimate their significance. The
hypothesis linking the misperception of an adversary's signals to the underestimations of
them that come from differing theories of victory (H 2 B) is strongly supported here.
China Had Already Missed Its Chance
Another major contributor to the American tendency to ignore the evidence of
Chinese intent and capability to intervene was the timing of the Chinese signals.' In
short, many believed that China had already missed its best chance to intervene. This
perception was heavily dependent on American strategic perspectives regarding optimal
strategies. In the American view, the best time to intervene would have been when the
124 Ibid.: 3.
125 Along these lines one CIA operative has recently argued that the United States ignored signs of the
Chinese troop deployment because of its belief that Chinese intervention would be equated with
general war, a situation they did not foresee as likely. Ibid. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the United States was heavily focused on the prospect for general war between the United States and
the Communist nations. That author summarizes similar information to that presented above, but is
less able to document the link between the ignoring of that evidence (which certainly occurred) to the
specific American expectation of intervention only in the context of general war.
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United States' back was to the wall at Pusan, and it was most vulnerable.'6 American
strategic doctrine would have suggested an attack at that point to pursue a complete
victory.' 7 Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence officer, put it succinctly in October:
"The auspicious time for intervention has long since passed."'" Even signals from
foreign embassies were discounted on these grounds. For instance, the American
ambassador in Russia, Alan G. Kirk, used this line of argument to undermine the signals
he had received from contacts in Moscow regarding the likelihood of Chinese entry if the
United States crossed the 3 8th parallel:
In commenting on this information, Kirk says he finds it difficult to accept these reports
as authoritative analyses of Chinese Communist plans. He takes the line that the logical
moment for Communist armed intervention came when the UN forces were desperately
defending a small area in southern Korea and when the influx of an overwhelming
number of Chinese ground forces would have proved a decisive factors.'2 9
The CIA made the same point in its own summary analysis under the heading "Factors
Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention" by arguing: "From a military standpoint the
most favorable time for intervention in Korea has passed."'30 Thus, "policymakers in
Washington simply did not believe Beijing's warnings" because-viewed through the
American perceptual lens-the militarily advantageous time to intervene had already
passed.'3 ' The official Army history of the war concurs on this point.'32
126 Foot, The Wrong War, 80; Stueck, The Korean War, 110-11.
127 See Weigley's discussion of the "Grant" strategy that was prevalent at this time in U.S. Army circles
which counsels utter annihilation of the enemy through mass and concentration. Russell Frank
Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 312.
128 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 77.
129 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical
Situations in the Far East."
130 Ibid., 450. And note that the general conclusions of this study, as noted elsewhere, did not expect
Chinese entry.
131 Chen Jian, China's Road, 169-170.
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In China, other factors seemed more important in timing their intervention.
Some sources of delays on the Chinese side stemmed from difficulties in logistics and
intra-alliance coordination issues.'33 However, if the Americans inferred anything from
this, they mistook a limitation in capabilities for a signal of intent. But more
fundamentally, as noted above, the Chinese strategic thinking emphasizing the value in
waiting until the U.S. supply lines were long, precisely the opposite of the American
view.134 A report written by the senior commanders of the NEBDA in late August made
clear the differences in Chinese thinking. It "suggested that the best timing for entering
the war might be when the UN forces had counterattacked back across the 38 'h parallel,
because this would put China in a politically and militarily more favorable position to
defeat the enemy."'35 Other Chinese sources concur, emphasizing long vulnerable
supply lines of the United States as they moved north.
Chinese behavior should not have puzzled those familiar with Mao's strategy in previous
wars. A key point in Maoist thought was the trading of space for time. The ideal
moment to attack an enemy of superior firepower came when its forces advanced beyond
their major supply bases into rugged terrain lacking easily defensible lines of
transportation and communication.36
(To some extent, this misperception can be viewed as a difference in perspective
about intent: the United States viewed Chinese motivations as primarily offensive, thus
suggesting that the best time to attack would be at the high tide of the North Korean
offensive. Had the United States considered the prospect for defensive motivations
132 See Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 277.
133 On the former see Chen Jian, China's Road, 148. On the latter see Thomas J. Christensen, Worse
Than a Monolith: Alliances in U.S.-PRC Security Relations (forthcoming).
134 Chen Jian, China's Road, 152.
135 Ibid. Also see Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 76.
136 Stueck, The Korean War, 112.
193
Twomey, The Military Lens
driving Beijing, would it have been less prone to make this assumption about the optimal
timing for the Chinese attack? Perhaps, but even this question emphasizes the doctrinal
blinders that the United States wore. For the Chinese, "luring the enemy in deep" was
an offensive strategy. Beyond that, some in the United States did consider the prospect
for insecurity in China, thus suggesting they were not unaware of the potential needs for a
defensive strategy.)
This is excellent evidence for the theory. The Chinese, because of their views on
warfare thought the best time to intervene militarily would be as the United States moved
north, with long supply lines. "Lure them in deep." The United States thought the best
time for the Chinese to have intervened would have been earlier, when American forces
were pinned down. These different perspectives shaped each side's policy, and through
that, the American assessment of the meaning of Chinese signals and thus their intent.
Both sides expected their view of warfare to be borne out on the battlefield (Prediction
#4) nor was there any attempt to have a nuanced discussion of the adversary's thinking
on the same issue (Prediction #3).
Dissenting Views from Outside the Military Leadership
Some American analysts did better at assessing the signals from China than others.
While the CIA was often wrong, it was rarely as extreme as the Pentagon in its cavalier
appraisal of the Chinese threat. Writing in early November, the Agency concluded that
"The Chinese Communists ... main motivation at present appears to be to establish a
limited "cordon sanitaire" south of the Yalu River."' 7 On November 24, the day before
137 "Memorandum by the Director of the central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the President," November
1, 1950, in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1025. See also the CIA's NIE of November 8, 1950.
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the Chinese attacked in force, the CIA submitted yet another NIE on the prospect for
Chinese intervention in which it became increasingly cautious: "It is estimated that Ithe
Chinese Communists I do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from
the peninsula, but that they do have the capability offorcing them to withdraw to
defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations."' 38
Interestingly, the senior China analyst at the Department of State, Edmund
Clubb,'3 9 was able to interpret many of these signals remarkably well even at a very early
date. Writing after the first battle that destroyed the 8 h Cavalry (discussed in detail
below) but before the large-scale Chinese attacks of late November, he joined the debate
over the true intent of the Chinese. He is worth quoting at length. After noting that
there was now undisputable evidence that the Chinese were directly involved in fighting,
he goes on to warn that Chinese intent was not likely to be limited.
It seems unlikely that the Chinese Communists would be prepared to venture into the
Korean theater in such a limited manner as would confront them with the danger of being
promptly bloodied and thrown out by the force which they themselves had consistently
characterized as a "a paper tiger". The recrudescence of Chinese Communist
propaganda whipping up enthusiasm of the Chinese people for "resistance to aggression
in Korea" would appear to indicate that a large effort may be involved. ... The move
of intervention would be designed, in short, to achieve some real measure of victory.
Although firm information to reach conclusions is still lacking, therefore, it would be
hardly safe to assume other than that (1) the Chinese Communists, if they are intervening
directly in Korea, propose to do so in considerable force ... '40
"Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency' National Intelligence Estimate, Chinese
Communist Intervention in Korea," November 8, 1950, in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1101--6.
138 Emphasis added. "Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency: National Intelligence Estimate,
Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," November 24, 1950, in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1220-22.
The latter, emphasized part, is substantially stronger than the Pentagon discusisons throughout the
month of November.
139 Clubb was later purged from State in the McCarthy era. For an interesting discussion of this period,
see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1999).
140 "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)," November 1, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1023-25.
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Clubb also made similar points in a number of memos in early November.' 4 ' Others at
State expressed views similar to Clubb's.'42 Even mid-level officials there
recommended great caution.'" Indeed, even Acheson seemed more able to recognize
the Chinese threats for what they were than the military leadership was.'44
Leaders who are outside the military or are not well versed in strategic thinking
should be less vulnerable to the pernicious effects of biases from various theories of
victory (as suggested in Prediction #11). This appears to be such a case: Clubb and
others at State (and to a lesser extent, others outside the Pentagon) were far more correct
than the military leaders at the Pentagon and in the field, described above. Even though
most of these assessments came too late to avoid the escalation of the war (although had
they been listened to, the U.S. defeats would have been lessened), their differences with
contemporary military officials are notable and are explained by this dissertation's theory.
Summary
It was thus that a range of military and diplomatic warnings did not lead to deep
introspection in Washington over the prospects of Chinese involvement. In a recent
141 E.g., "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)," November 4, 1950 in Ibid., 1038-41. Cohen
echoes this point regarding Clubb's views; see Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 141.
142 "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)," November 3, 1950, in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7,
1030. "Draft Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff," November 7, 1950
in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1078-85, espec. 1078-79.
143 Foot points out that Livingston Merchant and U. Alexis Johnson both recommended caution. Foot,
The Wrong War, 80.
144 '"There is no doubt but that Chilnesel military intervention is substantial, there is no reason to suppose
that it will not increase, and that very serious political and military implications are thereby raised."
Dean Acheson, 'The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," November 6, 1950, in
F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1052. Note that this statement occurs after the smaller scale Chinese offensive.
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book on the senior American leadership in the war, one scholar summarizes the American
analysis in mid November 1950:
Despite the high number of American casualties, China's increased bellicosity, and the
CCF presence in North Korea, both the U.N. Command and Washington downplayed the
threat of large-scale Chinese intervention. Although it had shifted from the academic to
the serious, said MacArthur, full-scale Chinese intervention appeared "unlikely." On
whether the Communists had made a decision to mount a full-scale offensive, said the
CIA, all available evidence remained inconclusive. Washington knew neither how
many Communist Chinese were in North Korea, said Bradley, nor their military objective.
"Our people," said General Charles D. Palmer later, "didn't want to accept the fact that
the Chinese were there in force." Washington preferred, added Willoughby, "the opiate
of wishful thinking, the myopic resignation of the ostrich."'4 5
Eliot Cohen comes to a similar conclusion:
The failures-or more accurately, semifailures-in warning and order of battle
intelligence have received a good deal of attention from students of the Chinese surprise
attack in 1950. Another more serious and generally ignored type of intelligence failure
occurred, however; failure to gauge the enemy's way of war, his methods, strengths, and
weaknesses. It is in the picture of the enemy held by U.S. forces in the Far East that we
find one of the chief sources of the failure of the winter of 1950.'46
The United States crossed the 38 th parallel not due to a lack of information about the size
of the Chinese force or its intentions (as the Alternate Hypothesis would have predicted),
but rather because Washington was unable to evaluate the signals because of biases that
derived from beliefs about the effective use of military power. This strongly supports
the link between the misperception from differing theories of victory and the faulty
interpretation of the adversary's signals (H2B) as well as providing support for the link
between those misperceptions and assessments of the general balance of power (H 2 A).
Post-Event Evaluations by the United States
Several of the theory's secondary predictions center on post-event evaluations
from the two sides. In particular, was there a degree of surprise regarding the enemy's
145 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 81.
146 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 176.
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intent (Prediction #9) and the effectiveness of his military forces and doctrines once the
war was joined (Prediction #8)? The following sections develop answers to these
questions. So firm were American beliefs about Chinese intent that the initial reaction
to the PLA's entry -both on the ground in Korea and up the chain of command - was
one of denial. The next section goes on to document American surprise at the
effectiveness of the Chinese forces through, among other pieces of evidence,
contemporary evaluations during the war and post-war changes in American forces and
strategies.
Initial Reactions of Denial
The thickness of the blinders worn by the U.S. decisionmakers is illustrated by
their initial reaction to the Chinese intervention. This section presents evidence on both
the tactical and strategic levels; then some dissenting voices from these appraisals are
discussed. As with the Chinese side in the previous case, this material supports the
dissertation's theory in many areas. First, it further bolsters the case for the hypothesis
linking differing theories of victory to underestimation (H,). It also supports several of
the predictions linking this underestimation of the adversary to perceptions of the overall
balance of power, the denigration of the adversary, and the simplistic discussions of his
strategies (Predictions #1-3). The large difference between the two countries' theories
of victory should and did lead to large scale and high frequency of misperceptions
(Prediction #10). Beyond that, the evidence presented here links the flawed
interpretation of the Chinese signals to the underestimations of capability that the theory
predicts (and thus supports H2B and the associated Prediction #7). Even in the face of
hard evidence to the contrary, American leaders continued to believe that the Chinese
198
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would not intervene. Lastly, there is significant evidence that the Air Force in particular
assumed that the tactics and doctrines from its theory of victory would be key to winning
battles on the ground (thus supporting Prediction #4).
Tactical Level Over-Confidence
Tactically, there were many miscalculations. Even after the Chinese First
Offensive destroyed a South Korean division and severely damaged several other South
Korean regiments, Eighth Army intelligence was estimating only 2,000 Chinese soldiers
in its sector, grouped in two regiments.'47 As POW reports accumulated after the
beginning of that offensive, the U.S. commanders faced some disturbing information: the
number of different large units that the prisoners claimed to be from was high. Rather
than conclude from this that the Chinese had a sizable force in country, the intelligence
staff of Eighth Army offered this novel interpretation to Washington in a cable on
November I (as passed on by the State Department):
On basis lof] information obtained from Sino prisonersl, which of course isl subject to
confirmation[,l 8th Army Intelligence considers there now [to be] two Sino regiments,
[and it isl possible a third, in [the] 8thArmy sector of North Korea. Appears these units
were formed by taking one battalion each of six divisions said to constitute [thel Sino
39th and 40th Armies, deployed along Manchurian-North Korean border.
Information from [the] 10th Corps area indicates a total of 18 Sino prisoners [have been]
taken through October 31. It is believed these Chinese come from units of Sino
Communist 42nd Army .
8th Army Intelligence is of [thel view, with which Embassy lisl inclined to concur, [that
thel Sino Communists will avoid overt intervention '48
147 Blair, The Forgotten War, 378. These reports were from October 30 and 31, 1950.
148 Note the terse prose is typical of cables. "The Charge in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State
(November 1, 1950)," reprinted in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1022.
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The more straightforward, and in retrospect accurate, conclusion would have been that
the three Armies had moved in themselves, en masse.'49
The first significant engagement between the U.S. forces and the PLA came in
early November.'-°
As darkness fell on the night of November 1, CCF troops hit the 8'h Cavalry Regiment of
the 1s' Cavalry Division near Unsan. As their blaring bungles and screeching whistles
'startled' the Americans, they attacked with mortars, grenades, and rifle and machine-gun
fire, surrounding some units and forcing others to retreat through the hills. After two
days of fighting, the Chinese had "effectively destroyed the 8'h Cavalry Regiment."' 5'
The official Army history records flatly that the Regiment was "very roughly handled."'52
An American General in Korea on a fact finding mission concluded "the Chinese had
destroyed the 8th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team."'5 3 Ridgway notes that the
regiment "lost more than half its authorized strength at Unsan, and a great share of its
equipment, including twelve 105-mm. Howitzers, nine tanks, more than 125 trucks, and
a dozen recoilless rifles."'54
Even when Chinese became heavily involved with the U.S. forces, American
perceptions of confidence were hard to shake. The story of the destruction of the 8th
Cavalry itself unfolds as a series of underestimations of the enemy. The Regiment
originally deployed wearing summer uniforms "believing [their] assigned task would be a
149 The command and control difficulties of selecting individual battalions from different divisions and
reconstituting them under new regimental leadership would have been severe. The whole point of
having divisional headquarters units is a recognition that battalions are not so easily plugged in to
different command structures.
150 The offensive began a few days earlier, on October 25, although initially only South Korean units were
hit. See Blair, The Forgotten War, 371.
151 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 77.
152 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 235.
153 Quoted at Ibid., 257.
154 Ridgway, The Korean War, 59.
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simple power punch through a thin NKPA line, followed by a one- or two-day dash to the
Yalu, then a return to the home base in Japan by Thanksgiving Day."'5 s In the days
before the Chinese attack, its 3rd Battalion, deployed on point, was "casually disposed" in
a valley rather than in surrounding high ground, and the battalion commander ignored
suggestions to move toward that safer position.56 Only after the Regiment was
completely cut off was it ordered to withdraw, and by that time, its plan to do so "had no
chance of succeeding. " 7 An attempt to use another heavily reinforced regiment to
open a corridor to Unsan, where the 8'h was holed up, was jauntily ordered as the
following situation report (SITREP) conveys: "Other elements of the 5th RCT are enroute
to assist the 8'h U.S. Cavalry RCT."'58 However, this effort, too failed in the face of
surprisingly strong Chinese opposition. The very next day the SITREP's tone is more
pessimistic: "Heavy resistance from strong enemy forces prevented the 5th and elements
of the 7th U.S. Cavalry RCT's from reaching the 8th U.S. Cavalry RCT (-) which was
isolated by a hostile envelopment in the Unsan area."' 59 Only then was it clear that the
8th had been destroyed as a functioning formation.
155 Blair, The Forgotten War, 380.
156 Ibid., 381.
157 Ibid., 383.
158 "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 128 (November 2, 1950)," in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection.
159 "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 129 (November 3, 1950)," in Ibid. See also Blair, The Forgotten War,
384.
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Figure 4-3: The UN Advance Meets the PLA (First Offensive)'60
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The confusion was not limited to the 8 'h Cavalry. Corps commanders across
North Korea were "profoundly puzzled" by the situation they faced. 161 Chinese troop
formations were not even shown on operational maps until November 6, 1950.162 On
November 12, the X Corps intelligence chief took stock of the recent battles and reports
of significant Chinese forces to his north and northwest, but nevertheless was confident
of his units ability to remain on the offensive and victorious:
160 Source: Department of History, Atlas Collection, U.S. Military Academy. Available online at
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/atlas%20home.htm.
161 Blair, The Forgotten War, 450.
162 See Joint Daily Sitrep Collection. The first time Chinese units show up is in "Joint Daily SITREP,
No. 128 (November 6, 1950)." At that point three units are listed: the 55th, 56th, and 124th divisions.
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Three unconfirmed reports from different sources have indicated the buildup of enemy
strength in the northeaster section of Korea, in the vicinity of Hoeryong and Chongjin.
The reports claim that large Chinese Communist units are present in this area. Should
this information be true, it would indicate a significant increase in the enemy's
capabilities on the east coast avenue of approach to the Korean border
Conclusions:
a. The enemy will, if strongly attacked, continue his retreat to the north,' 63
Two days later, Quinn's optimism continued to show in his reports:
Several recent unconfirmed reports, primarily from civilian sources, indicate a possible
concentration and build up of enemy forces in the area west and southwest of Choshin
Reservoir. Considerable number of CCF troops have been reported in this locality and
air observers have sighted at least one convoy moving southwest from Yudam-ni toward
Chang-ni .... The enemy is in position to attempt a penetration of the UN front
between the X Corps and Eighth Army, although such an operation would be faced by
extremely difficult cross country movement. The enemy's capability to launch an attack
against the X Corps from the west is restricted by the mountainous terrain through which
such an attack would have to be made. Winter weather will still further limit this
capability.
The most Quinn is willing to allow is that the Chinese might be driven by a need to
forage for supplies, and be forced to attack: "The enemy has demonstrated his ability to
cross difficulty ground, and the cold and lack of food may encourage him to attack in
order to obtain supplies."'6 5 Quinn's overall, optimistic conclusions about the prospects
for the X Corps offensive at the end of his report remained unchanged.
By November 25, on the eve of the second Chinese offensive, again Quinn shows
an awareness of the buildup of the Chinese, but retains an almost Panglossian confidence.
In terms of awareness of the enemy, he reports:
Additional indications of a CCF buildup on the west flank of X Corps.in the Sachang-ni
Yongdong-ni sector have been received.... All of this evidence tends to substantiate the
statements of civilians, refugees, PWs prisoners of war], deserters and other sources that
163 G-2 (Colonel William Quinn), "Headquarters X Corps, Periodic Intelligence Report #47 (November 12,
1950)", Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn. In the next day's
report, Quinn downplays reports of Chinese soldiers in rear areas.
164 G-2 (Colonel William Quinn), "Headquarters X Corps, Periodic Intelligence Report #50 (November 15,
1950)", Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.
165 Ibid.
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strong reinforcements, including large numbers of CCF have been recently moving into
the area between Sachang-ni and Choshin Reservoir.'"
He the briefly mentions this force's offensive potential buried in the analysis of his report,
but his final conclusions omit any mention of risk:
Conclusions:
a. Enemy forces in the western sector of the X Corps zone will attempt to defend
generally along the line Chagangjin-Yudam-ni-Sachang-ni. If forced to withdraw, they
will take up new defensive positions in the Chiang-no redoubt area.'67
While suggesting they have the capability to defend (although even here he hints that
they will not be able to hold the line again the X Corps), he does not emphasize that they
also have a dangerous offensive capability.
Quinn's boss, General Almond, shared that optimism. On the morning of
November 28, after the Chosin Reservoir battle had begun, he blustered to his
commanders:
The enemy who is delaying you for the moment is nothing more than remnants of
Chinese divisions fleeing north. ... We're still attacking and we're going all the way to
the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you.'6
Immediately Almond ordered an offensive into the teeth of the waiting Chinese. In the
Chosin Reservoir battle that followed two marine regiments were cut off and a "rescue"
task force of brigade strength suffered 40 percent casualties. 69
Soldiers on the ground had taken their cues from their leaders.
On the night of November 25 Eighth Army was almost casually disposed. The men had
two successful days of combat under their belts; the task lying ahead did not appear to
hold great danger. Few men took the precaution of digging foxholes in the frozen
ground.'70
166 G-2 (Colonel William Quinn), "Headquarters X Corps, Periodic Intelligence Report #60 (November 25,
1950)", Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.
167 Ibid.
168 Quoted in Blair, The Forgotten War, 462.
169 Ibid., 508 and 520.
170 Ibid., 440.
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The next day, the main Chinese attack pushed the Eighth Army into the longest retreat in
American military history.
During the retreat of Eighth Army along the western side of the peninsula, there
was a real danger of its line of retreat being cut. However, the American forces realized
this only belatedly. General Dutch Keiser, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division had
trouble believing he had been outflanked by Chinese soldiers without motor transport.
Keiser continued to misread his situation grossly. He persisted in the belief that the
roadblock was shallow or "local," that with a concerted "push" and with FEAF help it
could be overcome, that the road beyond the block was "clear."'71
As a result, his 2nd Division suffered over 30 percent casualties.' 72 Within days, Keiser,
his assistant, and several of his regimental commanders were fired. '"73
Strategic Level Over-Optimism
Both Tokyo and Washington continued to grossly underestimate the threat posed
by the Chinese, even after the mauling of the 8th Cavalry in the first days of November.
The View from Tokyo.
MacArthur was initially unruffled by the early defeat:
The eventual response from Tokyo was, however, one of irritation and impatience at
Walker's failure to move forward on schedule. No matter how thoroughly convinced
the I S Cavalry Division might have become that the Chinese had entered the war in force,
the Commander in Chief [MacArthur] persisted in a mood of renewed optimism.'7 4
Indeed, on November 4, he exuded confidence regarding the low likelihood that the
Chinese would intervene in spite of the mauling a regiment under his command had just
received.75 By the sixth, however, he was pleading for permission to bomb bridges and
171 Ibid., 482.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., 497.
174 Ridgway, The Korean War, 59.
175 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 82.
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supply lines near the Chinese border.'7 6 By the ninth, he had stopped debating Chinese
intent; he now assumed they were going to intervene in force. But he continued to
believe in his own robust capabilities, particularly in the ability of airpower to "interdict
Chinese reinforcements from Manchuria and to destroy those already in Korea."' 77
However, as soon as the Chinese pulled back, in the tactical lull between their First and
Second Offensives, MacArthur's confidence returned.'7
His intelligence reports were, indeed, ambiguous. Chinese units are not listed on
the Daily Joint SITREP maps until November 6, and the narrative of these reports only
refers to generic "enemy forces" as the attackers against the 8th Cavalry and the ROK
units. 79 Some reports suggested only a minimal Chinese presence in North Korea, 8
while others implied a larger force."8' MacArthur sided with the former, concluding in
mid-November that he was facing
176 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 24344.
177 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War, 84.
178 See Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 251. This tactical lull was intended to create
precisely that sense. Again see AI:tlJ, <<q i A>> Tao Wenzhao, History of Sino-
American Relations, 32; Yu Bin, "What China Learned (2001)," 15. It is notable how readily the
United States fell into the trap.
179 "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 128 (November 6, 1950)," in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection. Note Posen
finds a similar phenomenon in a different set of daily reports (identified as "United Nations Command,
GHQ, G-3 Operations Reports" available from British archival force; note these have a slightly
different correlation between date and numbering, suggesting a different set of reports although their
content overlaps heavily). See Posen, "The Chinese Intervention in Korea: A Case of Inadvertent
Escalation", 58, note 73.
180 One report suggested two Chinese divisions (thus some 15,000 troops) "The Consul General at Hong
Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State," October 27, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1003-04.
Another put the number even lower at 2,000. "The Charge in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of
State," October 31, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1018-19.
181 One report from Korea put elements of two different armies (a formation approximately equal to an
American corps) in North Korea. "The Charge in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State,"
October 30, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1014.
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certainly no more than 30,000. ... They could not possibly have got more over with the
surreptitiously covert means used. If they had moved in the open, they would have been
detected by our Air Forces and our Intelligence.'
In fact, his own intelligence at the time was estimating the "accepted" Chinese strength in
North Korea to be 51,600 and "probable total" to be 76,800.'83 In the context of this
early defeat followed by ambiguous evidence, MacArthur nevertheless eagerly
anticipated the beginning of his offensive: "this should for all practical purposes end the
war." 84 (One military historian's disparaging reference to this statement is suggestive
of the degree of overconfidence that MacArthur possessed: "Seldom in any war had a
commanding general so foolishly revealed his hand."'85)
Both MacArthur and his intelligence officer attributed their apparent success at
forestalling further defeats through November to UN airpower.'6 MacArthur's
pronouncement on 24 November, literally the day before the second Chinese attack
exudes such confidence. "My air force for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of
model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support
from the north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and
essential supplies markedly limited."' 7
182 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)," November 17, 1950 in Ibid.,
1175.
183 See "Joint Daily SITREP, No. 133 (November 13, 1950)," in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection.
184 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 273.
185 Blair, The Forgotten War, 435.
186 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 275.
187 MacArthur was likely basing this conclusion on the tactical lull between the Chinese First and Second
Offensives aimed to create precisely this sort of overconfidence. For MacArthur's quote, see Ibid.,
277-78. At that point in time, there is no evidence MacArthur feared that the troops he believed were
cut off posed any fundamental danger to his command. That was to change in the days to come.
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Air Force commanders shared similarly biased views. The official Air Force
history asserted: "Red China's Fourth Field Army was suffering frightful losses from
Fifth Air Force attacks and from Eighth Army ground fire." However, since that force
went on to retake the South Korean capital, the official history had to go on, allowing that
somehow "it had enough strength to rout American ground forces defending Seoul."'88
(The surprise of that author at the Chinese capabilities is almost palpable.'9 One can
imagine their reaction: "What? The enemy's army was still able to defeat us after we'd
hit them with everything we had. Inconceivable! They must be willing to tolerate
horrendous losses.")
Intelligence was a persistent problem for the MacArthur's command. As late as
December 26, the United States had no real idea how many Chinese troops it was facing:
No one yet had a good idea of how many CCF troops had been committed to Korea or if
the CCF had crossed the 38'h Parallel in full force to invade South Korea. On the Eighth
Army situation maps, Ridgeway remembered, the CCF was depicted merely by a large
red "goose egg" with "174,000" scrawled on its center. The true figure was closer to
300,000.'90
This was despite a truly massive intelligence gathering effort that had amassed some
27,643 photographs from aerial reconnaissance efforts.'9 ' Again, the American
confidence in their reconnaissance technology was to lead them to underestimate their
adversary
188 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 279.
189 One is reminded of the demonization and dehumanization of the enemy that Dower chronicles in a
different war across race lines. John W. Dower, War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books,
1986).
190 Blair, The Forgotten War, 569.
191 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953.
208
__ __ _
Chapter 4: The United States Crosses the 38 'h Parallel
Just as the destruction of the 8 th Cavalry in late October and early November had
occurred through a series of underestimations of the enemy, the strategic retreats of
Eighth Army and X Corps exhibited repeated miscalculations. Initially, following the
renewed Chinese attacks in late November, Eighth Army was to hold a line running east
from Sinanju, some 70 miles from the Yalu River (and the border with China). Days
later, it was to hold at Pyongyang, a further 50 miles south. Its next stopping point was
near the 38th parallel, but again it was forced to displace, surrendering Seoul for the
second time in the war.'"
Similarly, X Corps went from (1) being ordered to counterattack to relieve
pressure on Eighth Army to (2) defending a defensive line in the Hamhung-Wonsan
sector on November 30 to (3) withdrawing completely from North Korea on Christmas
Eve.' 3 Twenty-five years after the fact, General Almond, commander of the X Corps,
still had trouble coming to terms with the mobility of the light Chinese forces on foot:
I have already said that the gap between the two forces LX Corps and Eighth Army] was
interrupted by a difficult mountain range or series of mountain ranges and no road system
between. It would have been impossible for any force to break the gap and supply itself
except by air which the Chinese didn't possess.'4
192 For the detailed narrative of the retreat, see Blair, The Forgotten War, Part 8: Disaster and Retreat.
Also see Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Chapter 8: Two Months of Defeat
and Retreat.
193 Blair, The Forgotten War. Note that the JCS at least was less overly optimistic regarding X Corps
than MacArthur's command by the end of November.
194 Captain Thomas G. Fergusson and Lt. General Edward M. Almond, "Interview with General Almond:
Transcriptions of the Debriefing of General Edward M. Almond by Captain Thomas G. Fergusson
(Interview Section 4), 1975," p. 70, The Edward M Almond Papers, Box: "Recollections and
Reflections," Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.
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Of course, breaking the gap was precisely what the PLA's 42nd and 38th Armies did.'95
Blair, in the definitive military history of the United States in the Korean War,
summarizes the blinders that inhibited MacArthur's vision:
By November 28 it must have been clear to Douglas MacArthur that he had blundered
badly in Korea. The wine of victory had turned to vinegar. In a broad sense, Inchon
had become another Anzio. He had been outsmarted and outgeneraled by a "bunch of
Chinese laundrymen" who had no close air support, no tanks, and very little artillery,
modern communications, or logistical infrastructure. His reckless, egotistical strategy
after Inchon, undertaken in defiance of w.warnings from Peking and a massive CCF
buildup in Manchuria, had been an arrogant, blind march to disaster. What must have
been even more galling and humiliating was that MacArthur was on record with everyone
from the president on down as unequivocally assuring that the CCF would not intervene
in Korea in force, and if it did he would "slaughter" it with his air power. His
considerable intelligence-gathering apparatus had scandalously failed to detect or
interpret the massive scope of the CCF intervention. His air power had abjectly failed to
"slaughter" any appreciable number of CCF or even to knock out all the Yalu bridges.' 96
As an aside, clearly some of the scale of the American defeat in November and
December can be blamed on the specific operational strategies that MacArthur chose.
In particular, two decisions stand out. First was the withdrawal of X Corps from
Inchon and its reinsertion on the opposite side of the peninsula at Wonsan. This had the
effect of slowing the pursuit of the retreating North Korean forces, leading to the need to
chase them all the way to the Yalu with a large American force. It also divided the U.S.
force dangerously. Second, once redeployed MacArthur did not demand that the X
Corps make contact with the Eighth Army to its west. Rather, he relied on the rugged
mountain terrain to serve as a defensive obstacle protecting his force. These two
195 For description of the Chinese strategy here, see i -,,, _ ,<< P IA L-,PE : R&-l
5ttX>>(~15..T..:~i:a ~±. l )i~ 1990. Jol 1999). Shen Zonghong, Meng Zhaohui, and
others, The History of the War to Resist America and Support Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteer
Army (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1999), 29-37.
196 Blair, The Forgotten War, 464.
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decisions dramatically worsened the rout when the Chinese pressed their Second
Offensive. '97
What is interesting from the perspective of this dissertation is that those two
"mistakes" were deeply rooted in the American doctrine of the time. The standard
operating procedure for an offensive in peninsular terrain focused on a series of flanking
amphibious landings.'" The United States had pursued this strategy in Italy, the
Philippines, and elsewhere in WWII. MacArthur's use of X Corps was a textbook
application of this. Second, with regard to the absence of a link up of the two main
American forces in North Korea, again the treatment of the rugged mountain terrain as a
relatively impassible obstacle came straight out of American doctrinal thinking. Not
only was there no major supply route through this area, but also tactical mobility of
mechanized forces would have been highly constrained. The United States did not
carefully consider that the Chinese forces might view the terrain much less forbiddingly.
Thus, American doctrine even informed the mistakes the Americans made in Korea, and
the doctrinal differences between China and the United States amplified their scale.
211
197 See Ibid.
198 See the discussion in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4-4: The Rout in North Korea (The Chinese Second Offensive)'99
Clearly much of the evidence presented above focuses on MacArthur. However,
some focuses on other leaders in theater, and the following section focuses on the view
from outside his command entirely. This evidence cannot be simply explained away by
blaming MacArthur's uniquely extreme views. Eliot Cohen comes to similar
conclusions in his analysis of the misperceptions in the Korean War:
Attempts to pin the blame for the intelligence failure (which was only part of a large
operational failure) on one individual vastly oversimplify, and in some respects distort,
the nature of the intelligence failure in Korea.2()
199 Source: Department of History, Atlas Collection, U.S. Military Academy. Available online at
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/atlas%20home.htm.
200 Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 129.
212
II_ _ _ _
Chapter 4: The United States Crosses the 38 'h Parallel
In short, a range of commanders in the Far East found it very difficult to change
its prior beliefs about the likelihood of Chinese intervention and their capabilities if they
did intervene. The Chinese were able to use these blinders very effectively as they
prepared their surprise attack in late November. Escaping the lens that the American
theory of victory imposed proved to be very difficult.
The View from Washington.
The situation in Washington was little better. One can almost hear the
bewilderment in the voice of the Army Chief of Staff on October 31: "the intervention
was conforming to none of the patterns envisaged by the Joint Chiefs in their studies and
in their directives to General MacArthur."20' Other examples of difficulties in adjusting
to the new situation abound.
Initially, and in spite of evidence to the contrary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
continued to express a modicum of confidence. In a memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense on November 9 (that is, after the loss of the 8th Cavalry), they suggested that
absent Soviet action, the United States could not be pushed out of Korea by China.2 2
They specifically noted that a defensive line short of the Chinese-Korean border could be
held without any reinforcements. However, they also concluded "The Chinese
Communists are presently in Korea in such strength and in a sufficiently organized
manner to indicate that unless withdrawn they can be defeated only by a determined
military operation." 3 To remedy that some, although apparently not substantial,
reinforcement would be needed: Elsewhere they refer to the need for "some augmentation
201 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 234.
202 "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)," November 9, 1950,
in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1117-21.
203 Ibid., 1120.
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of military strength in Korea" if the goal was to "force the action to a successful
conclusion in Korea."204 Further, these flag officers suggested no change in the standing
orders under which MacArthur was operating. This implies that little had changed in
their minds and their overall military confidence remained, despite a substantial degree of
uncertainty. 5 Cohen writes that after the First Offensive
The Defense Department was more sanguine [than Edmund Clubb at State2061,
acknowledging that a limited intervention was underway but denying evidence of
"indications of psychological preparation for war in Korea" [by the Chinese]
Washington authorities, notably the JCS, seemed to believe that as long as direct clashes
along the Yalu could be avoided, so too could war with China-hence proposals by the
Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, that MacArthur stop five miles from the
border.2° 7
A series of meetings between senior representatives from the Departments of
State and Defense, generally including both secretaries, all the Joint Chiefs, and often
several service secretaries took place beginning in late November. These provide an
excellent window on the perspective of the top leadership in Washington. On
November 21, only days before the main Chinese attack but well after the sting of the
first offensive, several of the Joint Chiefs were optimistically discussing the positioning
of a line that could be held just shy of the Yalu River.
[Army Chief of Staff] General [Lawton] Collins suggested that General MacArthur, after
the attack is well launched and is succeeding, could announce that it was his intention
only to go forward to destroy. the North Korean units and that he intended to hold the
high ground overlooking the Yalu with ROK forces, assigning the rest of the UN forces
to rear areas.208
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 1121.
206 See discussion below in this chapter.
207 Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 140-43. He cites a telegram from the Army Chief of Staff to
MacArthur in the first passage.
208 Philip Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) (November 21,
1950)," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, ed. United States Department of State
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Similarly, at the same meeting, General Marshall expressed continued enthusiasm for
supporting MacArthur's planned offensive.2 9 Others rejected the consideration of a
cease-fire a sign of weakness.'
After the main Chinese offensive began in late November, the American
leadership belatedly began to shift its view. Several examples are illustrative. First, a
day after the main Chinese offensive began, the United States understanding of the
magnitude of the problem it faced remained exceedingly poor: X Corps was ordered to
continue with a previously planned offensive of its own in the hopes that it would relieve
pressure on 8 h Army."' Within days not only was such thinking considered childish by
the JCS, but also there were serious concerns regarding the ability to extract X Corps.2'2
In a later session of the State-Defense group on December 1, the military leaders
switched to talking about holding a few enclaves.213 Third, rather than rejecting
consideration of a cease-fire out of hand as they had on November 21, representatives
from Defense and State had a long conversation about what would be required in this
regard to make such an agreement palatable on December 1.24
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1206-7. Also optimistically discussing
the details of this line were Generals Bradley and Vandenberg.
209 Ibid., 1204-7.
210 Ibid.
211 Blair, The Forgotten War, 456.
212 Regarding such plans as childish, see Ibid., 472. Regarding concerns over the safety of X Corps as a
whole, see General Bradley's comments in "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at
Large (Jessup)," December 1, 1950 in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1223.
213 Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation (Jessup) 12/3/50," 1278.
214 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)," December 1, 1950 in F.R.U.S.,
1950, Vol. 7, 1223-34. It was the center of attention again at the subsequent meeting Philip Jessup,
"Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) (December 3, 1950)," in
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One of the clearest examples of the American inability to contemplate Chinese
involvement despite clear signals to the contrary came in the November 21 meeting of the
joint State-Defense group. Throughout the meeting there was no mention of the
possibility of China increasing its forces and initiating a massive attack on the U.S.
force.21 To emphasize, this meeting occurred after it was quite clear that the Chinese
had a large force deployed in Manchuria, had at least some forces inside of North Korea,
and had already dealt a large American unit a severe defeat. The meeting was one of the
few opportunities for all the senior leaders in charge of American security policy to get
together in the same room. Despite this, no one thought it worthwhile to bring up the
prospect of large-scale Chinese involvement. Again, as noted above in a different
context, ignorance of the data was not an excuse. Leaders in Washington were getting
timely copies of MacArthur's "Daily Intelligence Summaries" or DISs.2'6 Later, when
the joint State-Defense group met again, a few days after the full scale Chinese attack had
occurred, Acheson, seemly somewhat chagrined, made clear that previous discussions
had not raised the prospect of the situation that they were now facing:
Secretary Acheson opened the discussion by referring to the desire to resume the very
useful session which had previously been held. It was now necessary to consider the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, ed. United States Department of State (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).
215 Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation (Jessup) 1 1/21/50," 1204-8.
216 Many of the important DISs were telexed immediately by MacArthur's headquarters. (See, for
instance, Willoughby, "The Chinese Communist Potential for Intervention in the Korean War
(Undated)", p. 3.) Beyond that, the State Department staff on the ground in South Korea had access
to Eighth Army and X Corps intelligence reports as they were produced. They often cabled
summaries of these to Acheson in Washington. See, for instance "The Charge in Korea (Drumright)
to the Secretary of State (November 1, 1950)," reprinted in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 7, 1022. As noted
earlier in the chapter, in the worst case the DISs would arrive by courier some 3 to 5 days after being
published. (Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle'," 146, note 7.)
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contingency which had not been covered in the previous discussion; namely, what to do
in case the offensive failed.21 7
Either the note taker (Ambassador Philip Jessup) or Acheson is a master of
understatement. Previous sessions of the senior foreign and military policymakers of
the United States government had managed to ignore the possibility of a Chinese attack
despite significant evidence that one was, a the very least, possible. That such a
prospect had been imminent at the previous meeting must have been simply unthinkable
to them.
Change over Time
By the end of November, the signs of a Chinese intervention in force were too
large for even MacArthur to ignore. After his back-and-forth at the beginning of the
month, he had settled into a confident frame of mind through mid-November. However,
once the PLA's second campaign began at the end of the month, he was to send near
hysterical requests for more troops.218 At home in Washington, senior Army officials
began to consider the prospects for a complete withdrawal from the peninsula.2 9
A month after that, in early January 1951, General Ridgway was forced to
abandon Seoul.22 ° By this point, the JCS, again contradicting their earlier assessment as
217 Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation (Jessup) 12/3/50," 1276.
218 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 274-75.
219 Ibid., 298.
220 Ibid., 309. For a less negative view see Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 173n; Jonathan D. Pollack,
"The Korean War and Sino-American Relations," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint
Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Ming Yuan (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books,
1989), 225n.
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the Chinese intervention capabilities had become too clear to deny, "concluded that the
Chinese Communists had enough strength to drive MacArthur out of Korea.""'
Surprising Difficulties in Implementing Strategies
One problem for the United States was that it found that missions it had expected
to face were more difficult than expected. "The B-29 attacks on the key bridges in
North Korea demonstrated both the difficulty of hitting such point targets and the
enemy's growing ability to bypass and repair damaged bridges."222 Hitting troops on the
move also proved problematic:
Each day at dawn the Chinese concealed their mobile equipment in ravines, under bridges,
and in other carefully hidden positions along the main supply routes. Such targets were
exceedingly difficult to locate and harder to destroy.2-
Because of these difficulties, the Air Force shifted its emphasis to hitting supply centers,
(known to civilians by a different name: cities).' Yet, this was no panacea, as this
strategy, too, did not prove as effective as the Air Force had expected initially.2 '
More generally, the Air Force found its doctrine poorly designed to combat a light
infantry-based army.2' Close air support missions were plagued with problems,
particularly those strikes conducted by the Air Force.2 7 Dr. Robert Steams, an
221 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 310.
222 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 224.
223 Ibid., 263,703. One might have thought this same message would have been learned in WWII.
224 Ibid., 226.
225 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), 79.
226 One tactic the Air Force was forced to rely on was the bombing of villages it "knew" to be inhabited
by enemy fighters. Ibid., 67.
227 Dennis E. Showalter, "The First Jet War," Military History Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1996): 71. On the
relative advantage with regard to CAS held by the Marines, see Crane, American Airpower Strategy in
Korea, 1950-1953, 62.
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independent, academic evaluator appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force, provided a
generally positive preliminary assessment of the service's performance at the end of 1950.
However, he did note some interesting shortcomings: "He did concede that joint
doctrine and communications had to be improved, and a better antipersonnel air weapon
would be useful against masses of enemy manpower." Similarly, while using animals
and porters as their primary logistics train certainly had drawbacks for the CPV, it also
had advantages: "the relative invulnerability of marching troops to enemy air and
armored attack." Beyond that, "indeed the lack of motorized transport was something
of an advantage in that it permitted off-road movement over difficult terrain and thus
increased the ability of the CCF to avoid detection and attack by UNC air forces."
The Air Force faced substantial challenges trying to find Chinese troops who used
"excellent camouflage discipline ... in the heavily wooded mountainous terrain. "3
Further, in this conflict, with less emphasis on logistics by the enemy, airpower aimed at
interdiction was bound to have less effect." Note this is precisely the sort of limitation
this dissertation's theory would predict: the air force was poorly prepared for a sort of
adversary that it did not expect to fight.
This raised specific problems: the official air force history entitled one section on
the use of heavy bombers in October, "General O'Donnell Runs Out of Targets."232
228 Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 61.
229 Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War, 143 and 173, respectively.
230 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 228.
231 Even the official Air Force history admits as much. See Ibid. See also Pape, Bombing to Win, 145.
A more appropriate strategy would have focused much more on close air support rather than deep
interdiction.
232 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 205.
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Beyond that, moreover, the destruction of the original target set had been of only limited
utility: One scholar of strategic bombing concluded that by the end of that month they
had "achieved no perceptible effect on the course of the war." 33
MacArthur's assessment of the utility of airpower declined dramatically over time.
According to one of MacArthur's planning officers at the time, General Wright, "this
belief in the effectiveness of air power was one of General MacArthur's greatest
weaknesses in dealing with the Chinese."234 By 3 December, a mere week after he had
expressed such confidence about the role that airpower had played in cutting off
Communist logistics, MacArthur had changed his tune dramatically. He now argued
that the terrain did not favor American predominance in the air and on the sea, seemed to
have a new respect for Chinese mobility on foot across rough terrain, and expressed
concerns that his forces were at risk.235 (The Chinese continued to surprise the United
States with their tactical mobility on foot well into the summer of 1951.236)
Chinese Reactions Made Missions Even Tougher
Not only were anticipated missions more difficult than expected, but the Chinese
tactics also created problems for the United States. Because American planes,
particularly the vaunted B-29, were ill-suited for night strike operations,237 the Chinese
soon developed a preference for night movements which meant that U.S. air strikes
233 Pape, Bombing to Win, 145. That said, the Chinese certainly felt the American airpower was
imposing costs. See the discussion in the following chapter.
234 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 278.
235 Ibid., 281.
236 Ibid., 389.
237 Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 42.
220
C
Chapter 4: The United States Crosses the 3 8th Parallel
became rather ineffective and flares had to be used to attempt to remedy this.238 By May
of 1951, these problems were becoming even more pronounced as the Chinese further
adapted to the Americans. "[l It was becoming increasingly difficult to locate and strike
enemy interdiction targets in daylight. The CCF and NKPA were beginning to
implement even more effective camouflage discipline and habitually moved their men
and vehicles into cover and concealment during the daytime and moved only at night."239
The tenacity of the Chinese response to the American campaign was impressive:
The Navy, Marines, and Fifth Air Force were all assigned separate sectors to bomb.
Roads were cratered, tetrahedral tacks were dispersed to puncture tires, and delayed-
action and butterfly bombs were dropped to discourage repairs. Results again were
disappointing. Enemy repair crews exploded the harassing charges with rifle fire or
accepted the casualties necessary to fill the craters. Sometimes they just bypassed
blockages on secondary roads. ... [Elnemy countermeasures soon turned the tide.
The communists built duplicate highway bridges across key waterways and cached whole
bridge sections near important crossings so repairs could be completed quickly240
Additionally, the vulnerability of the B-29s had been emphasized by the destruction of an
attacking formation in October 1950: three B-29s were shot down, five were seriously
damaged, and only one returned unscathed." Following that, a decision was made:
"Pending more effective fighter cover to protect the bombers against the increasing
number of Communist MIG fighters, the B-29 attacks on bridges and other facilities in
the northwestern corner of Korea were suspended on 12 April 1951."242
238 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 380-83.
239 Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War, 180.
240 Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 83.
241 Ibid., 86.
242 Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War, 179.
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Not only did American offensive airpower strategy not live up to expectations
against the vastly different Chinese forces they faced, but also even defensive counter air
(DCA) missions found an unexpected challenge:
Night heckling raids by wood and fabric PO-2 biplanes were becoming [in Fall of 1951]
quite a nuisance. The "Bed Check Charlies" were almost impossible to detect, even
with radar, and one managed to damage F-86s at Kimpo with two small bombs on 23
September. The Air Staff was concerned that the enemy's ability to "operate with slow
obsolete biplanes almost at will" showed a serious weakness in Far East Command air
defenses. 2 4 3
One manifestation of this is apparent in comments from the deputy head of
logistics for the United States, General Darr H. Alkire, who was explicit in his admiration
for the Chinese ability to keep the supplies moving:
It has frequently been stated by commanders in Korea that the one man they would like to
meet when the war is over is the G-4 logistics commander] of the Communist forces.
How he has kept supplies moving in the face of all obstacles is a real mystery. He has
done it against air superiority, fire superiority, guts, and brawn.44
Limited War
Another area is suggestive of the role of American theories of victory in shaping
American misperceptions. As the war unfolded, it became quite clear that the U.S.
military leaders are chafing against the requirement of limited war. As noted in the
previous chapter, prior to the Korean War, the United States had been preparing for
general war, another world war that would demand the full attention of the nation.
However, the war they found themselves in required that they limit their exposure to
avoid being dragged into to an even wider peripheral conflict.245 One example of this
friction was the concerns over hot-pursuit of enemy fighters across the Chinese-Korean
243 Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 84.
244 Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War, 225-26.
245 For discussion of this, see Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation (Jessup) 12/3/50," 1276-82.
Present at this meeting were the secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the service
secretaries, and senior advisors from State and Defense.
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border.24 The air force strongly opposed restrictions on their ability to defend their
vulnerable bombers, but national policymakers recognized the importance of preventing
the war from spreading. Similarly, the Air Force often expressed enthusiasm for using
nuclear weapons in a variety of manners.247 MacArthur frequently called for additional
divisions to be deployed to the peninsula from the strategic reserve.248 A more thorough
anticipation of the risks of limited war would have prepared the military for this
eventuality and likely decreased their optimism regarding their prospects in such a
conflict.
Change in U.S. Strategies
These difficulties faced by the United States against the Chinese led to many
changes in the American approach to war. When Ridgway took over from MacArthur
in 1951, he began to implement some of these. At times, he pushed the United States to
become more like the PLA in certain regards:
The enemy, it is true, traveled light, traveled at night, and knew the terrain better than we
did. He was inured to the weather and to all kinds of deprivation and could feed himself
and carry what weapons and supplies he needed by whatever means the land offered-by
oxcart, by pony, even by camel, a number of which had been brought in by the Chinese,
or on the backs of native workmen, even on the backs of the troops themselves. There
was nothing but our own love of comfort that bound us to the road. We too could get
off into the hills, I reminded them, to find the enemy and fix him in position.' 9
At other times, he counseled a reinvigorated focus on firepower, while again noting the
issue of mobility off roads:
The Chinese greatly outnumbered the UN forces, and could reinforce their front-line
troops extensively. But our superior firepower more than redressed the balance.
246 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 223.
247 E.g., Dower, War without Mercy, 701.
248 Blair, The Forgotten War.
249 Ridgway, The Korean War, 89.
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Heretofore, we had not been taking advantages of this superiority, through lack of
intensive training, through use of pursuit tactics that scattered our forces, or from
allowing ourselves to grow roadbound. By February 1951, Field Artillery battalions
that had been undergoing intensive training in the States and had long been earmarked for
our use began to join the I and IX Corps, enabling those force to return to normal old-
fashioned tactics of coordinated action.5
Finally, by the end of the war, Ridgway was increasingly relying on the use of
fortifications to deal with the human wave tactics of the Chinese.25' This was a shift
from tactics that had emphasized mobility before the war.252
After the war, the U.S. military more broadly undertook a number of reforms that
suggested it had learned important lessons from the Chinese. One effect of the war was
to immunize the Navy and Marines from some of the heavy competition from the Army
and Air Force in preceding years of inter-service rivalry:
In the Korean War naval air and the Marine Corps plays such conspicuous and valuable
roles that their future are part of the Navy was never again challenged, and the conceptual
and operations value of sea power in a limited, protracted war confirmed.2
More specifically, the Navy was able to restart its long cherished plans for a supercarrier
that would provide it with the ability to combine surface control missions with substantial
strike capabilities:
The Forrestal, successor to the ill-fated United States, was a product of the Korean War,
which had changed many minds about many things. Within weeks of the North Korean
invasion, Defense Secretary Johnson, who had scrubbed the United States told Admiral
Sherman [then Chief of Naval Operations], 'I will give you another carrier when you
want it,' and the Forrestal went into the budget for fiscal year 1952.254
250 Ibid., 111.
251 See for instance the discussion of the defense of the Kansas Line in the summer of 1951 at Ibid., 180ff.
252 On the American reliance on mobile armor formations in general before the Korean War, see the
previous chapter. On the use of integrated combined arms formations in the early stages of the
Korean War utilizing the few M-24 Chaffee tanks available to Eighth Army, see Roy Edgar Appleman,
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June-November 1950 (Washington,: Office of the Chief of
Military History Dept. of the Army, 1961), Chapter 9ff.
253 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1994), 315-16.
254 Ibid., 335.
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Also, limited war became explicitly part of American thinking about the use of force. 5
Thus, it is clear that combat in Korea faced the United States with many
unexpected challenges. Most importantly, the utility of airpower against the Chinese
had been vastly overestimated before the war.' But also, the United States was forced
to reassess its thinking about the mobility and combat effectiveness of poorly armed
infantry forces. All of this strongly supports the dissertation's theory, which predicts
surprise regarding the adversary's capabilities and intent once war is joined (Predictions
#8 and #9). Thus, this section directly supports the link between different theories of
victory and underestimation of the enemy (H.). Differences in theories of victory
directly contributed to a misperception of the adversary's relative capabilities. This
suggests that American assessments of the balance of power and of Chinese signals
before the war likely suffered from the misperceptions that this dissertation has outlined
(with regard to the variants of H2), and indeed that previous sections of this chapter have
shown.
Conclusion
In this case, both way the Chinese sent military signals and the way the United
States evaluated those signals and the overall situation strongly support the theory. The
military signals that the Chinese sent were based entirely on its own theory of victory:
255 See Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
256 In particular, the emphasis on interdiction was misplaced. However, as the quotes above discuss,
CAS against difficult to find light infantry targets was also problematic.
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large scale infantry deployments (as anticipated by Prediction #5).257 The United States
viewed these through its own lens of understanding of military effectiveness and
downplayed both the likelihood that the Chinese would get involved in the war (H2B and
Predictions #6 and #7) and the effectiveness of the Chinese forces if they did get involved
(H 2Aand Predictions #1-4). Both these assessments were tragically wrong, as
subsequent events were to show. The Chinese did intervene in force, and when they did
so, American forces were repeatedly surprised at their effectiveness and their willingness
to join battle (Predictions #8 and #9).
Clearly, this theory does not have a monopoly on explanations for this American
misperception. However, the Alternate Hypothesis set forth in the theory chapter does
not do particularly well. Again, the Alternate Hypothesis represents the primary
approach to strategic coercion in the literature and suggests "Weak signals are more
likely to lead to coercive failure and escalation while strong signals are more likely to
lead to coercive success." In this case, the strength of the "objective" signal that the
Chinese sent was indeed substantial: numerous diplomatic warnings coupled with the
redeployment of a large portion of the Chinese army. Nevertheless, for the reasons this
dissertation's theory predicts, the United States was unable to anticipate the Chinese
reaction.
Thus, this case offers strong support for the dissertation's hypothesized links from
differences in theories of victory to underestimation of the adversary to
miscommunications and misperceptions that worsen conflict.
257 Although clearly the Chinese had little leeway here, given the makeup of the PLA.
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Chapter 5. CHINA'S APPROVAL
OF THE NORTH KOREAN
INVASION (CASE STUDY #2)
The previous chapter presented a strong case in support of the dissertation's
theory in its analysis of the U.S. decision to cross the 3 8th parallel in spite of strong
signals from the Chinese. There, the role of the misperceptions caused by doctrinal
differences were central to understanding how that attempt at strategic coercion failed.
This chapter turns to an earlier decision, looking at the Chinese approval of the
North Korean invasion that occurred in May 1950. This decision is complex, and
clearly many explanations play a role in shaping the outcome, as will be discussed.
However, throughout the more oblique diplomacy in this time period, the role of the
American and Chinese theories of victory can be seen, shaping the tacit signals between
the countries and their interpretation of them. This case highlights those factors and
suggests they can helpfully contribute to the understanding of this case, without denying
the important role of other explanations.'
1 For instance, clearly other actors on the Communist side had less distinct differences in their theories
of victory with the United States. Both the Soviets and the North Koreans (who had implemented
Soviet doctrine and been supplied with Soviet weapons) used combined arms strategies, even
sometimes supported by airpower. Thus, the dissertation's proposed theory cannot explain their
behavior at all. (They are, however, discussed briefly in a section at the end of this chapter.) On the
Chinese side, however, some explanatory value for the theory will be shown.
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Historical introduction
In the spring of 1950, the Chinese civil war was winding down. Mao had
proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China six months before, and
Chiang Kaishek had fled to Taiwan.2 In Europe, the Cold War was rapidly heating up
with the formation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the recent Soviet nuclear
test. Asia was joining the fray with the declaration of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. The
United States was in the process of drawing down its forces in the wake of WWII,
although NSC-68 was beginning to be circulated in the inner corridors of Washington.3
Following decisions taken by various Communist leaders in April and May 1950
discussed below, Kim II Sung finalized his plans for invasion and attacked on June 25.
The effects of that decision on international affairs were tremendous, including the
approval of NSC-68, the rearmament of Japan, and indeed the militarization of the Cold
War.4
Among scholars of the Korean War, there had long been a debate over the role of
the Soviets and the Chinese in the outbreak of the Korean War. There is now enough
evidence to end it. Scholars have long known that Beijing, like Moscow, had been a
strong supporter of the communist movement in the North.s There is evidence that Kim
traveled to China in April and May of 1949 where he met with Mao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De
2 For an excellent military history of the civil war, see Dick Wilson, China's Revolutionary War (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
3 The classic account of this history is John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1941-1947 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972).
4 See Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24,
no. 4 (1980).
5 On this support in general, see *jit, ((;E[iji)) (By: z;iAUJtJ±, 2002).
Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 2002), 172-73.
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(the leader of the PLA), Gao Gang (the regional military leader for the PLA in the
Northeast), and others.6 Later, early in 1950, Chinese General Nie Rongzhen, then
Chief of Staff of the PLA returned three divisions who had been fighting on the
communist side in the Chinese Civil War to the control of the North Korean communists,
under Kim's command. The CCP's Central Committee ordered that these 14,000 troops
keep their weapons as they deployed to Korea.7 This brought the total number of
Korean troops sent back from China to Korea after the communists' victory in the
Chinese Civil War to over 50,000.8 Many of these same troops were to later serve as the
spearhead of the attack southward in June.9 Similarly, there is some evidence that
Chinese military officers played important roles in North Korea's strategic planning over
the course of the year prior to the attack.'" Further, the head of the North Korean air
force had been one of fewer than 20 soldiers sent to the Soviet Union for training by the
Chinese communists during the early part of the Chinese Civil War when the PLAAF
6 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, 3 vols. (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska
Press, 2001), vol. 2, p. 6. KIDA cites Soviet archival evidence published by the Korean Foreign
Ministry for this information, but does not explain in detail the nature of that source.
7 t,. \ <<P[ i i >>(:4irP~/ilJ±. 1994). pp. 445-46. Cai Renzhao,
Nie Rongzhen: China's Principal Military Chief (Beijing: Central Party School of the CCP, 1994).1
See also Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American
Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 106-7. Liu Shaoqi attributes the
decision to let them take their weapons to Mao. lV-4'- ".,, ;t.E]S:~,PrpE '__ ]/
MI", 1950V-- +--- H<< liJ~' -b{>>, --f:7/1949-3/1950(t,'9: K: ~
lj)i, 1998)o Liu Shaoqi, "Telegrams Regarding the CMC Concurring with the 4th Field Army
Regarding the Return of the Korean Battalions to Korea (January 17, 1950)," in Liu Shaoqi's
Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998).
8 Chen Jian, China's Road, I 10- I ; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic history 21, no. 1
(1997): 93.
9 Chen Jian, China's Road, 1 10.
10 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 (Lawrence,
Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 45.
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was in its embryonic stage (and before there was any independent North Korean military
to speak of). 
However, far more critical than this direct military support for the North was
Mao's formal approval of Kim II Sung's attack. There is now widespread consensus
that Mao played an integral role here, along with Stalin.'2 Even most Chinese scholars,
including some writing within China, place Mao at the center of the decision making,
together with Stalin and Kim.'3 There is some evidence that Mao and Stalin may have
discussed Korea in February of 1950.'4 Similarly, there is indirect evidence that Mao
was encouraging the North Koreans to attack in late April or very early May. This
comes from a telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov) to the
Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow. In it, Shtykov relates a conversation among the
North Korean ambassador to China, Mao, and Zhou Enlai.
Mao Zedong added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible,
solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is
no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a
small territory. ]5
11 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, Ist ed.
(College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 18.
12 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 37, 39-40.
13 Chen Jian, China's Road, 112-13; Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners:
Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 145-46; Shen
Zhihua, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far
East," Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000): 67; William Stueck, The Korean War: An
International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 37, 39-40.
14 Shen Zhihua, "China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing's Policy-Making Process," in China and the
United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (Lanham: University Press
of America, 1998), 17.
15 It is unclear where Shtykov learned of this, although it is possible that Kim related the meeting to him.
"Document # 13: 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim II
Sung" in Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," Bulletin of the Cold
War International History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96): 38-39. This clearly occurs before Kim's trip to
Beijing, discussed below.
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These two points, however, remain unverified.
On the other hand, the rest of the story is clear. Kim II1 Sung, after much begging,
had received permission from Stalin to attack the South in April of 1950, pending
approval from Mao. Thus, in May of 1950, Kim went to China. While the minutes of
the meetings between Mao and Kim in Beijing that followed are not available, there is
very strong circumstantial evidence that Mao gave Kim the approval he sought. A few
key sources are illuminating. First, documents released from Russian archives confirm
that Kim I1 Sung left for Beijing on May 13, 1950.'6 Second, Khrushchev's memoirs
contain his recollections of this visit:
Stalin decided to ask Mao-Tse-tung's opinion about Kim Il-sung's suggestion [to invade
the South] ... Mao Tse-tung also answered affirmatively. He approved Kim II-sung's
suggestion. 17
Third, Kim was indeed planning to discuss his invasion plans with the Chinese on this
trip, hoping to "inform the Chinese Communists of the intention to achieve unification by
force, and explain about his meeting with Stalin in Moscow. ""' Fourth, one scholar writes,
There is even some reason to believe that, during Kim's May 1950 visit to Beijing, Mao
offered to position three Chinese armies along the Yalu River as backup for the North
Koreans but was assured that he precaution was unnecessary.' 9
Sixth, it is clear plans for a forthcoming attack were in fact discussed since Zhou Enlai, at
the request of Mao, telegrammed Stalin to solicit his view on this planned attack.20 Mao
16 "Document # 13: 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il
Sung" in Ibid.
17 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Mass.: Little
Brown, 1970), 368.
18 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, vol. 2, p. 14. Again, KIDA cites Soviet archival
evidence published by the Korean Foreign Ministry for this information, but does not explain in detail
the nature of that source.
19 Stueck, The Korean War, 39-40.
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was looking for confirmation that Stalin had indeed given his contingent approval to Kim.
Stalin replied that he had, but reiterated that it was up to Mao to make the final decision.
These telegrams between Zhou and Stalin are critical. The first makes clear that Kim
and Mao were discussing the invasion, and Stalin's reply makes clear Mao was, at the
very least, a potential veto gate.2'
Chen Jian is the leading Chinese scholar on the Korean War working in the West.
His argument, while cognizant of the limitations of the historical record, remains the
most thorough look at Chinese decision making on this point. He concludes,
In short, Kim came to Beijing largely because Stalin wanted him to get Beijing's support
for his attack on the South. Although Mao seemed to have some reservations, he never
seriously challenged Kim's plans. When Kim left China he thus had every reason to
inform Stalin and his comrades in Pyongyang (and we have every reason to believe that
he did) that he had the support of his Chinese comrades. ... Thus Kim's visit to Beijing
represented another crucial step toward the coming of the Korean War, and Beijing's
Korea policy escalated further the potential confrontation between China and the United
States in East Asia.22
Another Chinese scholar, one with access to Chinese archives, comes to a similar
conclusion: "After receiving this telegram [Stalin's response to Zhou's query], Mao
threw his support behind Kim's military plan."23 Other scholars immersed in this
history agree that Mao approved the attack.24
20 Roshchin to Filipov IStalinl, 5/13/50 and the reply from Vyshinsky to Mao, 5/14/50, Jim Hershberg,
"Documentation: More Documents from the Russian Archives," Bulletin of the Cold War International
History Project, no. 4 (1994): 61.
21 See the telegrams reprinted in Ibid.
22 Chen Jian, China's Road, 1 12-13.
23 Shen Zhihua, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War," 67.
24 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 145-46; Allan R. Millett, "The Korean War: A 50-
Year Critical Historiography," The Journal of Strategic Studies 24, no. 1 (2001); Stueck, The Korean
War, 37, 39-40; Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 319-20.
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The official South Korean history of the war summarizes the Chinese role in the
lead up to the war even more damningly:
Communist China was deeply involved second only to the Soviet Union in North Korea's
invasion plot. It encouraged Kim II Sung to invade South Korea by promising that if the
U.S. or the Japanese rendered assistance to South Korea after the eruption of the war,
China would assist North Korea. In addition, it provided North Korea with the decisive
support for the war preparations by transferring the Korean troops in the Chinese
Communist Forces to North Korea and rendering to North Korea necessary advice for the
war direction.25
Thus, this case will examine Mao's decision as a failure of the United States to
deter China.26 Of course, Stalin and Kim were certainly strong proponents for the war,
and each played an important role in persuading Mao to go along with the war.27 Indeed,
Kim in particular was impressive in his persistence and skill in manipulating both Mao
and Stalin.28 Kim's argument that the war would be over before the American's could
intervene went a long way to persuading the leaders of both China and the Soviet Union.
Additionally, several scholars argue that Mao had only limited freedom of action in this
case, given his relationship with Stalin.29 Mao did not want to be seen by the Soviet
leader as a Titoist in Asia at this early stage in the budding Sino-Soviet relationship.30
Nevertheless, had Mao been thoroughly and strongly deterred by the United
States and thus decided to actively oppose the attack, it seems likely that the entire chain
25 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, vol. 2, p. 5.
26 Again, see the brief discussion at the end of the case regarding explanations for Soviet and North
Korean behavior.
27 See Shen Zhihua, "Sino-North Korean Conflict and Its Resolution During the Korean War," Bulletin of
the Cold War International History Project, no. 13/14 (2003/04); Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out:
Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War, I st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000).
28 Shen Zhihua, "Sino-North Korean Conflict."
29 See Shen Zhihua, "China Sends Troops to Korea," 14. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao,
and the Origins of the Korean War.
30 Chen Jian, China's Road, Chapter 5: The Decision for War in Korea; Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman,
Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War, passim.
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of events leading the to the Sino-American conflict in Korea would have been avoided.
Had Mao deeply feared the threats potentially posed by American military power, he
likely could have found the wherewithal to slow the drumbeat of war among the
Communists in Northeast Asia. This case will provide contribute to the understanding
of why Mao was, instead, moderately optimistic regarding China's prospects in a war
with the United States.
What Kind of Case?
As will be clear, the U.S. signaling was generally rather oblique. What this case
presents, then, is an instance of failed general (rather than immediate), extended
deterrence of China by the United States.3 ' As noted in Chapter 2, scholarship of
deterrence in international relations often distinguishes between general and immediate
deterrence.3 2 This case is not a primarily an instance of immediate deterrence because
the specific threats toward China were limited. Rather, Washington expected its general
posture aimed at deterring Communist expansion everywhere to achieve the results in
Asia, too. The signals that Washington was sending often pertained to that general
posture, rather than the Korean Peninsula per se.
This sort of general deterrence is commonplace in Sino-American relations as
well as in international relations. One pair of scholars (one American, one Chinese)
writes of this sort of deterrence four years later in the same theater:
31 Among other failures, to be sure. There certainly was a failure to deter Stalin as well, to say nothing
of Kim. However, Mao also played a role, as has been argued, and-for the purposes of this study,
the U.S.-China dyad-is of greatest interest.
32 See the discussion in the Chapter 2 at note 16.
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Certainly American power constrained and influenced Chinese actions; the very U.S.
military presence, which was augmented in the Western Pacific during the crisis, may be
defined as a political-military deterrent.33
There were certainly elements of this sort of thinking in the spring of 1950 as well.
While achieving successful general deterrence is relatively challenging,
nevertheless, this sort of case is worth studying for several reasons. First, the
differences between immediate and general deterrence lie on a continuum, and cases
along the middle range of that continuum will instruct about both extremes,'as noted
earlier. Second, the United States did send some direct signals to China directly on the
Korean case, raising at least some elements of immediate deterrence. Third, different
theories of victory can impede communication of intent and capability through the same
dynamics in both immediate and general deterrence. Thus, this case will provide some
insight into the dissertation's theory.
In part because of this large element of general deterrence in this case, the
subsequent analysis will focus on very broad level doctrinal thinking by the two sides.
This is appropriate given that the decisions at this point were quite broad, with neither
side well focused on this particular adversary in this particular theater. Thus, the
assessment of threat posed by the other would have been at a very broad level.
Signaling by United States
There are a number of different elements in the U.S. signaling policy and general
deterrent posture. Particular policy statements at the diplomatic level, recent shifts in
33 John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press,
1988), 27. Note that an important advantage of a general deterrent posture, as opposed to an
immediate deterrent one, is that it can avoid provoking one's adversary. Lewis and Xue argue that
this played a role in the period before the 1954-55 crisis. See Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb,
31.
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military posture, both nuclear and conventional, and the general tenor of relations
between the two countries in the Cold War each conveyed some suggestion of U.S. intent
toward China and the situation on the Korean peninsula. This section evaluates each in
turn. In sum, this multifaceted signaling policy should have sent only a limited signal of
general deterrence to the Chinese. However, beyond that, several important elements of
the policy were based on an American conception of military strategy that would have
been difficult for the Chinese to interpret.
Changes in Grand Strategy
The highest level of America grand strategy at this time was the Truman Doctrine,
or containment.34 First announced in a specially called joint session of congress,
President Truman laid out a very clear policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."35 Even at that time, it was clear to the world that the
shift in American policy was broader than an aid package to Greece and Turkey, but
34 One might distinguish between the President's Truman Doctrine speech on aid to Greece and Turkey
in March of 1947 that proposed "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressure" and the blueprint for containment, Kennan's Mr. X article of
four months later, which counseled "confrontlingl the Russians with unalterable counterforce, at every
point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."
However, the concepts are closely related and historically intertwined and will be treated as such here.
For both quotes and discussion, see Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan,
American Foreign Relations: A History since 1895, 5th ed., vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999),
241-45. Also see Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 4
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 38-41; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), Chapter 3 Implementing Containment.
35 Address of the President of the United States: Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey,
March 12, 1947 available at the Truman Library's online collection at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/doctrine/large/folder5/tde2- I .htm
238
I
Chapter 5: China Approves the Invasion
rather included a set of principles that might be applied more widely: "Truman's
'Doctrine' Becomes Law At Last" intoned the New York Times.36
By late 1949, it was clear that this containment policy was to be both
comprehensive and firm, representing a hardening of American policy.37 There had
been a shift away from Kennan's strongpoint strategy that dominated in the late forties to
a more comprehensive defensive perimeter or containment strategy. NATO was created
in July of 1949. Truman's December 1949 signature of NSC-48, focused explicitly on
the security situation in Asia, furthered this trend by making explicit that containment
would be applied more broadly in Asia than before.
NSC-68 epitomized this changed emphasis in policy. While not formally signed
until after the Korean War's outbreak, its tenets were viewed sympathetically by many in
the foreign policy establishment in the early part of 1950. Nevertheless, fear of
opposition from within the Budget Bureau and from others concerned with the domestic
tax burden prevented NSC-68 from being implemented at the time. These budgetary
concerns are sometimes overdrawn. While the pre-Korean War buildup budgetary
situation looked severe compared to the post-Korean War budgets, by other standards, the
situation was not so dire.
36 The New York Times, May 25, 1947.
37 For similar characterizations, see Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the
Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 47-54;
William Whitney Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea,
1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 146-52.
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Figure 5-1: Nominal Military Spending (in billions of U.S.$)'
The post-WWII cuts had already bottomed out, and had done so at a level approximately
similar to that of the Soviet Union.
Aside from the budgetary concerns it provoked, NSC-68 served as a list of the
Administration's public talking points on its foreign policy.39 The ideas in NSC-68
embodied a shift toward a much more assertive American policy. "U.S. diplomacy was
imbued with an offensive spirit."4 It focused heavily on enhancing American military
capabilities to provide for robust deterrence of threats. It argued that, in order to
"prevent disaster," U.S. military forces must be able to
a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-
making capabilities can be developed;
b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for
victory are being built up;
38 Compiled using data from: J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "National Material Capabilities (Version
2.1), 1990 (updated April 1999)," Correlates of War Project, The University of Michigan.
39 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 107-08.
40 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 357.
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c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making
capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United
States and its allies can be brought to bear; ... 4
Thus, by early 1950, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, there was some
hardening in American general deterrent policy-particularly declaratory policy, so
critical to deterrence-against Communist aggression.
Nuclear Weapons Policy
On the nuclear side, several aspects of the American policy toward Communist
nations-in general and in Asia-bear mentioning. In this period, American
decisionmakers were extremely confident in the signals that implicit moves could send,
particularly if they involved atomic weapons. Relatively low-key deployments of B-29
bombers had been used to send deterrent signals to the Soviet Union in the past: in 1948,
two squadrons had been deployed to Britain during the first Berlin Crisis as a signal to
Moscow.42 Roger Dingman describes the legacy of that crisis:
Democratic and Republican statesmen looked back to the dispatch of two squadrons of
B-29s to Western Europe during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 for guidance on how
best to use American nuclear superiority... In the summer of 1948, American statesmen
doubted that the B-29 deployment contributed directly to settlement of the Berlin
Blockade crisis. But as time hazed over the particulars of this episode, they came to
believe that atomic arms could be instruments of "force without war." Their credibility
might even exceed their actual capability if they were used, without overt threats, for the
purposes of deterrence rather than compellence. Thus American statesmen and soldiers
brought to the Korean War the conviction that atomic arms, if properly employed, could
be extremely valuable tools for conflict management.
41 See NSC-68 in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. I:
National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977), 283.
42 Scott Douglas Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 15. These had been falsely described in public as "nuclear-
capable" although the specific planes sent were not modified to carry the weapons. That said, an
additional signal was sent at that time by putting the planes that had been so modified on high alert
status in the continental United States.
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Similarly, Richard Betts describes a series of crises in which nuclear deterrence was
attempted without explicit atomic or nuclear threats being made.4 3
Further, the United States had recently developed the capacity to launch nuclear
strikes from the continental United States. The first operational B-36 Peacemakers had
entered the Strategic Air Command's (SAC's) inventory in 1948, and by 1950 SAC could
call on three squadrons of such planes for strikes.44 Several long-range operational test
flights had displayed their capabilities in the late 1940s.
SAC celebrated the success of the program by staging a long-range navigation and
bombing mission that extended from taking off at Carswell through dropping a 10,000-
pound "dummy" bomb in the Pacific Ocean near the Hawaiian Islands and returning to
Carswell. The unrefueled mission covered 8,100 miles in 351/2 hours. The mission was,
in a way, a "LeMay triumph" in that the bomber made an approach over Honolulu
undetected by the local air defense system-on 7 December 1948! Early in 1949,
another B-36 crew set a long-distance record of 9,600 miles. The B-36 covered the
distance in 43 hours, 37 minutes. ... There was little doubt that the vast Soviet
communications monitoring system was taking note of these and other similar
demonstrations of long-range strategic "reach."4 5
This brandishing of planes capable of delivering weapons at exceptional range should
have also sent a general signal to the Soviets.
Beyond the intercontinental bombers, forward-deployed nuclear-capable bombers
played an active part of the American general deterrence of communism in Asia.
Through the early fifties, the bulk of the American deterrent was to be launched from
overseas bases, if war ever came.46 The B-29 was-with the B-36-the primary
43 See his pre 1958 cases in Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).
44 Chris Adams, Inside the Cold War a Cold Warrior's Reflections (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama:
Air University Press, September 1999); Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy
and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-54," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management: An
International Security Reader, ed. Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven Miller, and Stephen Van Evera
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 86.
45 Adams, Inside the Cold War a Cold Warrior's Reflections, 39.
46 For a fascinating discussion of the standing U.S. plans in approximately 1950, as well as discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of various permutations of overseas basing, overseas refueling, and
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platform for the delivery of nuclear weapons in this period. Again, the United States
had used overseas deployment of this very plane to send signals in previous cases. In
Asia, similar tacit signals were also being sent; from October 1949 to June 1950, Guam
hosted B-29 training missions.47 (The same B-29s were to later fly missions in Korea.48)
By familiarizing the Andersen Air Force Base staff with the maintenance and deployment
needs of the B-29 platform, the U.S. military made future immediate deterrent
steps-like the deployment of nuclear-capable B-29s-easier. Indeed precisely that
step, the deployment of 10 nuclear capable B-29s, was taken early in the Korean War in
late July.4 9
Again, it was believed in Washington that such tacit signals would be heard: "The
decisions of late July 1950 demonstrated the strength of Washington's belief that such
weapons, even if deployed without explicit statements of intent, could serve as
deterrents." s The confidence in the utility of such tacit signals was shown at a later date
as well: as conflict between China and the United States got closer in the fall, the United
basing in the continental United States (and the implications of all of that from a stability perspective),
see Albert J. Wohlstetter and others, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, R-266 (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, April 1954), 3-8ff.
47 It appears these were conventional B-29s, although that would not have been apparent to anyone other
than the highest-ranking Americans.
48 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/andersen.htm.
49 Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis
Management, ed. Stephen Van Evera (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 126-27. The New York
Times reported this deployment, so it would have been well known to the Chinese. Note that earlier
in the Korean War, on July 10th, the United States had sent a similar force of nuclear-capable B-29s to
bases in England to allow for potential attacks on Soviet bases from within Europe should the conflict
expand. Those bombers were deployed with "everything but the nuclear cores aboard." Ibid.
50 Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 55.
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States was again sending not so subtle nuclear threats by very publicly deploying heavy,
atomic-capable B-29s to the region in July.51
All these various policies were aimed at deterring communist aggression globally.
However, the way that they conveyed that message would have appeared less threatening
to the Chinese. China would have feared neither destruction of its industrial base nor
the prospect of the "full offensive strength" of the United States being brought to bear.
Given Beijing's theory of victory, those elements did no seem particularly threatening.5 2
Acheson's Speech
It is commonplace in the scholarship of early cold war American foreign policy to
bemoan Secretary of State Dean Acheson's infamous National Press Club speech of
January 12, 1950. In it, the conventional wisdom focuses on the exclusion of South
Korea (and Taiwan) from the U.S. defense perimeter in East Asia, and this is often
thought to have played a major role in convincing various Communist nations to go on
the offensive. The original source of that entire argument stems from partisan attacks. s3
This view is overstated because it relies on a selective reading of the speech and it
ignores how the speech was received at the time.
51 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), 27; Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the
United States During the Korean War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 26.
52 Rather, what likely would have appeared threatening was the forward deployment of very large
numbers of American troops.
53 Republican critics of Acheson's foreign policy on Capital Hill first popularized the argument that
Acheson invited the Korean invasion. See James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who
Created the American World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 222.
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A more careful reading of the speech suggests that this signal was unlikely to
have been as important as is sometimes suggested for several reasons. First, the idea of
a "defensive perimeter" that is the focus of so much attention in the historiography is
mention only in passing and is not developed at all in the speech. The most frequently
quoted portion is: "This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then
goes to the Ryukyus ... from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." 54 However,
quoting this portion alone is extremely misleading as it implies that the phrase "this
defensive perimeter" refers to a concept that had already been introduced in the speech.
That was not the case. Earlier portions of the speech neither mention nor presage the
concept of a defense perimeter per se. Rather, it is introduced abruptly.55
Second, as the rest of the speech makes clear, other parts of the region, although
not Korea, are indeed explicitly excluded from the sphere of American interests.
Elsewhere in the speech Acheson notes the limited role of the United States in Southeast
Asia and contrasts that with the more substantial obligations owed to Korea: "There
IKoreal our responsibilities are more direct and our opportunities more clear."56
Finally, Acheson's speech did speak specifically of a response to military threats
in the region outside of Japan and the Philippines:
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear
that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. ....Should such an attack
occur...the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which
54 Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia-an Examination of U.S. Policy (January 12, 1950)," Department of
State Bulletin 22, no. 551 (1950): 116.
55 One is only led to infer that this defense perimeter is necessary to the defense of Japan. Ibid.: 1 15-
116.
56 Ibid.: 117.
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so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect
their independence against outside aggression.57
While Gaddis finds this last sentence a "perhaps excessively elegant circumlocution," its
intent seems clear enough. 8 Looking back at the reference to the UN, a modern reader
tends to ascribe current-day thinking regarding the UN to that quote. This would
suggest that it was a rhetorical flourish, and that the UN, in fact, should have been viewed
as precisely a weak reed to lean on. However, to do so is to project backward current
American thinking on that organization. At the time, the UN was viewed as a relatively
robust institution, even in the international security arena.59 For instance, when Acheson
eventually heard that the North had attacked South Korea on June 24, the first action he
approved, before even informing the president or calling a meeting with the JCS, was to
raise the issue at the UN. 0 Dean Rusk similarly attests to the perception of the
importance of the UN at the time.6' Other examples of the perceived importance of the
UN in that era litter the historical record.62
57 Ibid.: 116.
58 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 72.
59 Furthermore, by this time the Soviets were already boycotting that body in protest over the prevention
of the PRC taking China's seat that was at the time held by the ROC/Taiwan representative. The
Soviets began their boycott on January 10, 1950. Thus, communists in Beijing and Pyongyang could
not count on the UN being kept out of any Korean conflict. Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., Assessing the
Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997),
Chronology.
60 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, NY: Norton,
1969), 401-5. See also extended discussion in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The
Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 888,
note 2.
61 Dean Rusk, Richard Rusk, and Daniel S. Papp, As I Saw It, I st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990),
164.
62 Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968), 99.
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Rather than viewing the speech as an abandonment of Korea, it is more
appropriate to see it as a statement that describes a range of American interests in the
region. As one historian writes,
In the soft-spoken language of diplomacy, however, Acheson had actually stated that the
United States would unilaterally defend areas which were strategically important to it and
would participate with the United Nations to check aggression against other free peoples
in the Pacific.6 3
In summary, while Acheson does not offer a blanket promise of aid to South Korea, he
certainly does not imply Washington is indifferent to its fate.
Communist Interpretation of the Acheson Speech
Furthermore, what is most important is not a close textual analysis of the speech
or an assessment of how it "ought" have been interpreted. Rather, the perceptions of the
speech at the time are what matters. In terms of the perceptions in the United States
and apparently within the Communist bloc, the most important parts of the speech were
those that focused on Russian attempts to take Manchuria from China and on suggestions
that the United States might abandon Taiwan. Based on the currently available evidence
from the Communist side, it appears that it was only after the outbreak of the Korean War
that the portion on the defensive perimeter received much attention.65
On the Korean side, the foremost scholar of Korean thinking during this period,
Bruce Cummings, concludes, "It turns out that the North Koreans thought Acheson
included the ROK in his perimeter, a bit of a daunting fact for Acheson's presumed
63 Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1983), 18.
64 Again, it is critical to know both the perceptions of what signals the United States thought it was
sending as well as understanding how those were interpreted on the other side. Both sides'
perceptions are relevant.
65 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 423-428.
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failure of deterrence."' One of the more robust pieces of evidence that Cummings
provides is a quote from an article in the North Korean Workers Daily newspaper
regarding the speech:
Acheson's view was that those countries inside what he called a defense line, meaning
those subjugated countries, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, such countries
would be America's 'direct responsibilities' Ifor defendingl.6 7
The currently available evidence on Chinese perceptions-while again based on
only limited information-also suggests that the speech did not shape (or reshape) their
view about American Korea policy in a fundamental way. Several points lead to this
conclusion. First, it is clear they studied this speech in detail.68 There is clear evidence
that the Chinese (and the Soviets) not only listened to this speech, but also adjusted their
assumptions about America policy with regard to the Sino-Soviet alliance because of it.69
Shi Zhe, who served as Mao's interpreter for many years including during the
negotiations over the Sino-Soviet Alliance in Moscow in 1949 and 1950, describes the
discussions between Stalin and Mao regarding the speech in some detail.70 However, all
the focus in his narrative is on the issues regarding Mongolia and Manchuria and
American accusations of Soviet designs on them. There is detailed discussion on these
points, and of the discussion between Mao and Stalin over the appropriate response to
66 Ibid., 423. Emphasis in the original.
67 Emphasis added. Ibid., 424.
68 See for instance the discussions between Mao and the Soviet Foreign Ministry: Document 17:
Conversation, V.M Molotov and A.Y. Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950
translated and reprinted in Odd Arne Westad, "Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-
Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950," Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, no. 8-9
(1996-1997).
69 Shen Zhihua, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War." See also Chen Jian,
China's Road, 102.
70 it <<AJIlJ :» - >>(slt : tj~j :I~, 1991), Shi Zhe, Beside the Great
Men of History (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1991), 454ff.
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this accusation from the Americans. 7' However, nowhere in his account is the
"defensive perimeter" portion of the speech mentioned.
Similarly, Shen Zhihua is a Chinese historian who is generally regarded by
Westerners as having good access to archival data, but also one who publishes
independent from government-run presses. In his Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War
(published in Hong Kong where there are fewer impediments to scholarship on sensitive
subjects), he discusses at length the issues of the Chinese and Soviet decision-making
during the treaty negotiations (these spanned the date of the speech). Shen does indeed
discuss the Acheson speech. However, drawing on Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, he
focuses on it in the context of the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations and the U.S. wedge
strategy, all relating to the issue of Manchuria.n It is not surprising that the issue of
territorial sovereignty of a former part of China would receive much attention. This had
clearly been a contentious issue in the treaty negotiations, and the Chinese also had other
areas-Tibet, for instance-that they were concerned about at the time.7 3
Beyond the work of these two Chinese scholars, a few other pieces of evidence
are suggestive of the Chinese views. A few months after Acheson's National Press
Club speech, Zhou Enlai responded with disdain toward a claim by Acheson that the
71 Ibid., 456.
72 ti,- - <<f:igh:*- -,r*q4Uff.ti: d: 4tggj^@t';>> Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1998.
Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: The Highest Top Secret Archives (Hong Kong:
Cosmos Books, Ltd., 1998), 179ff. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners.
73 See, for instance, }iJ~",. " ['3~nl~. )2.h,:i{l_:';-~ " 1950 -
A tt << l *i'Vi{J i>>. - :7/1949-3/1950( .:4~j3 t 1iM±. 1998).
Liu Shaoqi, "Telegram to Mao Zedong Regarding the Foriegn Ministry's Spokesman's Tibet Issue
Statement (January 17, 1950)," in Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing:
Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998).
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United States lacked territorial aspiration in Asia in a different speech. Historian Zhang
Shuguang summarizes Zhou's comments as follows:
Zhou Enlai retorted that the Truman administration wanted to "cheat us again." The
U.S. would always want to control Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina, and that was why "the
U.S. government is still supplying the KMT with bombers to bomb the Chinese
mainland; ... the U.S. is doing the same thing to support such puppet regimes as Baota
[Baoda] and Syngman Rhee ... so as to suppress the Vietnamese and Korean liberation
movements to strengthen U.S. control over those places."74
That further suggests that the Acheson speech was not the key source of Chinese
perceptions regarding the U.S. role in the region.
Once war broke out, the Chinese government repeatedly criticized American
policy over Taiwan as going against their previously stated official "hands off' policy
toward Taiwan.75 However, in none of these instances is American policy toward Korea
criticized with the same accusations of hypocrisy.7 6 For instance, the day after the
United States ordered its forces to Korea and the Taiwan Strait, Mao decried the
American hypocrisy in the latter case:
Only January 5 Truman stated that America would not interfere with Taiwan, but now it
is clear that the words he spoke were lies. Moreover, he is also shredding the American
policy of non-interference in Chinese internal affairs.7
Through his comments, there is no mention of American lies about Korean policy, or the
shredding of the Acheson National Press Club speech's tenets. Similarly, when Shen
74 The direct quotes are Zhou's words from a speech that was made on the March 18, 1950. The
remaining text is Zhang's commentary. See Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 44. For
the text of the Acheson speech that Zhou is reacting to, see Dean Acheson, "United States Policy
toward Asia (Mach 15, 1950)," Department of State Bulletin 22, no. 560 (1950).
75 On Chinese characterization of the U.S. policy in this manner, see *<< iR4~J41_4>> Song
Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War, 195. Describing the politics behind this shift in
American policies embodied in Truman's January 5 speech, is Thomas J. Christensen, Useful
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chapter 4.
76 If there had been a Chinese perception that the United States had abandoned South Korea, would it not
be likely that there would also be accusations of hypocrisy over that as well?
77 *'J<<i] fig~[" 16>> Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War, 197.
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Zhihua discusses the outbreak of the war, he makes no reference to the speech.78 The
official history of the Korean War published by the PLA press makes no mention of it.79
Clearly, all this is indirect and circumstantial evidence. Ideally, access to
Chinese archives would allow us to answer this definitively. However, the data
presented above does suggest there is not a large paper trail pointing to the Acheson
speech per se as leading the Chinese to support the war. Perhaps the Chinese have
hidden this record to deemphasize their role in the outbreak of the war.' While deeper
access to Chinese records may help to deepen scholars' understanding of this critical
issue, at this point the historic record lacks explicit evidence linking the Acheson speech
to the failure of deterrence.
Again, all of this suggests that the conventional wisdom regarding the Acheson
speech-and thus the Alternate Hypothesis' conventional wisdom regarding the failure of
general deterrence in Korea-overemphasizes the weakness of the diplomatic signal and
its causal imporance. The leadership of the United States did not conceive of the
Acheson speech as an abandonment of Korea. At the time of this writing, there is no
78 &<<f'- fMM ·- 1'f i r ic >> Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, see his discussion
throughout Chapter 4: Crossing the 38th Parallel, but in particular following page 192. Shen does
note that Stalin had changed his position on whether to support the North's plans to invade the South:
"therefore, one can absolutely confirm that Stalin's decision to change his policy toward the Korean
peninsula was made between January and April of 1950." (Ibid., 198.) However, Shen goes on to
attribute this change to the recent signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance, increasing Stalin's confidence in
the power of the Communist side. (Ibid., 198-99.) Elsewhere he focuses on Stalin's perceptions of
the power of atomic weapons in previous crises (specifically the Berlin Crisis of 1948), suggesting that
the Soviet acquisition of a nascent atomic arsenal played some role. (Ibid., 204.)
79 [ JW*t jR f ,<<o@l~A ~ ~3>>( J~, > : " - , 1992)o
National Defense University Concise Military History Group, A Brief War Fighting History of the
Chinese People's Volunteers (Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 1992), 2-3.
80 However, it seems that an accusation of American hypocrisy and policy inconstancy might be made
without any admission of Chinese culpability in this regard.
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direct evidence available that the Chinese leaders (or other communist leaders) took the
speech to have that meaning either. The Acheson speech is only one part of the
international context at the time. Until there is affirmative evidence that this speech
played a large role in shaping Communist perceptions, scholars should continue to look
for other, empirically supported explanations for the perceptions that led China to support
the war.
Other Diplomatic Signals
The United States sent a number of other signals regarding the issue. Senior
American foreign policy elites made showy visits to South Korea. Ambassador-at-
Large Philip Jessup (a senior policymaker in State with responsibility for East Asia) was
there in January of 1950,81 and John Foster Dulles (a consultant to Acheson at the time)
visited Korea in June of 1950 in a prominent tour of the region.8
Acheson, in speeches before and after the National Press Club appearance, had
emphasized the strength of the U.S. interests in the region in general and its willingness
to defend those interests with military force. On January 5 he stated:
It is a recognition of the fact that, in the unlikely and unhappy event that our forces might
be attacked in the Far East, the United States must be completely free to take whatever
action in whatever area is necessary for its own security.'
On March 15, he reinforced this message, mentioning Korea by name (although not
directly committing American military support):
81 Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 161.
82 James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), 37.
83 Dean Acheson, "Extemporaneous Remarks by Secretary Acheson (January 5, 1950)," Department of
State Bulletin 22, no. 550 (1950): 81.
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President Truman has declared his belief that it must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures and that we must assist free peoples to work toward their own destinies
in their own way. The aid we extend may be of a kind appropriate to the particular
situation; it must be fitted into the responsibilities of others, and it must be within the
prudent capabilities of our resources. In some situations, it will be military assistance,
in others, it may be grants or loans, ... In still others, the need may be for technical
assistance. There are not new principals nor is the application of them to the Far East a
new departure. In Vietnam, Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, for
example, we have demonstrated our desire to help where such help can strengthen the
cause of freedom.8
These speeches should have sent moderate signals to the Chinese, and Chinese sources
suggest they were being read with care by the Chinese leadership.85
Military Signals
Beyond American policy at the grand strategic level and diplomatic signals, the
U.S. military deployments in East Asia provided relatively tangible signals regarding
American interests. Many of these various force deployments emphasized the
importance of Korea to the United States. However, the U.S. theory of victory critically
shaped these, and they would have been difficult for the Chinese to interpret.
After the Japanese surrender, the United States had rushed a two-division corps to
the Korean peninsula, garrisoning all territory below the 38th parallel.86 These troops
eventually numbered some 45,000. Their withdrawal was initially proposed by the
Pentagon in 1947 as a way to hoard its declining military forces, although Acheson had
84 Acheson, "United States Policy toward Asia (Mach 15, 1950)," 471.
85 In addition to those citations in the previous section, see for instance, I_- , <<1*,LKti 1
*19[.:1949-1956>>(it,y,:-f iWjaI ± , Jtf 1994). Pei Jianzhang, Foreign Relations History of
the People's Republic of China: 1949-56 (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 328-29.
86 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 94.
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stymied this plan for years.87 However, by June 1949 the last of these combat troops
were withdrawn from Korea.8 This withdrawal decision precisely paralleled the Soviet
withdrawal from the North, where Moscow's last two divisions had pulled out at the end
of 1948. Both sides of the Cold War were reducing their on-the-ground commitment to
Korea.
Nevertheless, other American signals would have softened this blow to Seoul.
First, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) remained in place and expanded to
500 men (as well as another 150 air force officers). 9 This was the largest such group
anywhere in the world at that time.90 It integrated American advisors down to the
division level with the South Korean military. Its emphasis on combined arms training
and integration between the services would have been lost on the Chinese. Further, the
withdrawing American forces left some $1 10 million worth of military equipment.9 '
This transfer was made publicly and included over 40,000 vehicles as well as substantial
small arms, ammunition, and artillery.9 All of this would have been downplayed in
importance in Chinese doctrine.93 U.S. aid was used to equip and train the South
87 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 157-168; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 251-
253,300.
88 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 382; Gaddis, The Long Peace, 95. For detailed
discussion of the intra-Pentagon debates over this withdrawal, see Steven L. Rearden, The Formative
Years, 1947-1950, 3 vols., vol. I (Washington, D.C: Historical Office Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1984), 261-65.
89 Foot, The Wrong War, 57.
90 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 385.
91 Ibid., 473.
92 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, vol. 3 Policy and direction: the first year
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army/GPO, 1972), 35. The
transfers were discussed openly in congress in 1949.
93 Clearly the ROK arms were, in fact, insufficient to face the North's attack when it came.
254
Chapter 5: China Approves the Invasion
Korean military. The size of the force that Washington aimed to create had increased
from 50,000 to 65,000 as the United States was withdrawing in 1949.'4 The South
Korean military had grown further to 100,000 by 1950, and Ambassador Muccio traveled
to Washington in May of that year to secure increased aid for the growing Korean
military.9 5 The Truman Administration had battled with budget hawks in
Congress-and won-to preserve an $11 million military assistance package in 1949
under the provisions of that year's Mutual Defense Assistance Act.6 South Korea was
one of only three named recipients for grant aid under Title III of this auspiciously named
program.97 The fight over the aid packages continued the following year, with the
Administration again having to overcome an initial defeat in Congress. Eventually (in
January or February of 1950), it secured a $100 million aid package for Korea in fiscal
1951 (July 1050-June 1951).98 This came on the heels of a $150 million aid package in
fiscal 1950.99
Further, Korea was frequently the scene of American displays of force such as
fleet and airpower deployments. For instance, "the navy was persuaded to have an
94 Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 159.
95 Ibid., 165.
96 Ibid., 159.
97 Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, 264.
98 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2,425. For discussion of the domestic politics, and in
particular of the high cost the Administration was willing to pay for securing passage of the various
Korean Aid bills, see Christensen, Useful Adversaries, Chapter 4. Christensen puts the initial
(proposed) aid figure for FY 1951 at $60 million.
While this aid was in theory not to be spent on military hardware, it was not unheard of for exactly
that to happen. See Christensen's discussion of the contemporaneous aid package to Taiwan.
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, Chapter 4.
99 Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 159.
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American cruiser and two destroyers visit Inchon in the fall of 1949."' ° ° Other
deployments in the region were commonplace:
In late March 1950 the aircraft carrier Boxer scrambled forty-two jets for flights over
central Vietnam as a demonstration of American "military strength" and two weeks later
it sent fifty planes roaring over Pusan and Taegu. The carrier Valley Forge left on a
similar mission in mid-May, with an accompanying task force of twenty ships, to show
the flag in "the troubled Orient. " ''
None of these deployments would have looked particularly threatening through the
Chinese doctrinal lens.
Finally, the Air Force retained a significant position in the Far East. The
prodigious holdings of FEAF (the U.S. Far East Air Force) includedfourteen strike
squadrons of various aircraft, as well as an additional nine squadrons of air defense
fighters.
Figure 5-2: FEAF Holdings in East Asia 02
- Squadron Number of Plane Location
Type Sq
Bomber 2 B-26 Japan
3 B-29 Guam
Fighter-Bomber 6 F-80C Japan
3 F-80C Philippines
Fighter-Interceptor/ 5 F-80C and F-82 Japan
Air Defense 4 F-80C and F-82 Okinawa
The United States continued to show its commitment to maintaining a robust Air Force
presence even in the context of a global reduction in military forces in the late 1940s.
"On 23 July 119491, a devastating typhoon damaged Okinawan air facilities so severely
100 Ibid., 161.
101 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 477.
102 Data compiled from Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 2-4. The only aircraft
included are tactical ones. There were also sundry reconnaissance, transport and search and rescue
units.
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that the Air Force could not continue operations without extensive reconstruction."" 3
Over opposition from Air Force leadership (who had other funding priorities), MacArthur,
the Army Chief of Staff, and others were able to convince JCS, and eventually the
President, that rebuilding the Okinawan airbase was key to the American deterrent
posture in the region. The president's active support of this measure led to
congressional approval of a measure for over $50 million to rebuild the bases in October
of 1949.' °4 More generally, the Air Force was expected to play a significant role in any
American combat in the region. Indeed, Kennan later explained why he had been rather
sanguine about the American military position in the area:
I had been assured by a very high Air Force officer, on the occasion of my visit to Japan
in 1948, that we had no need for any ground forces in Korea anyway, because the Air
Force could control from Okinawa, through our strategic bombing campaign, anything
that went on in the way of military operations on the Korean peninsula.'0 5
Again, this sort of deployment would not have resonated in Beijing.
Thus, there were some military signals supporting the American general deterrent
posture. While none were direct or particularly large, it would be inappropriate to
characterize them as trivial either. Nevertheless, in each case they depended on factors
of military capability (training, combined arms, airpower, naval deployments) that would
have been foreign to the People's War doctrine prevalent in Chinese thinking at the time.
Thus, they support this dissertation's theory through Prediction #5 that states, "When
signaling to the other side, each side should send signals that make use of forces in
accordance with their own theory of victory."
103 Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 202.
104 Ibid., 202-4.
105 George Frost Kennan, Memoirs, 1st ed. (Boston,: Little Brown, 1967), 482. See also Stueck, The
Road to Confrontation, 158.
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Summary
American signaling policy came in several forms. First, the hardening of
American containment policy at the global level relied on offensive strikes and
punishment strategies. Second, there were diplomatic statements that were ambiguous
and certainly less than robust, although they did not represent a complete abandonment of
Korea. Finally, a number of military deployments and displays of force were made in
and around the Korean peninsula.
These policies, in sum, should have sent at least a limited, general deterrent signal
to the Chinese. Thus, the Alternate Hypothesis-which summarizes the conventional
wisdom regarding deterrence and emphasizes the importance of the "objective" quality of
the signal-would suggest that there was only a moderate chance for deterrence success.
Undermining those prospects even further, as the dissertation's theory would predict, the
military and grand strategic elements of these signals were deeply infused with the
American theory of victory (again supporting Prediction #5 regarding sending signals
with one's own theory of victory). This would have made them difficult to interpret by
the Chinese. The following section examines that claim.
Interpretation by China
There is only limited evidence on the intricacies of Chinese decision-making, but
what is available is supportive of the theory's predictions. This section lays out several
different arguments. First, there is substantial evidence that the Chinese had a deep
confidence that their tactics would be capable against the American forces. Second,
there is substantial evidence of Chinese denigration of the dangers posed by the
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American atomic arsenal. Finally, Mao (and Stalin) downplayed the threat of American
involvement in Asia, and this appears to be related to his firm belief of Chinese
superiority militarily.
That said, clearly other factors entered into Chinese decision making in this case.
While a previous section emphasized that the Acheson speech is often overemphasized
and that some aspects of American policy were hardening, neither of those points
completely undermines the conventional view about this case. American deterrent
policy was very general, and some aspects of policy were relatively weak. However, as
the remainder of this chapter will show, coexisting with that was a degree of relative
optimism about military factors in China.'" This section argues that this false optimism
also contributed to the Chinese decision to support the invasion plans.
Portions of the evidence presented below in support of the first two points
(confidence in the Chinese military) stem from four to five months (sometimes more)
after China decided to approve Kim II Sung's attack plan in May of 1950. While such a
gap is not an extended period of time, neither is it trivial. The data comes from the
period when China was preparing to respond to the U.S. crossing of the 38th parallel with
an intervention of its own. It is not surprising that more information would be available
on Chinese perceptions as the prospect of Sino-American conflict increased through the
summer. Nevertheless, the geopolitical logic explaining that decision is unquestionably
different from that explaining the May decision. 7 However, this evidence does speak
106 As noted earlier as well, at a later point, once the United States seems likely to move into North Korea,
there is a degree of insecurity about the long term competition with the West in Beijing. However,
this security dilemma logic does not contribute substantially in this earlier period.
107 This is discussed in the section on case selection in Chapter 2 as well as the introduction to the
previous chapter on the U.S. decision to cross the 38th parallel. In short, the May decision could have
been deterred, while the October one was less amenable to strategic coercion. (Clearly, it could have
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to the issue of the relatively high degree of confidence that the Chinese felt with regard to
its military forces in a conflict against the United States. It seems very likely that this
confidence also existed in May of 1950 as Mao was deciding whether or not to approve
Kim's plans. (Nothing had occurred between May and the early fall that would have
increased China's confidence about facing the United States; indeed it is quite possible
that it would have decreased."'°) Thus, evidence from the later period should be useful
in allowing us to extrapolate Chinese beliefs from May.
Confidence about Conventional Battles
As they finally explicitly faced the prospect of war with the United States, the
Chinese felt they had grounds for a degree of optimism regarding a number of tactical
issues. This evidence strongly supports the link between different theories of victory
and underestimation (H,) as well as several of the theory's component predictions. First
is simply the prediction that there should be correlation between differences in theories of
victory and underestimation (Prediction #1). Second is the prediction that states with
different theories of victory will denigrate their adversary (Prediction #2), as discussed
above. Further, the theory also predicts "Larger differences between the two states'
theories of victory should correlate with a larger or more frequent underestimation of the
been avoided by not crossing the 38th parallel, but that would not have been a case of deterrence
success.) Nevertheless, the operational and tactical level perceptions that are presented in this section
would seem likely to be persistent as they are not dependent on the geopolitical rationale for the war.
108 That is, the Chinese did not have reason to change their perception of their relative power in a positive
direction between May and the late summer and early fall. A case could be made that the Chinese
should have been less confident in August and even less in September as the United States first
stabilized its lines in Pusan, then went on the offensive in Inchon. This would mean that Chinese
confidence in May was even higher than one would infer from the statements recounted in sections
below from the late summer and early fall.
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adversary's capability" (Prediction #10). All three of these predictions are borne out by
the evidence presented in this section.
The optimism of Chinese leaders as they faced the increasingly likely prospect of
conflict with the United States was widespread. In August, Zhou had conducted
research into the American army at Mao's request. His findings suggested weaknesses
such as "the heavy American dependence on logistical support."' 9 Similarly, a detailed
assessment made by field commanders from late September makes explicit the sources of
Chinese confidence. The following summary of that report, with a number of direct
quotes from actual document, merits reprinting at length:
First, the U.S. forces were politically unmotivated because "they are invading other
people's country, fighting an unjust war, and thus encountering opposition not only from
the American but other peace-loving peoples around the world," whereas the Chinese
forces would "fight against aggression, carrying on a just war, and thus will have the
support of our people and other peace-loving peoples; and more important our troops
have a stronger political consciousness and higher combat spirit." Second, the U.S.
troops were inferior in terms of combat effectiveness, because, "although they have
excellent modern equipment, their officers and soldiers are not adept in night battles,
close combat, and bayonet charges." By contrast, the CCP troops "have had rich
experience over the past ten years in fighting an enemy of modern equipment ... and are
good at close combat, night battles, mountainous assaults, and bayonets charges."
Thirst, the U.S. forces were not tactically flexible, since "American soldiers always
confine themselves to the bounds of military codes and regulations, and their tactics are
dull and mechanical." On the other hand, the CCP forces were "good at maneuvering
flexibility and mobility and, in particular, good at surrounding and attacking enemy's
flanks by taking tortuous courses, as well as dispersing and concealing our own] forces."
Fourth, American soldiers were not capable of enduring hardship. "They are afraid of
dying and merely relying on firepower [in combat, while] ... on the contrary our soldiers
are brave and willing to sacrifice life and blood and capable of bearing hardship and
heavy burdens," attributes that would remedy the disadvantage of inferior firepower.
Finally, the U.S. forces had greater logistical problems. The U.S. was "carrying on a
war across the IPacificl Ocean and has to ship most of the necessities from the American
continent-even if it can use supply bases in Japan, [for instance] it is transporting
drinking water from Japan-and there fore its supply lines are much longer, eventually
making it difficult for them to reinforce manpower and supplies." Meanwhile, the
Chinese would be close the rear bases and "back by [theiri fatherland." The
109 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 337, note 19.
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organization of supplies would also be much easier; because "we have less trucks and
artillery, we won't consume that much gasoline and ammunition.""
In this passage, note in particular the references to U.S. military weakness due to
numbers of troops, long supply lines, tactical inflexibility, lack of appropriate political
motivation, and the dismissal of nuclear weapons. Conversely, the Chinese side was
thought to benefit from the justness of its cause, their ability to move on foot, their
aptitude for hand-to-hand fighting, and their light logistics tail. These Chinese military
lens clearly shaped both those perspectives.
Mao's own optimism regarding his ability to withstand American attacks can be
seen in discussions regarding the possibility of Sino-American war as China
contemplated intervention in Korea in early October 1950. (This is not to say that Mao
was blithely and universally optimistic; see the discussion below.) At that point, Mao
was certainly cognizant of the prospect that the United States might attack China:
Once the Chinese military (of course, the name we will use will be the volunteer army)
has engaged the U.S. army inside of Korea, we have to prepare for America to declare
and get into war with China. We also must prepare, at least, for the United States to
bomb large cities and industrial bases within China and of the navy attacking our coastal
zone. "'
He went on to downplay this danger however, noting that it was not as important as
victory on the battlefield-"most importantly, destruction of the 8th Army"-and
110 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 76-77. The bracketed editorial clarifications are all
Zhang's. Zhang's footnote does note make clear the precise date, although it is clear it comes from
late September 1950.
Ill tt - --,¥,i«},! _90, <<~ X.LX,: A-Ifa> > X 1:[,f: [l J,. 1990. FM
1999). Shen Zonghong, Meng Zhaohui, and others, The History of the War to Resist America
and Support Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1999),
9. Note this language appears to come from the unsent version of Mao's telegram to Stalin on
October 2, 1950. For discussion of this, and translation of the complete document, see Thomas J.
Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War
Telegrams," International Security 17, no. 1 (1992). As argued elsewhere, even though this telegram
was not sent, it still has utility for assessing Mao's thinking.
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suggesting that the population could be mobilized to create air defense forces. 12 It is
unclear why the local peasantry would have better luck at air defense than did the PLA,
who at least had some dedicated anti-aircraft artillery. Mao's confidence in his ability
to destroy the 8 th Army seems quite excessive as well. Mao's writing on this almost
precisely the same as his writing in 1947 when facing the corrupt and inept KMT army,
discussed in an earlier chapter."3 In this case, he called for overwhelming numerical
superiority-"my army needs four times the troop strength as the enemy's"-and
expected this to allow him to "thoroughly annihilate one army of the enemy."'' 4 The
consistency of Mao's strategy against vastly different military adversaries is instructive
of the persistent influence of China's theory of victory on analysis. At a somewhat later
date, Christensen writes of a "the optimistic tone of Mao's communiques" to Stalin, Zhou
Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and others on military issues before February 1951."5
Other instances of relative Chinese confidence abound. One of Mao's generals
later wrote of the perceptions at the time:
During the past several decades, our army had always defeated well-equipped enemies
with our poor arms. Our troops were skillful in close fighting, night combat, mountain
operations, and bayonet charges. Even though the American army had modern weapons
and advanced equipment, its commanders and soldiers were not familiar with close
fighting, night combat, and bayonet charges.' 6
112 ,~,<<ttg ijWt>> Shen Zonghong, Meng Zhaohui, and others, The History of the War, 9.
113 See Chapter 3: Facing Off over Korea, in the section entitled "Integration of the Various Tactics."
114 See 1_*3,. " :l:+)Jlj [J/ t.gl-i " . 950lf - H <<T~HpIM
3i»>> -. ~-:9/1949-12/1950( :t,.:dOCA±}II ±. 1987)m 539 jo. MaoZedong,
"Telegram to Stalin Regarding the Decision to Send Troops to Korea for Combat (October 2, 1950),"
in Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents
Publishers, 1987), 541.
115 Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," 144, note 63. See also Chen Jian,
China's Road, 143.
116 Xuezhi Hong, "The CPVFs Combat and Logistics," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea, ed. Li
Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 115.
263
Twomey, The Military Lens
The Chinese expected bayonet charges to play a large role in the hypothetical next war;
the United States thought that in general strategic bombing and nuclear exchanges would
be central. Again, this is precisely what the theory would predict: "Each side should
believe that battles will be dominated by factors emphasized by their own theory of
victory." (Prediction #4)" 7
On October 24, 1950 in a speech to the People's Consultative Congress, Zhou
Enlai wrote, "Our Army is capable of resolving the problem. The Air Force and Navy
will not go because only next year will we establish them. But should we wait until our
strength has grown before intervening? No!""8 When it intervened, writes one Chinese
scholar and military historian, "the CPV employed all of these familiar tactics: numerical
superiority, mobile operations, and surprise.""l 9
Another Chinese source quotes the Current Events Bulletin of the Central
Committee of the CCP of October 26, 1950. This was an internally circulated,
classified source that would have only been available to senior Chinese decisionmakers.
This report also expresses their confidence in any conventional battle:
[The United States] has economic strength and superiority of weapons and equipment,
but its invasion actions toward the five continents has received the opposition of the
people of the world and led to its political isolation. Militarily speaking, it also has
many weak spots: its front line is long, its rear areas are far away, its troops are not
numerous, its morale is not high. Its allied friends-England, France, etc.-are no
longer great powers. Japan and West Germany have yet to arm. Atomic weapons are
117 And it is irrelevant to the theory which side was correct in their expectations. The widely disparate
views shaped their threat assessments.
118 J ,)Jl<<i,,t±:.i>>l P[:(z; K : df, 1997)o Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai's Selected
Military Writings (Beijing: People's Publishers, 1997), 76.
119 Yu Bin, "What China Learned from Its "Forgotten War" in Korea," in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA
Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 127.
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now held by others, and furthermore do not determine victory or defeat. The final
victory will certainly belong to the Chinese and Korean people.'2
Thus, the Chinese confidence on conventional grounds was widespread.
Mao's Doubts
This is not to say that Chinese optimism was not unchecked, by any means. It is
clear that Chinese entered the war with much trepidation. Mao is reputed to have paced
the floor for a few days as the final moves were being made, and much of the back and
forth communication with Stalin in early October did center on the provision of Soviet air
support (which did not materialize until much later).'2 ' However, the most shrill of the
Chinese communications seem clearly to be attempts by the Chinese to get the best
possible bargain from their Soviet patrons. 12 2 Clearly, such an ideal bargain would
include air support and mechanized weapons. But the key point is, when the Soviets
rebuffed the personal request for air support of Zhou Enlai, who had flown to Moscow on
short notice in early October, the Chinese went ahead with their decision to intervene
nevertheless. From their perspective it seems, air support would have been a welcome
addition, but was not deemed absolutely critical to military operations.
Across all these pieces of evidence, the Chinese assessment of both sides'
capabilities is precisely predicted by this dissertation's theory: Differences in theories
of victory correlate with underestimation (Prediction #1). Leaders denigrated their
adversary's theory of victory (Prediction #2) and did not have nuanced discussions of
120 ,ii,<< ~jltiR -- >> Shen Zonghong, Meng Zhaohui, and others, The History of the War,
10.
121 For the best recreation of Mao's decision making here, see Chen Jian, China's Road, 171-209.
122 Ibid., 199.
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their adversary's strategy (Prediction #3). Indeed, the lack of sophistication in
considering American strategies and capabilities is precisely that suggested in that
prediction. The very large difference in the theories of victory led to large and frequent
underestimations (Prediction #10). The optimism that comes from the difference in the
two sides' theories of victory supports H. and likely informs conclusions regarding the
dangers of war with the United States in the first place. That is, it supports the link
between mistaken assessments of the balance of power that come from the
underestimation of the adversary and escalation of the conflict (H2A).
Again, this data regarding Chinese perceptions of the prospects for war with the
United States comes from periods after May 1950. Nevertheless, it illustrates the
enduring Chinese views regarding air power and mechanization that were present both
before and after the key decision was taken. These perceptions would have informed
Chinese decisionmakers as they faced the decision of whether to support Kim's invasion
plan since one possible outcome they would have had to consider was war with the
United States.
Confidence in the Face of Atomic Weapons
A second element of the Chinese confidence in their forces' ability to fight the
Americans came on the issue of nuclear weapons. As the evidence will show, once the
Korean War broke out, a wide range of Chinese leaders continued to express confidence
in their ability to address this potential threat. Again, much of the evidence presented
below focuses on Mao's thinking about potential American atomic weapon use in late
1950, not earlier that same year. However, if the Chinese leadership did not find
American atomic weapons threatening at this later point, when any uncertainty about
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American involvement in Korea had been resolved, it is unlikely that they would have
felt differently in May when they decided whether to support Kim's invasion plans.23
In part, Chinese leaders likely took some limited solace in the signing of the Sino-
Soviet alliance as a way to provide some extended deterrent to China. However, it is
unlikely they had complete confidence the reliability of his Soviet ally. They would
have been concerned about the Soviet side's negotiating behavior earlier in 1950. In
Moscow, the Soviets had expressed great reluctance to include catch phrases like "with
all means at its disposal" in the key provision of the treaty: "In the event of an invasion of
one of the signatory countries by a third country, the other signatory country shall render
assistance with all means at its disposal." Only after much foot dragging by Moscow,
was the provision inserted. (Even then the Soviets also were able to limit the scope of
the alliance to conditions that were formally "in a state of war", providing Stalin with
some leeway should Chinese behavior appear to put the Soviets in a corner.'2 ) This
reluctance by Stalin likely did not inspire great faith in Mao regarding the reliability of
123 One argument why this might not be the case would be to note that the Chinese might have increased
their confidence over time that the United States would not use such weapons since they had not done
so in the war from June to October. This, however, only invalidates arguments regarding the
likelihood of use of atomic weapons, not the confidence about the Chinese ability to overcome them if
used.
124 The aforementioned points regarding the motivation on the wording and in particular on Stalin's desire
to limit his commitment on the atomic side especially are drawn from Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners, 1 18. (A similar point is made in Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in
the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 66.) The full text of this key paragraph in the
Sino-Soviet Treaty is "Both Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measure at
their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the
part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of
aggression. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied
with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render
military and other assistance by all means at its disposal." See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners, Document 45, p 260. The second caveat explicit in the treaty that gets less
attention is the provision regarding "Japan or any other state allied with her...." Clearly, this implied
the United States. However, the formal U.S.-Japan alliance was not signed until 1951, so this too
likely provided Stalin some wiggle room on his commitments.
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his extended nuclear deterrent.'5 Similarly, Goldstein's study of Chinese nuclear
deterrent thought points out "Even before a formal treaty of alliance was signed, Soviet
behavior under Stalin had provided reason for China to worry about the possibility of
abandonment."" Goldstein goes on to argue that these concerns remained unanswered
throughout the 1950s.'7
As the two sides were edging toward conflict, the United States sent a number of
subtle nuclear threats.'" Beginning in early July, the United States had engaged in
noisy signaling of nuclear threats by deploying heavy, atomic-capable B-29s to both
Northern Europe and to the Asian region in a very public manner.'29 However, the
Chinese were by no means cowed by these threats. The Chinese media emphasized that
nuclear weapons lacked tactical utility.'" Ryan's study of the Chinese views of nuclear
weapons summarizes the "systematic, integrated party line dealing with nuclear
weapons" of the Chinese policymakers once they had decided to intervene in the Korean
War: "The United States had certain glaring weaknesses in its military posture in Korea
... It was futile to try to use nuclear weapons to compensate for these weaknesses.
Bombing per se, including nuclear bombing, could not be a decisive military tactic."' 3'
125 See other discussions, with Stalin downplaying the utility of the Soviet arsenal at the time, at
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 108.
126 Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, 65.
127 Ibid., Chapter 3.
128 The best discussion of this can be found in Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War."
129 Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953, 27; Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear
Weapons, 26.
130 Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 54.
131 Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, 39-40. Ryan suggests this view applied "during
the period from late October 1950 through January 1951."
268
Chapter 5: China Approves the Invasion
At the same time, private, internal commentaries echoed these public views. At
a meeting of the commanders at divisional level and above of the Northeast Military
Region on August 13, 1950, one senior participant recalled that the military leaders relied
on international popular opposition to prevent the United States from using the weapons:
We then explicitly assessed the factor of nuclear weapons and concluded that it was men,
not one or two atomic bombs, that determined the outcome of war. And an atomic
bomb use on the battlefield would inflict damage not only on the enemy's side but also
on friendly forces. Furthermore, the people of the world opposed the use of nuclear
weapons; the United States would have to think twice before dropping them. 32
Such thinking seems more appropriate for pacifist idealists and political propagandists
than for hard-nose military line unit commanders. Senior leaders at the same meeting
shared this approach, focusing on their ability to overcome such weapons:
Top CCP leaders speculated ... that the atomic bomb might be used. They understood
that if the United States were to use the atomic bomb in Korea China had no way to stop
it. But they would not be scared by such a prospect and would try to use conventional
weapons to fight the Americans. ... In short, the dominant voice of the conference
favored the CCP Politburo's opinion that China should not be scared by the bomb.'33
Internal briefing papers were making similar points in November:
The atomic bomb itself cannot be the decisive factor in a war ... the atomic bomb has
many drawbacks as a military weapon ... it can only be used against a big and
concentrated object like a big armament industry center of huge concentration of troops.
Therefore, the more extensive the opponents' territory is and the more scattered the
opponents' population is, the less effective will the atomic bomb be.' 4
A later discussion held by operational military commanders toward the end of the war
was similarly Panglossian and simplified.'35
132 Du Ping, "Political Mobilization and Control," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea, ed. Li Xiaobing,
Allan Reed Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 62.
133 Chen Jian, China's Road, 142-4. Indeed, in the early days of the Korean War
134 This is a quote from the internal circulation (neibu) Current Affairs Handbook (Shishi shouce) on
November 5, 1950. Quoted in Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, 42. While some
in the United States would make similar points at the time, the overall tenor in the United States would
have been quite the opposite.
135 See Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 237-38.
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Mao, in particular, was dismissive of the value of nuclear weapons for the United
States in this case. At the 9 th meeting of the Central Committee on September 5, 1950,
he argued:
We will not let you (the United States) attack us. If you absolutely want to do so, then
go ahead. You attack us your way, we will attack you ours. You attack using atomic
weapons, we will attack using hand grenades; we will grab on to your weaknesses, and
after this, in the end, defeat you.' 6
As a sign of his confidence about this issue, in his telegram to Mao conveying his
decision to enter into war to Stalin, Mao makes no mention of nuclear weapons.'3 7
A scholarly assessment from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1994 is
highly critical of Mao's views on nuclear weapons. It characterizes them precisely as
above, that is, as strongly denigrating the weapons' utility.'38 This study goes on to
explicitly make the point of this dissertation's theory:
In the case of Sino-U.S. conflict, we can see that Chinese leaders, particularly Mao
Zedong, and the American leaders used different criteria to assess atomic bombs or
atomic warfare. They lacked the basis to reaching a common understanding.'39
Similarly, Chen Jian describes the view of top leaders from the CCP as they
moved closer to intervention later in the summer:
Top CCP leaders speculated ... that the atomic bomb might be used. They understood
that if the United States were to use the atomic bomb in Korea China had no way to stop
it. But they would not be scared by such a prospect and would try to use conventional
weapons to fight the Americans. ... In short, the dominant voice of the conference
favored the CCP Politburo's opinion that China should not be scared by the bomb '4o
136 ,, «><< 9iRt.>> Shen Zonghong, Meng Zhaohui, and others, The History of the War, 5.
137 For a work that emphasizes this point as significant and related to Mao's pejorative views of such
weapons, see Chen Jian, China's Road, 179. For a view that places less emphasis on this, see
Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," 137, note 43.
138 He Di, "Paper Tiger or Real Tiger: America's Nuclear Deterrence and Mao Zedong's Response,"
American Studies in China 1 (1994).
139 Ibid.: 14.
140 Chen Jian, China's Road, 142-4.
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Certainly some of the Chinese confidence stemmed from a belief that the United States
was unlikely to use nuclear weapons.'4 Nevertheless, even this judgment contains some
assessment of the likely utility of the use of such weapons for the United States; it
involves some cost-benefit analysis. As the Chinese made that estimate, they
substantially downplayed the benefits that would accrue to the United States relative to
the perceptions on that issue in the United States.4 2 (This imputation of intent from
capability precisely that predicted in H 2 A of this dissertation.)
Additional evidence on this point can be found once the two sides were engaged
in conflict. At various times during the war,'4 and particularly during the long drawn
out negotiations over ending the Korean War, the United States made threats-sometimes
oblique, sometimes less so-regarding atomic weapons to push the Chinese negotiating
position. In early 1951, Truman deployed not only atomic-capable bombers, but
bombers loaded with actual atomic weapons to the region.'44 However, as one scholar
well versed in Chinese sources regarding the Korean War concluded,
There is no evidence to show that the Beijing leadership, while forming this tough
strategy [regarding its negotiating position at Panmunjom], paid any significant attention
to whether or not the Americans would use nuclear weapons in Korea. Although
military planners in Beijing probably considered the possibility that the Americans would
use nuclear weapons for tactical targets in Korea, Mao and the other Chinese leaders
firmly believed that the outcome of the Korean conflict would be determined by ground
operations. Not surprising at all, then, when Mao and the other CCP leaders analyzed
141 Ibid., 178.
142 And again, the critical issue is that the two sides differ in their valuation of a particular strategy, not
which side is correct. Different perspectives, right or wrong, will make communication more difficult.
143 There may have been attempts to quietly threaten the Chinese in May of 1951, although precisely what
was being demanded of the Chinese is unclear from the available historical record (perhaps simply not
expanding the war further, although it is odd this threat would be conveyed to the Chinese rather than
the Soviets). See Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," 140-41.
144 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996), 146.
271
Twomey, The Military Lens
the means Washington might use to put pressure on the Communists, they did not even
bother to mention the atomic bomb.' 45
If the Chinese were not threatened by (or could not understand) the more explicit
threats in late 1950 and 1951, then there is no chance they would have been deterred by
the mere possession of atomic weapons by the United States in early-mid 1950. Again,
this evidence supports the link between different theories of victory and underestimation
(H1) and the predictions regarding the perceptions of the adversary's strategies, the
overall balance of power, the nature of war, and the effect of extreme values on the
independent variable (Predictions #1-3 and #10).
The evidence above suggests large degree of confidence on the Chinese side
regarding both conventional and atomic warfare. This confidence supports the link
between different theories of victory and underestimation of the adversary (H1) and likely
shaped China's views about the overall balance of power (thus, supporting Predictions #1
and #10 and H2A) and also about the degree of intent that the American policies would
have communicated. In turn, this led to difficulty in interpreting the adversary's
intent-H 2 B-and downplaying the likelihood that he will indeed get
involved-Prediction #6 and #7.
Beliefs regarding American Intent
In addition to exhibiting confidence regarding Chinese capabilities, Mao did not
expect the United States to get involved in the Korean War. This directly supports
Prediction #7: "Leaders of states with different theories of victory should downplay the
145 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001),
111.
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likelihood of the other side getting involved in a conflict or in further raising the stakes in
it." Khrushchev, in his memoirs, writes of Mao's perceptions as the Chinese leader was
approving the invasion in May: Mao "put forward the opinion that the USA would not
intervene since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would
decide for themselves."' 4" Similarly, in December of 1949, Mao summarized his and
Stalin's shared views on the general situation in Asia:
Stalin said that the Americans are afraid to fight a war. Americans order others to fight,
but they too are afraid. According to this thinking, it would be very hard for war to arise.
We agree with this estimate.'4 7
Merely a fortnight later, on January 5, 1950 in Beijing, senior military leaders in China
were downplaying the possibility of the United States sending troops to defend Taiwan in
the event of a PRC invasion there on military grounds.'48 The proponent of this was Su
Yu, the leader in charge of the invasion of Taiwan, who was speaking at a "military
conference". Chen Jian summarizes:
From a military perspective, Su saw a vulnerable America. He believed the that United
States needed at least five years to mobilize enough troops to enter a major military
confrontation in the Far East. Su's conclusion was that "in terms of their attitude toward
Taiwan, the American's would not send troops to Taiwan but might send in planes,
artillery, and tanks."'4 9
(Note that the two pieces of evidence presented here predate the Acheson speech so
certainly cannot have been affected by it.) After the Korean War broke out Zhou Enlai
expressed a similar optimism about American behavior in the face of Chinese people's
146 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 368.
147 Emphasis added. Mao was summarizing a conversation he had with Stalin on December 16, 1950
two days later in a telegraph to Liu Shaoqi. See <<,P$).L# "ob A3>> Pei Jianzhang,
Foreign Relations History, 17. For a comparison of this source to two others on the same meeting,
see Chen Jian, "Commentaries: Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure
for Cold War History," Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96): 20.
148 Chen Jian, China's Road, 1 02. Chen implies this is not a response to President Truman's speech later
on the same day in Washington, and given the 13 hour time difference this is almost certainly the case.
149 Ibid.
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War strategies: "The unity of our nation and our people is so important and so powerful
that any imperialist attempt to invade China would be frightened away by it."'50 Each of
these examples suggests that at a general level, the Chinese were inclined to downplay
the likelihood of American intervention.
The two leading Chinese scholars writing on this period from the United States
also agree. Zhang Shuguang writes that Chinese military commanders were "alarmed at
the vigorous American military reaction to the Korean events" in June of 1950.'5' Chen
Jian supports this at a number of points, for instance: "Mao Zedong and others in
Beijing should not have been surprised by the North Korean invasion, but they were
certainly shocked by the quick and unyielding American reaction." 52 As discussed
above, there is evidence from the Russian archives that Mao was encouraging the North
Koreans to use force for reunification and to not expect American entry.' 3 Other
scholars point out that Mao had not expected any substantial U.S. military commitment
before the war.5 4
It is easy to understand why this might have been the case given the perspective
on American strategy outlined above, as H2A suggests: "An underestimation of an
150 Zhou was speaking on October 1, 1950. Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture:
Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 94.
151 Zhang Shuguang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea, 1950-51," in
Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and
Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 91.
152 Chen Jian, China's Road, 126. See also pp. 134-5.
153 "Document # 13: 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim 11
Sung" in Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," 38-39. For the precise quote,
see the discussion on page 232, above.
154 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 321. Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 56-57. Shen suggests
that there were concerns that Japan might enter, but not the United States. Shen Zhihua, "China
Sends Troops to Korea," 15.
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adversary's capabilities can lead to deterrence and coercive failure, escalation, and
conflict in international crises because it complicates assessments of the balance of
power." Since Mao thought U.S. intervention would be costly to the Americans (for the
reasons discussed in previous sections), and because he thought the United States cared
about such costs, he likely downplayed the likelihood of the United States getting
involved. Part of this view came from a general view that communist leaders believed
that contradictions among the capitalist forces would be unlikely to lead them to unify in
opposition to any communist gains.'55 These logics had shaped Chinese interpretation
of previous cases. There was also the belief that communist forces had deterred the
United States from intervening in the Chinese civil war:
The United States refrained from dispatching large forces to attack China, not because the
government didn't want to, but because it had worries. The first worry: the Chinese
people would oppose it and the U.S. government was afraid of getting hopelessly bogged
down in a quagmire.'5
All of this supports the hypothesis linking underestimation to faulty assessment of
the balance of power and coercive failure (H2A) and the prediction that leaders will
downplay the likelihood of their adversary's involvement (Prediction #7). Particularly
in the cases of Mao's December 1949 assessment and that of the military conference in
January 1950, the quotes explicitly link the assessment of American intent to a pejorative
view of American capabilities that stems from the Chinese theory of victory.
155 Stueck, The Korean War, 79. For a study describing the role that communist ideology played in
shaping Mao's evaluations of international relations in general, see Michael M. Sheng, Battling
Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1997).
156 Mao Tsetung, "Farewell, Leighton Stuart August 18, 19491," in Mao Tsetung and Lin Piao: Post
Revolutionary Writings, ed. K. Fan (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), 54. See also Zhang
Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 35-6.
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Dissent in China
While it is correct to characterize the dominant view in China as optimistic
regarding its own capabilities compared to the Americans, there were some prominant
dissenters.'" These tended to come from military leaders who had been exposed to
western training.
Thus, Zhu De in particular repeatedly advocated that additional resources be
dedicated to artillery, air defense, logistics, and air support. '58 Zhu De was one of the
most senior military leaders in China and was commander-in-chief of the PLA at the time.
He had been trained at the Yunnan Military Academy and later taught at Whampoa
Military Academy where as noted above, he would have been exposed to German
operational arts.'9 Zhu De also served under Chiang Kai-shek in a number of capacities.
All of which is to suggest that he had reason to view warfare somewhat differently than
did Mao.
Similarly, at an early August 1950 discussion, Ye Jianying had argued with Mao,
over the merits of sending troops to Korea and the speed with which they could be
157 Peng Dehuai is sometimes regarded as a dissenter as well. See Andrew Scobell, China's Use of
Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 84-86. However, the evidence for this is debatable. Within 24 hours of being appraise
of the plan to send Chinese troops to Korea in October of 1950 he goes from believing that "troops
should be sent to rescue Korea to believing it was "essential" or required that they do so. Neither of
these seems fundamentally opposed to intervention. Further, there is little sense of particular concern
regarding the prowess of American weaponry or its air force in Peng's statements at the time.
158 Yu Bin, "What China Learned (2003)," 129. On Zhu De, see also Scobell, China's Use of Military
Force, 86.
159 Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965
(Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1971), 245. See also Wilson, China's Revolutionary
War.
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deployed.' Ye was a senior Chinese military leader who had been trained at the
Yunnan School, and who also served as an instructor at Whampoa. Some line officers
within the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA) also seemed cognizant of the many
of their equipment and training problems.16'
Lin Biao is another leader often cited as one who had a more conventional view
of military operations than Maoist doctrine permits. (His later turn toward extreme
Maoist rhetoric is often explained with reference to another aspect of his character: "a
shrewd and increasingly cynical Lin began to tailor his advocacy to the prevailing
wind."'6 2) Indeed, during the late 1950s and early 60s, Lin Biao's contributions towards
modernization and professionalization of the PLA were substantial.
On 29 September 1959, in his first major policy speech, Lin set the tone for much of what
was to follow ... A subtle but significant modification was also made to Mao's doctrine
that "men are superior to material." Lin's new formulation was that "men and material
form a unity with man as the leading factor." Later in the year, Lin also reinstated Su
Yu as vice-minister of defense. Su had been fired in October 1958, for advocating all-
out priority to PLA modernization.'63
Lin's emphasis on preserving professionalism and enhancing modernization within the
military remained strong even during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution.'64
Thus it is not surprising that Lin's views led him to a deep skepticism about the
merits of Chinese involvement in Korea.'65 Unfortunately, there is no evidence
160 Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, 27. Ryan cites the memoirs of one of Peng
Dehuai's assistants on Mao's argument. See also Scobell, China's Use of Military Force, 89.
161 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 62.
162 Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural
Revolution, 1966-1971 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 17. On Lin's politics, see also,
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (London,: Oxford University Press,
1974), vol. 3, p 449.
163 Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-
1981 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 55-56.
164 Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis, 1966-1969," in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao
and Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 156.
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regarding his position in May 1950, as the decision to support the North Korean's
invasion in the first place was being made. However, there is information regarding
Lin's views on Chinese intervention in October 1950. At that point, he would have
been the obvious leader to take command of the Chinese forces in Korea. He was a
well-respected military leader who commanded the Fourth Route Army, the seasoned
army already deployed in the Northeast that was later to serve as the core of the
intervention force. Furthermore, he was quite close to Mao. However, he refused the
job offer from China's paramount leader (never an easy task in authoritarian
dictatorships). Publicly, this was said to be because of his poor health. However, there
is significant evidence that this story is, at best, incomplete. Peng Dehuai, the eventual
commander, writes in his autobiography: "Mao needed a willing military commander
since his first choice, Lin Biao, clearly was reluctant to take the assignment."' No
mention of the health issue here, and indeed "reluctance" and a need for someone
"willing" suggest that there was more going on here. More sharply worded on this point,
however, is the autobiography of Nie Rongzhen, at that time Chief of Staff of the PLA:
Lin Biao opposed sending our troops to Korea. At first, Mao had chosen Lin to
command the CPVF in Korea, but Lin was so fearful of this task that he gave the excuse
of illness and obstinately refused to go to Korea. It was strange to me because I had
never seen him so timid in the past when we worked together.'6 7
Chen Jian as well characterizes Lin as opposed to the war, citing memoirs of Chai
Chengwen, a Chinese diplomat stationed in onigahng, as well as documents and
165 Again see Scobell, China's Use of Military Force, 87-89.
166 Emphasis added. Peng Dehuai, "My Story of the Korean War," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea,
ed. Li Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001),
32.
167 Nie Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene," in Mao's Generals Remember Korea, ed. Li Xiaobing,
Allan R. Millett, and Yu Bin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001).
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recollections of the relevant Politburo and senior leadership meetings.'8 Lin apparently
led some other dissenters in the Politburo Standing Committee meeting of October 4,
although little is known of their identities.'69
Thus, there clearly was some dissent regarding the utility of People's War against
the American forces, and this led some leaders to oppose the war in early fall. However,
as is made clear above, the dissent seems centered in a few leaders who were least
identified with a People's War doctrine or leaders who had been exposed to western
thinking about military affairs. In these cases, their own theory of victory was closer to
that of the United States, and so their assessments of the Chinese prospects were much
more pessimistic. Unfortunately, Mao and the most important other top leaders held
different views.
This section thus supports the prediction from the theory chapter that suggested
that leaders less wrapped up in their side's theory of victory will be less likely to make
the underestimating errors associated with this theory (Prediction #11).
Post-Event Evaluations by the Chinese
Again, the theory chapter suggests that in addition to direct evidence through
process tracing, a number of other, related, ancillary predictions of the theory can be used
to test it. Several of those pertain to surprise by the countries after a failure of strategic
coercion. This section shows that the American response surprised Mao and the
Chinese leadership. There is clear evidence that they had misjudged American intent
168 Chen Jian, China's Road, 152, 185. See also associated notes.
169 Ibid., 182.
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(Prediction #9). The theory also makes predictions about Chinese assessments of both
its and the U.S.'s doctrines after war has been joined by both sides. The shock shown at
all levels-tactical, operational, and strategic-in China as well as at the effectiveness of
American airpower comes up repeatedly and strongly supports Prediction #8 which
anticipates precisely this reaction.'70 These assessments led to significant changes in the
PLA. Since part of the calculus for the Chinese regarding supporting Kim's
intervention in the first place was based on the prospect of China getting involved in a
wider war (and confidence about that), this evidence strongly supports H, this
dissertation's theory.
Again, as with the previous section, some of the evidence presented here will
come from the fall of 1950. (Although some data does come from June and July 1950,
so is less far removed from the Chinese decision of May and does not raise these issues.)
For the most part, however, there is no alternative, even if complete access to Chinese
archives was possible. Of course, the only way to assess how Chinese perceptions of their
relative capabilities stacked up in the real world is to examine them during and after a
military conflict. Due to particulars about alliance relations in the Korean War, the
Sino-American conflict did not begin until five months after Mao gave his approval for
the war to begin. However, the Chinese surprise at that point would have been based on
(and contrasted with) beliefs that were in place in May 1950 as well. Thus, that
170 In full, Prediction #8 reads:
8. Actual battle outcomes, when they occur, should deviate further from leaders' expectations when
nations have more different theories of victory guiding their forces.
a. · In cases where one side forced the battle on the other, the side taking the initiative should be
surprised at its difficulties on the battlefield
b. In cases where both sides pursued battle, both sides should be surprised at their difficulties
c. More generally, any leader who believes s/he has a viable strategy in the context of the current
-'- *.. . ^conflict should be surprised at its (relative) shortcomings when battle is actually joined.
d. Leaders often have incentives to conceal their surprise, so it may manifest itself as hastily
reinforcing or last minute changes in strategy.
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information is useful here for evaluating the various predictions of the dissertation's
theory, as outlined above.
Surprise at American Entry
As argued above, Mao had not expected the United States to get involved in the
Korean War. Beyond the points raised above, his surprise at U.S. entry is shown
through his behavior after the war broke out. The U.S. response led to substantial
changes in Chinese policy in several areas, something that would be unlikely had the
Chinese anticipated the American action.' 7 ' Chinese policy toward the United States
shifted at a grand strategic level, moving to a more confrontational mode toward not only
Korea, but also toward Indochina and Taiwan.'7 2 On July 7th, not even two weeks after
the outbreak of war, the Central Military Commission (CMC) quickly made a decision to
act: '"There emerged a consensus that the Sino-Korean border defense must be
strengthened immediately since 'it is necessary to prepare an umbrella before it rains.""'
Note that this same logic would have applied in May or throughout June had the Chinese
expected the United States to become significantly involved.'7 4 While post hoc, ergo
proctor hoc is not logically correct, nevertheless, this evidence is suggestive. It seems
likely that the Chinese were not expecting a substantial and effective American
engagement or they would have made these moves earlier.
171 And as noted, the Chinese knew of the North Korean plan to attack, so that event cannot be the cause
of the change in Chinese behavior.
172 Chen Jian, China's Road, 130ff.
173 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 59.
174 While the Chinese claim to have had no prior knowledge of the precise date of the North Korean
offensive, they should have had some rough sense of this following the May meetings.
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As it was, only immediately following the CMC meeting was the PLA to move
large numbers of troops. These had been deployed in Fujian, the obvious jumping point
for an invasion of Taiwan, but were moved towards the northeast, where they would form
the core of the NBDA.'75 Further, these early Chinese moves to redeploy troops were
particularly hurried, with large units given very short timeframes to complete their
orders.'76 Note also, these moves occurred in mid-July, well before the war began to
turn in favor of the United States (at which point a different logic-defensive concern
over Manchuria-might explain the Chinese moves). All this suggests that the U.S.
action surprised Mao and the senior Chinese leadership, and they had misjudged
American intent in the diplomatic and military signaling before the war.
Strategic Level Evidence
When American and Chinese forces met in November 1950, the Korean War
proved disastrous for Maoist military thought. Whitson writes that after the outbreak of
the war, the role of the "peasant ethic" in Chinese military thought declined.l77 He
summarizes the lessons learned:
The first year of the Korean War thus challenged the 1947 ten-point compromise between
Mao and his generals. On the strategic level, the belief of senior Communist officials
that a quick battlefield victory would demoralize the United Nations troops proved not
only erroneous but terribly costly in trained manpower. At the tactical level, commissar
emphasis on political ideology soon rang false, as officers and men rediscovered the
virtues of small-unit professional leadership as the greatest assurance of battlefield
performance and loyalty. These lessons reinforced the post-1951 trend toward
175 Chen Jian, China's Road, 132.
176 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 58-60; Zhang Shuguang, "Command, Control, and the
PLA's Offensive Campaigns," 92.
177 William W. Whitson and Zhenxia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist
Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York, NY: Praeger, 1973), 459.
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modernization in the PLA and had an immediate impact upon the preparation of the
second great wave of PLA units assigned to Korea.7'
Later, he continues,
A few senior leaders and many younger leaders learned that the best-trained and best-
indoctrinated infantry soldier, lacking properly coordinated air and artillery support, is a
poor match for massed modern firepower, coordinated by a single staff through
sophisticated communications. They learned other disheartening lessons about the
efficacy of guerrilla warfare, Mao's thought, and "People's War."' 7 9
Several quotes from senior Chinese leaders emphasize this point. Mao later wrote:
The War to Resist America and Support Korea served as a large classroom for us. At
that time we engaged in a big practice exercise. This exercise was much more useful
than ordinary military training."'
This suggests that Mao learned something new about American tactics and warfare from
the war. Zhou Enlai had a similar impression, writing in 1952:
Although in terms of equipment, weapons, and firepower we were weak compared to the
American imperialists, we learned many things from our enemy's side. Now we have
practiced, and we know how to drive back their attacks. ... If this war had not occurred,
we would not have been able to learn from these experiences' 8 '
Both of these quotes blandly suggest that in Korea the United States taught the Chinese
forces some lessons. Given that archival material is only selectively released by a CCP
bureaucracy that uses historiography (and hagiography) to justify the party's continued
authoritarian rule, one should not expect too much more. (Indeed, at a general level,
even now one only sees occasional critiques of Mao's conduct of the war in China. For
instance, one Chinese scholar writes specifically of Mao's "rash determination to entirely
178 Ibid., 95.
179 Ibid., 462.
180 1~, ±Jl~, , ;keJ<<s-A2:,~,,,~J~..>>bi,]'J(zlts:f~.~A ± 2001). Liao
Guoliang, Li Shishun, and Xu Yan, The Development of Mao Zedong's Military Thought, Revised ed.
(Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 2001), 452.
181 XJ<< ,l~,: g:J_>> Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai's Selected Military Writings, 297.
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destroy the UN Army" following the successful second campaign leading to "suffering
many serious setbacks in subsequent campaigns."" )
Outsiders can be more honest. In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes of the
persistent optimism of the Chinese forces as they entered the Korean War, and the
mistaken nature of those beliefs:
In the archives you can find documents in which P'eng Te-huai gave his situation reports
to Mao-Tse-tung. P'eng composed lengthy telegrams expounding elaborate battle plans
against the Americans. He declared categorically that the enemy would be surrounded
and finished off by decisive flanking strikes. The American troops were crushed and
the war ended many times in the battle reports which P'eng sent to Mao, who then sent
them along to Stalin.
Unfortunately, the war wasn't ended quickly at all. The Chinese suffered many huge
defeats. ... China bore terrible losses because her technology and armaments were
considerably inferior to those of the Americans. On both the offensive and the
defensive, Chinese tactics depended mostly on sheer manpower. 83
At a military strategic level, the entire shift to 'rotational warfare' in 1951 also
suggests an evolving understanding of the war by the Chinese. Rather than an early,
comprehensive victory, Chinese leaders recognized they would be fighting the war over a
sustained period, thus necessitating a regular rotation of troops into Korea from PLA
reserves. Mao's own explanation of this to Stalin expresses the belated nature of the
recognition of this point:
First, it is clear from the most recently conducted campaigns of the Korean War that the
greater part of the enemy has not suffered destruction and therefore is not going to
abandon Korea. If we are going to destroy the enemy in any large numbers, then we
need time. We ought make preparations for at least two years...After losing several
hundred thousand Americans over a period of several years, they will have to recognize
the difficulty that they are in and pull back. Then we can settle the Korean question. 84
182' HiS,<<X=]= ibJ.lTx. iE~lmtcrqEi>>m%- 39 ],%R 2 M(2000).
Shi Yinhong, "Several Major Strategic Problems Regarding Taiwan That Must Be Addressed,"
Strategy and Management 39, no. 2 (2000): 29.
183 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 372.
184 This is drawn from a telegram from Mao to Stalin on March 1, 1951, reprinted in Michael H. Hunt,
Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy: An International History Reader (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1997), 227-28.
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The latter portion of that quote is particularly interesting given that Mao had earlier
bemoaned the loss of a "over a hundred thousand battle and non-battle casualties" of his
own in less than three months of fighting. This hints at his views of the relative casualty
sensitivity of the two sides: several hundred thousand casualties over a period of many
years would cause a strategic reappraisal in the United States, but losses on a pace of
several hundred thousand in a single year would not be a problem for China.
All of this suggests that at a strategic level, the Chinese were surprised by the
prowess of the American military it faced with its own People's War strategy. This
surprise at the adversary's capabilities on the battlefield is precisely what the theory
predicts (Prediction #8). In turn, this supports the overall hypothesis that there was an
underestimation and that it was linked to the difference in the theories of victory between
the two countries (H1).
Chinese Casualties Were Much Higher than Expected
Mao's views on casualties in mid-1951, above, had come a long way. Before
the war, Chinese expectations were much more optimistic. In August of 1950, Beijing
considered the possibilities of casualties explicitly. Addressing the question of how to
replace casualties within the NBDA, Zhou Enlai spoke of "selecting 10,000 men from all
other PLA forces for the NBDA replacements."'85 At a meeting of the CMC, the
members "estimated that casualties of around 200,000 (60,000 deaths and 140,000
wounds Isicl) would occur in the first year of the war and that proper medical support
should be prepared."'" In January 1951, a mere six weeks after beginning his main
185 Quoted in Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 64.
186 Chen Jian, China's Road, 151.
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offensive, Peng Dehuai already reported having lost half his men, which translates into at
least 200,000 casualties.87 By June 1951, the UN estimated the PLA had suffered some
577,000 casualties.'88 That was only months after the war started. American estimates
put total Chinese casualties for the war at I million, with the vast majority of those
coming before the end of 1951 (and thus the end of the period for which the Chinese
estimated incurring 200,000 casualties). After this point, the war settled into relatively
static combat with no further major Chinese offensives.
Again, this strongly suggests that the cost-benefit analysis that Beijing had in
mind when deciding to take steps that led toward war was far too optimistic.
Tactical Level Evidence for Ground Combat
A large amount of evidence regarding Chinese shock at their ineffectiveness
compared to the UN forces is also available. Some has been alluded to above; much
more will be presented here. The two great powers fought their initial battles in
November of 1950. The Chinese soon found that the difficulties in surrounding and
wiping out large enemy units-the primary operational strategy for the PLA-were
pronounced. American tactical mobility and the substantial firepower available even to
small American units caused these problems for the Chinese. Beyond that, the PLA
found the logistics demands of a foreign war to be taxing, and the American air force, in
their view, caused significant problems. The following sections develop these points.
187 Peng Dehuai, "My Story of the Korean War," 34. For the quantification, see the editors' footnote at
Ibid., note 13.
188 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 8.
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Views on American Tactical Mobility
The Americans' tactic of rapid withdrawal without the collapse of units also had
not been expected by the Chinese (although it had been planned by the U.S. military even
before hostilities broke out).' 9 The United States would simply retreat to stretch the
Chinese lines of communication and would do so even when not under direct pressure.'9
This led to problems for the Chinese, as Segal describes,
There were signs that the strategy of ambush and luring in deep had its limits against a
more modern and mobile force than Chiang Kai-shek's forces. U.S. troops soon found
that Chinese forces could not fight lengthy continuous battles without having to stop for
supplies and new instructions to get to the front. The swift U.S. withdrawal to the 3 8'h
parallel far outstripped the pace that the less flexible Chinese command and logistics
system was designed to handle.'9'
Peng Dehuai, as well, noted these difficulties keeping up with the rapidly moving U.S.
forces:
Because of their high level of mechanization, the U.S., British, and puppet troops were
able to withdraw speedily to the Chongchon River and the Kechon Area, where they
started to throw up defense works. Our troops did not pursue the enemy because the
main enemy force had not been destroyed even though we had wiped out six or seven
battalions of puppet troops and a small number of American troops.'2
Even much later in the war (in the middle of 1951), Peng complained about the same
problem:
Except our energetic pursuit of anti aircraft artillery (including both low and high attitude
weapons), increasing military strength outside of battles of the five campaigns in the
areas of tactics, technology, and leadership still has many limitations. In too many
opportunities to wipe out the enemy, he has again escaped. This deserves thorough
discussion, self-criticism, and rectification. What important shortcomings does our
military have?'9 3
189 Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1999), 89.
190 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 304.
191 Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 101-03.
192 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-
1974), trans. Zheng Longpu (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984), 475.
193 Emphasis added. ,*f"ljl tJt1Il'~ fin' ,Y"(8/15/51),3"Gi~b lhl
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Other scholars note that the Chinese were surprised by the speed of American offensives
and counterattacks as well.'94
Destroying Americans Units once Engaged
Once the U.S. forces had been found and fixed, the Chinese forces still had
trouble destroying them (which they had been able to do against similarly engaged
Japanese or KMT forces). "Luring them in deep" was not effective when "they" could
then set up hasty, but strong, defensive positions from which they could easily hold off
the ill-equipped Chinese forces.'95 Again, Peng notes
If we encircled a U.S. regiment, our troops would need two days to wipe it out because
they were poorly equipped and the enemy air force and mechanized units would do
everything to rescue the encircled unit. Only once did our troops wipe out an entire U.S.
regiment and none of its men was able to escape; this took place in the Second Campaign.
Otherwise our troops were able to wipe out only whole U.S. battalions. If a U.S.
battalion encircled in the night were not wiped out while it was still dark, the Americans
had the means to rescue it the following day.' 6
Similarly, another scholar, Yu Bin, writes:
The First Campaign also revealed some major problems in the CPVF, however. One
was its inadequate firepower, which was so weak that a much larger CPVF unit was often
unable to overcome a small enemy unit (battalion level) in a hastily built defensive
position. The CPVF was also unable to pursue retreating UN forces because of its
unmotorized infantry and lack of supplies. These difficulties were therefore one of the
main reasons for its 'disappearance,' which has been widely interpreted by Western
analysts as part of the CPVF's strategic plan after the initial engagement with the UN
forces.'97
on Several Tactical Problems (October 15, 1951) (Reprinted in Two Speeches by Peng Dehuai During
the Korean War')," Party Historical Documents, no. 68 (1998): 3-4.
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Difficulties with Logistics for the PLA
The problems that the logistics system had faced were substantial. Beyond the
paucity of military equipment, the PLA troops lacked basic supplies critical for survival
in general.
First, we had a big problem feeding our soldiers in the war. Since enemy airplanes
bombed us frequently, grain could be transported to the front only with difficulty. Even
though some reached the front, our troops could not cook their food. Cooking needed
fires, and fires caused smoke, which would surely expose our troops' position and attract
enemy air raids. There was almost no way to solve this problem. During our five
offensive campaigns, many CPVF troops had to allay their hungers with 'one bite
parched flour and one bite snow." We should say that the parched flour had played a
significant role in our food supply during the mobile warfare period. However eating
parched snow caused diarrhea.'98
Zhou Enlai, who was organizing supply issues for Mao during the war, recognized that
the food supplies that the PLA had brought along were insufficient and "every day he
called twice" to check on the production of winter clothes.'99 The general supply
situation was so bad that on January 22, 1951, Zhou was forced to hurriedly call for a
meeting of the senior political-military leaders (including Nie Rongzhen and others) to
discuss logistics. This was the first time that such a meeting had been formally held
regarding the Northeast army and the forces in Korea.200 This poor preparation meant
difficulties for the troops in Korea:
[A] large number of CPV troops were severely frostbitten and unable to fight. Some
had even died of exposure. The troops had virtually no protection against frostbite; they
coated their faces with pork fat and wrapped their feet in straw.2 0'
Indeed this problem complicated the ability of the PLA to prosecute their offensives, as
discussed above: "one Chinese military historian points out that the CPV's defeat in May,
198 Nie Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene," 54.
199 : '],~l~3fi,,_99998, 1- (,C0- MAt--)45-55 Zhou
Enlai Editorial Group, "Resist America, Support Korea (Zhou Enlai Biography Selected Publication),"
Party Documents, no. I (cumulative #61) (1998): 52.
200 Ibid.: 53.
201 Zhang Shuguang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns," 104.
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1951 demonstrated the Communist forces' inability to overwhelm the enemy without air
cover to guarantee the delivery of supplies."2 2 Even given these limitations, the
demands on the domestic transportation system back in China were tremendous,
requiring the use of a full 20 percent of all Chinese trains in fall of 1951. 2
The Dangers of the USAF
The Chinese certainly had not appreciated the full extent of the dangers that the
U.S. Air Force would pose. It exacerbated all of the problems listed above. For
instance, the U.S. bombing campaign was having significant effects on logistics. Mao
reported to Stalin with a tone of chagrin, "At the same time, the enemy has been
constantly bombing transport lines. Only sixty to seventy percent of the resupply
materiel for our forces are reaching the front lines, and the remaining thirty to forty
percent is being destroyed."2 4 Zhou Enlai's biography also emphasizes the difficulties
posed by the enemy's air force to the logistics flows, particularly for those heading to the
front lines.205 The tactical effects of all UN air strikes were devastating: "The Chinese
admitted that for three years their ground forces were unable to carry out large military
activities in the daytime because of such intensive bombing. " When the fledgling
Chinese air force first took to the sky against the UN forces, it repeatedly suffered
202 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 117.
203 Nie Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene," 56.
204 Telegram from Mao to Stalin, March 1, 1951, reprinted in Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 228.
205 :,lt'~,- E] Zhou Enlai Editorial Group, "Resist America, Support Korea ," 53.
206 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 204.
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setbacks, causing the Chinese leadership to pull it back for additional preparation on two
separate occasions.'
Other Problems
In some cases, the Chinese simply found themselves fighting a war they did not
understand. The PLA's use of artillery was rudimentary and dealing with counter
battery fire proved problematic. As late as October of 195 1, a full year after Chinese
entry, Peng Dehuai- the top military commander of the PLA forces in Korea-was
providing basic admonitions to the senior leadership of the 3r Army that would have
been familiar to any enlisted soldier in the artillery corps in the United States Army:
Under this condition of our inferiority to the enemy in terms of range, if we are
unrealistic and fire our own artillery from exposed, open positions, this is not appropriate.
If we do not carefully attend to camouflage and cover, we will immediately encounter
unnecessary personnel losses.2'
A similar disconnect with modem warfare is apparent in the following passage:
Amazingly, enemy horse cavalry made daytime appearances. FEAF aircraft found
several cavalry units and inflicted heavy losses to men and horses. Pilots reported that
the horsemen neither dismounted nor took cover when attacked.2 9
Both these are consistent with a peasant, infantry army facing an adversary whose tactics
created foreign and heretofore-unseen dangers.
It is not only the problems that the PLA faced that are instructive. It is the acute
surprise they felt. In short, nearly all the tenets of People's War were not working
against the Americans. Alexander George found evidence for this in his survey of some
300 prisoner of war interviews from the Korean War. He summarized,
207 Ibid., 107, 155.
208 ~i ,;"L W'7 , 1 "i5 : Gi ;- ',0," Peng Dehuai, "Summary of Lecture on Several
Tactical Problems (October 15, 1951) ," 2.
209 William T. Y'Blood, Down in the Weeds: Close Air Support in Korea (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 2002), 22.
291
Twomey, The Military Lens
As remarks of the kind just quoted imply, PLA military doctrine was discredited in the
eyes of the Chinese soldiers by what they had experienced in Korea. It is of particular
importance to note that disillusionment with Mao Tse-tung's doctrine extended to combat
cadres. ... The eighteen hard core prisoners (mostly junior combat cadres at company
and lower levels) were virtually unanimous in reporting that they and their fellow soldiers
had come to question the applicability of PLA military doctrine to the conditions of
combat and the nature of the enemy in Korea. 1
George also relates the plaintive pleas from battalion and regimental elements for
"reinforcements of airplanes and artillery." 1' From nearly a hundred interviews of
soldiers who had entered Korea with the first wave of Chinese forces in the fall of 1950,
more than 85 percent found their training to be "totally inadequate" for the Korean
War.2'2 This figure is particularly astounding since these forces, committed to the war at
the outset, were among the best-trained and equipped forces of the PLA at the time.213
The Full Range of Tactical Problems
Peng Dehuai summarized the wide scope of problems that the Chinese forces
faced at the end of the Third Campaign, in early January 1951:
By now the Chinese People's Volunteers had fought three major campaigns in a row in
severe winter after their entry into Korea three months before. They had neither an air
force nor sufficient anti-aircraft guns to protect them from enemy bombers. Bombed by
aircraft and shelled by long-range guns day and night, our troops could not move about in
the daytime. And they had not had a single day's good rest in three months. It is easy
to imagine how tired they were. As our supply lines had now been extended, it was
very difficult to get provisions. The strength of our forces had been reduced by nearly
50 percent due to combat and non-combat losses. Our troops badly need reinforcements
and rest and reorganization before they could go into battle again.214
210 Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath
(New York,: Columbia University Press, 1967), 171.
211 Ibid., 174.
212 Ibid., 168.
213 Former KMT troops were used as well, but mostly later in the war. The troops involved in the earlier
campaigns were drawn heavily from the Fourth Route Army, the most storied in PLA history from the
Chinese Civil War.
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All of the evidence presented in the sections suggests that the PLA had not expected to
face such a capable military, as the dissertation's theory would predict in the context of
such differing theories of victory (Prediction #8). The repeated surprise at the
shortcomings of the Chinese way of war is clearly apparent in the evidence above. This
suggests that the Chinese were likely to have misperceived the overall balance of power
before the war, contributing to errors in their decision-making and their assessment of the
U.S. side.
Changes in Doctrine during the War and After
After the Chinese had entered the Korea War and engaged the UN forces, they
made a number of changes in PLA doctrine and strategy. These, too, are suggestive of
the failure of the Chinese side to accurately assess the other side's capabilities. Many of
these changes addressed difficulties stemming from the unexpected effectiveness of the
Americans against People's War strategies.
Some of these changes refined the PLA's tactics:
Overwhelming UN firepower, in turn, forced the CPV to change its tactics ... The CPV
adopted its so-called mobile defense tactic. It would deploy its forces lightly at the front
while reserving the main units at grater depth. This helped reduce casualties from UN
fire and maintained some flexibility for mobile operations.21 5
Other scholars note a Chinese shift toward static, attritional warfare that was not in part
of a Maoist People's War strategy and had not been part of the PLA's original plan.216
For the infantry itself, infiltration tactics, utilizing highly trained small units (and not
large masses of poorly trained units as would have been called for under a People's War
215 Yu Bin, "What China Learned (2003)," 133. This is a standard implementation of a defense-in-depth
strategy, useful against a mobile, armored adversary.
216 Pape, Bombing to Win, 155.
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strategy) were increasingly used. 7 The logistics system was thoroughly overhauled in
the wake of the bloody losses of the Fifth Campaign. 1 Yu Bin provides an excellent
summary of the range of military changes:
From the conclusion of the Fifth Campaign until the end of the war, the CPV adopted
more cautious and realistic strategies, including maintaining a relatively stable front line,
increasing CPV air force, artillery, and tank units; and beefing up logistical supplies.
Indeed the CPV increasingly became a mirror image of its American counterpart in its
calculation and operation of the war. In the end, the CPV emphasized professionalism,
the role of firepower, and improved capabilities.21 9
Additionally, very rapidly during the war, Chinese forces moved away from the political
emphasis inherent in People's War strategies." °
The Chinese also made changes in the nature of units brought to Korea.
Whitson notes that the second set of units the PLA deployed to the Korean theater put
increased emphasis on the technical branches: "artillery, anti-tank, engineer, railway-
guard, and eighteen out of twenty two new air divisions were committed in an apparent
process of modernization under fire."22' The PLA Army Groups committed to the fifth
offensive by the Chinese (in spring 1951) were much better equipped, having received
Soviet weaponry for most of their order of battle. After the war, Peng proposed
217 ?t W'~~" tJ~,{~"~-]i:,j" Peng Dehuai, "Summary of Lecture on Several
Tactical Problems (October 15, 1951) ," 3. Again, this comes from a lecture in mid-1951 by Peng to
the senior leadership of the 3rd Army. In it, he emphasizes the importance of company and battalion
infiltration, of highly trained, "crack" troops who would aim to destroy command and control targets,
as well as of artillery. Again, this is a contrast from aiming to wipe out entire units, as was called for
under traditional People's War tactics. The tactics are clearly reminiscent of German doctrinal
innovation late in WWI facing a similar strategic terrain: static front lines well supported with
substantial firepower.
218 Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the
Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 17.
219 Yu Bin, "What China Learned (2003)," 137. Clearly these military changes were coupled with
changes in political or geo-strategic goals. However, these are clearly related: the changed political
goals resulted from difficulties faced on the battlefield.
220 Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 95.
221 Ibid.
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increasing the relative weight of the artillery, air defense, armored, engineers, and other
technical branches still further, all at the expense of the infantry.222
Additionally, and of the largest long-term importance, after the war, the PLA
began to strongly emphasize modernization. The link between this and the lessons of
the war are indisputable: "The impact of the Korean War on the modernization of the
Chinese army can hardly be overestimated.23 As a specific example, the Chinese
undertook a program of training guided by the PLA's Academy of Military Science
IAMS] that went was very different from previous military education:
PLA training for conventional warfare was to employ combined arms operations in the
Soviet model. AMS recommendations indicate that future training was to go beyond
simply combining ground force arms to include all three services in addition to the
infantry, artillery, and tank and air defense units of the ground forces. The PLA was
taking its first steps toward joint warfare."
In a recent comprehensive study on the evolution of China's national military science and
technology research programs, Feigenbaum describes the depth of change that followed
the war in this regard.
Doctrinal differences erupted full-force within the PLA, although the precise tenor and
scale of the disputes remain difficult to gauge even five decades later. As early as 1952,
Liu Bocheng, a hero of the civil war, began to deliver a series of now-famous lectures to
division-level officers at the PLA's new Military Academy in Nanjing that offered a
theoretical rationale to undermine Mao's doctrine of "man over weapons." After the
Korean armistice, the practical impact of American firepower combined with Liu's
theoretical insights to establish what Lewis and Xue have termed a "new baseline of
knowledge" for military professionals. The academy began to teach the "lessons" of
Korea in the classroom and nurtured an entire generation of Chinese senior officers on
the notions of "modern," mechanized, technologically oriented warfare that had emerged
from the PLA's brutal encounter with American technology in Korea.2 5
222 Ef ;, <<V II;il>>( ll1±: ip ;±,1993)o Wang Yan et al., Biography ofPeng Dehuai
(Beijing: Modem China Press, 1993), 505.
223 Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
224 Paul H.B. Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949-99," in Chinese
Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael
A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 34.
225 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, 18.
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Peng Dehuai's biography suggests that these lessons reverberated far beyond the military
and explains the emphasis on military technology in the 1952 five year plan with
reference to the war: "That was the plan made during the period while the war was still
continuing, [calling for] large scale development of technology in all branches of the
armed services."22 6 When Peng presented a 10-point report the senior military
leadership of the PLA in early 1954, less than six months after the war, the bulk of the
discussion focused on modernization and technology development.27
Changes in the focus of the senior leadership paralleled these changes in the mid-
level officer training. Liu Shaoqi, later to serve as defense minister, served as
commandant of the Nanjing Academy during this time of debate and change. There he
battled against the established Maoist ideology.228 Peng Dehuai (Minister of Defense
through much of the later 1950s) tried to implement these changes throughout the mid-
and late-1950s.22 9 As Feigenbaum writes,
Under Marshal Peng Dehuai, the high command spent much of the 1950s trying to cope
with vast gaps in Chinese readiness and technology revealed by the Korean War.
Influenced by Soviet doctrine, these men recognized the sharp divergence between the
army's guerrilla traditions and its need for modern weapons. Thus [they were] united
by a nearly universal sense that the PLA's guerrilla heritage had lost relevance in the face
of enemy firepower...230
The struggles over professionalization (or man versus weapons) of the PLA throughout
the late 1950s and early 1960s centered on interpreting the lessons of the Korean War.23'
226 ,J <<%;~?>> Wang Yan and al, Biography ofPeng Dehuai, 502.
227 Ibid., 510-513.
228 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, 22. Discussing the Nanjing School in similar terms is
Whitson and Huang, The Chinese High Command, 462.
229 Yu Bin, "What China Learned (2003)," 138.
230 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, 27.
231 Joffe, Party and Army, 48-50.
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Ellis Joffe, a doyen in PLA studies for the last several decades, summarizes these
doctrinal and force structure changes:
It is difficult to evaluate the less tangible aspects of the Korean War's impact on the
Chinese military leaders, but there can be little doubt that it was a traumatic experience
for them. It hammered home the fact that their army would have to undergo a sweeping
technological and organizational transformation before it could lock horns with a modern
military force; it exposed them to the manifold problems of modern warfare for which
their rich storehouse of experience provided no solutions; and it dramatically
demonstrated the limitations and liabilities of their hitherto successful strategy and tactics.
In sum, the Korean War not only gave the Chinese an almost newly equipped army, but it
also probably raised serious doubt in the minds of at least some leaders regarding the
continuing validity of many facets of their experience.23
These shifts suggest that the Chinese found their previous doctrine lacking in comparison
to their adversaries, thus calling into to question the assessments of power and intent that
sprang from them. This is precisely what the theory predicts: nations should be
surprised at their relative weakness on the battlefield (Prediction #8). The existence of
such surprise strongly suggests that their original estimation of the adversary was
mistaken (H.),
Slowly Budding Interest in Airpower
The problems posed by American airpower were noted above. However, even
after the war began, Mao continued to downplay the role of airpower. His persistent
reluctance to fully appreciate the impact of airpower on his ground forces was a constant
source of tension with the operational commander on the ground, Peng Dehuai. Mao
repeatedly pushed Peng to move faster and to push harder, while Peng would point out
the severe damage American airpower was imposing.33 Similarly, Mao expressed
232 Ibid., 12.
233 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 1 14.
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skepticism about the effects of airpower to line commanders who, having been on the
receiving end, knew better:
Zhu Guang, commander of the 2nd Artillery Division, later recalled that when he returned
to Beijing several months later, Mao invited him to his office and asked for Zhu's opinion
about how serious a threat UN airpower was to ground operations, and how many
casualties were actually inflicted upon Chinese forces by aircraft. The chairman
appeared displeased with those he thought exaggerated the role of enemy airpower.34
However, eventually Peng and others were able to change Chairman Mao's mind,
and secure additional support for the PLA Air Force. Both it and the Navy received
added attention after some of the sharp losses of the battles with the United States:
By mid-1951 U.S. intelligence estimated that there were "10,000 Soviet military advisers
throughout China." Soviet assistance had made substantial improvements to the
Chinese air force and navy and was expected to increase sharply.2 35
After the war, the air force received particular attention. Rather than undergoing a
demobilization, as is the case in many countries following the conclusion of a large scale
war, the Chinese aimed to more than double the size of their air force within a mere five
years.3 After the war, Peng emphasized the importance of the air force for the future
security of the PLA. 37
234 Ibid., 115. While it is possible that Zhu Guang was, in fact, exaggerating the role of American
airpower, that is inconsistent with the line of reasoning Zhang is making when he uses this evidence.
Zhang presents this data to bolster a point he made regarding Mao's "reservations about the effect of
the enemy's airpower in Korea."
235 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 7.
236 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 209.
237 t,4 <<,,ff>> Wang Yan and al, Biography ofPeng Dehuai, 506.
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Rethinking Nuclear Weapons
Chinese thinking regarding nuclear weapons changed in the wake of the Korean
War and, even more, the 1954-55 Taiwan Straits Crisis.2 8 Early inklings of this were
apparent during the later stages of the Korean War.
Thereupon, the Chinese Peoples' Volunteers launched an urgent campaign to construct
fortifications, including, "in the frontline battlefield, Anti-Atom shelters ... built deep in
the middle of the mountains." And then too there were the deliberate leaks: "We
purposefully let the spies of the other side ... get some intelligence of the preparations we
were waging. " 3
Parallel to these military defense measures for their forces in the field, the Chinese were
engaged in a significant civil defense program at home. ° By 1953, the Chinese were
carefully following the changes in the American nuclear posture under Eisenhower.24
By 1955, Mao's conversion on the issue of nuclear weapons was complete
By 1955, this French advice and assistance had helped raise the level of consciousness in
Beijing about the bomb and its potential significance for China. Mao characterized that
significance for his senior colleagues in 1958, when he told them that without atomic and
hydrogen bombs, "others don't think what we say carries weight." Mao thus understood
the importance of nuclear weapons and the power they bestowed.242
Chinese scholars, too, place Mao's conversion on this issue to the mid-to late-1950s.243
Again, these shifts emphasize that when faced with incentive to consider more
carefully atomic weapons, Mao was forced to change his view on them. This
238 On the role of the Korean War in particular, see Pape, Bombing to Win, 170-71. More generally see
Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, Chapter 2 "American Power and Chinese Strategy, 1953-55".
239 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 15. Note the citations for this passage are interviews with
senior Chinese leaders at the time. The precise timeframe they refer to is unclear, although Lewis and
Xue imply that it is during the armistice negotiations.
240 Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons, 109.
241 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 18; Pape, Bombing to Win, 171. See also Lewis and Xue,
China Builds the Bomb, 256 note 35. This continued as the United States shifted from "massive
retaliation" to "flexible response" in its nuclear doctrine. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb,
195.
242 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 36.
243 He Di, "Paper Tiger or Real Tiger," 17.
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emphasizes the superficial way that nuclear weapons had been considered in the past,
supporting Prediction #3 which expects an absence of nuanced discussion regarding the
adversary. It also suggests he likely had underestimated their utility in the previous
period, as this theory would predict. Again, this supports the main hypothesis linking
differences in theories of victory to underestimation of the adversary (H.).
Summary
Thus, in nearly every relevant area, the American intervention surprised the
Chinese. They had misjudged American intent, underestimated their own casualties,
and were deeply mistaken regarding the dangers posed by airpower and mechanized,
combined arms formations.244 After the war, the PLA made numerous doctrinal and
strategic changes in response. This all suggests that the Chinese, when deciding
whether to support Kim's invasion plan in May in the first place, were basing their
thinking on a flawed cost-benefit analysis. The costs of potential conflict with the
United States were much higher than they expected. All this supports one component of
the dissertation's theory, linking differences in theory of victory to underestimation, as
well as specific predictions of that theory regarding surprise at the adversary's
capabilities and intent (Predictions #8 and #9).
244 Some of these misjudgments may have come from ignorance about American doctrine and limited
study by the PLA regarding American doctrine and tactics from WWII. However, such ignorance is
clearly related to the fact that the American doctrine was so different from that of the Chinese. Had
they been more similar, such ignorance would have been dramatically easier to overcome.
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An Aside on Soviet and North Korean Motivations
This case examined the failure of the United States to deter Chinese support for
the Korean War. What of Soviet and North Korean support? While this dissertation
does not aim to explain those nations' policies, they are worth discussing briefly before
turning to the next case. For both of those countries, the theory of victory was more
similar to that of the United States than that of the Chinese. Clearly, they were not
precisely the same (on atomic weapons and strategic bombing in particular there were
significant differences), but the Soviets-and the North Koreans whom they taught-did
focus on the importance of combined operations, blitzkrieg-type breakthroughs led by
tanks, and to some extent on tactical air support.245 Thus, they should not have been
subject to the same over-optimistic biases that this dissertation argues the Chinese fell
victim to. Nevertheless, both were in favor of the invasion. Does this contradict the
dissertation's theory?
Simply, those two cases of enthusiasm for the war have other explanations. For
the North Koreans, there was a strong motivated bias in favor of foreseeing victory.
Only by claiming that they were likely to succeed would they be able to secure the
support of their two patrons. Reunification was a political and nationalist goal of the
highest order,24 and the support of their allies was required for it. In negotiations with
the Soviets and the Chinese, the North Koreans constant downplayed the likelihood that
245 See, for instance, Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea (New York: Times Books, 1988);
Eliot A. Cohen, "'Only Half the Battle': American Intelligence and the Chinese Intervention in Korea,
1950," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. I ( 1990): 137, passim; Korea Institute of Military
History, The Korean War.
246 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,
1945-1947, vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); Cumings, The Origins of the
Korean War, Vol. 2.
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the United States would intervene. Additionally, the potential costs of a general war
would not be borne primarily by them, so the risks of that were not central to their
decisionmaking. 2 4 7
The Soviets were likely taken in to some extent by Kim's enthusiasm. But
beyond that, for them, and Stalin in particular, an additional rationale applied. As noted
above, Chen Jian and Richard Thornton separately argue that Stalin wanted to keep Mao
dependant on, and to some extent subservient to, Moscow for his survival. In order to
achieve this, China had to be in a state of perpetual conflict with the United States. (In
at least one account, Stalin saw a greater likelihood of American intervention than Mao
did.249) Dragging the Chinese into the Korean War would accomplish that like no other
policy, and so Stalin expressed his support for the war, so long as the Chinese agreed
-who as discussed earlier, were to take the lead in supporting communism in East Asia.
After May 1950, Stalin's trap was set.
This dissertation makes no claims to explain all cases of false optimism.'
Other explanations for optimism, false or otherwise, certainly exist. Beyond that, not all
wars are explained by false optimism. More to the point, not all participants in a
particular war need have the same motivation for entry into it. The dissertation has little
to say about the Soviet and North Korean rationales for entering the war. However, for
the Chinese in this period, the dangers of getting involved in a potentially catastrophic
247 That should be relevant, for instance, for consideration of atomic issues.
248 Chen Jian, China's Road, Chapter 5: The Decision for War in Korea; Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman,
Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War, passim.
249 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 368.
250 See the discussion in the "Theory and Method" chapter.
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conflict with the United States were viewed with false optimism. Certainly some of that
optimism came from Kim's persuasion of Mao that China would not get involved.
However, based on the discussion above, it also seems likely that the role of doctrinal
difference contributed to Chinese misperceptions and false optimism.
Neither of these above rationales that swayed Moscow and Pyongyang applied to
Beijing. The Chinese were likely to bear the direct costs of any escalation themselves,
and Korean unification was not a nationalist issue in Beijing. Further, they had no
interest in deepening the rift with the United States just as Washington was moving away
from alignment to the KMT on Taiwan. For the Chinese, the optimism regarding the
possibility of facing the United States had to come from other sources. This chapter has
tried to lay out at least a partial explanation for that.
Conclusion
This case provides some moderate support for the dissertation's theory. The
effects of the two sides' theories of victory certainly shaped each side's perception of its
capabilities relative to the other, strongly supporting H. The two sides' theories of
victory also seemed to have blurred their assessments of the balance of power (H2A) and
shaped the pre-war diplomacy (H2B) in ways that contributed to the deterrence failure.
These points are clearly apparent in the way that the United States used threats and force
to send general deterrent signals. There is also circumstantial evidence that the Chinese
interpreted U.S. signals as predicted given the context of doctrinal differences. It is
there that this case is weakest (although the shortcomings stem from a limitation of
available evidence more than the existence of contradictory evidence.) Further, the
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dramatic post-war re-evaluation of People's War strategies by the PLA suggests that its
leaders felt their prior theory of victory had been incorrect in many ways, also supporting
the theory (H,, in particular).
The explanation suggested by the Alternate Hypothesis focusing on the objective
strength and clarity of the signal in accounting for this failure of general deterrence also
does a reasonable job of explaining the case, although it does leave open some questions.
As noted, post-hoc concerns over Acheson's speech seem unlikely to entirely explain the
case, and there were some military signals sent. Absent the difficulties in interpreting
these signals that this dissertation explains, it would seem that the Chinese should have
been more cautious in May 1950. The Alternate Hypothesis should predict a low
chance for deterrence success and, in fact, deterrence failed. However, at least some of
the processes by which deterrence failed appears to have followed the paths predicted by
this dissertation's theory.
Thus, in this case both theories contribute to a rich understanding of the outcome.
While the Alternate Hypothesis has traditionally been the focus of scholarly explanation,
based on the limited evidence available, the dissertation's argument also receives some
support. The next case turns to a different theater of Sino-American conflict to see how
the proposed theory works there.
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Chapter 6. CHINA POSTPONES
THE INVASION OF TAIWAN
(CASE STUDY #3)
Historical Background
This case shifts to look at a different theater. In April of 1949, Communist
forces crossed the Yangtze-the critical piece of strategic geography in continental China
dividing the north from the south. KMT resistance in the south rapidly crumbled.
Immediately thereafter, Mao began to turn his attention to the next and final phase of the
civil war, Taiwan.
Taiwan was paramount among a range of Chinese concerns, for both offensive
and defensive reasons.' The Central Military Commission warned "If we fail to solve
the Taiwan problem in a short period, the safety of Shanghai and other coastal ports will
be severely threatened."2 Indeed, Shanghai was regularly being attacked from the air at
the time, and Chinese air defense forces were only having limited success at stymieing
the enemy.3
I Zhou Enlai characterized the Chinese grand strategy at the time as "the concept of confronting the
United States on three fronts." The three fronts were Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea. Quoted in
Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 94.
2 "Telegram, CCP Central Military Commission to Su Yu and others, 14 June, 1949" in Zhang
Shuguang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New
Documentary Evidence, 1944-50 (Chicago, Ill.: Imprint Publications, 1996), 117.
3 ~J01 , " -,T E% jff E ~'L ti Et JR l)f i", 1950 - a - << 3N 1;JL '
.:Tj>>. .-;l:7/1949-31950(JtI~.::13 ~:Ti :. 1998)o Liu Shaoqi, "Telegram to Mao
Presenting Notes on the East China Bureau's Report on the Situation Surrounding the Unrestrained
Bombing of Shanghai (February 7, 1950)," in Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State
(Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998).
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Plans were gathering momentum to take Taiwan by mid-1950, with most analysts,
both contemporary and subsequent, viewing the KMT's situations as hopeless. More
than 30,000 transferred soldiers had reinforced the Chinese Communist Navy.4 Military
preparations had advanced quite substantially:
By spring 1950, the Communists had assembled a motley armada of 5000 vessels for the
invasion by commandeering freighters, motorized junks, and sampans and refloating
Inaval warshipsl that had been sunk in the Yangtze River. Further, they gathered and
trained over 30,000 fishermen and other sailors to man the flotilla.
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson later revealed that between June 10 and June 24,
1950, the strength of the [3 rdl field army [stationed across from Taiwanl swelled from
40,000 to 156,000 men. Also prior to June 25, elements of Lin Biao's 4 th Field Army
moved from south China to the Shanghai area.5
Construction of regional military infrastructure was also progressing rapidly: "in 1950,
the PRC was actively building or rehabilitating 6 airfields in the Taiwan Strait area."6
The 1950 Chinese New Year's proclamation by the official Xinhua news agency
mentioned that Taiwan would be attacked that year.7
American sources also thought the invasion was imminent. The CIA predicted
in March that Mao's forces "are estimated to possess the capability of carrying out their
frequently expressed intention of seizing Taiwan during 1950, and will probably do so
4 XIj ., i Vil- *T' 4", 1950 _- 4 tH << *)t .>>> 
-;:7/1949-3/1950(Jt,~,:qp:5~ ~tt , 1998), Liu Shaoqi, "Telegram Regarding the
Transfer of 4 Divisions to Qingdao for Naval Training (February 10, 1950)," in Liu Shaoqi's
Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998).
5 Edward John Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The
George Washington University, 1990), 139.
6 David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Epping: Bowker, 1983), 55. Muller cites a report from
the Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy from 1955 for this data.
7 Chinese New Years in 1950 would have been celebrated on February 17. Although much later in the
year, Mao chastised the head of Xinhua for this broadcast. See " E 
St,4JA # i01Hi W 7n", 1950 A A -- +t A <<31 [9 VJ *t -1` 9 llbZi M.>> M %-
;T]:9/1949-12/1950(litL I,:rP3 di tfJiI, 1987). Mao Zedong, "Letter to Hu Qiaomu
Regarding Not Mentioning the Time for the Attacks on Taiwan and Tibet in Propaganda Broadcasts
(September 29, 1950)," in Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing:
Central Party Documents Publishers, 1987).
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during the period June-December." 8 This judgment was repeated in an updated
appraisal written dated April 10.9 In another report, the CIA noted:
Despite reported Communist dissention over such matters as the degree of subservience
to the USSR, policy toward the West and methods to alleviate peasant unrest, there is no
conclusive evidence of disagreement concerning the necessity for the early occupation of
Taiwan and Hainan and the elimination of the Nationalist Navy and Air Force.' °
According to American weekly intelligence digests prepared by the Far East Command in
July and August 1950, the Chinese had originally planed to start probing operations in
July with the main assault to follow in early August." 
While it is unclear precisely where the actual Chinese timetable for invasion stood
during late-June 1950, contemporary scholars generally all agree it was imminent. The
range of expected start dates only runs from weeks to nine months hence.'2
In Washington, even at the earliest stage of the Korean War, on June 25, concerns
about Chinese goals vis-A-vis Taiwan were paramount. The Secretary of Defense
recommended immediately assessing Taiwanese security needs, and viewed the North
8 "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of
State (April 17, 1950)," in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1950, vol. VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976),
330.
9 See again "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the
Secretary of State (April 17, 1950)," in Ibid.
10 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 164. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 31 March 1950, China:
Military Plans," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J. Kuhns
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), 365.
11 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 16-7.
12 For various views on this, see Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the
Origins of the Korean War, Ist ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000), passim. Note that most
scholars refer to He Di's article as the best on the topic: Chen Jian, China's Road, 101; He Di, "'the
Last Campaign to Unify China': The CCPs Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan," Chinese
Historians 5, no. I (1992): 10-12; Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-
American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 72-3. See also
~_icitt~,<< ~ ~R-E]~~l`i>>( fEf :;, Ki Ki it),2002). Song Liansheng, Recollections on
the Korean War (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 2002), 194.
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Korean attack as a Communist feint, presaging a broader offensive.13 At the first Blair
House meeting, Kennan argued that while not the first stage of a general war, the Korean
attack was likely the first in what would be a multi-pronged offensive by the
communists.'4 Truman was so concerned about this prospect that the only order to come
out of the first Blair House meeting was for the Pentagon to make some assessment of
where else the Soviets might attack and to prepare plans to meet that eventuality.' 5 It is
in this context that during the second Blair House meeting, the President also ordered the
neutralization of the Taiwan Strait by the Navy's Seventh Fleet.'6 This proposal echoed
a recommendation made on May 19 by hard-line anti-Communist John Foster Dulles,
who was then serving as a Consultant to the Secretary of State.'7 In a paper circulated to
senior State Department leaders, he suggested
If the United States were to announce that it would neutralize Formosa, not permitting it
either to taken by Communists or to be used as a base of military operations against the
mainland, that is a decision we could certainly maintain..."8
Just over a month later, Acheson found reason to draw upon precisely that idea. Thus, a
mere two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States signaled its intent
13 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea (New York: Times Books, 1988), 71.
14 Ibid., 74.
15 William Whitney Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea,
1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 178-79.
16 See Blair, The Forgotten War, 75. Note that this decision was cast as an attempt to neutralize-and
indeed communication went out to Jiang to cease bombing and commerce raiding, Glenn D. Paige, The
Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968), 183-4. However,
MacArthur's military orders as of June 29 still did not mention anything regarding restraining Jiang.
Paige, The Korean Decision, 251.
17 The paper was also supported by Rusk and Nitze.
18 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 149. Other proposals to neutralize
Taiwan in various circumstances had also been made. Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American
Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985),
64.
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to defend Taiwan against a Chinese offensive. In the more than 50 years since then,
there has been no invasion.
This case asks to what extent did the two sides' theories of victory in the naval
sphere contribute to the outcome of deterrence success in this case.
Figure 6-1: The Taiwan Strait Area
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The Two Sides' Theories of Victory at Sea
While the previous two cases centered on warfare in the Korean Peninsula (and
potentially in China proper), this case demands consideration of a different military
environment. Thus, it cannot rely on Chapter 3's characterization of the two sides'
theories of victory. For the Taiwan Straits theater, the relevant military forces are
obviously naval and air forces.
One set of naval forces and doctrines was indeed quite different across the two
nations. The two sides' views of the sea control mission-competing for control of sea
lines of communication-were far apart. Chinese naval doctrine was rather poorly
formed at the end of their long civil war:
The PLA did not have a naval tradition when the Communists came to power in 1949.
The famed military writings of Mao Zedong do not mention naval warfare or the role of
seapower in national strategy.' 9
Thus, the PLA was forced to look elsewhere for its doctrine in this regard
Although the PRC in its first decade had no coherent body of maritime strategic thought
of its own, the Soviet Union did. Soviet doctrine concerning the development and
employment of a navy was adopted wholesale by the Chinese.2 0
The dominant Soviet strategic thought at the time was known as the Young School,
which emphasized coastal defense, submarines, small patrol and attack craft, and land
based aircraft, but no oceanic capability.2 ' This actually meshed rather well with a
People's War approach. The Chinese tactics were grounded in a related doctrine:
Formulated by the former navy commander-in-chief Admiral Xiao Jingguang in 1950,
the doctrine was a copy of the Soviet 'small battle' theory, which prescribed naval
19 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 47.
20 Ibid., 48.
21 Ibid., 49. All instructors at the first Chinese naval academy were Soviets, and submarine tactics were
emphasized. Muller, China as a Maritime Power, I . For discussion of the force that this approach
put into the field in its first few years (a submarine-heavy one) see Gene Z. Hanrahan, "Report on Red
China's New Navy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 79, no. 8 (1953): 848ff.
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warfare conducted by light warships, shore-based planes and submarines. Nothing is
more revealing about the Navy in its formative years than Xiao's following instructions:
"The navy should be a light type navy, capable of coastal defense. Its key mission is to
accompany the ground forces in war actions. That basic characteristic of this navy is
fast deployment, based on its lightness."22
Thus, the Chinese navy (such as it was at the time) specialized in "well-coordinated
sneak attacks, delivered from all quarters by torpedo and gun boats. This might be
thought of as an adaptation of guerrilla tactics to naval warfare."23
In contrast, the U.S. view of naval warfare focused heavily on carrier air and large
strike ships.24 The war plan in 1949 called for the Navy to engage in a "mainly
defensive, a sea-control campaign of running convoys for the coalition" against the
Soviets.25 A long-term plan written in the same year by the Joint Staff foresaw the
following role for the Navy in the event of war: "protecting communications to the
United Kingdom, destroying Soviet naval power, and securing overseas bases."26 The
U.S. Navy had long viewed sea control as its central goal.27 The justification for this
after WWII was a need to be able to strike Soviet submarines at their bastions and pens
22 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 164.
23 Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-
1981 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 161-62.
24 Karl Lautenschlager, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare," in Naval Strategy and
National Security: An International Security Reader, ed. Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 206-07.
25 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1994), 217.
26 Ibid., 313.
27 Ibid., 285, 290. Note there was also some discussion in the navy about obtaining a deep strike
mission using nuclear weapons for strategic attacks. However, in this period, the navy was unable to
secure this mission from the Air Force. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 296.
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early in the war to allow the United States to have freedom of movement on the seas.28
This, in turn, required having carrier battle groups with their own mobile striking power.
However, for the purposes of this case, the key comparison is in doctrine
regarding amphibious operations. The coercive attempt here is one of deterring a
Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Thus, the question is, did the Chinese have
difficulty understanding the threat posed to their invasion plans by the Americans due to
differences in the two nation's amphibious operations doctrine. In particular, would the
Chinese be likely to underestimate the threat posed by the American 7 th fleet?
American Amphibious Operations Doctrine
As noted above, the long-term plans for the U.S. Navy in 1950 focused on sea
control, so the World War II experience retained a heavy influence on the less studied
issue of future amphibious operations. At the broadest level, American thinking about
amphibious operations set a high bar: it focused on opposed amphibious landings.
While this sounds obvious, for many nations amphibious doctrine focused on the less
challenging goal of unopposed landings.29
In any amphibious operation, whether opposed or not, the United States
recognized one overriding threat: "The principle danger in such an operation is an
attack on the invading force by an opposing navy."30 If the opposing navy can attack the
28 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 289.
29 See the discussions of British and Japanese doctrine before World War II in Allan Reed Millett,
"Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars-the American,
British, and Japanese Experiences," in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson
Murray and Allan Reed Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
30 Ibid., 51.
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landing force's vessels, particularly the vulnerable shallow-draft landing craft and tank
landing ships, defeat will likely result.
Moreover, this was not the only difficulty an attacker must surmount, in the eyes
of the American theory of victory. Millett summarizes the key doctrinal thinking in the
United States regarding amphibious operations:
The amphibious force would have to isolate the objective area, then pound the defenders
into a stupor with naval gunfire and close air support. The landing itself would require a
violent assault by a combined arms team, probably over a broad front, perhaps a beach of
a thousand yards' width or more. To secure the beachhead, the landing force would
need rapid reinforcement, complete with artillery and tanks. The greatest threat to a
landing was disruptive air and naval attack, which might pull critical fleet units from the
objective area, but a combined air and ground counterattack was the most immediate
concern. A counterlanding might give the enemy a striking advantage because it would
be difficult for a landing force to protect its supply line and logistics support areas as well
as defend the perimeter of its own enclave. An amphibious expeditionary force could
not rely on guile for success, but would require local superiority in every element of air,
naval, and ground combat power.'
The U.S. experience from WWII covered a great many campaigns: Patton's unopposed
landing in North Africa, MacArthur's island hopping in the Pacific, the landings in Italy
and eventually the largest amphibious operation ever conducted, the Normandy
landings.32 In the Pacific theater, where nearby airfields were generally not available,
carrier-based air was critical. On the other hand, in the Sicily and Normandy landings,
carriers were absent, and land-based craft provided the air support (both defensive and
offensive).33 Those two American landings also did not involve Marines whose entire
doctrine centered on amphibious operations. Rather, regular Army divisions that had
31 Ibid., 77.
32 On Normandy, see John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris,
June 6th-August 25th, 1944 (New York: Viking Press, 1982), Chapters 1-3; Williamson Murray and
Allan Reed Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), Chapter 15; Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day: June 6, 1944
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959).
33 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 31 1.
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received some training in this sort of operation were used (supported by Seabees).34
(Interestingly, the role of close air support was limited in Army doctrine for amphibious
operations. 3 )
Another important element in American doctrine centered on the use of
commercial shipping. Again, Millett describes the U.S. Navy's thinking:
The navy followed the prewar assumption that it could create an amphibious transport
force by converting merchantmen and liners to military service, including the installation
of davits and cranes capable of handling landing craft.3 6
Of course, there was also widespread use of dedicated military amphibious craft and
ships.
In 1950 the United States could look with pride on it amphibious capabilities.
They had been tested in demanding battle conditions during WWII and continued to
evolve and improve. How did the Chinese doctrine and equipment compare?
Chinese Amphibious Operations Doctrine
On the issue of amphibious operations, there would have been a surprising degree
of shared understanding between Beijing and Washington. At a broad level, China
faced the same strategic situation that the U.S. military had in World War II: the need to
develop doctrine for opposed amphibious landings. Several specific factors regarding
the Chinese Navy merit discussion. First, in contrast to the backward PLA ground force
(that is, the Army per se), for idiosyncratic reasons the Chinese Navy was relatively
modem. Further, the naval doctrine regarding amphibious warfare evolved substantially
34 The U.S. forces that landed on the first day of the Normandy landings were the I st and 4th Infantry
Divisions of the U.S. Army.
35 Millett, "Assault from the Sea."
36 Ibid., 83-4.
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in response to a series of failures at the end of the civil war. A successful attack on
Hainan displayed many of these improvements, and the PLAN continued to improve after
that point with an eye toward the imminent invasion of Taiwan. These points are
explained in turn, below.
The Roots of the PLAN: The Nationalist Navy
It is important to note that the Chinese Navy-or the People's Liberation Army
Navy (the PLAN) as it was officially known-was relatively professionalized and
technically advanced, at least in comparison to the PLA ground force. There were two
main sources for the leaders in this service: graduates of Soviet training academies and
KMT defectors. Over 400 students were in the Soviet Union receiving naval training at
the end of the civil war.37 Even more numerous were the recent defectors from the
KMT.3 8
While the Soviet naval advisors and instructors played an important role in the
beginnings of the Communist naval force, the core of the new navy was formed by the
2,000-odd former R.O.C. naval personnel who defected in 1949, most of them with their
ships. 3 9
Some analysts go even further in emphasizing the role of the KMT turncoats, noting that
the PLAN's very organization was imported from the losing side of the civil war:
General Chang's "navy" was the forerunner of Red China's present navy; yet it was
Communist in name only. Most of the officers and men were Nationalist deserters,
while the naval craft were captured or brought over from the enemy. With the exception
of the highest command echelon and the ever-watchful political commissars, Red China's
first navy was made up almost in toto of the enemy.4"
37 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 19.
38 See, for instance, Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 299.
39 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 13.
40 Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," 847. Cummings is similarly sweeping regarding the
PLAN in 1950: "the only naval personnel were those who had defected from various segments of the
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This would have substantial effects in creating a different organizational culture in the
PLAN versus the other branches of the communist forces. Reforming the political
thought of these former KMT sailors and officers was an important concern for the
nascent PLAN.4' The recent defectors were sent to a parallel track of training academies
in Communist China, one that focused solely on political indoctrination and
rehabilitation. 4 2
Many of the defectors had even been trained in the West, underscoring their
familiarity with the American way of war.
The officers and sailors from the KMT were a special new type of serviceman. Most
had received relatively high levels of education and they were politically quite sensitive.
Many had gone to England or the United States to receive training or take delivery of a
warship. 4 3
For some of these officers, their very exposure to Western ideas furthered their
disillusionment with the corrupt KMT regime.
Most of the bright young officers and sailors sent off to study in the United States and
Great Britain in 1930s and early 1940s were dedicated to the creation of a strong Chinese
navy and knew that this could not be accomplished under the nationalist regime. Many
were thus susceptible to the appeals of the Communists to defect for the good of China.44
Beyond that, in general, intellectuals were more welcome in this service than they were in
the army.45 As the official naval history notes:
Nationalist Navy" Captain E. J. Cummings, Jr., "The Chinese Communist Navy," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings 90, no. 9 (1964): 66.
41 See FiI-, :T , << ~>> ql 1X ~@4JgjS~3L.(;: :tti,1989).
Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy (Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press,
1989), Chapter 2: Emergence, Part III: Competing for and Reforming the Sailors Originally from the
KMT, pp. 22-25.
42 Muller, China as a Maritime Power.
43 y, 2,<< a.>> Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy, 23.
44 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 9.
45 Eric Heginbotham, "The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic
Politics, and Grand Strategy," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002).
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People recruited from the ground forces [to the navyl normally were required to have
achieved more than an elementary school degree. In order to supply the navy with
people having technical ability, the Central Military Committee CMCJ required each
field army to comprehensive assess their people. As many as possible of the following
were to be provided to the navy: anyone who has previously served in the navy, worked
on board a ship, studied shipping, and has even a little bit of knowledge regarding
machinery or has driven tanks or cars. The CMC was very diligent in attracting
intellectuals to the navy.46
The defecting troops, and often their ships, formed the core of the new Navy.
Indeed, the very first naval vessel that the PLA obtained was a KMT vessel-a tank
landing ship captured in 1947-and the tactics learned from that ships crew were put to
good use in later river crossings by the PLA in the civil war.47 The Nationalist
flagship-the Chongqing, formerly the HMS Aurora, a 7400-ton cruiser-defected on
February 24, 1949 and would eventually go on to serve as the PLAN's flagship. In
April, 1949, another 26 ships and other craft, from destroyers to amphibious landing craft
to gunboats, also defected.48
Zhang Aiping, who had been deputy commander of the central China military, was
appointed commander and commissar. He accepted the task of organizing the
foundation of the navy around the naval vessels that had defected and joined our side
from the KMT.49
This first naval unit in the PLAN was made up entirely of the ships that had defected
from the KMT's Second Fleet.so By 1950, "the PRC Navy found itself in possession of
some 30 landing ships of U.S. World War II construction, all left behind by or defected
46 /A, ~i,V<<*Tif>> Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy, 21.
47 Ibid.
48 Muller, China as a Maritime Power. Also see Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," 847.
49 , i,-<<t>> Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy, 15.
50 He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China: The CCP's Unrealized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-50,"
in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein,
and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 77.
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from the ROC navy."5' This was enough to move 20,000 amphibious assault troops at a
time. (Another source suggests slightly higher holdings.5 2) In addition to these
captured ships, the PLAN also relied on salvage operations and some foreign purchases:
"Between late 1949 and early 1950, China bought forty-eight used warships totaling
25,470 tons."5 3
These former KMT officers were well versed in amphibious operations, and
provided a core of expertise for the PLAN to refine. The Nationalist Navy had
conducted unopposed amphibious landings numerous times, including a major operation
in August 1947.54 As the civil war turned against the Nationalists, their navy conducted
a series of amphibious extractions, often while the ground element was under attack, a
particularly challenging tactical situation.55 Further, they had experience using naval
gunfire support in many of these battles. 6
This legacy of ties to the KMT's navy and in particular the elements of
professionalization (particularly relative to the army), exposure to western training, and
experience with amphibious operations in the PLAN helped lead it to a relatively similar
understanding of amphibious warfare as that of the American Navy.
51 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 53.
52 Cummings, "The Chinese Communist Navy," 69. Cummings puts the figure at 50 landing ships, and
also emphasizes the large number of ex-U.S. vessels.
53 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 (Lawrence,
Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 5 1.
54 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 8.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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The PLAN's Early Experience with Amphibious Operations
Beyond these background conditions, the Chinese communist leadership had
recently learned quite a bit in this area against a relatively advanced foe. Their attempts
to conquer the small coastal islands of Jinmen, Zhoushan, and Dengbu in late 1949 had
led to abysmal defeats.
Mao's assessment of the October 1949 attack against Jinmen was stark: "This is
our biggest loss of the war."57 In that battle, a KMT navy-led counter attack led to
tremendous Chinese Communists losses, totaling nearly 10,000 men.i8 One Western
analyst noted the poor preparation for that attack: "landing in scantily-armed junks and
on rafts, with no support from artillery or aircraft, the PLA forces were mauled, losing
thousands of men without ever gaining a beachhead."59 The attack on Dengbu was yet
another setback:
But, under conditions lacking naval cooperation, sometimes one could not avoid paying a
heavy price. For instance, on October 3, 1949, the PLA 21st Army, 61st Division sent a
force of five battalions strength to attack Dengbu Island in eastern Zhejiang province.
That day, troops landed smoothly and secured the capture of 600 of the enemy.
However, on the second day the enemy's second regiment reinforced from the sea.
Facing the enemy on three sides, the PLA landing force had no other alternative but to
fight out in retreat. Casualties reached 1490 men.6i
The official Chinese naval history, after relating a series of examples from this period,
suggests a conclusion that would be shared by military leaders in the Pentagon, "the
bloody facts show, if you want to breakthrough an ocean blockade to liberate offshore
islands, the navy, ground force, and air force must all work in cooperation." 6'
57 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 301.
58 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 53.
59 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 16.
60 /#, 'I,f<<'i~:>> Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy, 18.
61 Ibid.
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These setbacks taught the Chinese many lessons about the conduct of such
landings.6 2 For instance, they began to focus on providing the troops with specialized
training for amphibious landings, something prior Chinese operations had lacked. Soon
they would be using translated U.S. Marine amphibious warfare manuals.63 At this
point, the Chinese communists were using regular Army divisions rather than dedicated
marines, just as the United States had occasionally done in WWII.64 They established
the Navy as a separate branch of the PLA on April 14, 1950.65 From their prior defeats,
"they again learned that without the support of regular navy ships, landing operations by
small boats could be disastrous."66 They prepared to remedy this problem as well.
Further, these defeats had also emphasized the importance of follow-on logistics support:
Although PLA forces eventually security their beachheads, most of their boats were left
aground when the tide went out. The first wave could not be reinforced, and Ye Fei and
62 MV "t40A4 E qI J *. . 8l]J A J', ngtt", 1950 l-:) AtiL <<l [A
1)*+;A5 -I>> , 7-:9/1949-12/1950(..:qfirt(~Jv:, 1987)m 257 , Mao
Zedong, "Telegram to Liu Shaoqi Approving Li Yu's [Deputy Commander of the 3rd Field Army I
Proposal for the Training of Four Division for Amphibious and Related Operations", February 10,
1950, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State (Beijing, Central Party Documents
Publishers, 1987) p. 257. g/, ", 1 3t+_ )llj - t RTIK", 1950
-i t--' <<1 « ll.3~i>> , ~ -f:9/1949-12/1950(JL,: ~kti'±L ti,. 1987)
g 259 JoY Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Lin Biao Approving the 43rd Army to Operate Jointly in
Amphibious Crossings", February 12, 1950, in Ibid., p. 259. t "
4l9SA Q ;tt+". 1950 tLH «-L » << -tl Fsg;i;> i> 
J:9/1949-12/1950(1[;if:4U9SJ: 5 L~±., 1987)M 357 o. Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Li Yu
From the Central Military Committee regarding Dealing with the Zhoushan Islands after their Capture",
February 10, 1950, in Ibid., p. 357
63 Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," 853.
64 On the Chinese, see footnote 62, above. The first dedicated marine unit in the PLA was established
in 1953.
65 >, >,4<<~5  Lu Ruchun, Jiang Jitai, et al., History of the Navy, 15.
66 Alexander C. Huang, "The PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999: From Coastal Defense to Distant
Operations," in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M.
Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 252.
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other PLA commanders were forced to watch helplessly as the defending Nationalist
forces destroyed their troops. 7
Thus, the key lesson of the importance of controlling the sea to prevent the opposing
navy from attacking or reinforcing was emphasized.6 8' The PLAN would have to
address this problem, too.
Over time, the PLA had internalized many of the lessons from these earlier
campaigns. They also benefited from Soviet training of an amphibious assault group in
late 1949 and early 1950.69 By April of 1950, they were ready to resume their attacks on
the offshore islands.
The Attack on Hainan
The diligence and dedication following their earlier defeats allowed them to win a
resounding victory on Hainan. Hainan is a large island, similar in size to Taiwan itself
that had been held by some 300,000 well-equipped KMT soldiers. Hainan was not only
defended by troops on the ground, but by Nationalist Navy's Third Naval Squadron,
consisting of 3 destroyer escorts and 15 other smaller warships.70 The squadron
engaged in aggressive patrolling of the Hainan Strait on a regular basis and also patrolled
the nearby coastline of the mainland, sinking Communist shipping there, preventing any
large amphibious force from gathering.7 ' This allowed the KMT Navy to fend off
eleven separate probing attacks during March and early April 1950.72 Many of these led
67 Ibid., 251.
68 Again this was central to the thinking in the United States as well: Millett, "Assault from the Sea," 5 i.
69 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 304.
70 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 125.
71 Ibid., 126.
72 Ibid., 128.
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to the loss of scores of Communist boats and hundreds of Communist soldiers and
sailors.73 However, these taught the Chinese communists an extremely important
lesson:
Perhaps most importantly, the preliminary operations revealed to the Communists that the
main invasion fleet would be destroyed if the relatively lethal Nationalist Navy and Air
Force patrol units were not driven from the strait.74
In contrast to other times in the Civil War, during this battle the Nationalist
military did not collapse, but rather "by most accounts fought long and hard against the
invasion forces. There were no mass defections to the Communists before the island's
fall."75 American military attach6s in Hongkong reported that the Nationalist Navy and
Air Force were "doing their most effective work since the end of World War 11 with
morale and reliability the highest in years."76
To achieve their victory against this force, the Chinese relied on a hodgepodge
landing fleet, closely coordinated timing, and some naval gunfire support. The eventual
armada used for the Hainan operation included 400 boats of assorted types. "Many of
the vessels were armed with light artillery pieces, antitank guns, mortars, and machine
guns."77 (This use of civilian shipping reinforced with military hardware again was
something the United States had relied on in several instances in the Second World War.)
Responding to the lessons of previous defeats, this motley navy, supported by large
73 Ibid., 128-9.
74 Ibid., 129.
75 Ibid., 134. For a countervailing view, albeit one little detail, to back it up, see Muller, China as a
Maritime Power, 16.
76 "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of
State (April 26, 1950)," in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 6, 333.
77 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 127.
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amounts of coastal artillery and antiaircraft fire was able to defend the strait for the initial
landing and the critical resupply sorties that followed.78
The Nationalist Navy and Air Force was [sicl driven from the strait, after a hard-fought
interdiction effort... Having previously learned the hard way what Nationalist sea and air
forces could do to invasion flotillas, the Communists lined either side of the strait with
coastal artillery and antiaircraft weapons that effectively covered the entire water way.
On the 18th, for example, the Third Naval Squadron flagship, Tai Ping a former U.S.
Navy shipl, was heavily damaged by radar-directed Communists coastal artillery.
Squadron Commander Wang was wounded and the ship's executive officer was killed.79
Adequate logistical supplies were delivered. The Chinese also used advanced forces to
prepare beachheads that the main force would land on later."
The victory was complete, with the KMT forces routed. While many retreated
to Taiwan, many others were killed and captured before they could embark.
78 Ibid., 131.
79 Ibid.
80 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 304-5. Note that the Chinese used guerrilla forces already on the
ground. In practice, this seems quite similar to the American practice of using paratroopers and other
special forces for the same mission. The Normandy invasion had relied on three paratroop divisions
(two American, one British) to delay the Gennan reinforcements from hitting the amphibious
beachheads.
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Figure 6-2: Maps of Hainan and the PLA Campaign of 19508'
The Chinese communist confidence after the success at Hainan rose appreciably.
Senior CCP leaders believed that many of the lessons of this experience had prepared
PLA well for the upcoming invasion of Taiwan.82 Following this victory, Liu Shaoqi
(soon to be groomed as Mao's successor) trumpeted the "PLA's mastery of the art of the
sea-borne landings."3
81 English map source: Wall Street Journal; available online http://vvwww.taivandc.org/vws-2001-06.htm.
Chinese map source: available online http://www.unitedcn.com/O I ZGZZ/images/02JINDAI/hnd.jpg.
82 Clearly, coastal artillery would be insufficient to sanitize the entire Taiwan Strait, although most other
tactics wvere directly relevant to this theater.
83 Quoted in Melvin Gurtov and Byon-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and
Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 33.
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Looking toward Taiwan
As the Chinese looked forward to the invasion of Taiwan, they recognized
"victory would depend on cooperative operations of the three services."84 They also
knew they could draw on units that were now experienced in conducting successful
amphibious assaults against an opposed coastline.8
Many of these elements of matured Chinese thinking regarding amphibious
operations would have been quite familiar to the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, there no
question the Chinese forces were not as well equipped and as technologically capable as
the United States' forces. However, in the case where this was most acute, the PLA was
striving to improve (again, primarily because of the lessons of its earlier failures).
Thus, while airpower had not played a major role in the Chinese history of
amphibious operations,86 the Chinese certainly recognized the importance of at least land-
based air power in this sort of operation. Mao wrote in July of 1949:
We must start preparation for the invasion of Taiwan. In addition to ground forces, we
need to rely on internal cooperators and an air force. Our action will succeed if we meet
one of the two conditions; and our hope will be even greater if both conditions are
satisfied.
Similarly, Liu Shaoqi emphasized the same message early the following year:
Regarding Zhoushan, Taiwan, Jinmen, and Hainan islands ... if we do not have air
support as well as a certain amount of naval support, advancing across the sea for an
84 He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," 80.
85 These would be the forces from the Third and Fourth Field Armies that were to be used again against
Taiwan as they had against Zhoushan, Hainan, and others. Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese
Civil War, 1945-52", 159.
86 *-~] Q, <<~ 1:if 5~ E>>,(itT:±tfi,1998)* 15-16 f. Zhang Yutao,
Summary of Important Events in the New China's Military (Beijing: Military Science Publishers,
1998): pp. 15-16.
87 "Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 10 July, 1949" in Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese
Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-50, 123.
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amphibious attack cannot be done. Today's report from Hainan and Jinmen makes
these points clear. 8
Later, Mao implored the Soviets to provide the Chinese with an air force having the
amphibious assault of Taiwan in mind 9 and indeed as mid-1950 approached China was
increasingly getting the support of Soviet air assets. Likely Mao and Liu were
particularly emphatic about the utility of air support here given that the sea surrounding
Taiwan could not be defended using coastal artillery as had several of the earlier islands
taken by the PLA.
The Soviets had recently deployed several squadrons of MiG-15Ss, the premier jet
fighter in the world at the time, to Shanghai. The Soviets continued to fly them (for
purely defensive missions), as there were no available Chinese pilots, although they did
so wearing Chinese uniforms.9 The KMT had flown bombing strikes against the
mainland with some effect throughout 1949 and 1950, and this deployment was intended
to address that.9 ' This is the first time the MIG-15 flew in combat. While there are no
records of plans to use these fighters to defend the seas around an amphibious invasion
fleet, the possibility of this can certainly not be excluded without further access to
88 At 51` "4, J-f fi P -4 *ft A X f ~ -Vf Wt l M lb, iJ9 j*i~ b 95", 1950 V- - f to - <<A P9 W
J*]iV C>>, g->> M-:7/1949-3/1950(,,~,,:o?- tj t s , 1998). Liu Shaoqi,
"Telegram to Mao Regarding the Problem of Needing Assistance from the Air Force in the Battles for
Zhoushan Island and Other Similar Locations. (January II, 1950)," in Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since
the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998), 252.
89 Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, I st ed.
(College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 32-33.
90 These deployments occurred in March of 1950. Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture,
72-3; Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 61, 78-84. Note that it appears these forces were
redeployed from Lushan, and did not represent net additions to the Soviet forces in China. Rather
they were moved from a place where they did not enhance Chinese security to a somewhere that they
were more relevant. See Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 181.
91 For discussion of the costs of these attacks, see f1fi,V <<"itf;>>( l,: 1ff kJ: 1993)
Wang Yan et al., Biography ofPeng Dehuai (Beijing: Modem China Press, 1993), 530.
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Chinese and former Soviet archives. 92 They certainly had the capability to play a role
here, and the Soviet role in supporting the Chinese intervention in Korea is now
recognized to be far heavier than previously understood.94
Beyond that, much of the Soviet aid to China provided in the wake of the signing
of the Sino-Soviet Alliance on February 14, 1950 was being used to improve Chinese
military capabilities with an eye toward Taiwan.
Although Stalin cautiously did not agree to use Soviet air and naval assets to support the
attack again Taiwan, in the end he did agree an appropriate opportunity to liberate
Taiwan required preparation. He also agreed that one half of the Soviet aid to China, a
loan of $300 million (U.S.), would be used to order equipment that would be most
important in order to attack Taiwan.9 5
Zhou Enlai pressed hard for that hardware to be delivered that same year (1950) so that
the invasion plans would be kept on track.96 By some reports, rather than half of the
loan being used for military hardware to be aimed at Taiwan, the entire $300 million
was.7 While the Chinese did not develop their own Higgins landing craft until the
92 Even the original MiG-15, notoriously short-legged, would still have had the range to provide
defensive combat air support for such a fleet. Its range of 500 miles would limit its role in a Taiwan
contingency from its Shanghai bases, although it would be able to serve as defensive air support for a
fleet in the northern portion of the Taiwan Strait. Beyond that, moving to more appropriately located
airbases would have increased its potential substantially (and, as discussed above, military
infrastructure construction in that region had been proceeding rapidly in 1949 and 1950). For the
MiG- 1 5bis, this range concern would have been even less of a concern.
93 While they rules of engagement nominally restricted them to the coastline, on at least one instance, the
Soviet fighters were prepared to attack Nationalist naval vessels, suggesting some confidence with
over-the-water operations. Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu, 82.
94 See Ibid.
95 5'<<9t l- ll>> Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War, 196.
96 Ibid.
97 Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 99-100. Goncharov et al concur that at least half of
it was certainly used for military purposes and provide some evidence that the rest might have been as
well.
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1960s, they had captured scores of the real thing from retreating KMT forces.98 There is
certainly more to building a navy or an air force that simply buying the hardware, but this
does speak to the issue of the recognition in China of the importance of these two
services for the amphibious mission.
Similarly, Beijing's repeated postponements of the invasion of Taiwan before
mid-1950 generally had been made to allow more time for training of highly specialized
amphibious assault troops. '° ° The Chinese were in the process of demobilizing large
portions of their army, while preserving a core of forces that would be able to attack
Taiwan. '° ' (In this vein, Zhou Enlai initially took a rather sanguine view of the U.S.
deployment of the Seventh Fleet, noting it would allow more time to prepare.' 2)
Finally, other small-scale naval engagements after Hainan continued to allow the
PLAN to hone its skills at sea.
The campaign near Lajiwei Island was considered the PLA Navy's first direct
warfighting engagement, and the designation of some gunboats as an attack squadron,
98 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 18.
99 And note also that the PLAAF was prepared to fight in Korea in the middle of 1951 after a crash
course in tactics and organization. It is likely that this force would have fared better against the KMT
air force than it did again the UN in the Korean War. See Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu.
100 See again, ; -t " t;t[IJ'fll #-p - i l in]lJ,' 1950 -_-,+
)t El<<'zl[XFi J21sa -j>>, ~ig--:9/1949-12/1950(L,.T,:ip t Jli, 1987), 257 3i.
Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Liu Shaoqi Approving Li Yu's IDeputy Commander of the 3rd Field
Army I Proposal for the Training of Four Division for Amphibious and Related Operations", February
10, 1950, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State (Beijing, Central Party
Documents Publishers, 1987) p. 257. See also '<<;Et-i~>> Song Liansheng,
Recollections on the Korean War, 194.
101 Mao Tsetung, "The Struggle for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Financial and Economic
Situation IJune 6, 19501," in Mao Tsetung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings, ed. K. Fan (New
York, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), 109.
102 Quoted in "Recollection, Xiao Jinguang, 'The Taiwan Campaign was Called Off,' 30 June 1950,
reprinted in Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold
War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-50, 155.
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separated from the landing ships, may be taken as the earliest PLA Navy development of
naval tactics.' 3
This battle in late-May 1950 showed an increasing amount of command and control
sophistication by the Chinese, including not least the coordination of multiple forces in a
single naval battle. Of particular interest was the use of the small fleet to clear the area
of KMT naval vessels before sending the vulnerable amphibious element to sea.' 4 This
lesson was increasingly firmly ingrained within the PLAN.
Summary
Thus, in this case, the difference between two nations' theories of victory-the
independent variable-was relatively small. Both sides understood the paramount
importance of defending the landing force from attack from the opponent and of ensuring
a steady supply of reinforcements and resupply over the same waters. Whether the
threat was from the opponent's navy or air force, it had to be neutralized if there was to
be any chance for an amphibious operation to succeed. Beyond that, the Chinese shared
with the Americans a recognition of the utility of naval gunfire support, specially trained
amphibious assault troops, and specialized landing craft. Lastly, the Chinese at least
aspired to create an air force to support their fleet and the landing force.'0 5
Interestingly, one piece of evidence emphasizes the degree to which the Chinese
understood the American view of amphibious operations. Basically, the senior
members of the PLA anticipated the Inchon landings in the Korean War.
103 Huang, "What China Learned," 256.
104 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 53.
105 While substantially behind the United States with regard to airpower, the intensity with which Mao and
his compatriots pursued an air force seems deeper in the Taiwan theater than in the deliberations
regarding crossing the Yalu.
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On August 23 the staff of the Operation Bureau of the PLA's General Staff convened a
meeting to discuss the situation on the Korean battlefield, chaired by Zhou IEnlai'sl
military secretary Lei Yingfu (who had then also been appointed as the Bureau's vice
director). After debating different options and conducting a simulated scenario on maps,
the participants unanimously concluded that the enemy's next step would be a landing
operation at one of five possible Korean ports, Wonsan, Nampo, Inchon, Kunsan, and
Hungnam. Among these ports, the most likely and threatening one would be Inchon.' 6
The report's detail about the strategic level goals of such an attack was quite accurate.
Zhang quotes the report directly:
To make a large-scale landing of its main force on our flank rear areas (near Pyongyang
or Seoul) and at the same time employ a small force to pin down the lNorth Korean]
People's Army in its present positions, enabling it to attack from the front and rear
simultaneously. In that case the People's Army would be in a very difficult position. 7
This was precisely the plan that X Corps put into place in its first landing on the
peninsula." That the PLA senior leaders were able to anticipate the likelihood and the
dangers posed by MacArthur's daring plan suggests they shared his understanding of how
amphibious warfare was to be carried out effectively. Indeed the detail of the Chinese
understanding about this plan stands in noted contrast to many of the discussions
regarding the American strategy on the Korean peninsula. This sort of nuanced
discussion is supportive of Prediction #3.
Signaling by the United States
American signaling regarding Taiwan consisted of both diplomatic and military
elements. The former were clear and forceful. The latter were much less strong, and
were conveyed through the use of forces integral to the American theory of victory for
amphibious operations. That is, the signals followed the predictions that stem from the
106 Chen Jian, China's Road, 147.
107 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 73.
108 See Blair, The Forgotten War, Chapters 7-9, passim.
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dissertation's theory (specifically Prediction #5). These signals are both discussed in
turn.
Diplomatic Signals
The American announcement of June 26 was very clear. On the morning of
June 26 at a well-covered press conference, Truman announced the U.S. policies of
providing air, naval, and logistics support to the South Koreans and the policy of
neutralizing the Taiwan Strait. The President stated that the 7 th Fleet would "neutralize"
the Taiwan Strait. He did so because "the occupation of Formosa by communist forces
would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces
performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area surrounding Koreal."'l
Later, supplementing this diplomatic signal, the commander of the Seventh Fleet joined
MacArthur on a trip to Taibei in August of 1950.1 ° However, far more important than
these words and gestures were actions.
Military Signals
The United States' rapid reinforcement of South Korean positions in June and
July should have sent a broad signal about the robustness of American containment
policy in general. (That said, the American performance on the battlefield in this period
may have undermined that signal to some extent.)
109 Quoted in James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, vol. 3 Policy and direction: the
first year (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army/GPO, 1972),
368.
1 10 James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), 139. While MacArthur was there, Chiang Kai-shek played up his
relationship with the United States well beyond the degree of commitment that had been offered by
Washington. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 368.
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In the Taiwan Strait itself, the deployment of Seventh Fleet was the sole military
signal. However, the American forces available in the region were rather limited. The
vaunted Seventh Fleet at this point consisted of a single aircraft carrier (the USS Valley
Forge), one heavy cruiser (the USS Rochester), and eight smaller destroyers."' Even
this small force was not sent to the Strait, however:
As a result of budgetary constraints, American naval power in the western Pacific was
seriously understrength. Given the navy's tasks in Korea, few ships or planes were left
to protect Chiang Kai-shek. Until late July, little was done around Taiwan except
reconnaissance flights with navy airplanes. A month after the Korean attack, a
destroyer division traveled southward from the Yellow Sea through the Taiwanese straits,
but on I August it headed north again. On 4 August, the Seventh Fleet formed a new
task group, consisting of only three destroyers, to patrol the waters separating Taiwan
from the mainland. Thus the announcement that the United States would prevent a
Communist attack on the Nationalists' last stronghold was largely a bluff."2
As this passage suggests, there was little permanent deployment to the Strait by
surface ships, at least initially. The few early passing shows of force (some listed
above) are worth discussing in detail, however. A single destroyer, the Brush, was
dispatched to Keelung to evaluate Taibei's defensive needs on June 28."3 On the
morning of June 29, the Valley Forge sent some 29 planes through the Strait, although it
appears the carrier did not traverse those waters itself.' The bulk of the fleet did not
stop in Taiwan, rather, it continued north, arriving in Okinawa on the 30th where it was to
begin operations in support of the Korean War."'5
I I I Paige, The Korean Decision, 135.
112 Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 196.
113 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 156.
114 While deploying a modern Nimitz-class carrier in the waters surrounding Taiwan, rather than in the
Strait itself, sends a powerful signal, naval air at this time was exceptionally limited in range. Thus,
the issue of whether the Valley Forge traversed the Strait is important.
115 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Albert Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Mary.: Naval
Institute Press, 1957), 34; Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 54-55. Crane
suggests that the Valley Forge continued to consider the situation in the Taiwan Strait for a few days
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While the Seventh Fleet had received orders from the JCS to defend the Strait, 16
for the next several months the bulk of the operations to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait
were carried out by patrol planes. However, even here, the size of the squadrons
deployed was quite small. Further, the emergency nature of the 1950 patrol was clearly
reflected in the way it was set up and carried out.""'7 While five squadrons of naval
patrol planes were deployed to support operations around the Korean Peninsula (where
they could also count on the surface fleet for support and information), a mere two patrol
squadrons were deployed to the Taiwan Straits area-VP-46 and VP-28.18 Each was
equipped with nine patrol planes. Their missions eventually began on July 16 and 17,
north and south of Taiwan respectively."'9 The squadrons were initially based out of the
Pescadores, islands in the middle of the Strait, and Okinawa, just to its northeast. 20
However, as the weather worsened in October, they were moved to the Philippines and
Okinawa, decreasing their ability to closely and regularly monitor the situation. 121
The official U.S. Navy history of the war suggests the patrols were "brandished
lasl a weapon of publicity against the Chinese Communists."" Another historian
makes a similar point, noting that
after its first strike missions on the Korean Peninsula in early July. Conrad C. Crane, American
Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 28.
116 Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the
Korean War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 206, note 3.
117 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 174.
118 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 375,520.
119 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 110.
120 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 384.
121 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 174.
122 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea.
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During this first patrol, in July 1950, MacArthur approved Struble's commander of the
Seventh Fleet} recommendation that the patrols be publicized. The U.S. interest in the
inviolability of Taiwan, first demonstrated by the Seventh Fleet's June 29'h aircraft
flyover of the strait, was to be made absolutely clear. For deterrence to work this was
considered an essential measure.'2
Thus, there are grounds to believe that the Chinese would have been aware of this
deployment.
As for the capability inherent in this initial deployment, a U.S. Naval War College
history claims:
These two squadrons maintained a continuous 24-hour patrol of the Formosan Straits and
the China coast ... A round-the-clock coverage of the China coast was maintained with
two flights of landplanes of seven to eight hours' duration during the daylight hours and
one seaplane patrol during the period of darkness.'24
It does not take much reading between the lines to note the bravado in this report.
Covering a coastline of several hundred miles with a single aircraft patrol at night leads
to very thin coverage. Occasionally, these patrols would sound warnings of possible
invasion fleets massing. One report on December 7, 1950 found some 750 junks in two
separate fleets (far larger than the usual fishing fleet size) at sea.'" That these fishing
fleets were not noted gathering at the Chinese ports, but only caught after underway,
steaming towards Taiwan, is suggestive of the thinness of the American coverage.
Acheson recognized these concerns "concedling] that the reconnaissance has been
inadequate as a basis for firm conclusion on this point [the possible buildup of unusual
123 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 177.
124 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 384. Note that Cagle suggests that these patrols were
"supported by ready-duty destroyers from the Seventh Fleet maintained in constant readiness in
Formosan waters" (Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 384.) but there is no evidence that such
arrangements existed before late July or early August. Indeed, Field directly contradicts this. Field,
History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 67.
125 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 384-85. In this particular instance, the fleet turned around
within hours.
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concentrations of junks."' 26 Further, it was not until August 2, 1950, that the rules
about what reconnaissance would be allowed were actually finalized. 27 (MacArthur
had attempted a unilateral decision on this issue a few days earlier, likely prompting this
policy to be determined by Washington.'28) The final rules were relatively restrictive
and did not allow crossing into Chinese territorial waters.'29 It appears from the
discussion between the representatives from the Departments of State and Defense that
prior reconnaissance had taken place even further offshore.
Aside from the issue of detection, it would have taken several days for ships from
Korean waters to respond to any convincing evidence that a landing attempt was
underway. 130 However, typically, the first response was to send out additional
reconnaissance planes to reconfirm the sighting the next day, adding to the potential
delay a true invasion force would have benefited from.
Eventually the air reconnaissance patrols were reinforced. They were joined on
July 18 by two fleet submarines, the Catfish and the Pickerel, who conducted
reconnaissance along the Chinese coast.'3 ' However, this deployment was not
126 "The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) (July 31, 1950)," in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol.
6,403.
127 See Note 2 in "Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council
(August 2, 1950)," in Ibid., 407.
128 See "Joint Daily SITREP No. 34 (July 31, 1950)" in Joint Daily Sitrep Collection, (Carlisle, Penn.:
Military History Institute Library, U.S. Army War College, 1950). This was the situation report for
the entire Far Eastern Command.
129 "The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) (July 31, 1950)," in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol.
6, 405.
130 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 117. While some air support might
have been provided by the prop-driven twin-Mustangs (F-82) based in Okinawa, the jet fighters there,
the F-80s, would have been out of range.
131 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 67.
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announced (thus negating any potential deterrent value), and was temporary, with the
boats returning to Japan on July 30.132 One brief deployment of surface ships to the
area-including the heavy cruiser Helena and 4 destroyers-was ordered on July 26 in
response to stepped up reports of an imminent attack. 13 3 The deterrent value of this
deployment was very clearly in the mind of the Joint Chiefs in their directive to
MacArthur (who had protested of the need for Seventh Fleet assets in Korea). They
noted that the:
presence of elms [elements] of 7 th Fit in Formosa Strait and Iwaters] of Formosa even for
a short time, would be an [effective] demonstration of U.S. intentions and a deterrent to
invasion.3 4
The Helena and its fleet was soon relieved by a smaller fleet. This was centered around
the Juneau -a light anti-aircraft cruiser--and also included an escort of two destroyers.
This group was formed into Task Group 77.3, which was permanently tasked with the
defense of the Taiwan Strait in early August.'3 5 While not a trivial deployment, this
fleet, by itself, would have been insufficient to stop an invasion fleet. The PLA had
fought off attacks by one or two destroyers in their campaigns against the KMT. 3 6 By
132 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 178-9.
133 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 125. One source suggests only a total of four
destroyers. See Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 182.
134 From a message dated July 27, 1950, cited in Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War,
1945-52", 181.
135 Field suggests the date of August I (Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 128.).
Whereas Marolda puts it at August 4 (Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52",
1183.). One of the destroyers was the USS Maddox, which was later to play a prominent role in the
Gulf of Tonkin Incident of 1964 of Vietnamese waters.
136 Huang, "What China Learned."
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winter, the group was reinforced more significantly with another cruiser and a third
destroyer. 137
American Insecurity about the Capabilities Used to Signal
Not only was the initial force deployed relatively small, but also local American
commanders repeatedly expressed concerns over whether it would be sufficient to defend
Taiwan. Throughout the Korean War, the dual responsibility of the Seventh Fleet-to
neutralize the Taiwan Strait and to support the war in Korea-was imbalanced, strongly
favoring the Korean mission. The Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary of
Defense that this problem be addressed by ensuring,
... the Chinese forces on Formosa must be prepared, within reason, to resist attack. It is
imperative, therefore that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist forces be assessed at
the earliest possible date; that immediate and positive steps be taken to insure that such of
their military equipment as requires maintenance be rendered usable; and that
deficiencies of mat6riel and supplies essential to the Chinese Nationalist forces be met.'38
There were repeated attempts to reinforce the small deployment by the U.S. Navy to the
Taiwan Strait, however in each case, the requests were rebuffed because the requested
forces were needed even more urgently in Korea.'39 The Seventh Fleet's commander
"complained that he could not fight in Korea and stop a PRC invasion at the same
time."'40
137 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 398.
138 "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)," July 27, 1950, in
F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 6, 393.
139 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 58, 62-63, 67, 120, 266. Also on the pull of
Korea for forces also tasked with the defense of Taiwan, see Robert Frank Futrell, The United States
Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History United States
Air Force, 1983), 50.
140 Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis
Management, ed. Stephen Van Evera (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 125.
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With regard to the prospect for a Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan, the
United States remained concerned through much of 1950. In early July, the CIA
reported "an analysis of recent Chinese Communist troop movements, propaganda and
press comment indicates that the Peiping regime may now be capable of launching an
assault against Taiwan."'4 Later that month, the Joint Chiefs themselves expressed a
number of similar concerns:
Current intelligence indicates that sufficient build-up of troops and water lift now exists
on the China coast for launching an invasion of Taiwan. Estimates of Chinese
Communist air strength indicate that moderate air support would be available for an
assault. It is doubtful, however, that information of an imminent attack may be obtained
except through photographic reconnaissance.'4 2
They concluded, "neither the Seventh Fleet nor Chiang's troops were capable of
stopping an invasion." 43 They went on, "recommendlingl approval for Chinese
Nationalist 'offensive-defensive' actions [i.e., preemptive attacks] there, despite President
Truman's previous rejections of that course of action."'"4 4 Also in late July, the CIA
concluded,
There are no indications the U.S. pronouncement of 27 June 1950 has caused the Chinese
Communists to abandon these preparations. Barring effective opposition by U.S. naval
units, Chinese Communist forces are capable of security and initial lodgment of 75,000
fully equipped troops on Taiwan and within two or three weeks of establishing control
over the entire island. An early assault may well be launched." 5
141 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 183. Daily Summary Excerpt, 12 July 1950, Possible Assault
on Taiwan," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J. Kuhns
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), 418.
142 "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)," July 28, 1950, in
F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 6, 395.
143 Emphasis added. Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1999), 39.
144 Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," 126. Johnson passed on may of these
concerns to Acheson. "The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State," July 29, 1950,
in F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 6, 401.
145 Central Intelligence Agency, "Document 186. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 28 July 1950,
Soviet/Satellite Intentions," in Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J.
Kuhns (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997).
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Even after the U.S. deployments to the region were regularized, a large number of "war
scares" in the Taiwan Strait-and the degree to which they caused grave concern in
Tokyo and Washington-emphasized the perception of potential danger here, at least in
Washington's eyes.'4 By October, the CIA was more confident of the American ability
to defend the island (so long as the Soviets did not intervene), but noted the "Chinese are
now capable of launching an invasion against Formosa with about 200,000 troops and
moderate air cover,"'
Indeed, even in the spring of 1950,'48 before the outbreak of the Korean War (and
its demands on the 7th Fleet's assets), the U.S. military leadership had felt that they lacked
the forces available in the region to adequately defend Taiwan from Mainland China.'4 9
Paul Nitze, head of Policy Planning at State at the time and the primary author of NSC-68,
recalled a discussion with John Foster Dulles. Nitze had just explained to Dulles that
the group drawing up NSC-68 had consulted thoroughly with the Pentagon regarding
what areas they had the forces to defend, and the Pentagon had rejected Taiwan. Dulles
pushed Nitze further on this point:
What we should have asked, Dulles argued, was if the President determined that it was of
great political importance that Taiwan be defended, could the Joint Chiefs of Staff make
the forces available? So I INitzel went back to the Joint Chiefs and they went through
the analysis in great detail. The upshot was that the Chiefs decided that we could not
prudently make the forces available to defend Taiwan despite a determination that it was
politically important to do so. '50
146 Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, 110, 256, 274, 343.
147 "Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency: C. Threat of Chinese Communist
Invasion of Formosa," October 12, 1950, F.R.U.S., 1950, Vol. 6, 529. This memo was prepared for
the Wake Island conference between Truman and MacArthur.
148 Nitze does not elaborate more fully on the date.
149 In this period, the United States was also moving away politically from a decision to support the KMT,
so the question was moot. That said, the fact that it was discussed at senior levels is interesting.
150 Paul H. Nitze, "The Development of NSC-68," International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): 175.
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(To be sure, that passage speaks to both intent and ability. However, as Nitze, himself,
noted, concurring with part of this dissertation's argument, these are often closely
interrelated. 51)
Clearly, the above several paragraphs speak primarily to American perceptions of
the military balance here with the forces that were available at the time. What matters
more for assessing the dissertation's theory is the Chinese perception. Yet, in the
absence of detailed information on how prepared the Chinese were-in a military
sense-to invade, this is nevertheless useful. It helps to bound the question and
suggests that the Chinese may have had a reasonable degree of capability relative to that
the United States had in the region.
Additionally, however, given the pessimism regarding their own position, it is
clear that the United States was not overestimating its own capabilities, as it had done in
the prior two cases. This, too, is as this dissertation's theory would predict: more
similar theories of victory should lead to less over-optimism (Predictions #1 and #10).
Thus, in a military sense, the "deployment" of the 7 th Fleet was less strong that it
might have appeared. For a month, there was a single show of force by a carrier and a
series of air patrols. After that only a small fleet was deployed, and it was frequently
pulled to Korean waters-days away from the Strait-to support the war effort there.
151 The passage cited above implies there are forces elsewhere that might be up to the task, but that it
would be imprudent to do so. However, things are not so neatly divisible, as many examples in this
dissertation have shown and as Nitze notes in the paragraph immediately following:
There is always an inter-relationship between capabilities and intentions, tactics, and strategy.
Because of the limitations of means-we had only seven active divisions at the time of the outbreak
of the Korean War-our policy choices were obviously constrained. We had to tailor planning to
the means available. As the means increased, we could contemplate other, more powerful
reactions in other places. However, we did not foresee any time when U.S, means combined with
those of our allies, would be such as to give us an unlimited range of political/military options.
See Ibid.
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Beyond that, U.S. military leaders repeatedly expressed concern throughout the fall that
they would be unable to stop a significant Chinese attack.
Interpretation by China
There is limited information available about the Chinese interpretation of this
threat. However, their response was immediate, and suffered from none of the wildly
optimistic misperceptions that the other cases exhibit. This section will provide strong
support for the theory: in the absence of large differences in theories of victory, there was
no underestimation of the United States (thus supporting Hi) and no subsequent
misperception of American signals or capabilities that might have led to an avoidable
military conflict in the Strait (thus supporting H2 A and H2 B). Minimal differences in the
theory of victory correlate with more accurate perceptions (Prediction #1), and there was
no questioning of American intent (as expected by Predictions #6 and #7).
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the Chinese were increasingly expecting
the United States to avoid direct military involvement in the conflict.'5 2 As mentioned
in a previous chapter, Beijing had previously believed that the United States could be
deterred from intervening in the Chinese Civil War. This had come from the Chinese
experience late in the Civil War when they deployed a large force, purely for the
purposes of signaling to the United States the dangers of large-scale intervention, along
the Northeastern coastlines of China. The lack of a U.S. response convinced Mao that
he had deterred the United States from intervening. (In fact, there is little evidence that
152 As mentioned in Chapter 5, on January 5, 1950, hours before the President's speech, senior military
leaders in China were downplaying the possibility of the United States sending troops to defend
Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion there on military grounds. Chen Jian, China's Road, 102.
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the United States was strongly considering intervention at that point, and it had already
reduced its forces from Chinese territory-which had numbered several thousand in
1948.) Nevertheless, according to Mao's perspective, the lack of American involvement
in the Chinese civil war implied that the United States would be unlikely to interfere once
the invasion of Taiwan was underway.'5 3
Additionally, even before President Truman's "hands off' speech, Chinese
military leaders argued that the United States was too overstretched to get directly
involved. i' 4 The President's speech itself signaled the beginnings of the public moves
toward abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek.'5 s Beyond that, as argued at the beginning of
this chapter, the Chinese plans for the invasion of Taiwan were clearly moving forward.
They would come crashing to a halt after June 27 (i.e., after the U.S. declaration
regarding the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait).
The deployment of the Seventh Fleet caused the Chinese to abandon their plans.
In the context of amphibious operations, this new policy by the United States spelled
disaster for Mao's plans. (In Korea, in contrast, as shown in the previous chapter,
doctrinal blinders continued to nourish false optimism by the Chinese from the initial
decision to intervene and even for several months after People's War tactics should have
by been thoroughly discredited.)
153 See Ibid., 98; Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949-55," in Sino-American
Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Ming Yuan
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1989), 186; He Di, "The Last Campaign," 2.
154 Chen Jian, China's Road, 102.
155 For discussion of the speech and the politics surrounding and resulting from it, see Thomas J.
Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chapter 4.
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Following the announcement of the 7 th Fleet deployment, a number of orders were
issued immediately in Beijing to push back the invasion of Taiwan. On June 30, just
over two days after Truman's declaration, Zhou Enlai ordered "the date for the invasion
of Taiwan to be postponed. The army should continue to demobilize, and the
establishment of the air force and navy should be strengthened. '"56 The formal order
from the CMC to relocate troops that had previously been slated for the invasion of
Taiwan was issued on July 7. '57 In early August, they were shifted northeast where
they would participate in the Korean intervention. 8 Also in early August, the CMC
gave its formal approval to an extended delay, postponing the invasion until after 1951. 59
Not only were troops moved, but military construction projects were also discontinued.
At the beginning of this chapter, work on a number of airbases was mentioned, "but these
projects ceased at the beginning of the Korean War as assets were shifted to northeastern
China. " '60
In terms of detail on why this decision was taken, it is clear from several other
pieces of evidence that the Chinese leaders found the American threat to be both credible
and very capable. For instance, one Chinese scholar provides added context to Zhou's
original statement postponing the invasion:
Zhou Enlai pointed out the General Staff Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs must watch the Korean battlefield's situation attentively and carefully. However,
156 Quoted inJ>l>l,~±%Ji, i t<<~:j {tiW,,k.,d1 >>]JlC&iti, ,:J±it,2001).
Liao Guoliang, Li Shishun, and Xu Yan, The Development of Mao Zedong's Military Thought,
Revised ed. (Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 2001), 372.
157 Zhang Shuguang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 59.
158 Chen Jian, China's Road, 132.
159 '<<5i -- ]>> Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War, 204.
160 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 55.
345
Twomey, The Military Lens
the demobilization work should still continue according to plan. Only the plan to
liberate Taiwan must immediately be abandoned because of the 7 th Fleet that the
Americans had stationed in the Taiwan Strait. According to the memoirs of Xiao
Jinguang, on June 30, 1950, Zhou conveying the Central Committee's analysis of this
situation to him [Xiao], saying "the changed situation adds to the problems we face in
attacking Taiwan. Because the U.S. blocks the Taiwan Strait ... the ground forces
should continue to demobilize, and we'll continue to establish our navy and air force.
We will postpone the attack on Taiwan."'61
Similarly, while the 3rd Field Army had prepared hard for the invasion, the top political
leadership of the PRC quickly recognized a need to abandon these plans: However, in an
internal directive, the Central Committee [of the CCP] had to admit: it China] did not
have the ability to compete with the United States in a trial of modern navies."'62
Finally, a tantalizing report regarding the reaction in Beijing to the American deterrent
threat comes from a Chinese Nationalist agent who reportedly attended a high level
meeting in Beijing. He passed on the conclusion of the senior Communist cadres, that
the Chinese assault fleet would "last only a few [hours] against 7th Fit and U.S. Air
Force."'6 3
In each of these three pieces of data, the specific dangers posed by the U.S. Navy
(and in at least one case, the Air Force) are tied to the decision to postpone the attack.
Thus, the Chinese understood that even this minimal deployment would decimate any
prospects for a successful invasion. They understood both the capability that the signal
entailed (H2A) and the intent that it conveyed (H2B). After this, there was no longer any
161 j<<YL-[9-i9l~] >> Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War, 204. Xiao Jinguang
was a senior Chinese military leader, veteran of the revolutionary war, and was to go on to command
the PLAN. Chen Yi was another senior communist leader who served as a senior military leader
under Zhu De during the civil war and later was mayor of Shanghai and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
162 Ibid., 197. The precise date of this "internal directive" is unclear from the text of Song's book,
although it appears to be only a few days after June 28, 1950.
163 Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-52", 192.. Marolda cites a message sent
from the U.S. Air Attach6 in Taipei to the Chief of Naval Operations on August 25, 1950 available in
the MacArthur archives.
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doubt regarding whether the United States would intervene and what that intervention
would mean to the Chinese invasion plan if it did so.
Summary
This case suggests several conclusions. First, it suggests that the Alternate
Hypothesis that focuses on the 'objective' quality of the signal as being critical for
coercive success is partially supported, but only partially. The signal was, at best,
moderately sized. In terms of 'objective' quality, it certainly was quite clear (Truman's
speech left little ambiguity), but the strength of the military signal was quite weak at first.
Over time, it grew to be-at the most-a moderately strong military signal. 64
Nevertheless, deterrence held. The Alternate Hypothesis can take some credit for
explaining this, but not exclusive credit.
More convincingly, this case supports the argument advanced by this dissertation.
There is evidence to support the contention that neither side had an unduly high view of
its own capabilities: for weeks, the United States was worried about its ability to defend
Taiwan and some branches of government were not reassured until the full buildup for
the Korean War was underway in early 1951. The Chinese had backed down in the face
of only a moderate deterrent threat. Thus, this case supports H1, clearly and directly.
This case further suggests that in instances where the two sides have similar
theories of victory, international communication is easier (H2B) and joint assessments of
164 The alternate explanation cannot be rescued completely by invoking Mearsheimer's stopping power of
water. (See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2001), 114-28.) The stopping power of water may have played a role in amplifying the
clarity of the American signal to the Chinese, but Mao's views changed over the feasibility of the
attack directly in response the U.S. moves. An exclusive focus on the stopping power of water cannot
explain that.
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the military balance are likely to be similar (H2A). In this case, an only moderately sized
signal was sent. However, the signal was so clear and the military language so
straightforward, that it was sufficient to deter the Chinese from continuing on this path.
Because both sides understood amphibious war similarly, they both instantly understood
the damage even a few surface ships or a rapidly deployed air squadron could do to a
Chinese landing force. In this case, there is none of the "explaining away" of the
adversary's capabilities that other cases displayed. Both sides knew how to interpret
this signal. No translation was needed.
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Chapter 7. CONCLUSION AND
IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter summarizes the results of the three cases, highlighting the
strongest arguments made in each, as well as acknowledging their key shortcomings. It
then turns to the implications of this research for both practitioners and theorists. In
short, the dissertation has found initial support for the proposed relationship between
doctrinal differences, misperception, and coercive failure. Nations look at the world
through their own military lens. Doctrinal differences impeded communication and
signaling between the United States and China. This, in turn, contributed to deterrence
failure and escalation of conflict in the cases.
For effective international communication, both sides must understand the
language of diplomacy. When that language depends on military threats, different
theories of victory can lead to problems in translation and thus unnecessary conflict.
Looking forward, policymakers in similar situations to those studied in this
dissertation-attempting to deter or compel an adversary with a different doctrine than
their own-need to recognize the acute difficulties in such a project and adjust their
behavior and expectations accordingly.
Summary
Although additional concurring empirical work would bolster the confidence in
these findings, these three cases provide tentative, initial support for the hypotheses. In
two of the cases, deterrence failure and subsequent escalation occurred in the context of
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deep differences between the two nations' theories of victory. The causal role of the
doctrinal difference is clear-cut in one case (the United States crossing the 38th), and more
ambiguous because of limitations in evidence in the other (China's approval of the
invasion). In a third case, more similar theories of victory permitted the straight-
forward communication of intent and capabilities between the two nations over Taiwan.
Beyond this, the eleven ancillary predictions of the dissertation's theory received wide
support across all three cases. While each of the three cases supported the dissertation's
theory, the Alternate Hypothesis received only mixed support. (That said, clearly
combining the two will lead to the most accuracy.)
The cases present several different types of evidence. In all three cases, the
outcomes correlate with predictions based on the characterization of the relevant theories
of victory. However, this would be only thin evidence for a qualitative research project.
Much more convincing is the data presented that shows that the process by which the
outcome occurs indeed corresponds to the detailed predictions of how the proposed
theory should work. Thus, the strongest evidence presented in each of the cases is
process tracing data.
In the case of the U.S. decision to cross the 38 'h parallel, the data presented above
makes very clear that the United States explained away the Chinese threats for precisely
the reason predicted by the dissertation's theory. That is, in a series of quotes from both
civilian and military sources, American analysts and decisionmakers would move with
ease from statements belittling China's doctrine of People's War to statements
concluding that Chinese capabilities were weak relative to those of the United States.
They would then use those relative weaknesses in PLA capability to derive an assessment
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of Chinese intent that downplayed the likelihood of Chinese intervention. This led to
mistakes in American policy that critically shaped the Korean War, and indeed the entire
Cold War.
In the case focusing on Chinese decision making in May of 1950 regarding
approval of Kim's invasion plan, the limitations of the historic record impede analysis to
some extent. Nevertheless, in December 1949 and January 1950 Mao and other senior
Chinese leaders linked their expectations about a general withdrawal from Asia by the
United States to perceptions about American military relative weakness. Again, in turn,
these assessments of American weakness were made using language that suggested that a
People's War doctrine underpinned the analysis.
In contrast, in the Taiwan Straits case, the evidence available about Chinese
decision-making suggests that similarity in doctrine reduced the prospects for coercive
failure. In various quotes describing the reasoning of senior Chinese leaders as they
abandoned their planned attack, it was precisely the dangers the American Navy would
have posed invasion that accounted decision. In that case, there was no evidence of the
pervasive false optimism that the other two cases exhibited.
Thus, in each of the three cases, there is process tracing evidence that the precise
biased perception that the theory predicts was in fact used to draw conclusions about the
situation and the adversary's behavior.
Beyond that, however, the specific predictions regarding related phenomenon are
also borne out pervasively in the associated historic record. In all three cases, it is very
clear that the signals sent were products of the sending nation's theory of victory. The
military signals were clearly products of the dominant doctrine on each side.
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Additionally, in the two cases of coercive failure, there is copious evidence that United
States and China were both surprised by the effectiveness of their adversary and the
limitations of their own forces.' Indeed, this was endemic, ranging from shock
regarding specific tactical issues and the strategic success of the opponent to a broader
surprise over the opponent's involvement in the conflict.
In total, then, all three cases provide some initial support for the proposed theory.
Significant differences in theories of victory did indeed lead to misperception,
miscommunication, and miscalculation. In turn, these errors played important roles in
key deterrence failures in the Korean War, leading to a substantial worsening of that
conflict. On the other hand, mistakes and escalation were avoided in the case where the
theories of victory were more similar. The conventional wisdom regarding deterrence
failure that focuses on the "objective" clarity of the signal did not explain the cases as
well as the proposed theory.
The figure, below, summarizes these judgments.
Figure 7-1: Summary of Cases
ypothesisl Outcome HArnate: IV: Difference H,: Diff H2 : Underest.
ariable 'Objective' in Theory of Theory of Mil. -> Coercive
Quality of Victory Victory -> Failure
Case Signal Underest.
U.S. Crosses Deterrence Weakly Large Strongly Strongly
38th Parallel Failure Supported Supported Supported
Chinese Deterrence Supported Large Moderately Weakly
Approval of Failure Supported Supported
NK Invasion (poor evidence)
China post- Deterrence Weakly to Small Strongly Moderately
pones Taiwan Success Moderately Supported Supported
Invasion Supported (poor evidence)
I Clearly, both sides were surprised. As noted in the theory chapter, that is certainly a possibility.
Both sides had high expectations of quick victory against their adversary. Instead, what each got was
a bloody stalemate that did little to advance its national interests.
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Future research will help to deepen the understanding of these hypotheses more
generally.2 Until additional work is done, however, it is important to consider how this
project might contribute to the understanding of international conflict, signaling, and
beliefs about war.
Implications for Policy
Attempts at coercion of one sort or another are pervasive in international politics.
The United States has done this in more than half a dozen major cases just since the end
of the Cold War.3 It is remarkable how often such attempts fail, even when the nation
attempting coercion is, like the United States, dramatically more powerful than the target
nation by conventional measures of power. This dissertation helps to explain this sort of
failure.
2 Several cases seem promising. Cases from the U.S.-Vietnamese War, would illustrate to what extent
learning occurs between the same two adversaries. (Three decisions would appear worthy of study: a.
The 1962 decision by China to support the North Vietnamese; b. The escalations following the Gulf of
Tokin incident; and c. Chinese attempts to deter the United States from widening the war in 1965 and
1966.) Other cases might focus on Chinese crisis diplomacy with a country less far ahead in
technology and less distinct in doctrine and theory of victory. In this regard, the Sino-Vietnamese
war of 1979 and the Sino-Indian war of 1962 seem promising.
Clearly there would also be advantages from the perspective of generalization to adding a case
completely outside of this dyad. One way to do this would be to build on Jonathan Shimshoni's work
on the Arab-Israeli wars. (Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare
from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).) In particular, study of the 1973 war,
which Shimshoni does not examine, would seem interesting from the perspective of this study.
Another promising case might be WWII; witness the examples discussed in the Theory and Method
chapter, above. The Napoleonic period seems particularly promising given the range of conflict that
occurred, as does the pair of U.S.-Yugoslavia/Serbia crises in the 1990s. (Barry R. Posen, "Military
Responses to Refugee Disasters," International Security 21, no. 1 (1996); Barry R. Posen, "The War
for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security 24, no. 4 (2000).) Other
cases from perhaps the Crimean War, the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, Austro-Prussian War (see
Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization
51, no. I (1997): 70-76.), etc., might also be helpful.
3 Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Yugoslavia in 1995, Serbia in 1999, and
Afghanistan in 2001.
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The dissertation also lays out a path for states to avoid these dangers.
Deterrence theory has long emphasized the importance of assessing what an adversary
values to enhance coercive threats. This dissertation points out that in many cases that
is insufficient. For deterrence or compellence to succeed, states also have to understand
how the target understands military power. In order to send an effective deterrent or
compellent signal, states have to understand the perceptual lens through which that signal
will be evaluated. This requires understanding the adversary's theory of victory.
Perhaps the most important policy implication of this study is simply that
coercion of either form -compellence or deterrence-is very, very difficult. State
leaders need to understand that and be restrained in their expectations about shaping other
countries' behaviors. Target states with differing doctrinal lenses will often
misunderstand threats, and pursuing the steps outlined below to avoid this may not
completely vitiate this problem. Compellence and deterrence promise victory on the
cheap: Rather than having to rely on brute force to achieve one's goals, threats backed up
by limited uses of force might suffice. However, this dissertation warns that
compellence and deterrence will often fail, leaving the threatening state in a position
where brute force will have to be used to achieve its goals. For many goals, this more
costly policy will not be worth the stake at hand.
This dissertation's conclusions are particularly relevant today for two reasons.
First, in the context of the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA), it is likely that
the United States will view warfare very differently than any of its adversaries do.4 The
4 For descriptions of the RMA, see Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Retired, Planning a Revolution:
Mapping the Pentagon's Transformation, WebMemo #292 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation,
June 12, 2003); Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002).
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U.S. theory of victory increasingly emphasizes a number of exotic technologies:
precision guided munitions, space-based intelligence gathering, electronic warfare,
information warfare, stealth, heavy strategic bombers, standoff weaponry, "total
battlespace awareness," and systems integration. In every single one of those areas, the
United States has a substantial lead on the entire globe.
However, when the United States sends deterrent or compellent signals relying on
the threat or actual use of this sort of military power, it should avoid assuming that its
adversaries will view American forces as Washington does. For instance, Saddam
Hussein is said to have remarked, "The United States relies on the Air Force, and the Air
Force has never been the decisive factor in the history of war."' This likely led to
misperceptions and miscalculations on the part of Iraq before the first Gulf War.6
Indeed, this problem is likely to become even more pronounced over time as the
United States continues to invest heavily in high-technology weapons programs and
systems integration. Today, the United States spends more on military research and
development than any other country spends on its entire military budget.7 Over time,
the gap between the American theory of victory and that of nearly all of its potential
adversaries is likely to widen. The dangers outlined in this dissertation will also grow,
and must be carefully guarded against.
Second, because this dissertation looks at Sino-American cases, it is likely to have
continuing relevance to those two great powers. The interaction between the two is
5 Merrill A. McPeak, "Leave the Flying to Us," Washington Post, June 5, 2003.
6 A similar case could be made in the second gulf war regarding Hussein's expectations for various
guerilla strategies.
7 Research and development spending in the 2004 budget totals some $61.8 billion.
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likely to shape international politics in the East Asian region, if not more widely, for the
next century.8 Thus, learning more about how the two sides can reduce the prospect for
unintended conflict is valuable. The lessons of this dissertation are likely to be
particularly apt given that the differences between Chinese and American military
technology remain very substantial.9 The problems that faced the two in Korea in 1950
may well arise again. Attention to the two sides' understanding of military power
through their theories of victory will help to ameliorate this danger.
Indeed, one prominent argument suggests that China is engaged in a deliberate
effort to develop asymmetric strategies that might be used in a coercive manner to
counter current American conventional dominance.s Since that "asymmetry" is defined
relative to the U.S. strategy, this is, by definition, a theory of victory very different from
that of the United States. This will have the effect of making communication of military
threats more difficult for both sides. Washington and Beijing will not understand the
overall balance of power and the degree of intent communicated by military signals when
the other side's theory of victory is different than its own. There are some signs,
8 Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,"
International Security 23, no. 4 (1999); Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching
Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security 25, no. 4 (2001);
Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security 22, no. 3
(1997/98); Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty First Century,"
International Security 23, no. 4 (1999).
9 Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher, and Adam Segal, Chinese Military Power: Report of an
Independent Task Force (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2003).
10 Christensen, "Posing Problems."; Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the
People's Republic of China (Report to Congress Pursuant to the Fy2000 National Defense
Authorization Act) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 12, 2002). Note the Pentagon's
attention on this is promising, particularly on the power balancing side. However, understanding the
adversary's signals based on asymmetric tactics will remain challenging.
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however, that Chinese strategy is moving toward that of the United States." This may
actually be a healthy sign from the perspective of crisis stability.'
Again, many students of strategic coercion preach similar general lessons to those
that this dissertation counsels. 3 Morgenthau has a section in the final chapter of his
Politics Among Nations entitled "Diplomacy Must Look at the Political Scene from the
Point of View of Other Nations."'4 One recent examination of deterrence policy with
the post-Cold War era in mind concludes:
That solution [to the problems posed by post-Cold War deterrence] is to examine as
closely as possible the particular opponent's thinking-its beliefs and thought filters-to
better anticipate its likely behavior in response to U.S. deterrence policies, and structure
those policies accordingly.' 5
11 In particular, here one thinks of the PLAAF's focus on tactical airpower, the move toward sea control
rather than the People's War/Soviet Young School model that focuses on coastal defense and
submarine forces.
12 These shifts are not without other costs, to be sure. However, they should reduce the potential for
dangerous misperceptions. Indeed, to the extent that the Chinese shifts are toward strategies that
favor first strikes, this is not a healthy trend at all, as the large spiral model literature has pointed out.
There is a debate on the direction of Chinese military strategy. Pessimistic on the score discussed
here is Christensen, "Posing Problems." More optimistic accounts can be found in Solomon M.
Karmel, China and the People's Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developing State?, I st
ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,"
International Security 25, no. 2 (2000); Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence,
Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002).
13 E.g., Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of
Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 66ff. See also Robert S. McNamara
and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, I st ed. (New York: Times
Books, 1995), 322. On other dangers of mirror imaging, see Les Aspin, "Misreading Intelligence,"
Foreign Policy, no. 43 (1981). -
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major
Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 587.
15 Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, Kent.: The
University Press of Kentucky, 2001), xi.
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With regard to China in particular, this is also a frequent plea. 16 Shimshoni also makes
similar policy prescriptions;'7 however, his conclusions suggest more hawkish policies in
general, even though he notes that this has its own set of dangers (making war more
likely in the long term). This dissertation suggests that by tailoring signals to the
adversary, leaders can cut the Gordian knot. They will not attract aggressors in the short
run, but at the same time will not provoke security dilemmas in the long run.
More generally, the existing work on "putting yourself in your adversary's shoes"
generally focuses on considering his national interests. How important is a specific
piece of territory to him? Would a particular concession be difficult to make? This
project points out that this is insufficient. This dissertation contributes to the points
made on mirror imaging in general by providing specific evidence of this phenomenon,
locating it in one very important issue-area, and explaining why it occurs by making
explicit its causal mechanism. Policymakers need to understand how their adversary
assesses power, which requires understanding his perspective on effective military
doctrines, his theory of victory.
Clearly, the independent variable of this study is not directly manipulable by
policymakers. It is not easy for nations to change their theory of victory. As was
noted above, the various theories regarding the sources of theories of victory are deeply
rooted in systemic pressures, technologic opportunities, bureaucratic procedures, and
16 The importance of focusing on the Chinese perceptions of the world is emphasized in Melvin Gurtov
and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 4-5.
17 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 201.
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historic experience. Nevertheless, several specific steps can be taken to remedy this
problem.
First, states should strive to tailor their signals to the perceptual framework of
their adversaries with regard to military doctrine and effectiveness, that is, to their theory
of victory. Policymakers can send signals that will be easier for the other side, with its
distinct theory of victory, to interpret. While one side's military may not be optimized
to implement the other's doctrine, it may, nevertheless, have some forces that might be
particularly relevant to the adversary. 8 These can be used to enhance the clarity of the
signal, even if the signaling state does not value them highly.
Second, leaders can also "red team" their own net assessments of the adversary's
forces. This is not, however, a call for instructing intelligence analysts to make worst-
case assumptions.'9 Rather, analysts and scholars who are experts in the country being
studied should conduct their honest appraisal of what they understand the adversary to
believe regarding its own forces. The value of such red teaming is not that it will allow
a state to better assess the overall balance of power, but rather it will allow the state to
18 Thus, for the United States in 1950, leaving a substantial ground presence in Korea would have been a
more clear signal to China than airpower deployments. This would have likely led to a different
conversation between Kim and Mao in May of 1950. For China, deploying troops to North Korea
earlier (i.e., in August) would have likely deterred the United States from crossing the 38th parallel in
October. Clearly, at times material conditions will not allow a state to send precisely the signal it
would like. The cost of very expensive signals must be weighed against the cost of inadvertent war
however.
19 Again, on the dangers of such an approach, see Jane Kellett-Cramer, "National Security Panics:
Overestimating Threats to National Security" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2002); Fareed Zakaria, "Exaggerating the Threats," Newsweek, June 16 2003. For a
contemporary example of the dangers of a "red team" that was given too much guidance, see Franklin
Foer and Spencer Ackerman, "The Radical: What Dick Cheney Really Believes," The New Republic,
December 1 2003; Seymour M. Hersh, "Selective Intelligence (Annals of National Security)," The New
Yorker, May 12 2003; Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe (Annals of National Security)," The New
Yorker, October 27 2003; James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping
Intelligence," New York Times, April 28 2004.
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better understand what its adversary thinks the balance of power is, and thus provides
some insights into how the adversary views the world.
Third, a final important policy prescription is to engage is military-to-military ties.
These will have the effect of allowing both sides to better understand the other's theory
of victory. This, in turn, will improve the prospects for avoiding unnecessary escalation.
The dangers that this dissertation highlights are severe and can lead to
unnecessary conflict. However, they are not inevitable and can be reduced if given
appropriate attention.
Implications for Theory
This study speaks to several different theoretical literatures in political science.
Most importantly, this dissertation speaks to the large deterrence literature. Its key
conclusion is that deterrence is more difficult that many posit. Achieving successful
deterrence is not simply a matter of making credible threats. Rather, it requires
understanding how those threats will be interpreted. While substantial attention has
been paid to the Alternate Hypothesis in the existing literature (emphasizing the role of
having the capability to back up a deterrent threat), other areas would seem to warrant
additional study. In particular, understanding how different countries perceive power
and how they communicate threats seems critical from the evidence presented here. The
approach used in this dissertation is only one of many possible ways to examine these
issues. Others will likely bear fruit as well. Regardless, the results of this dissertation
suggest that net assessments and weighing the balance in particular dyads is insufficient.
Rather, focusing on the perceptions as they are influenced by their theories of victory on
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both sides-whether they are correct or incorrect-will likely enhance the predictive
value of such analysis.
What this requires, however, is detailed knowledge of the countries that one is
trying to influence. Without strong language skills and deep understanding of other
countries, this knowledge will be impossible to obtain. However, for someone trained
in these areas, the information regarding national approaches to military strategy is
readily available. Even relatively closed societies often publish doctrinal debates in
open sources.20 This would suggest more emphasis in political science on area studies
and historical knowledge and less on abstract theory. Unfortunately, "area studies in the
United States is under siege."2' Put bluntly, this threatens American national security.
Second, there is a substantial formal literature on the causes of war that views war
as a failure of bargaining.22 One of the primary sources of such failures in this literature
is deliberately created informational asymmetry:
Rational leaders may be unable to locate a mutually preferable negotiated settlement due
to private information about relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent
such information. Leaders know things about their military capabilities and willingness
to fight that other states do not know, and in bargaining situations they can have
incentives to misrepresent such private information in order to gain a better deal.'3
20 Again, see the discussion of this point in Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward a Better Net Assessment:
Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security 13, no. (1988): 212.
21 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Area and Regional Studies in the United States," PS: Political Science and
Politics 34, no. 4 (2001). For a general discussion on the status of area studies w ithin the field of
political science today, see the roundtable discussion in the same issue. For a concurring view on the
importance of this body of scholarship, see David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks," International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 83.
22 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict," American Political
Science Review 74 (1980).
23 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 381.
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This study draws attention to a different informational problem: opacity and the
importance of perceptual bias.24 As the argument of this dissertation makes clear, there
are times when informational asymmetries do not come from each side's incentive to
misrepresent. Rather, each side's perceptual bias makes it very difficult for them to see
information in the same way as its opponent does. This is the case even when one side
is trying to communicate-not trying to obfuscate-by sending signals to communicate
its capabilities and intent. Rather than informational asymmetries being voluntary and
intentional, they are unavoidable and deeply ingrained. This calls for a fundamentally
different understanding of the rationality of war.
Another literature that this project speaks to is the effects of military doctrine.
There is already one well-understood link between military doctrines and crisis outcomes.
Scholars know that offensive doctrines can worsen the security dilemma and increase the
propensity for spirals.2 5 This danger is profound and continues in many areas today.26
However, this project points to another potential problem that traces its roots to a related
independent variable that also deserves study. Military doctrines can impede
communication and increase the prospects for unnecessary conflict.
24 Note opacity is the core of the critique of Fearon made by Kirshner. Jonathan D. Kirshner,
"Rationalist Explanations for War?," Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000).
25 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984);
Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991); Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and
the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of
the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Military Strategy and the Origins of the First
World War: An International Security Reader, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1985).
26 Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia."; Christensen,
"Posing Problems."; Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflict under
the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis, MR-1450-USCA (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001).
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Finally, this project also highlights the importance of opening up the black box of
the state. There is a view that the most important insights into international relations
come from studying the international system and the relations among the units.z7 This
project suggests that important elements in explaining the outbreak of war come from not
only state level variables, but even sub-state level variables: the nature of thinking about
how to win wars generally comes from within the military. Given that these factors
have been shown to be critical to understanding the outbreak and nature of conflict
between two of the major powers in the Cold War system,2' then ignoring such factors
sacrifices too much at the alter of parsimony.
Thus, the dissertation has important policy prescriptions and theoretical
implications. Strategic coercion is a high stakes foreign policy under the best of
circumstances. When nations see the world through different military lenses, the risk of
misperception and miscommunication in the conduct of their diplomacy and statecraft
grows even higher. Mitigating these dangers will help advance the cause of peace and
stability.
27 For the classic and pure statements of this view, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics (McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory ofInternational
Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986); Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.";
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2
(1993). For authors who continue to focus primarily on systemic level factors, see Dale C. Copeland,
The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
28 Indeed, given that some have argued that the Korean War was a central cause of the militarized
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union that came to be known as the Cold War,
than understanding this case is even more important. Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War
on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1980).
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